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Abstract 
Non-availability of seed is the single biggest constraint to smallholder agriculture in large parts of the 
developing world. This publication reports on a 5-day conference that sought to define seed-supply problems 
in Africa and West Asia; discuss the current and potential roles of the private and public sectors, NGOs, 
international research institutes, cooperatives, and farmers' groups; and analyze the working of various seed 
supply channels, including farmer-to-farmer exchange. The conference was organized by ICRISAT, 
ICARDA, IITA, and GTZ, and attended by over 70 participants from 18 countries (Algeria, Cdte d'lvoire, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, ,Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, 
Tanzania, Turkey, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), 4 CGIAR Centers, and a number of donors, NGOs, 
regional and international agencies, and advanced research institutes. 
The major objective was to develop strategies to strengthen both formal and informal seed distribution 
channels, particularly for food-security crops where private sector interest is limited. Almost half the 
conference was devoted to identifying and prioritizing policy and institutional constraints, and on the basis 
of these discussions, developing action plans to improve seed availability in each of three regions—Southern 
and Eastern Africa, Western and Central Africa, and West Asia and North Africa. These proceedings contain 
the papers presented at the conference, and the recommendations and action plans developed through the 
discussions. 
Resume 
Strategies alternatives pour la fourniture de semences aux petits paysans: comptes rendus d'une 
conference internationale sur les possibilites de renforcement des systemes nationaux et regionaux en 
Afrique et en Asie de l'Ouest. La non-disponibilite de semences constitue la contrainte unique la plus 
importante a l'agriculture pratiquee par les petits paysans dans de vastes regions des pays en voie de 
developpement. Cette publication rapporte sur une conference de cinq jours qui a eu pour objectifs de: 
definir la problematique de la fourniture de semences en Afrique et en Asie de l'Ouest; examiner les roles 
tant actuels que potentiels des secteurs priv6 et public, des ONGs, des instituts internationaux de recher-
che, des cooperatives, ainsi que des syndicats des paysans; et enfin, analyser le fonctionnement de divers 
voies de fourniture de semences, y compris l'echange entre paysans. 
La conference etait organisee par l'ICRISAT, l'ICARDA, l'IITA, et le GTZ, reunissant plus de 70 par-
ticipants venant de 18 pays (Algerie, Cote d'lvoire, Egypte, Ethiopie, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Maroc, 
Namibie, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Soudan, Syrie, Tanzanie, Turquie, Yemen, Zambie, et Zimbabwe), des 
quatre centres du GCRAI, ainsique de nombre de bailleurs de fonds, d'ONGs, d'agences regionales et 
Internationales, et des instituts avances de recherche. 
Le but principal de la conference etait l'elaboration des strategies pour le renforcement des canaux 
formels et informels de distribution de semences, notamment pour les cultures de securite alimentaire qui 
ne suscitent qu'un interet limite chez le secteur prive. Presque la moitie de la conference etait consacree a 
l'identification et la prioritisation des contraintes institutionnelles et celles relevant de la politique 
generale. A la suite de ces discussions, la conference s'est penchee sur la mise au point de plans d'action 
visant l'amelioration de la disponibilite de semences dans chacune de ces regions—Afrique australe et 
orientate, Afrique occidentale et centrale, Asie de l'Ouest et Afrique du Nord. Cet ouvrage comprend les 
communications presentees a cette conference, ainsi que les recommandations et les plans d'action 
elabores au cours des discussions. 
See inside back cover for abstracts in Portuguese and Arabic. 
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Introductory Session 

Opening Address 
The Hon D R Norman 
Minister of Agriculture, Government of Zimbabwe1 
Mr Chairman, invited guests, represen-
tatives of the donor community, ladies and 
gentlemen: 
I have the pleasure of welcoming you all 
to Harare and to this conference on strengthe-
ning seed supply systems. I sincerely hope 
that those of you visiting Zimbabwe for the 
first time wil l find the weather pleasant, the 
conference environment conducive to good 
work, and that you wil l be able to participate 
effectively. Indeed, I feel greatly honored to 
inaugurate this important conference. 
Mr Chairman, the success of agricultural 
research depends on the development and 
adoption of new and better technology. The 
impact of crops research, in particular, 
depends on the development and distribution 
of new varieties. This requires the main-
tenance of strong crop breeding programs as 
well as a strong seed sector. Zimbabwe has 
one of the stronger seed systems in Africa. 
The national seed sector is particularly well 
developed for hybrid maize, though it also 
supplies seed for a wider range of crops 
including wheat, cotton, sorghum, pearl 
millet, groundnut, sunflower, and vegetables. 
In fact, on attaining independence in 1980, 
more emphasis was also placed on sorghum 
and millet. We view this conference as a 
valuable opportunity to share experiences 
gained in developing this seed system, and to 
identify alternative strategies for strengthe-
ning it further. 
Zimbabwe's seed sector was originally 
built on the strength of a cooperative 
agreement between seed producers' associa-
tions and government breeders. Seed 
producers were provided free access to 
government-bred varieties in exchange for 
their agreement to an annual production 
schedule which assured a minimum national 
seed supply and seed security stock of 20%. 
The development of a well organized and 
efficient seed industry grew slowly from that 
initiative, but in 1990 the industry began to 
expand rapidly. In recent years competition 
in the industry has grown with the 
establishment of several locally owned seed 
companies, e.g., National Tested Seeds, 
Savannah Seeds, and Agricultural Seeds and 
Services, and the establishment of seed 
production facilities by international seed 
companies such as Cargill, Pannar, and 
Pioneer. 
Mr Chairman, so far the greatest success 
of our national seed industry is hybrid maize 
seed. More than 90% of national maize area 
is planted to hybrids, and virtually all maize 
growers in the country purchase hybrid seed 
each year. The broad distribution of hybrid 
maize seed to small-scale farmers at 
Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 contri-
buted to a tripling of smallholder maize 
production by 1985. Average maize yields in 
the smallholder sector have since continued 
to grow. In addition, small-scale farmers 
1. Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development, P Bag 7701, Causeway, Harare, Zimbabwe 
Norman, D.R. 1997. Opening address. Pages 3-6 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an 
International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 
Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra 
Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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have access to a wider range of maize variety 
choices than ever before. 
Unfortunately, adoption levels of other 
crops such as sorghum, sunflower, groundnut, 
and pearl millet still remain low relative to 
the record of hybrid maize. Only limited 
quantities of seed of these crops flow through 
commercial distribution channels. While 
hybrid sorghum seed (DC 75) has been 
widely purchased by large-scale commercial 
farmers, small-scale farmers still tend to plant 
open-pollinated varieties (OPVs). The same 
applies to groundnut, sunflower, and pearl 
millet. In semi-arid areas, sorghum and 
millets commonly account for more than half 
the total area under grain production, and yet 
food insecurity continues to be a problem. 
This is because most of the seed used is of 
traditional, unimproved varieties of low 
productive capacity. 
Zimbabwe's research services have 
developed several new varieties of sorghum, 
pearl millet, finger millet, groundnut, and 
sunflower. However, it is not enough to 
produce top-quality seed. There must be an 
efficient system of marketing and distribution 
which ensures that the seed gets to those 
farmers who need it. It would appear that the 
present system is working well in meeting 
smallholder needs in the case of improved 
maize seed. Several distributors appointed by 
seed houses countrywide, including rural 
retail shops, still tend to supply only hybrid 
maize. I would like to encourage much stronger 
efforts towards ensuring that smallholder 
farmers have direct and easy access to seed 
of improved varieties for other crops. 
The Zimbabwe government has promoted 
the distribution of some of these new 
varieties through input delivery schemes 
associated with drought relief programs. But 
we recognize this is not a sustainable means 
to channel new seed to farmers in view of 
fiscal demands and the possibility of creating 
a dependency syndrome. We all note with 
growing concern the continuing lack of any 
formal seed multiplication system for a 
number of smallholder food crops such as 
finger millet, bambara nut, cassava, and 
sweet potato. In this aspect, we are no 
different from most national seed systems 
around the world. Seed houses are pursuing a 
relatively more profitable hybrid seed market 
wherein farmers are likely to purchase new 
seed stocks every year. But farmers do not 
have access to improved seed of the less 
popular crops. In effect, the argument has 
been that OPV seed is less profitable to 
produce and farmers are known to obtain 
such seed from the previous year's harvest. 
These are problem areas where we seek 
advice for improvement. 
Given that seed houses have limited 
interest in the production and sale of OPVs, 
what alternatives exist for the consistent 
distribution of this seed? Supply of sorghum 
and pearl millet OPVs has increased as a 
result of recent demand for these seeds for 
distribution under the government and 
regional drought relief programs. Several 
seed houses are competitively producing 
sorghum and pearl millet seed for distribution 
through these government and donor-assisted 
channels. However, it is not clear whether 
retail sales wil l increase once drought relief 
deliveries are no longer provided. 
Mr Chairman, what we need are 
consistent efforts from researchers to exploit 
the genetic advantage of these varieties. 
Large gains in productivity can be derived 
from a combination of improved varieties 
and crop management which can be 
generated through consultation with farmers. 
We need to develop input markets for 
improved seed and product markets capable 
of storing the produce, especially grain, in 
areas of surplus production, and moving it 
efficiently from surplus to deficit households. 
The combination of improved productivity 
and strong rural markets wil l reduce 
dependency on draught relief and food 
imports. 
In this context, Zimbabwe is interested in 
learning from the experiences of other 
4 
countries in Africa and Asia about strategies 
for providing a wider range of high-quality 
seed to farmers throughout the country. We 
expect this conference to offer specific 
recommendations on opportunities for 
improving seed supply in Zimbabwe, the 
wider Africa, and the West Asia region. 
What are the prospects for private sector 
interest in the production of OPVs, and how 
might government encourage such 
investments? Seed houses need better 
information to judge the retail demand for 
OPVs of secondary food crops. Is evidence 
available for evaluating the likelihood that 
farmers wil l simply retain seed stocks from 
their grain harvest each year as opposed to 
the probability that they wil l periodically 
return to the market to purify their stocks? 
Can this demand be estimated and predicted 
under variable rainfall scenarios? How can 
retail traders be encouraged to stock new and 
often unknown seed varieties? Should we 
encourage the development of small, localized 
seed companies with lower overheads to target 
small market niches for particular crops? Is 
research producing a complete package, i.e., 
coming up with new varieties and also giving 
options for use of the crop? Perhaps some of 
these questions wil l be answered during this 
conference. 
Government policy in Zimbabwe is to 
encourage smallholder farmers to participate 
in the commercial production of their own 
seed. There are several ways in which this 
can be done. One way is to assist smallholder 
farmers with ideas on seed management 
practices by setting up demonstration plots in 
various parts of the country. These plots 
could be used as "shopping windows" to 
enable farmers to learn more about varieties 
and good farming practices. 
We note the increasing interest of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in seed 
multiplication and distribution. Environment 
in Development Activities - Zimbabwe 
(ENDA-Zimbabwe) has recently worked with 
the Seed Company of Zimbabwe to promote 
smallholder participation in sorghum and 
pearl millet seed production. Other NGOs 
such as the Community Technology Associa-
tion (COMMUTECH), the Intermediate 
Technology Development Group (ITDG), 
and the Organisation of Rural Associations 
for Progress (ORAP) have sponsored smaller 
seed production schemes. Other NGOs have 
taken interest in facilitating the distribution 
of seed to small-scale farmers. However, let 
me quickly point out that government, 
through the introduction of seed legislation, 
wil l continue to certify seed to ensure that 
high-quality seed is available for both local 
and foreign markets. 
What role should research agencies 
themselves play to improve seed supply for 
secondary crops? It makes little sense to 
invest in breeding programs for pearl millet 
or bambara nut, and to release new varieties 
if you are not prepared to promote the 
multiplication and distribution of these seeds. 
Should public seed production units be 
maintained for crops of limited commercial 
interest? During recent years we have been 
moving away from government involvement 
in activities best carried out by a competitive 
private sector. However, just as we recognize 
the value of maintaining a public sector crop 
research program targeting the development 
of technologies of limited interest to the 
private sector, perhaps we also need to 
consider the distribution of some of these 
technologies as a public investment. If the 
distribution of improved seed can improve 
production levels and food security, this 
investment may offset the necessity of future 
public investments in drought relief. 
Finally, let me encourage you to engage 
yourselves in vigorous discussions on 
alternative strategies for assuring seed quality 
in an environment where government seed 
services need to do more with less resources. 
The provision of consistent inspection 
services and analytical support was already 
difficult when there was only one major seed 
company in the country. The proliferation of 
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seed companies, NGOs, and farmers' groups 
involved in seed production makes strict 
quality control for all traded seed even more 
difficult. 
Let me end by saying that economic 
growth in Africa and elsewhere in the 
developing world depends on the generation 
and application of improved technology. In 
most countries this growth is closely linked 
with the performance of the agricultural 
sector. Improved agricultural productivity 
depends, in turn, on the development and 
adoption of better varieties. Stronger seed 
supply systems are essential for variety 
adoption. My ministry notes this conference 
has targeted the development of action plans 
for improving seed multiplication and 
distribution. We also note the broad range of 
expertise brought together at substantial 
expense to critically discuss seed supply 
problems and solutions. We have high 
expectations that this collective expertise can 
offer us specific recommendations useful to 
policy makers and practitioners. We in the 
Ministry of Agriculture of Zimbabwe look 
forward to receiving these recommendations. 
But we also look forward to the opportunity 
to collectively take responsibility for their 
implementation. 
I wish you progress in your deliberations 
and now declare this workshop open. 
Thank you. 
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Objectives of the Conference 
D D Rohrbach1 
National and international agricultural 
research institutes are increasingly concerned 
about the costs of delays in the period 
between crop variety release, seed 
multiplication, distribution, and adoption. 
Such delays reduce the returns to investments 
in agricultural research and limit gains in 
farm productivity. Questions have been 
raised about the willingness and capacity of 
commercial seed companies to multiply seed 
of many new varieties, particularly of open-
pollinated crops. In some countries, 
government seed multiplication units have 
acted as substitutes for commercial seed 
production, though with varying success. In 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, NGOs have 
initiated seed multiplication and distribution 
schemes, most often in response to drought. 
In both Africa and West Asia, farmers 
commonly multiply and trade seed on their 
own. 
A number of alternative strategies for 
seed sector development have been explored, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, but the 
strength of most publicly funded efforts 
remains open to question. The sustainability 
of NGO commitments is unclear. Private 
companies seem prepared to sell seed for 
drought relief programs, but unwilling to 
invest in developing rural distribution 
networks for open-pollinated varieties. The 
financial constraints affecting each of these 
entities are reinforced by continuing 
questions about national policies regulating 
seed production and trade. 
In view of these problems, ICRISAT, 
ICARDA, HTA, and GTZ coordinated efforts 
to organize a conference aiming to review 
our knowledge of factors limiting seed 
supply in Africa and West Asia, and identify 
opportunities for resolving these constraints. 
The main objective was to outline a set of 
regional action plans to improve seed supply 
systems for crops of limited interest to 
commercial seed companies. 
More specifically, the conference aimed 
to 
• Review the institutional, policy, and 
regulatory constraints to the multipli-
cation and distribution of new varieties 
• Clarify the objectives of an efficient seed 
multiplication and distribution system 
• Evaluate institutional options for seed 
supply, including the potential roles of 
small private companies, government 
seed units, NGOs, and farmers 
• Suggest policy and regulatory changes 
that might improve national and regional 
seed supply systems 
• Outline national and regional strategies 
for improving seed supply systems. 
Just over half the meeting consisted of 
presentations and discussions on the structure 
and performance of alternative channels for 
supplying seed of open-pollinated varieties to 
farmers in Africa and West Asia. Three 
regional overview papers were followed by 
20 papers on efforts to promote seed supply 
through small-scale private companies, NGOs, 
1. SADC/ICRISAT Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program, PO Box 776, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
Rohrbach, D.D. 1997. Objectives of the Conference. Pages 7-8 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: pro-
ceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and 
West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 
502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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emergency relief programs, public seed 
multiplication units, research agencies, 
farmers' groups, and individual farmer-to-
farmer exchange. Each presentation aimed to 
identify problems experienced in establishing 
alternative seed supply systems and strategies 
for resolving some of these constraints. 
Finally, four general concept papers were 
presented by internationally recognized 
experts on seed marketing. These papers 
summarized the key issues for consideration 
during the development of regional action 
plans. Edited versions of all these papers are 
presented in this proceedings volume. 
The second half of the meeting comprised 
nine working group sessions targeting the 
development of regional action plans for seed 
sector improvement. Six groups were first 
formed to discuss policy and institutional 
constraints to seed supply through alternative 
channels. Each group focused on a specific 
area: (1) seed regulation and policy, (2) the 
roles of the private and public seed sectors, 
(3) the roles of national and international 
institutes, (4) roles for NGOs and farmers' 
groups, (5) emergency seed schemes, (6) seed 
information systems. 
The results of these discussions were re-
examined by three working groups, each 
focusing on one region: (1) Southern and 
Eastern Africa, (2) Western and Central Africa, 
(3) West Asia and North Africa. Each group 
first identified a limited subset of the highest-
priority problems, then sought to identify 
solutions—or paths to solutions—to these 
problems. Each group outlined possible 
solutions, activities necessary to implement 
these solutions, who would take responsi-
bility for implementation, and funding 
implications. The results of these working 
group discussions are also summarized in this 
proceedings volume. 
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Session I 
Defining the Problem of Seed Supply 

Seed Supply Constraints in Southern and Eastern Africa 
S W Muliokela1 
Abstract 
Certified seed use in the SADC region is largely restricted to maize and cotton. For 
other crops, the majority of smallholder farmers use farm-saved seed, and the use of 
improved varieties is correspondingly limited. The reasons for low seed sales of 
improved varieties include high cost (both real and perceived) of seed and 
associated inputs, and unreliability of returns. More important, administrative or 
institutional inadequacies (e.g., public sector monopolies, poor incentives for the 
private sector, lack of policy attention to "minor" crops) limit the production and 
sale of improved seed. These inadequacies must be resolved through discussions 
involving both producers and users of seed. In addition, seed regulations (e.g., 
variety release and certification procedures) are often cumbersome and expensive, 
and need to be simplified and also harmonized across different countries in the 
region. Until that is achieved, a transitional arrangement such as the FAO Quality 
Declared Scheme could be considered. Information exchange is needed among 
different countries in the region on the performance and potential suitability of 
imported varieties. Seed certification procedures must be modified to reduce delays 
and costs, and ensure that quality standards are not excessively strict. These 
changes could be accelerated by establishing a regional seed fund to finance 
reviews, seminars, and seed networks, and provide support to NGOs, cooperatives, 
and farmers' groups. 
Introduction 
Agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan 
Africa must improve in order to increase 
rural incomes and meet the demand for food 
in both rural and urban areas. Agricultural 
production has not kept pace with population 
growth (nearly 3% annually since the end of 
World War II). Yields and aggregate 
production of food and export crops have 
remained stagnant or fallen in many 
countries. The region already has a large 
cereals deficit, and if current productivity 
growth rates do not increase, this deficit wil l 
more than triple by the year 2020. It has been 
estimated that agricultural production in 
Africa must grow at 4% per year to maintain 
a satisfactory level of economic develop-
ment, but average growth rates have been 
only 1-2% during the last decade. 
Previous production increases were 
achieved largely by bringing in new land 
into production, but this w i l l no longer 
work because uncultivated land is no 
1. Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust, PO Box 50834, Lusaka, Zambia 
Muliokela, S.W. 1997. Seed supply constraints in Southern and Eastern Africa. Pages 11-17 in Alternative strategies for 
smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional 
Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, 
A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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longer freely available. Productivity can be 
increased through improved varieties and 
better management, but these benefits wi l l 
not be realized unless substantial 
improvements are made in seed production 
and distribution. 
National seed systems 
Past experience provides several lessons 
about the development of national seed 
programs. 
• Government leadership and investment 
are essential to launch the seed industry 
and sustain it through the stages of 
development. Private sector investment in 
research and development, especially in 
the early stages, is unlikely. 
• Official seed certification systems (deve-
loped and supported by the government) 
protect farmers and reputable seed 
companies from unscrupulous firms. The 
"seal of quality" so created is the key to 
creating seed markets with low tran-
saction costs and encouraging farmers to 
plant seed whose quality is "guaranteed" 
in some way. During the 1970s and the 
1980s foreign aid, experts, and equipment 
were brought in to help improve govern-
ment seed agencies in many countries 
(Eicher 1984, 1987). These projects often 
failed because of the lack of workable 
seed laws and low-cost enforcement. 
Private sector participation is encouraged 
by access to publicly-developed material, 
transparent rules on evaluation, release, 
and registration of varieties, minimal 
government controls on seed import and 
export, laws protecting intellectual 
property rights, and minimal subsidies to 
state-owned seed companies. 
Public-private partnerships are generally 
more effective than either government seed 
companies or entirely private ventures in 
marketing certified seed to farmers. 
Because of the increasing globalization of 
the seed industry, domestic seed 
companies must acquire managerial, 
financial, and marketing capabilities to 
compete with multinational companies. 
Table 1. Sources of seed for communal farmers in Zimbabwe (% of farmers using different 
sources), 1991. 
Source Maize Sorghum Sunflower Groundnut Cotton 
Farm-saved 2.1 56.1 50.4 71.5 3.0 
Local farmer - 8.8 19.5 11.1 1.5 
Local trader 13.1 5.3 6.5 7.0 1.5 
Local store 14.8 3.5 1.2 1.2 13.6 
Cooperative Union 
Urban store 
13.1 
25.9 
1.8 2.6 
1.2 
4.7 
0.6 
22.7 
7.6 
Farmers' cooperative 
GMB/CMB1 
Seed Co1 
25.9 5.3 
14.0 
2.6 1.7 
0.6 
13.6 
36.4 
AFC loan 5.5 - 1.7 - -
Drought relief - 5.3 14.3 - -
1. GMB/CMB = Grain Marketing Board/Crops Marketing Board, Seed Co = Seed Company of Zimbabwe, 
AFC = Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Source: World Bank 
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Seed supply and utilization 
The basic elements needed for a national seed 
program are in place in all the countries in 
the region. However, in most countries the 
public sector until recently has focused only 
on one crop to the total exclusion of other 
important food security crops. (Similarly, the 
private sector too has focused on hybrid seed 
of one or two crops.) In several countries, 
crop improvement programs have recently 
been expanded to include sorghum, pearl 
millet, groundnut, and in some instances, 
cassava and sweet potato. In theory, 
therefore, farmers in the region should have 
an array of crop and varietal options to 
choose from. However, even in countries 
with relatively advanced seed industries (e.g., 
Zimbabwe, Table 1), certified seed use is 
largely restricted to maize and cotton. For 
other crops, the majority of communal 
farmers use seed saved from their previous 
harvest. Several reasons are cited for low 
utilization of certified seed by small-scale 
farmers. 
• Price—although seed is cheap compared 
to other inputs, money has to be found at 
the beginning of the season 
• Price of other inputs—some modern 
varieties require fertilizer to achieve 
significant yield gains 
• Uncertain crop marketing arrangements 
and prices 
• Uncertainty in rainfall, particularly after a 
decade of frequent droughts 
• Transport and other costs involved in 
reaching seed distribution outlets from 
remote areas 
• Yield or quality advantages of new 
varieties are often unclear or uncertain 
• Limited resources—small plots, infertile 
soils, shortages of labor and capital 
• The perception that new varieties are 
difficult in terms of crop management 
• Ineffective extension systems 
• National seed programs and monopoly 
seed agencies focus on hybrid seed at the 
expense of traditional crops essential for 
household food security 
• Tariffs tend to limit international seed 
trade 
• Complicated phytosanitary regulations 
hinder regional seed trade. 
These bottlenecks need to be removed. 
But there are even more fundamental reasons 
for low seed utilization (Table 2), which are 
administrative or institutional in nature. Any 
effort to improve seed utilization by small-
scale farmers in the region should begin by 
addressing these issues. 
Need for regional cooperation 
Structural adjustment programs are encou-
raging private domestic and multinational 
investment in the seed industry, expanding 
regional seed trade, and facilitating the 
development of a common seed market in 
southern Africa. However, formidable 
barriers still remain. The challenge for 
regional organizations such as the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) 
and the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) is to harmonize seed regulations 
across different countries. 
Procedures for variety release, seed 
certification, and laboratory testing are 
increasingly based on standards developed by 
the International Seed Testing Association 
(ISTA) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). It is 
therefore feasible to harmonize regulations in 
these areas—for example, developing a 
system of regional testing and registration 
(varieties can be tested and registered in any 
country, and this registration would be valid 
throughout the region), a practice used in the 
European Community. SADC needs to har-
monize phytosanitary regulations and intro-
duce plant health passports to reduce the 
spread of diseases and parasites which are 
becoming more important as intra-regional 
seed trade grows. Most countries are thinking 
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of introducing plant variety protection laws 
based on the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 
model. Ideally, such protection should be 
automatically valid in all countries, with 
regional and/or reciprocal agreements between 
SADC countries. 
Regional programs could help strengthen 
the seed industry in several countries. For 
example, South Africa has capabilities for 
training seed inspectors and analysts, which 
could be exploited for regional benefit. Regional 
organizations could strengthen seed inspectorates 
by developing a regional accreditation system 
for inspectors. National seed certification 
organizations such as SANSOR in South 
Africa could expand seed certification 
programs in other countries in the region. 
The problems summarized in Table 2 
need serious consideration. Structural rigidities 
need to be reviewed and in some cases 
removed altogether. Some other key issues 
merit broad consultation among all 
stakeholders—governments, private and public 
sectors, farmers, NGOs, etc. These issues are 
briefly discussed below. 
Variety release and registration 
Delays. The current testing process for 
approval of a new variety is often excessively 
long. In addition, release committees may not 
meet regularly. If these delays are reduced, 
new, improved varieties could reach farmers 
several years earlier than they do at present. 
Costs. It is too expensive for the government 
to maintain an extensive variety testing 
system. Instead, both public and private plant 
breeding organizations should bear the cost 
of testing. Registration requirements— 
especially those needed to establish plant 
breeders' rights—are becoming more com-
plicated, time-consuming, and costly. Public-
sector institutions often lack the staff and the 
finances to register their varieties or ensure 
that their rights are protected. 
Extension. Extension and seed production 
activities are not linked effectively into the 
process of variety development and release. 
Extension workers and seed producers 
usually have inadequate information about 
new varieties. Consequently farmers tend to 
be unaware of new developments, and 
adoption of many new varieties remains poor. 
Release of a variety should be accompanied 
by a promotional campaign, disseminating 
information to extension staff, farmers, and 
potential seed producers. Unless a deliberate 
effort is made to this end, extension wil l 
continue to remain an academic exercise. 
Variety identification. The move towards a 
more precise characterization of varieties 
means that an increasing proportion of time 
during development and evaluation wil l be 
spent on establishing varietal distinctness, 
rather than on useful characteristics per se. In 
addition, demands for greater varietal uni-
formity would threaten attempts to improve 
heterogeneous and composite varieties, for 
example, exploiting this existing variation to 
breed for specific local adaptation, which is a 
critical factor especially in marginal envi-
ronments. 
Variety performance testing. In many 
countries in the region, performance standards 
for variety release are usually biased towards 
broad adaptation rather than on local adap-
tation and suitability for resource-poor 
smallholders. Rigid official standards also 
limit the release of appropriate varieties by 
private breeders and farmers. 
Exchange of information. The flow of 
information within the region on the perfor-
mance and potential suitability of imported 
varieties is limited. Better mechanisms need 
to be developed for exchanging information 
and accelerating the release of suitable 
imported varieties in a number of SADC 
countries. 
Seed monopolies. Many countries have 
protectionist policies that tend to limit the 
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participation of foreign seed houses—arid 
sometimes of farmers and domestic private 
plant breeders—in variety development. 
Minor crops. Variety release procedures are 
often poorly defined for minor crops, which 
are critical for household food security. The 
resulting uncertainty is a disincentive to 
variety development by NGOs, farmers' 
groups, and farmers. 
Legal standing. In several countries, the 
mandate and responsibility of variety authorities 
(e.g., the release committee) is ambiguous. In 
some cases, the legal standing of these 
bodies, and thus their power. to create or 
enforce regulations, is in doubt. 
Seed quality control 
Seed quality control systems (seed certi-
fication) also need a comprehensive review. 
The key issues are similar to those for variety 
release and registration. 
Delays. Seed certification requires timely 
field inspections and tests. If quality control 
staff cannot be mobilized on time, 
certification wil l be delayed and seed may 
reach the market late, or not at all. 
Costs. Seed certification implies a very seasonal 
demand for skilled staff. The costs of multiple 
field inspections, especially in widely dispersed 
fields, are considerable. The costs of laboratory 
testing are also rising. Public sector resources 
are over-stretched, and the authorities are 
hardly in a position to do meaningful work. 
Standards. Excessively strict seed certi-
fication standards are sometimes responsible 
for keeping appropriate seed out of the 
market. But simultaneously, public seed 
companies or government monopolies 
sometimes sell seed that is of a class below 
the established certification standards—for 
example, the government may temporarily 
suspend certification standards to cope with 
emergency situations. Such practices are 
common, and call into question the adequacy 
of the existing standards. 
Fairness. In systems where seed certification 
is mandatory, commercial firms are rarely 
allowed to participate in the development of 
certification procedures and standards. Until 
recently, there were few instances where 
private certification or seed testing was 
allowed. However, the situation is improving 
in several SADC countries. 
Small-scale seed production. Government 
seed certification agencies are rarely able to 
service or advise local-level seed production 
projects operated through NGOs or farmers' 
groups. On the contrary, seed certification 
requirements often discourage such projects. 
Transparency. Mandatory certification schemes 
are not free of loopholes. Seed certification 
rules can be interpreted differently by 
different inspectors, and provide opportu-
nities for cheating, corruption, and the 
exercise of political influence. Collusion 
among public sector entities is also possible. 
The legal powers of the seed certification 
authority may be ambiguous. Also, staff and 
funding are insufficient to monitor seed 
quality at the point of sale, contributing to 
farmer uncertainty regarding the nature and 
purpose of certification. 
The FAO seed scheme 
The concept of quality declared seed, 
developed by the FAO, could serve as a good 
transitional arrangement until governments in 
the region develop and enact schemes to 
improve variety testing and release, seed 
certification, and seed production and 
distribution. The scheme would not unduly 
tax the national seed regulatory system. The 
main components of the scheme are: 
• Regional list of varieties eligible for seed 
production—a variety is considered 
eligible for production throughout the 
region if it has been officially released or 
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registered (or otherwise declared eligible 
for production) in any one country. A 
regional authority would be responsible 
for maintaining the list. Submissions for 
including a variety on the list would be 
simple—a morphological description, a 
statement defining the conditions for 
which the variety is suitable, and evidence 
of acceptable agronomic performance. 
• Register of seed producers—qualified 
seed producers must demonstrate that 
they have suitable land, access to seed for 
multiplication, qualified supervisory staff, 
and access to appropriate equipment and 
seed testing facilities. 
• Spot check of seed crops by national 
regulatory authority—the authority wi l l 
check at least 10% of seed fields each season 
and compare them to standards prescribed 
in the Quality Declared Seed system. 
• Spot check of seed offered for sale—the 
national regulatory authority wil l sample 
at least 10% of the seed at points of sale, 
and test it for germination, purity, and 
other parameters considered appropriate. 
The system provides minimum standards. 
• Registered seed producers provide a 
Quality Declared Seed declaration for 
each seed lot. The national regulatory 
authority is empowered to penalize 
anyone wrongfully using this label. 
Players in an integrated system 
The complete seed system—variety develop-
ment, seed production, seed marketing, quality 
control, and farmer utilization—involves a 
number of players. To be effective, the system 
must be integrated, responsive to the diverse 
needs of different players, and should exploit 
their specialized skills in different areas. 
NGOs. The removal of structural and 
institutional road-blocks would pave the way 
for increased participation by NGOs in the 
region's seed delivery system. Many NGOs 
have a fine record of performance, and have 
been able to mobilize large amounts of seed 
during recent droughts. In some countries, 
many farmers would have been starved of 
seed but for NGO seed distribution schemes. 
National agricultural research systems 
(NARS). Numerous reviews of NARS perfor-
mance continue to show low impact, essentially 
as a result of weak variety absorption systems. 
NARS need to improve the system's ability to 
absorb new varieties by removing institutional 
bottlenecks to adoption and by promoting 
other seed distribution/adoption channels. 
Establishing a seed fund. A case may exist for 
establishing a regional seed fund, and perhaps 
even a series of funds at national level. Such 
a fund would help remove some of the 
structural rigidities in national seed systems 
by financing regular reviews, seminars, and 
information exchange via seed networks. The 
fund would also support NGOs, cooperatives, 
farmers' groups, and emerging seed entre-
preneurs, accelerating the process of dis-
mantling seed monopolies and replacing 
them with a more efficient seed industry. 
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Z Bishaw and S Kugbei1 
Abstract 
Seed is fundamental in the transfer of technology to farmers. If the results of 
research efforts by international centers and national programs are to be fully 
exploited, developing countries must have dynamic seed industries that are 
responsive to farmers' needs. Most formal seed programs in the WANA region have 
evolved from special projects of recent origin. This paper discusses the status of the 
seed industry in the region; reviews the performance of the formal sector; identifies 
major policy, regulatory, and institutional constraints; and makes suggestions for 
improvement. The paper also synthesizes existing information on the informal seed 
sector, including the role of NGOs in encouraging local seed production through the 
use of indigenous knowledge and practices. Finally, an attempt is made to define the 
respective roles of the formal and informal sectors, and examine how these sectors 
could be linked effectively to improve seed production and supply at different levels. 
Introduction 
The West Asia and North Africa (WANA) 
region extends from Morocco in the west to 
Pakistan in the east, and from Turkey in the 
north to Ethiopia in the south, covering a 
total land mass of 1.7 billion ha. About 128 
million ha of this area is arable, of which 35 
million ha is irrigated (Schoonhoven 1991). 
The region is characterized by extremes of 
climate, ranging from mediterranean to 
monsoon, and from temperate to tropical. A 
mediterranean climate with cool to cold 
winters and hot to extremely hot and dry 
summers is common across much of the 
region. There is wide variation in temperature 
and in the amount and distribution of rainfall 
in different parts of the region. 
Because less than 30% of the arable land is 
irrigated, agriculture in WANA is heavily 
dependent on rainfall. A cereal-fallow rotation 
integrated with livestock is the most common 
farming system, with wheat and barley as the 
dominant crops (Pala 1991). The WANA region 
is the second largest dryland wheat and barley 
production zone in the developing world, and 
accounts for 36% of global wheat area. 
The farming systems are generally sub-
sistence in nature. The majority of farmers 
are smallholders (Tully 1990), who obtain 
low yields but nevertheless make a subs-
tantial contribution to the national economy 
1. Seed Unit, International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA), PO Box 5466, Aleppo, Syria 
Bishaw, Z. and Kugbei, S. 1997. Seed supply in the WANA region—status and constraints. Pages-18-33 in Alternative strategies 
for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed 
Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). 
Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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Seed Supply in the WANA Region—Status and 
Constraints 
in all countries. For example, in Ethiopia 
smallholders cultivate 82% of the total wheat 
area and account for 76% of wheat 
production (Haile et al. 1991). 
According to Nordblom and Shomo 
(1995), most countries in the WANA region 
are facing increasing problems with food and 
feed production as a result of rapid 
population growth, rural-urban migration, 
and low profit from rainfed agriculture in 
marginal areas. The population of WANA is 
projected to reach 1.5 billion by 2030 
(Schoonhoven 1991), while food deficits wil l 
rise to 70 million tons by 2020 (Nordblom 
and Shomo 1995). 
Most seed programs in WANA were 
special projects designed originally to 
address the seed needs of the diverse farming 
systems in the region. However, these projects 
have undergone distinct and sometimes 
overlapping structural changes. Almost all 
countries have the basic infrastructure needed 
for crop research, variety development, and 
seed production and distribution, particularly 
for the major food crops. These functions are 
organized in various ways and to different 
levels of sophistication in different countries. 
On the whole, seed production and supply 
channels are a mix of the formal sector 
(public/private organizations) and the informal 
sector (farmers' groups, NGOs). The lack of 
modern varieties in crops like barley, food 
legumes, and pasture crops is the main 
limitation to the development of national seed 
programs (Srivastava 1986, van Gastel and 
Bishaw 1993). 
The formal seed sector 
The formal sector has had mixed results in 
meeting the varietal and seed requirements of 
a majority of farmers. The public sector 
focuses on supplying seed of a few varieties 
of the major food crops, mostly to farmers 
located in favorable and accessible areas. The 
private sector concentrates on hybrids, which 
are profitable but of limited relevance to 
small-scale farmers, particularly in less 
favorable areas. Thus, small-scale farmers in 
low-potential and remote areas have only 
limited access to improved varieties and 
quality seed. Much of the discussions about 
the formal sector relate to adoption of 
modern varieties and the availability of 
certified seed. 
Adoption rates for modern varieties vary 
between and within countries and are influenced 
by several factors including varietal choice, 
availability of seed and other inputs, price 
policy, credit facilities, agroecological zones, 
and rural infrastructure. A CIMMYT survey 
(Byerlee and Moya 1993) covering 70 million 
ha or 94% of the wheat area in developing 
countries indicate that in the WANA region, 
42% of the wheat area is sown to modern 
varieties, with large differences between and 
within countries (Tables 1, 2). Adoption rates 
of modern cereal varieties are generally low 
in many countries: 30% in Jordan (Hasan 
1995), 36% in Lebanon, 42% in central 
Anatolia of Turkey and less favorable zones of 
Tunisia (cited in van Amstel 1994). However, 
high adoption rates for wheat varieties have 
been reported from Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia 
(Byerlee and Moya 1993) and in two major 
wheat production zones (Bishaw et al. 1994) 
and three districts in central Ethiopia (Nigatu 
et al. 1992). 
The legume seed industry is relatively 
underdeveloped due to the scarcity of 
appropriate varieties, high production costs, 
mechanization problems, and seedborne 
diseases (Erskine et al. 1988), all of which 
hinder the adoption of legume-based 
cropping systems (Oram and Belaid 1990). In 
Ethiopia, farmers in the two most important 
faba bean production zones grow only local 
varieties (Bishaw et al. 1994). The formal 
seed system for forage crops has very limited 
activity. For example, inadequate production 
of medic seed limits the large-scale adoption 
of ley farming in WANA (Christiansen 
1993). 
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Table 1. Maize and wheat area (1990-92 average) and coverage by modern varieties (MVs) in some 
WANA countries. 
Maize Wheat 
Area % under MVs Area % under MVs No. of wheat varieties 
Country ('000 ha) in 1992 ('000 ha) in 1990 released, 1966-90 
Algeria 5 na 1633 25 25 
Egypt 857 35 877 76 18 
Ethiopia 1000 17 687 12 35 
Iran 43 na 6357 33 16 
Jordan 1 na 59 25 13 
Lebanon 2 na 26 50 10 
Morocco 404 5 2530 60 28 
Pakistan 860 31 7878 91 50 
Saudi Arabia 3 na 761 100 9 
Sudan na na 368 95 34 
Syria 63 95 1330 68 11 
Tunisia na na 954 80 14 
Turkey 515 31 9410 31 78 
Yemen1 na na 92 50 12 
Total 3753 19.5 32 962 56.9 353 
1. former Yemen Arab Republic 
na = data not available 
Sources: CIMMYT 1993 (wheat), CIMMYT 1994 (maize) 
Table 2. Adoption of wheat varieties by rainfall zone, northern Punjab, Pakistan, 1990. 
High-rainfall zone 
(>500 mm) 
Low-rainfall zone 
(<500 mm) 
Local varieties (%) 
First generation semi-dwarfs (%) 
(e.g. Lyallpur-73) 
Second generation semi-dwarfs (%) 
(e.g.Pk-81) 
15 
17 
68 
73 
8 
19 
Source: Ahmed et al. 1991 (cited by Byerlee and Moya 1993) 
Certified seed production and/or 
distribution by national programs is limited 
largely to one or two major food crops for 
which modern varieties have made an impact 
and for which rainfall is sufficiently reliable 
(Table 3). For example, despite the long 
history of organized seed production in 
Morocco, in 1996 the formal sector supplied 
only 11% (66 000 tons) of the total seed 
requirement for wheat and rice (bread wheat 
accounts for 64% of the seed distributed). 
Seed production and distribution programs 
tend to focus on cereals, particularly wheat 
and maize, while seed availability is a 
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Table 3. Seed production and distribution of cereals, legumes, and oilseed crops in six WANA 
countries. 
Quantity 
produced/ 
distributed (t) 
Percentage share of different crops 
Wheat Barley Rice Maize Other 
cereals 
Legumes Others 
Ethiopia (1995/96) 
Production1 
Distribution 
20 676 
13 104 
66.5 
71.5 
6.1 
2.1 
- 19.5 
21.5 
5.3 
3.9 
2.1 
0.9 
0.5 
0.1 
Egypt (1994/95)2 
Production 
Distribution 
686 582 
621 156 
55.4 
60.5 
- 28.5 
28.7 
13.1 
8.2 
- 2.7 
2.2 
0.3 
0.4 
Turkey (1996) 
Production 136 849 77.9 12.5 0.2 6.2 . 0.3 2.9 
Cyprus(1995) 
Production 10 953 9.2 90.6 - - - 0.2 -
Syria (1994) 
Production 187 579 92.9 5.0 - 0.9 - 1.1 -
Yemen (1995) 
Production 1171 84.7 0.7 - 1.3 13.3 - -
1. Uncleaned seed 
2. Quantity in ardab in Egypt 
Sources: Gurmu and Gudissa 1996 (Ethiopia), Kutay 1997 (Turkey). For other countries, Focus on Seed Programs published 
by WANA Seed Network Secretariat—No. 8 (Cyprus), No. 5 (Egypt), No. 4 (Syria), No. 6 (Yemen) 
limiting factor in barley, food legumes, and 
forage crops (van Gastel and Bishaw 1993). 
Many national programs do not have any pre-
release seed multiplication; production often 
starts only after a variety is released, causing 
delays in supply of breeder or basic seed to 
companies that produce certified seed. Seed 
imports play a significant role in the WANA 
region. Most vegetable seed and some hybrid 
maize and sunflower seed are imported each 
year. In 1996, the region imported seed worth 
about $200 million, and exported only $25 
million worth (Le Buanec 1997). 
Limitations of the formal seed sector 
result partly from the direct application of 
models based on centralized organization and 
large-scale production by state monopolies. 
These models can hamper seed distribution 
and marketing, and in fact, ignore practices 
and management skills already existing in 
traditional farming communities (van Amstel 
1994). 
Regardless of progress made in the 
technical aspects of seed production, several 
important constraints still limit the effective-
ness of the formal seed sector: 
• Ineffective seed policies 
• Inappropriate seed legislation 
• Inappropriate approaches to variety 
development 
• Inflexible variety evaluation and release 
systems 
• Seed quality control measures 
• Infrastructure and pricing policies 
• Weak institutional linkages 
• Limited human resource development. 
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Ineffective seed policies 
McMullen (1987) described government seed 
policies as follows: "Government policies in 
the developing world created a situation where 
an inefficient public seed sector dominates, 
local private companies are struggling entities, 
and international seed companies operate at 
sub-optimal levels that cannot properly 
contribute to the agricultural development of 
the country." In general, seed polices in 
WANA lack any force of law. There are no 
clear guidelines on the provision of credit 
facilities, and limited incentives to encourage 
private sector participation. One means of 
developing a clear strategy is to establish 
national seed councils (with representation 
from all sectors of the seed industry) to serve 
as advisory bodies to the government, and 
help guide and monitor progress. 
Inappropriate seed legislation 
Few countries have any form of legislation to 
regulate the seed sector. In cases where some 
attempts at regulation have been made, the 
procedures used are based on seed legislation 
designed and used in developed countries 
(Louwaars 1996). Many countries are now 
drafting new or revising existing legislation in 
the light of current developments and to meet 
the requirements of international seed trade, 
e.g., variety registration, variety protection, 
plant breeders' rights, seed import/export 
regulations. What may be required in WANA 
is an alternative approach, with legislation that 
is sufficiently flexible to serve both the formal 
and informal sectors. It is important that all 
concerned parties from both sectors are 
involved in revising or drafting such legislation. 
Inappropriate variety development 
approaches 
Formal plant breeding, on the whole, has not 
fully considered the ways in which farmers 
use indigenous knowledge to exploit crop 
and cultivar diversity. Rather, the emphasis 
has been on wide adaptation, high grain 
yield, large-scale mechanization, varietal 
uniformity, and grain quality (for commercial 
and industrial use). This approach has not led 
to rapid adoption of modern varieties. Conse-
quently, an alternative breeding strategy has 
been suggested, which involves farmer 
participation during selection, particularly for 
diverse or relatively unfavorable areas. There 
is enough empirical evidence in favor of this 
approach (Eyzaguirre and Iwanaga 1996). 
Participatory breeding using locally 
adapted germplasm and landraces to exploit 
specific adaptation has become a focus of the 
ICARDA barley breeding program for low-
input areas (Ceccarelli et al. 1996). Moreover, 
the barley, lentil, and durum wheat breeding 
programs at ICARDA have initiated 
decentralized selection with some NARS. For 
example, the Ethiopian durum wheat and 
barley breeding programs are using local 
landraces, rather than introduced germplasm, 
to develop varieties at the national level. 
Inflexible variety evaluation and 
release systems 
In most cases, distinctness, uniformity, and 
stability are important criteria in variety 
evaluation. However, these criteria may not 
necessarily be relevant in a variable and 
complex environment in which farmers have 
diverse requirements. Evaluation and release 
systems vary considerably, among different 
WANA countries. A few countries (e.g., 
Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey) have set up an 
independent agency responsible for variety 
evaluation. Most countries either rely on 
breeders' evaluation and data (Cyprus) or 
verify data through on-farm trials (Ethiopia). 
A l l these arrangements lack flexibility and 
are not without bias. For example, the trial 
system may delay release, restrict the number 
of entries, discriminate against private sector 
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varieties, or even fail to identify the right 
varieties. 
The variety release committee in many 
cases is dominated by breeders and officials 
from the public sector, and excludes the 
private sector and farmers. In many developing 
countries, frequent release of modern varieties 
is essential. A more flexible approach to 
variety release (for example, approving some 
varieties that may lack uniformity) together 
with a shift towards participatory breeding 
wil l permit more rapid release, particularly of 
varieties which would be targeted at marginal 
areas and multiplied and distributed through 
the informal seed sector. 
Inadequate seed quality control 
measures 
In many countries seed certification is 
absent, or quality control is carried out by 
the same organization that produces seed. 
Independent certification agencies exist in 
a few countries but lack resources and 
facilities. For most countries, low-key 
external quality control with devolution of 
more responsibility to the producer 
(whether public or private sector) appears 
to be an alternative approach. For example, 
although Pakistan has a comprehensive 
seed certification program, it allows the 
private sector to use truth-in-labeling to 
ensure product quality. In Afghanistan the 
FAO follows a quality declared seed 
system to encourage local seed production 
and distribution. Many countries could 
benefit from adopting this system, which 
requires less resources and passes on more 
responsibility to the producer (FAO 
1993). However, a well organized internal 
quality control system is essential before 
such a scheme can be implemented. 
Infrastructure and pricing policies 
A seed industry requires investment in 
research and machinery, seed processing 
plants and storage facilities, and rural 
infrastructure (e.g., a good transport 
network). In WANA, however, facilities, 
distribution networks, and infrastructure are 
inadequate. Consequently the majority of 
farmers have only limited access to high 
quality seed. Moreover, seed pricing policies 
do not reflect actual value and thus often 
hinder the development of sustainable 
national seed programs. Insufficient price 
premiums for contract growers have a 
negative effect on seed quality, while 
subsidized prices for seed users are a burden 
on the national treasury and may create 
dependency on government. In order to 
improve distribution and marketing, national 
seed programs should have many distribution 
outlets, including private seed dealers, and 
have a realistic price policy to make seed 
available at affordable prices. 
Weak institutional linkages 
The performance of the seed sector depends 
on cooperation and strong linkages between 
the various institutions involved. There are 
poor linkages between agricultural research, 
development, extension, and seed producers 
who could promote the use of improved seed. 
Seed supply is a low priority in many 
extension programs. 
Limited investment in human 
resource development 
There is a general lack of trained and 
motivated staff to lead and manage national 
seed programs. It is therefore important for 
each country to develop strategies to correct 
these deficiencies. Training programs need to 
focus on several key areas—seed program 
development, seed enterprise management, 
seed marketing, privatization of the seed 
sector, and strengthening of the informal 
sector. 
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Table 4. Public and private sector seed supply in Pakistan and Turkey, 1995/96. 
Pakistan Turkey 
Total1 Public Private % Total1 Public Private Imports 
Crop % % (prod+imports) % % % % 
Wheat 8.89 89 11 40 88 10 2 
Barley - - - 18 70 29 1 
Rice 5.82 90 10 28 95 - 5 
Maize 6.08 44 54 1002 1 99 -
Soybean - - - 100 20 80 -
Sunflower - - - 1002 - 100 -
Cotton 40.96 49 51 100 99 1 -
Forage crops - - - 20 70 27 3 
Vegetables - - - 100 3 72 25 
1. Total % shows formal sector seed supply as percentage of national requirement. Public %, private % are percentage 
shares of public, private sectors in formal sector production 
2. Hybrids 
Sources: Ahmad 1997 (Pakistan), Kutay 1997(Turkey) 
The private seed sector 
Although the public sector is dominant in 
almost all countries, the private sector has a 
major share in hybrid seed production and in 
the import and distribution of vegetable 
seeds. In Turkey, the private sector supplied 
almost the entire quantity of hybrid maize, 
sunflower, and vegetables in 1996 (Table 4). 
Moreover, the share of the private sector is 
beginning to grow even in self-pollinated 
crops where national seed companies are 
involved in seed supply. In 1996 the private 
sector supplied about 20% of wheat, rice, and 
faba bean seed in Egypt. 
A large number of private firms operate in 
the region—12 in Egypt, one in Ethiopia, 138 
in Pakistan, and over 70 in Turkey. These 
companies are either subsidiaries of foreign 
firms working on hybrids and vegetable 
crops or national enterprises that depend on 
public-bred varieties and public facilities. 
Some are essentially seed traders. In Egypt, 
for example, 53 companies are registered for 
import and 148 for seed export, and all are 
involved in wholesale and distribution of 
seed to farmers. 
As part of structural adjustment policies, 
many countries are attempting to liberalize 
their national seed programs, which are 
currently dominated by the public sector. 
However, particularly in WANA, priva-
tization may not necessarily improve seed 
supply to resource-poor farmers in low-input 
areas (van Amstel 1994). Moreover, seed 
production of self-pollinating crops is not 
attractive to the private sector and therefore 
difficult to privatize (Turner 1996). 
The experience, progress, constraints, and 
steps for privatization of the seed industry in 
WANA have been summarized by van Gastel 
et al. (1997) and Bishaw et al. (1997). The 
key points: 
• Lack of government commitment to 
privatization is often reflected in outdated 
seed laws and regulations, which may be 
more relevant to the public sector. Govern-
ments should have a coherent policy and 
legal framework to encourage private 
investment, both national and foreign. 
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• Unfair competition (subsidies) from the 
public sector is a major constraint to the 
emerging private sector. Other constraints 
include lack of equal access to germplasm 
and breeder/basic seed, over-regulation of 
seed import/export, lack of investment 
and financial laws, absence of credit 
facilities and incentives, distorting seed 
pricing policies, the large capital investment 
required, and lack or inadequate enforce-
ment of variety protection laws. 
• Governments should encourage private 
investment through partnerships with 
national public or foreign companies to 
attract foreign capital and better technology. 
The private sector should have access to 
low-interest credit, public sector varieties, 
and breeder seed; should be permitted tax-
free import of capital goods, inbred lines, 
and seed; and should be given additional 
incentives such as tax holidays. Restrictions 
on seed import/export and repatriation of 
profits (for foreign investors) should be 
removed or reduced. Governments should 
deregulate and liberalize the seed sector to 
ensure fair competition. 
• Governments should continue basic and 
applied research in plant breeding with 
emphasis on low-profit crops, and ensure that 
farmers in remote areas have access to seed. 
• Regional cooperation among WANA 
countries and assistance from donors and 
international organizations could strengthen 
the private sector. The private sector 
should have equal access to advanced 
germplasm and training at IARCs. Donors 
should provide technical and financial 
assistance through bilateral projects to 
accelerate privatization. 
• A Privatization Committee should be 
established, composed of representatives 
from donors, ICARDA, and the private 
sector, to support national privatization 
efforts within WANA. The committee 
could assist countries in their privatization 
efforts, and study the effect of liberali-
zation or privatization on the seed sector. 
The informal seed sector 
After three decades of emphasis on and 
investment in organized seed production and 
supply, more than 80% of major crops in 
developing countries are still sown from 
seed stocks selected and saved by farmers 
(Osborn and Faye 1991, Bal and Douglas 
1992, Cromwell et al. 1993). It is therefore 
necessary to formulate national policies that 
focus more specifically on informal seed 
systems, which are particularly important for 
resource-poor farmers in less favorable areas. 
Local seed systems are characterized by 
low levels of organization and institutional 
development (van Amstel et al. 1996). They 
are known under different names and vary in 
organization and approach. Experiences from 
Africa, Asia, and South America show that 
small-scale farmers in local systems possess 
an indigenous capacity to produce and 
distribute good seed. Seed surveys in WANA 
(Hasan 1995, Bishaw et al. 1994, van Gastel 
and Bishaw 1994, Abdel Fattah 1994, Tetlay 
et al. 1991) and elsewhere (Wright et al. 
1994, 1995, Wright and Tyler 1994) have 
suggested ways to investigate and broaden 
our understanding of the informal seed sector. 
Several studies highlight the status and 
essential features of seed production within 
the informal sector. Experiences relate to a 
wide range of issues, which require further 
investigation and understanding. Some of 
these ideas and experiences are presented in 
the following sections. 
Support for local initiatives in 
community seed production 
In Ethiopia, the government supports the 
informal sector at the community/village 
level for both local and improved cultivars 
through secondary seed production schemes 
(Amare and Alemayehu in press). In Pakistan 
the informal sector is active in seed production 
of legumes and other crops (Siddiqui in 
press). In Afghanistan, FAO, in collaboration 
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with the World Food Program, launched a 
food-for-seed program under which contract 
seed growers are given food wheat in 
exchange for seed, which is then distributed 
to other farmers. Foundation seed is also 
supplied to encourage local seed production 
and lateral diffusion of seed. Mobile seed 
cleaning/storage facilities and the quality 
declared seed system are used to develop and 
maintain a flexible seed production system 
under civil war conditions. 
Variety and seed replacement 
The decision by farmers to change varieties 
already adopted is termed variety replace-
ment, whereas the decision to obtain fresh 
seed stocks of the same variety is termed 
seed renewal. In both cases the decision to 
replace seed may be due to perceived reduction 
in productivity arising probably from genetic 
change and/or physical contamination through 
continuous use of the same seed. 
Earlier studies have tried to assess the 
impact of plant breeding by predicting the 
rate of variety (Brennan and Byerlee 1991) 
and seed replacement (Heisey and Brennan 
1991). In the case of variety replacement, the 
average age of varieties and the number of 
years since a variety was released are 
weighted by the area sown to the variety. The 
optimal period depends on yield gain of new 
varieties, yield loss of old varieties, and risk 
involved in changing the variety (Brennan 
and Byerlee 1991). In 1990, the weighted 
average age ranged from 6-8 years in Syria to 
more than 16 years in Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Yemen (Byerlee and Moya 1993). 
Seed retention 
Farmers generally save seed each year for a 
number of years following an initial purchase 
of certified or commercial seed. The formal 
seed sector usually recommends that seed 
stocks be renewed every year for hybrids, 
every 3 years for open-pollinated crops, and 
every 5 years for self-pollinated crops. Yield 
declines have been estimated at 35% for 
hybrids (Pray and Ramaswami 1991); zero in 
dry areas of Australia, 0.25% in Pakistan, and 
1.6% in Nepal for wheat; and 1.6% for rice in 
India (Heisey and Brennan 1991). In Egypt, 
cotton seed after 7 generations of multipli-
cation from breeder seed showed a decline of 
28% in yield and 15% in fiber quality (Gregg 
1993). Seed replacement rates are influenced 
by both yield reductions and the cost of new 
seed (Heisey and Brennan 1991). 
Farmers frequently renew hybrid seed, but 
tend to retain seed of self-pollinating crops 
for much longer periods. Evidence from 
Ethiopia (Bishaw et al. 1994, van Gastel and 
Bishaw 1994) and Nepal (Cromwell et al. 
1993) indicates that farmers retain seed of 
modern varieties for longer periods than 
anticipated (Table 5). In developing countries 
with a low turnover of new varieties, frequent 
renewal should not be advocated for strictly 
self-pollinated crops (van Gastel and Bishaw 
1993). 
Sources of seed 
Farmers often have different sources of seed 
(Table 6) including the formal sector, 
neighbors, traders/markets, or own-saved 
seed. A survey in Pakistan (Tetlay et al. 
1991) indicated that other farmers are not 
only major sources of wheat seed (23%), but 
are also more important than the formal 
sector as sources of new varieties (on average 
50% vs 34%). 
Seed quality 
Seed surveys in Egypt (ICARDA 1988), 
Ethiopia (Bishaw et al. 1994), Syria (van 
Gastel and Bishaw 1994), and Jordan (Abdel 
Fattah 1994, Hasan 1995) investigated the 
quality of seed sown by farmers (Table 7). 
The results showed that seed from the formal 
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Table 5. Seed retention by farmers (both modern and traditional varieties). 
No. of years Ethiopia, wheat Ethiopia, barley Syria, wheat 
seed is saved (n=388) (n=314) (n=118) 
1 1.5 1.0 50.0 
2 12.1 4.5 26.6 
3 18.3 3.5 9.4 
4 11.9 2.2 3.1 
5 19.3 4.1 -
6-10 20.6 5.8 3.1 
11-15 13.5 2.8 1.6 
>20 2.8 76.1 3.1 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
n = number of farmers 
Sources: Bishaw et al. 1994, van Gastel and Bishaw 1994 
Table 6. Farmers' sources of wheat seed (% of total) in four WANA countries. 
Country1 Own Neighbor Commercial market Other 
Ethiopia 95.3 1.2 0.2 3.3 
Jordan 58.3 7.6 34.1 -
Pakistan 59.0 23.0 9.0 9.0 
Syria 55.9 25.4 18.6 -
Average 67.0 14.0 16.0 3.0 
1. National data for Jordan, zonal data for Ethiopia and Pakistan, district-level data for Syria 
Sources: Bishaw et al. 1994 (Ethiopia), Hasan 1995 (Jordan), van Gastel and Bishaw 1994 (Syria), Tetlay et al. 1991 (Pakistan) 
sector had better physical quality due to 
cleaning, although germination of the 
majority of own-saved and neighbor-
purchased seed was acceptable and in line 
with national seed standards. Wright et al. 
(1995) also report good germination—with 
some exceptions—of seed samples collected 
in surveys in Ghana, Malawi, and Tanzania. 
However, varietal purity and seed health 
appear to be the main problems associated 
with seed saved by farmers. The embryo test 
and washing test showed that a large 
proportion of seed samples were infected/ 
contaminated—69.3% with Ustilago tritici, 
43% with Tilletia caries, and 85% with T. 
foetida (Abdel Fattah 1994). Infection was 
higher in samples collected from own-saved 
seed and seed purchased from neighbors than 
in treated certified seed. Simple improvements 
in local seed cleaning and treatment can help 
produce good quality seed on the farm. 
NGOs in seed supply 
Countries in the Greater Horn of Africa— 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan—have become 
increasingly vulnerable to recurrent drought 
and human conflict. Several NGOs operate 
seed programs (generally beginning as relief 
operations) in these countries. In Ethiopia 
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Table 7. Quality of seed sown by farmers in selected countries. 
Physical purity Below standard Germination Below standard 
Seed source (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Egypt(n = 362) 
Seed plant (4) 98.8 - 94 -
PBDAC1 (74) 98.9 - 94 2.7 
Cooperatives (154) 98.9 1.3 94 0.6 
Own-saved (130) 97.0 16.2 93 6.9 
Standard2 95 85 
Jordan (n = 379) 
Government (130) 99.4 4.6 84 38.5 
Neighbors (29) 96.6 34.5 86 24.1 
Own-saved (220) 96.8 41.8 88 22.3 
Standard 95 85 
Syria (n = 118) 
Government (22) 98.7 - 84 36.3 
Neighbors (30) 94.1 80.0 91 6.6 
Own-saved (66) 95.4 62.0 90 6.0 
Standard 97 85 
n = number of farmers 
1. PBDAC = Principal Bank for Development of Agricultural Credit 
2. Standard = minimum quality prescribed for certified seed 
NGOs accounted for up to 26% of seed 
distribution until 1990 and are the main 
customers of the formal seed sector. NGOs in 
Sudan depend on the formal seed sector for 
cleaning, treatment, and testing of grain 
distributed for seed in emergency operations. 
NGOs are adopting several innovative 
approaches using informal systems. For 
example, Worede (1992) describes a farmer-
based genetic conservation, germplasm 
enhancement, and seed production program 
supported by the Unitarian Service Committee/ 
Canada in Ethiopia to rehabilitate the local 
landraces lost following drought years. 
Community seed banks operated by the Tigray 
Development Association in northern Ethiopia 
(Indeshaw 1997) and by Oxfam in Sudan 
(Cromwell et al. 1993) and CARE Inter-
national's seed recovery project in Sudan 
(Hashim and Ibrahim in press) are some of 
the approaches being used to improve local 
seed supplies in drought-prone areas. 
NGOs seem to have a comparative 
advantage working with small-scale farmers 
in remote and less favorable environments 
(Cromwell et al. 1993) and appear strong in 
organizing farmers and developing participatory 
methods (Bebbington 1993). However, doubt-
ful sustainability after donor support ends, 
farmer dependency on free services, loose 
linkages with the formal sector, and lack of 
professional and technical expertise are major 
shortcomings (Cromwell et al. 1993, 
Bebbington 1993). 
A large number of NGOs in Ethiopia (up 
to 120) seem to work in isolation, lack 
effective coordination, and do not share 
information and experiences. The formal 
sector and NGOs have complementary 
strengths that need to be combined to develop 
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sustainable seed supply systems for resource-
poor farmers. 
The role of lCARDA 
Van Amstel (1994) suggests that since 
international agricultural research centers 
(IARCs) work on crops that are important to 
small-scale farmers, these centers could 
support the development of local seed 
systems by influencing national policy and 
linking local systems with public sector 
institutions. Of all centers supported by the 
Consultative Group on International Agri-
cultural Research (CGIAR), ICARDA is the 
only one with a functional seed unit. 
ICARDA's Seed Unit helps strengthen 
national seed programs through training, 
networking, financial/economic analysis of 
seed systems, multiplication of source seed, 
studies of the informal sector, and of seed 
security for drought-prone areas. The Seed 
Unit has been recognized as the base for the 
WANA Regional Seed Network and center 
for training on seed-related issues within and 
beyond the region. 
Conclusions 
It is generally accepted that seed sector 
development requires an integrated national 
seed system linking the formal and informal 
sectors. But what mix of formal or informal, 
public or private sectors is necessary to 
develop sustainable seed programs? There 
are no ready-made answers, but there are 
promising ways of studying and developing 
national seed systems, taking into account 
differences in local conditions. The formal 
and informal sectors wil l continue to exist, 
each with a distinct role to play. 
In reviewing current situations it is clear 
that the public sector has a major role to play 
in basic and applied crop research, source 
seed production, provision of credit, quality 
assurance, and training. On the other hand, 
the private sector (from small scale farm 
enterprises to multinational companies) has 
proved to be effective in producing high-
value seed and supplying it to niche markets, 
while the informal sector needs support and 
strengthening particularly in the development 
of small-scale seed enterprises that could 
meet local needs. 
In order to develop effective and efficient 
national seed systems, governments in 
developing countries need to develop policies 
and institutional and legal frameworks to 
complement and link the roles of the formal 
and informal sectors. One way of doing this 
is by establishing national seed boards that 
would define the responsibilities of each 
sector, and develop ways to link the two 
sectors to improve seed production and 
supply. Alongside this is the need for a 
flexible regulatory framework that accommo-
dates the requirements of different sectors of 
the seed industry. The work of IARCs is vital 
in this respect, since they work on crops 
essential to small farmers and wil l continue 
to generate technology suited to the needs of 
small farmers and to support national seed 
systems. 
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Constraints to Variety Release, Seed Multiplication, and 
Distribution of Sorghum, Pearl Millet, and Groundnut in 
Western and Central Africa 
J Ndjeunga1 
Abstract 
During the past 20 years, donors have invested more than US$ 100 million in seed 
projects in the semi-arid tropics of Western and Central Africa. A number of 
improved varieties (31 sorghum, 36 pearl millet, 33 groundnut varieties) have been 
released in the region. Despite the availability of improved varieties and massive 
investments in seed multiplication and distribution, formal seed supply systems have 
failed to ensure that farmers have access to high quality seed of improved varieties. 
Adoption of such varieties—and thus the returns to investment in research and seed 
multiplication—is very low. This paper analyzes the constraints to variety release, 
seed multiplication, and distribution of sorghum, pearl millet, and groundnut in four 
countries in the region—Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Senegal. The primary 
constraints are limited supply of breeder seed, poor seed quality control, poor 
demand estimation, and inadequate distribution systems. Secondary constraints 
include the lack of national variety release committees, variety development without 
consideration of farmers' preferences, poor linkages between institutions and lack 
of institution building, and lack of seed laws. 
Introduction 
Countries in the semi-arid tropics of Western 
and Central Africa have an agriculture-based 
economy. The agricultural sector employs 
more than 70% of the labor force and 
contributes over 30% of the gross domestic 
product. Yet, food production is not sufficient 
to ensure self-sufficiency; most countries in 
the region rely heavily on food aid. Yields of 
the major crops (pearl millet, sorghum, 
groundnut) are low, and declining in many 
areas. Adoption of improved varieties is low. 
During the past 20 years, governments 
and external donors have invested over US$ 
100 million in seed projects in the region 
(Table 1), but this investment has not 
improved seed availability, adoption rates of 
improved varieties, or productivity. State 
seed industry infrastructure has been 
established but not maintained. This paper 
examines the possible reasons for this failure, 
and suggests areas that need more careful 
examination while formulating plans for 
agricultural development. 
1. Socioeconomics and Policy Division, ICRISAT Niamey, PO Box 12404, Niamey, Niger 
Ndjeunga, J. 1997. Constraints to variety release, seed multiplication, and distribution of sorghum, pearl millet, and 
groundnut in Western and Central Africa. Pages 34-46 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of 
an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-
14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra 
Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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Table 1. External donor funding for seed projects in four countries. 
Country 
Donor funds 
(US$ million) Period No. of projects' 
Burkina Faso 
Chad 
Niger 
Senegal 
20.30 
8.86 
45.76 
33.34 
1974-1995 
1984-1994 
1976-1993 
1976-1995 
7 
6 
3 
3 
1. Independent projects only; does not include rural development projects with seed components 
Major crops, areas, and yields. Sorghum and 
pearl millet are the main staple crops in 
Western Africa. Area and production (1992-
94 average) are estimated at 14.9 million ha, 
10.2 million tons of pearl millet, and 12.5 
million ha, 9.5 million tons of sorghum 
(FAO/ICRISAT 1997). Yields are poor and 
declining. In Niger, between 1986 and 1994, 
yield decline was estimated at 2.9% in pearl 
millet, 10.2% in sorghum, and 3.9% in 
groundnut. Similar trends are observed in 
other countries in the region. Particularly in 
the context of rapid population growth, this 
yield decline represents a serious threat to 
food security. In contrast to sorghum and 
pearl millet, which are essentially subsistence 
crops, groundnut is a cash and export crop in 
many countries in the sub-region, notably 
Senegal and Burkina Faso. But even in these 
countries, groundnut yields are low (e.g., 900 
kg ha-1 in Senegal), partly because of poor 
adoption of improved varieties, which in turn 
is due to poor seed multiplication and 
distribution systems. 
Variety development. International research 
centers have invested heavily in providing 
support to national breeding programs. 
ICRISAT has played a significant role in 
developing about half of the released 
improved pearl millet varieties. The Institut 
de recherche pour les huiles et oleagineux 
(IRHO, France) has helped develop 90% of 
the released groundnut varieties; and the 
Institut de recherches agronomiques 
tropicales et des cultures vivrieres (IRAT, 
France) has developed about half the 
sorghum varieties released (Table 2). Three 
regional research networks—West and 
Central Africa Millet Research Network 
(WCAMRN), West and Central Africa 
Sorghum Research Network (WCASRN), 
West and Central Africa Groundnut Research 
Network (WCAGRN)—have played 
significant roles in developing and 
strengthening cooperation between national 
and international research institutes, 
encouraging multidisciplinary research, 
assisting information dissemination, and 
facilitating better use of human and material 
resources to extend improved technologies. 
Adoption patterns—major and minor 
constraints. In general, the area sown to 
improved varieties is low. However, there are 
differences in adoption levels between and 
within countries which are largely explained 
by the availability of breeder seed, seed 
quality, and the effectiveness of distribution 
systems. For example, in Niger, government 
funding for breeder seed production is very 
limited; quality control, demand assessment, 
and distribution systems are poor. 
Correspondingly, the level of adoption for 
new varieties of most major crops is very 
low—only 1% of sorghum area, 5% of pearl 
millet area, and 15% of groundnut area are 
sown to improved varieties. In contrast, in 
Senegal, the government places a priority on 
breeder seed production, and quality control 
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Table 2. Adoption of released pearl millet, sorghum, and groundnut varieties developed by 
different research institutions in four countries. 
Number of released varieties 
Research institution Pearl millet Sorghum Groundnut 
Burkina Faso (9+10+9 varieties) 
IRAT/NARS 4 7 0 
ICRISAT/NARS 5 3 0 
IRHO 0 0 9 
Adoption (% of area) 2 2 80 
Chad (6+6+6 varieties) 
IRAT 0 3 0 
ICRISAT 6 3 0 
IRHO 0 0 6 
Adoption (% of area) 4 6 10 
Niger (17+9+9 varieties) 
IRAT 0 4 0 
ICRISAT 3 1 0 
IRHO 0 0 9 
INRAN (national program) 14 4 0 
Adoption (% of area) 1 5 15 
Senegal (4+6+9 varieties) 
IRAT 1 1 0 
ICRISAT 3 1 0 
IRHO 0 0 6 
ISRA (national program) 0 4 3 
Adoption (% of area) 8 7 100 
IRAT = Institut de recherches agronomiques tropicales et des cultures vivrieres (France), IRHO = Institut de recherche pour 
les huiles et oleagineux (France), INRAN = Institut national de recherches agronomiques du Niger, ISRA = Institut 
senegalais de recherches agricoles 
and seed distribution systems are relatively 
well developed, especially for cash crops. 
The entire groundnut area (but only 8% of 
sorghum and 7% of pearl millet area) is sown 
to improved varieties. 
Other (less important) factors also hamper 
seed systems in the region. These include 
delays in variety release because there is no 
formal national variety release committee or 
no standardized release procedures; poor 
linkages between research centers, seed 
multiplication units, and extension units; and 
a restrictive regulatory and legal environment 
that does not encourage growth. 
Sustainability of seed projects. There are no 
ongoing seed projects in the four countries. 
The lack of donor interest is perhaps due to 
poor performances and lack of sustainability 
in the earlier projects. These projects, which 
dealt almost exclusively with the formal seed 
sector, were funded primarily by external 
donors. Their operations were heavily 
subsidized and thus financially unsustainable. 
Seed was produced only so long as donor 
funds were available; subsequently the 
projects collapsed. This is true particularly 
for pearl millet and sorghum, where seed is 
of low commercial value. In groundnut, in 
36 
contrast, parastatal institutions and donors are 
more likely to provide funding for seed 
production, and extension and marketing 
infrastructure are more developed. In Burkina 
Faso, between 1986 and 1990, the Banque 
Ouest Africaine de Developpement (BOAD) 
funded a groundnut seed project that sought 
to increase groundnut production through 
investment in breeder and basic seed 
production with the Institut national des 
etudes et de la recherche agronomique 
(INERA), and support for strengthening 
groundnut markets. 
Objectives, methodology, and study 
area 
The objective of this study was to identify 
and analyze the reasons for the failure of seed 
systems in Western and Central Africa, 
specifically with reference to three ICRISAT 
mandate crops, sorghum, pearl millet, and 
groundnut. Field surveys were conducted in 
four countries—Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Niger, and Chad, the major producers of 
these three crops in Western and Central 
Africa. These crops together occupy more 
than 50% of the total cultivated area in each 
country. 
The surveys were conducted during Sep-
Dec 1996. Structured interviews were used to 
obtain information from a range of seed 
Table 3. Primary and secondary constraints as 
cited by respondents. 
Constraint Percentage of respondents 
Lack of breeder seed 90 
Poor quality control 90 
Poor demand assessment and 
distribution systems 95 
Lack of national variety release committee 60 
Unsuitability of varieties 40 
Poor linkages and institution building 60 
Lack of seed laws 40 
industry participants—researchers (breeders, 
agronomists, socioeconomists), managers of 
public and private seed multiplication units, 
merchants, traders, NGOs, contract farmers, 
and policy makers. Data on seed production 
and varietal characteristics were obtained 
from research institutes and seed multipli-
cation units in each country. Information on 
variety release procedures, government 
policies affecting seed multiplication and 
distribution, and constraints to seed multipli-
cation and distribution was collected through 
interviews. 
Primary constraints to variety 
release, seed multiplication, and 
distribution 
In all four countries, the national programs 
are responsible for variety maintenance and 
production of breeder seed. Responsibility 
for the production of foundation seed varies 
by country. In Niger, the state seed 
multiplication unit of Lossa produces 
foundation seed. In Senegal, production is 
contracted out to farmers' groups through 
Groupes d'interet economiques (GIE). In 
Burkina Faso and Chad, research institutes 
are responsible for the production of basic 
seed. Registered and certified seed are 
produced by state seed multiplication units 
through contract farmers. Certified seed is 
distributed by extension services, rural 
development projects, NGOs, and merchants 
(Fig.1). Seed imports of pearl millet, sorghum, 
and groundnut are not significant. 
More than 75% of respondents reported 
that limited supply of breeder seed, poor 
quality control, and poor distribution systems 
were the primary constraints faced by formal 
seed supply systems in the region (Table 3). 
Limited supply of breeder seed 
Breeder seed is the basic input for seed 
multiplication; high-quality breeder seed 
must therefore be produced in adequate 
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Table 4. Certified seed production and national seed requirements in four countries in Western 
and Central Africa, 1991-95. 
Production/requirements (tons) in different years 
Crop/Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Sorghum 
Chad Production 8.9 6.9 6.4 2.0 3.6 
Requirements 1172.4 1220.7 1156.8 1443.2 1575.5 
Burkina Faso Production 22.4 8.3 10.9 10.9 4.8 
Requirements 3178.0 3300.0 3444.0 3614.0 3373.3 
Niger Production 0 0 0 11.4 0 
Requirements 4831.9 5904.5 5223.9 4703.7 4514.8 
Senegal Production 62.1 8.4 10.9 14.1 9.7 
Requirements 233.2 306.6 294.8 331.2 346.3 
Chad Production 1.3 2.4 3.3 0.8 0.05 
Requirements 944.8 945.3 849.0 1081.2 1066.4 
Burkina Faso Production 8.9 0.9 2.4 3.1 1.7 
Requirements 2014.0 2006.0 2155.0 2185.0 1699.0 
Niger Production 177.4 42.4 53.9 187.6 77.5 
Requirements 7309.0 8231.0 6433.8 8224.4 8715.7 
Senegal Production 29.2 65.1 31.0 74.2 59.0 
Requirements 1465.3 1289.5 1623.0 1559.6 1484.8 
Groundnut 
Chad Production 121.2 131.9 194.8 97.1 88.1 
Requirements 3761.7 4579.8 4469.5 4621.7 5311.2 
Burkina Faso Production 2599.8 2708.6 2825.1 2124.5 2113.8 
Requirements 2938.3 3817.2 3622.3 4040.0 4572.5 
Niger Production 21.8 0 0 313.4 52.2 
Requirements 1725.5 2919.7 1411.7 2517.3 4488.2 
Senegal Production 16782.5 15174.0 22898.0 11297.3 14733.6 
Requirements 14526.9 15946.3 12738.1 15466.9 14689.5 
Sources: Centres de Multiplication des Semences (Niger and Burkina Faso), Seed Division (Senegal), Gassi Project (Chad) 
quantities. More than 90% of respondents 
indicated that shortage of breeder seed was a 
key constraint to the production of certified 
seed. National agricultural research systems 
(NARS) claimed that the government 
provided very limited funds for breeder seed 
production. This problem is particularly 
serious in pearl millet and sorghum, but less 
so in groundnut, which is of greater 
commercial value and has an active 
production market. In Senegal and Burkina 
Faso, parastatal seed companies provide 
funding to research institutes for groundnut 
breeder seed production. 
Table 4 shows the production of certified 
seed in the four countries surveyed. 
Production of certified seed is inadequate, 
partly due to shortage of breeder seed. The 
seed coverage, i.e., the percentage of area 
sown to certified seed, was calculated for 
each crop, assuming that all certified seed 
produced was sold, that farmers purchased 
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fresh certified seed every 3 years for sorghum 
and millet and every 6 years for groundnut, 
and that farmers used the seed rates 
recommended by extension services1. 
Between 1991 and 1995, average certified 
seed coverage was generally less than 1% for 
pearl millet and sorghum, but over 60% for 
groundnut in Burkina Faso and Senegal, 
where governments provide marketing infra-
structure through parastatal institutions. For 
example, seed coverage (1991-95 average) 
for sorghum, pearl millet, and groundnut was 
0.5%, 0.2%, and 2.8% respectively in Chad, 
and 8%, 4%, and 100% respectively in Senegal. 
The organization of seed supply systems 
is too inflexible and bureaucratic to deal with 
demand for all classes of seed. Poor 
communications and weak linkages between 
institutions frequently cause delays and 
shortages. In Niger, for example, research 
institutes complain of lack of funding for 
breeder seed production. The seed multipli-
cation unit, which is responsible for bulking 
breeder seed into basic seed, complains of 
delays and inadequate supplies of breeder 
seed from the national research institute 
(Institut national de recherches agronomiques 
du Niger, INRAN). Seed multiplication 
centers (SMCs) which are responsible for 
registered and certified seed production 
complain of non-availability or delayed 
deliveries of basic seed. In return, the seed 
multiplication unit of Lossa, which is 
responsible for the production of basic seed, 
claimed that SMCs often place their orders 
late, giving insufficient time to produce 
adequate quantities of basic seed. Managers 
of all categories of institutions and seed 
production centers also complained that 
budget allocations (from the government) 
were generally insufficient and delayed, 
preventing them from planning production in 
advance. 
Throughout the region, formal seed 
schemes depend on external sources of 
funding. Donor-funded projects between 
1974 and 1995 commonly provided funds to 
NARS to produce breeder seed. When these 
projects were phased out, breeder seed 
production fell significantly. For example, in 
Niger, a USAID project was established in 
1975 solely to develop seed infrastructure. 
The project set up six seed multiplication 
centers with well-equipped laboratories and 
provided funding to the NARS for breeder 
seed production. Between 1985 and 1988, an 
average of 1500 tons of certified pearl millet 
seed were produced each year through 
contract farmers. At the end of the project in 
1989, this fell to 108 tons per year. Similar 
cases are reported from other countries. 
In some cases, breeder seed production 
has been hampered by poor variety 
maintenance by NARS. For example, a 
United Nations funded seed project in 
Burkina Faso was forced to obtain seed of the 
pearl millet variety CIVT from ICRISAT, 
because genetic purity of the variety had not 
been maintained. Because of lack of variety 
maintenance, NARS often turn to ICRISAT 
for repeated supplies of breeder seed of 
varieties developed by ICRISAT. For 
example, 193 kg of breeder seed of the millet 
variety ZATIB was provided to the NARS in 
Niger in 1996. 
IARCs have also played a significant role 
in breeder seed production in the region. 
During the last 3 years, ICRISAT has provided 
on average 300 kg per year of pearl millet 
breeder seed (all varieties combined) to 
NARS for research and multiplication 
(ICRISAT 1994, 1995, 1996). 
Poor seed quality control 
Seed certification, licensing of seed producers, 
and quality control are performed either by a 
government department or by individual seed 
production units (usually parastatals). However, 
quality control regulations are not enforced, 
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1. Recommended seed rates are 5 kg ha-1 for pearl millet, 7 kg ha-1 for sorghum, and 100 kg ha-1 (in-shell) for groundnut 
and seed of all classes is poor in quality. 
Farmers' groups in parts of Senegal withdrew 
from contract production of basic, registered, 
and certified sorghum seed because of low 
germination rates in breeder seed. More than 
90% of respondents interviewed during this 
study considered poor seed quality to be an 
important constraint to the wider use of 
certified seed and adoption of new varieties. 
The lack of quality is apparently due to 
lack of funding and/or personnel for field 
inspections and post-harvest tests. Without 
staff and funds, regulatory authorities are 
unable to monitor seed producers or enforce 
standards. In Senegal, the seed division has 
been unable to monitor quality for the past 5 
years due to funding constraints. One 
consequence is decline in production of 55-
437, an important export variety of 
groundnut. The Interprofessional Union for 
Groundnut Grains (UNIA) has promised to 
pay the seed division 0.5% of the value of 
groundnut seed produced by Union members, 
in order to provide operating funds for seed 
quality control. 
Training and infrastructure development 
for quality control has depended almost 
entirely on projects funded by external 
donors. These projects provided training for 
large numbers of technical staff. 
Unfortunately, once the project concluded, 
many of these trained staff left the seed 
division to join rural development projects 
where they were offered higher salaries and 
incentives. In Niger for example, out of the 4 
seed technologists, 8 seed inspectors, and 6 
laboratory technicians who were trained 
during the USAID project, only 2 inspectors 
and 2 technicians remain in the seed division. 
In Burkina Faso, out of the 4 seed 
technologists, 7 seed inspectors, and 5 
laboratory technicians trained during the 
USAID seed project, only 1 technologist, 4 
inspectors, and 2 technicians remain in the 
seed division. 
Quality control infrastructure is weak in 
some countries. In Chad, for example, there 
is only one poorly equipped seed laboratory 
and no seed technologist (Table 5). However, 
the main problem is lack of trained staff 
rather than shortage of equipment. In 
addition, management of existing staff and 
facilities is poor. Unless these areas are 
addressed, government investments in new 
infrastructure wil l probably yield only 
marginal benefits. 
Even during the period of involvement of 
seed projects, when quality control units were 
relatively well equipped, seed quality was 
poor. For example, in Niger, certified seed 
produced by contract farmers was not 
inspected; quality was correspondingly poor 
(Couvillon 1985). In Burkina Faso, contract 
farmers in a United Nations funded seed 
project indicated that the government 
multiplication unit provided them with 
registered pearl millet seed of poor quality 
with a low germination rate. Despite the 
relatively high level of quality control 
infrastructure, seed projects were unable to 
adequately conduct field inspections and 
post-harvest tests. 
Table 5. Seed quality control staff and infrastructure in four countries in Western and Central Africa. 
Burkina Faso Chad Niger Senegal 
No. of seed inspectors 
No. of laboratory technicians 
No. of seed technologists 
No. of seed laboratories 
Laboratory equipment 
4 
2 
1 
6 
Fair 
1 
1 
0 
1 
Poor 
2 
2 
0 
12 
Fair 
240 
16 
12 
8 
Good 
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Quality control is essential to ensure that 
certified seed is indeed of high quality. In 
addition, wide availability of high-quality 
seed may induce farmers to purchase larger 
quantities of commercial seed. Poor quality 
discourages farmers from buying certified seed, 
thus reducing demand and seed producers' 
profits. 
Poor demand assessment and 
distribution systems 
More than 90% of respondents point to poor 
demand assessment and distribution systems 
as key constraints. 
Demand assessment. Demand assessment is 
an essential component in seed production 
planning. Poor demand estimation may result 
in over- or under-supply of seed to farmers. 
Essentially, seed producers do not know how 
much to produce because they do not know 
how much they wil l be able to sell. This 
weakens every link in the "seed chain", 
including seed distribution (deciding how 
much seed to distribute and where, and 
planning the logistics), extension (seed for 
demonstration plots), and the wholesale and 
retail sale of seed. 
Seed demand can depend on many 
factors, including the prices of seed available 
from alternative sources, farmers' incomes, 
tastes and preferences, and the type of crop. 
In many countries in the region, demand is 
assessed simply on the basis of cultivated area 
and the recommended seeding rate, without 
accounting for other factors. This often results 
in overestimation of demand. For example, in 
Burkina Faso, project targets for foundation 
seed production were exceeded. Much of the 
excess seed was used as certified seed, 
increasing costs and reducing efficiency. The 
National Seed Service was required to buy all 
foundation seed produced by the research 
stations and sell this at a loss (USAID 1987). 
Another problem is inefficient multi-
plication. For example, in 1985/86 the 
Burkina Faso project produced 11 t of sorghum 
and 26 t of groundnut foundation seed, but 
multiplied this into only 31 t of sorghum and 
65.5 t of groundnut certified seed. Using 
standard procedures, the 11 t of sorghum 
foundation seed should have been multiplied 
into more than 22 000 t of certified seed. 
Seed distribution. Seed is distributed 
through various channels—extension services, 
national and regional development projects, 
NGOs, and merchants (Fig. 1). While 
distribution channels are fairly efficient in 
Senegal, this is not true of the other three 
countries, where less than 40% of sorghum 
and pearl millet certified seed produced was 
eventually sold (Table 6). One major problem 
is that there are too few wholesale and retail 
points; in Chad for example, there are only 
two wholesale points in Djamena and Gassi, 
both located far away from farmers. 
Farmers are willing to purchase groundnut 
seed (because the crop is easy to sell and 
highly profitable), but not seed of sorghum 
and pearl millet, which are subsistence crops. 
During the last 5 years, seed production units 
have sold, on average, 70% of the certified 
groundnut seed produced, but less than half 
of the certified seed produced for sorghum 
and pearl millet (Table 6). 
Respondents also indicate that seed 
distribution involved very high transportation 
costs as farmers are widely scattered, and 
often located in remote areas with poor road 
access. In Niger, Couvillon (1985) noted that 
due to high transportation costs, seed could 
reach only a few large markets. The most 
frequent answer given by farmers as to why 
they did not purchase seed of improved 
varieties was unavailability—seed distribution 
points were too few and located too far away 
from their farms. 
Poor distribution has a number of inter-
related effects. Because farmers have limited 
access to improved varieties, seed demand is 
low, and as a result sales volumes and profits 
by seed production units are low. This, 
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Table 6. Production and sale of certified seed in four countries in Western and Central Africa, 
1991-95 average. 
Annual production of certified seed (t) No. of wholesale 
Pearl millet Sorghum Groundnut outlets 
Niger 
Burkina Faso 
Senegal 
Chad 
108 (30) 
3.4 (50) 
51.7(100) 
1.57(30) 
2.28 (40) 
11.45(50) 
21.04(100) 
5.56 (30) 
77.5 (80) 
2474.4(100) 
16 176.9(100) 
126.6(70) 
7 
10 
250 
2 
Figures in parentheses show what percentage of the certified seed produced was eventually sold 
together with the high transport costs, makes 
seed production financially unviable. 
Secondary constraints to variety 
release, seed multiplication, and 
distribution 
A number of secondary factors constrain 
variety release, seed multiplication, and 
distribution in the region. These factors, which 
were listed by less than 60% of respondents 
(Table 3), include lack of a national variety 
release committee, unsuitability of varieties, 
poor linkages between research, extension 
and seed multiplication units, lack of 
institution building, and lack of seed laws. 
Lack of national variety release committees. 
Countries in the region have similar 
procedures for variety evaluation, involving 
research station testing, multilocational on-
farm trials, and then review of performance 
data to decide on the release of a variety. 
However, this review is conducted not by a 
formal variety release committee but by ad 
hoc release committees which meet 
infrequently (in Burkina Faso, for example, 
there have been no meetings in the last 3 
years). This has significantly slowed the rate 
at which new varieties are released, and 
increased the time lag between variety 
identification and release. Promising 
materials (e.g., the sorghum series SARIASO 
in Burkina Faso) have been successfully 
tested on farmers' fields, but are still 
awaiting formal release. 
Unsuitability of varieties. Robins (1995) 
surveyed four villages in Burkina Faso to 
obtain farmers' opinions on improved 
varieties of sorghum, pearl millet, and 
groundnut. The results showed that farmers 
were willing to replace local varieties with 
improved varieties in groundnut, but not in 
pearl millet and sorghum. Essentially, 
profitability (yield) was the key issue in 
groundnut adoption. In the subsistence crops, 
additional factors are important. For example, 
the pearl millet variety ICMV 8201 was 
appreciated for its high germination rate and 
resistance to diseases and drought, but was 
not adopted because it was not suitable for 
making to, the traditional millet food. 
Poor linkages and institution building. Few 
countries in the region have a coherent seed 
strategy. The four countries surveyed have no 
national seed committee, no national seed 
policy, no national seed plan, no national 
release committee, and no seed laws and 
regulations. There is a lack of coordination 
and planning for seed activities, and of 
information on released varieties. Almost all 
countries have poor management information 
systems. In Niger and Burkina Faso, for 
example, data on national seed production are 
not available, even to seed policy planners. 
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Some production data are available from 
individual seed production units but mainly 
in annual reports and receipts from sales, not 
in readily usable form. 
Linkages between the national research 
systems, national seed services, seed 
multiplication units, and extension services 
are weak. In Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, 
no formal meetings have been held between 
extension agents and researchers for the past 
2 years. Requests for breeder and basic seed 
made by state seed multiplication units were 
not met on time by research institutes. 
Extension agents were unaware of varieties 
that had been released. 
In Burkina Faso, there is almost no 
interaction between research stations and the 
Seed Division for monitoring the quality of 
breeder seed produced by research stations. 
In Senegal, relationships between the extension 
services, Seed Division, and the research 
institute are weak. Extension agents are 
generally unaware of the characteristics of 
released varieties. For example, they are 
unaware of the newly released groundnut 
variety Fleur 11, and do not include it in their 
promotion programs. Extension services are 
not involved in seed promotion and 
marketing. The Senegalese government is 
currently restructuring its extension services 
in order to facilitate the flow of information 
between researchers and farmers. 
In three countries (Senegal is the 
exception), seed-related issues are given low 
priority. The national seed services are 
ranked low in the organization charts of the 
Ministries of Agriculture, and headed by 
individuals who have received little formal 
training on seed technology, laws and 
regulations, and planning. 
Lack of seed laws. In all four countries, 
consultations between the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), and the government led to the 
development of a draft national seed policy. 
These drafts have yet to be approved by the 
governments. In Niger and Senegal, national 
seed laws and regulations have been 
approved, but have not yet been enacted. 
These regulatory and legal issues are not the 
primary constraints in Niger, Chad, and 
Burkina Faso. However, they become more 
important as seed industries are commercia-
lized. In Senegal, for example, numerous 
cases of individuals trading falsely labeled, 
poor quality rice seed have been reported to 
the Seed Division, but the Seed Division is 
unable to prosecute these traders because the 
relevant laws do not exist. 
Conclusions 
Countries in the semi-arid tropics of Western 
and Central Africa face similar constraints to 
variety release, seed multiplication, and 
distribution. Lack of funding for breeder seed 
production, poor quality control, and poor 
seed distribution systems have severely 
limited farmers' access to high-quality seed. 
These constraints have also limited seed 
demand for improved varieties, thus reducing 
the market size and profitability for existing 
firms and potential entrants. Seed production 
units have historically operated with 
significant losses that were covered by huge 
donor subsidies. Once external funding 
ceased, seed units were forced to shut down 
or scale down operations. 
In order to alleviate these constraints, 
governments in the region must show a greater 
commitment to seed sector development. It is 
essential to increase funding for breeder seed 
production. Quality control is important, and 
can best be implemented by spot checks of 
retailers and seed warehouses to ensure 
quality and truthful labeling. Detailed 
certification requirements may not be 
necessary at this stage of development of the 
seed industry, and in fact are likely to be 
counter-productive. Governments should 
provide tax breaks and other incentives to 
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encourage private sector investment. 
Centralized seed distribution schemes involve 
very high transport costs, especially when 
they serve farmers in remote communities. 
One possibility would be to enlist NGO 
support for seed production schemes that are 
located in the rural areas, near farmers. 
In view of the poor performance of seed 
systems, the role of government needs 
reconsideration, particularly in the context of 
structural adjustment and liberalization 
policies that stress reduction of subsidies and 
government control and emphasize greater 
competitiveness through privatization. Current 
seed schemes are more institution-focused 
than farmer-focused. 
The poor performance of the seed system 
as a whole is partly because farmers—who 
ought to be the centerpiece of the seed 
system—are neglected. "Farmers must be the 
basis of seed policy. Any effective seed 
policy must recognize what farmers can and 
cannot do. Farmers can efficiently reproduce 
and store seed of most self-pollinated crops, 
such as wheat, rice, and groundnut. They can 
reproduce and store some varieties of open-
pollinated crops and some clonal varieties. 
Many farmers will experiment with new 
varieties in small plots in their fields. They can 
learn of new varieties from relatives, neighbors, 
and merchants who sell agricultural inputs. 
Even poor farmers can afford to buy small 
amounts of expensive seed, which they can 
use to reproduce enough seed to plant their 
entire farm with a new variety in a few 
years." (Pray and Ramaswami 1991). 
Very little information is available on the 
informal seed supply system. As a prerequisite 
to improving seed availability, more 
information must be collected on farmers' 
sources of seed, their perceptions of seed 
quality, the factors that determine when they 
buy seed, and how informal community seed 
traders operate. This information could help 
reduce quality control and distribution costs 
incurred by current seed schemes. Information 
is also required on farmers' resource levels, 
levels of seed production, seed market 
infrastructure, and price and trading patterns. 
This information is needed for a cross-section 
of communities and for each of the major 
crops. NGOs and farmers' groups wil l play 
an important role in seed industry development 
and technology diffusion. Therefore, 
information is needed on both these groups as 
well. National seed systems wil l need to be 
built based on the strengths and comparative 
advantages of both formal and informal 
market systems. 
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Session II 
The Role of the Private Sector 

The Private Seed Sector in Turkey 
A Kutay1 
Abstract 
There are approximately 80 private seed companies in Turkey, of which 34 are 
registered with the Seed Industry Association. Seed production in the formal sector 
(public and private) is sufficient to satisfy demand in hybrid maize, hybrid 
sunflower, cotton, soybean, and vegetable crops. Seed of some crops (potato, 
melons, hybrid vegetables) is imported. The Turkish government has taken a series 
of steps to improve private sector research and development, and public 
organizations are gradually being withdrawn from seed supply activities. However, 
the private sector still faces a number of constraints—difficulties in production, 
cumbersome variety registration and seed certification procedures, lack of effective 
plant breeders rights, unrealistic government pricing, frequent changes in export 
and import regulations, excessive quarantine regulations and mandatory laboratory 
tests, and high value-added tax on seed. 
In addition to the mainstream private sector, opportunities and a favorable 
operating environment exist for small-scale seed traders, for example in areas not 
serviced by large companies. These firms could supply seed at affordable prices to 
smallholder farmers by entering into partnerships with government research 
institutes or private seed firms. 
National objectives 
The objectives of the national seed supply 
system in Turkey are in the short term to be 
self-sufficient in seed of field, industrial, and 
vegetable crops; and in the medium term to 
become a reliable supply point for seed 
markets in Europe and the Middle East. At 
present, seed production is sufficient to satisfy 
demand in hybrid maize, hybrid sunflower, 
cotton, soybean, and standard vegetables and 
crops (Table 1). For some crops (potato, 
melons, hybrid vegetables), seed is imported. 
The aim is to increase production and 
strengthen seed production technology by 
improving private sector research and 
development. The government is taking steps 
to achieve this goal; public organizations are 
gradually being withdrawn from seed supply 
activities, and the private sector is playing a 
progressively larger role. Currently, there are 
about 80 private seed companies in Turkey, 
of which 34 are registered with the Turkish 
Seed Industry Association. 
1. Halit Ziya Bulvari 72/303, 35210 Izmir, Turkey 
Kutay, A. 1997. The private seed sector in Turkey. Pages 49-53 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: 
proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa-and 
West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 
324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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Table 1. Seed supply and demand of major crops in Turkey. 
Total Annual seed Formal sector Share (%) of different 
cultivated requirements production as components of the formal sector 
Crop area ('000 ha) ('000 t) % of requirement Public Private Imports 
Wheat 9500 310 40 88 10 2 
Barley 3500 100 18 70 29 1 
Rice 50 1 28 95 - 5 
Soybean 60 4000 100 20 80 -
Maize1 200 5000 100 1 99 -
Sunflower 420 4000 100 - 100 -
Forage crops 550 3000 20 70 27 3 
Cotton 700 50 000 100 99 1 -
Potato 200 135 000 20 1 60 -
Vegetables 700 3 100 3 72 25 
1. Total maize area is 400 000 ha, of which 200 000 ha is sown to hybrids 
Seed supply in Turkey 
Seed production by the formal sector (i.e., 
public/government organizations and commer-
cial private firms) is sufficient to satisfy 
demand in several crops, including hybrid 
maize, hybrid sunflower, cotton, soybean, and 
vegetable crops (Table 1). Processing and 
storage capacities are adequate for these 
crops (Tables 2, 3). However, seed supply in 
inadequate for some crops, especially cereals 
and some industrial crops. For instance, 
annual requirement for certified wheat seed is 
370 000 t, whereas the formal sector supplies 
only 100-150 000 t. The remainder comes from 
the informal sector, i.e., farmer-saved seed. A 
similar situation is found in other crops 
(barley, rice, fodder crops, open-pollinated 
crops) and to some extent in potato. 
In order to increase seed supply through 
the formal sector and promote the use of 
certified seed of these crops, the government 
is taking a series of steps. 
• Develop appropriate legislation, incentives 
for local and foreign investors, and 
financial regulations to liberalize the seed 
market, encourage genuine private sector 
competition, and thus increase production 
• Provide subsidies for seed of some crops, 
e.g., hybrid sunflower, soybean, and fodder 
crops 
• Enact variety protection laws and plant 
breeders' rights to encourage private firms 
to enter the market for open-pollinated 
crops. 
Major constraints 
The development of the seed sector in Turkey 
is hampered by a number of constraints. The 
major constraints are discussed below. 
Legislation. Some seed laws do exist, but do 
not conform to international regulations and 
do not clearly address the changing needs in 
Turkey's seed sector. Revised seed laws are 
being formulated but have not been finalized. 
The new regulations on variety registration, 
seed certification, market quality controls, 
and most important, on variety protection and 
breeders' rights, are still being discussed. No 
effective market control systems exist. 
Significant improvements in the private 
sector can occur only after the laws are in 
place and an effective market control system 
is established. 
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Table 2. Seed processing capacity and utilization1 in Turkey. 
Processing capacity available (t, annual) 
Crop Public sector Private sector Total 
Wheat + barley 400 000 (30) 25 000 (54) 425 000(31) 
Maize 50(100) 31 500(53) 31 550(53) 
Sunflower 0 11 700 (56) 11 700 (56) 
Soybean 50(100) 9 500 (86) 9 550 (86) 
Cotton 124 000(100) 0 124 000(100) 
Sugar beet 0 3000(100) 3 000(100) 
Potato 2 500(100) 20 500 (90) 23 000(91) 
Vegetables 20(100) 8 000 (45) 8 020 (45) 
Fodder crops 0 2 000 (63) 2 000 (63) 
Total 526 620 (47) 111 200(64) 637 820 (50) 
1. Figures in parentheses show percentage of capacity utilized 
Table 3. Seed storage capacity and utilization1 in Turkey. 
Storage capacity available (t, annual) 
Crop Public sector Private sector Total 
Cereals 
Industrial crops 
Vegetables 
Fodder crops 
Total 
155 000(77) 
286 550 (65) 
50(100) 
0 
441 600 (69) 
41 500(98) 
61 000(51) 
8 000 (45) 
2 300 (72) 
112 800(68) 
196 500(82) 
347 550 (63) 
8 050 (45) 
2 300 (72) 
554 400 (69) 
1. Figures in parentheses show percentage of capacity utilized 
Variety registration. Registration procedures 
are slow and often bureaucratic. The seed 
industry would benefit from more liberalized 
procedures, particularly since the "life span" 
of some commercially attractive varieties is 
very short, e.g., 3 years for cucumber 
varieties. The private sector has 
recommended that there be two lists—one 
list of registered varieties (with some form of 
voluntary registration) and another of 
government-recommended varieties that are 
officially tested and approved. 
Seed production. Lack of large farms is 
making it increasingly difficult to maintain 
adequate isolation distances in some crops. In 
hybrid seed plots, particularly sunflower and 
maize, this is a major problem, since plots 
tend to be close together. Many seed growers 
lack modern cultivation and planting 
equipment. 
Crop pricing. Crop prices (wheat, maize, 
sunflower, cotton) are determined by the 
government, and are often unrealistic and 
below world prices. In order to encourage the 
wider use of certified seed, crop prices 
should be determined by the market—not by 
the government, which may make decisions 
based on political factors. For example, the 
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government fixed unrealistically low prices 
for soybean in 1995/96. Seed companies 
could not find growers, and as a result the 
government was forced to import large 
quantities of maize and soybean the following 
year. The ideal system is the establishment of 
a crop bourse where current and future prices 
of different crops wil l be established. This 
wil l allow farmers to make informed 
decisions on which crops to grow and whether 
to use certified seed to get higher returns. 
Subsidies. In principle, seed subsidies can 
encourage farmers to use certified seed. 
However, the present system of subsidies is 
not effective enough. Under the present 
system, dealers sell seed to farmers at the 
subsidized price and send copies of the 
invoices to the seed company, which then 
recovers the subsidy amount from the 
government. Instead of paying the subsidy to 
the seed company, it should be paid directly 
to the farmers on submission of an invoice. 
This wi l l streamline the process, and also 
make farmers aware that they are, being 
supported. 
Other agricultural and seed policies. There is 
instability in exports and imports, caused 
partly by changes in implementation of 
regulations. Quarantine regulations also need 
to be modified, especially to reduce the 
number of mandatory laboratory tests. Seed 
registration and certification procedures (e.g., 
permission needed to produce and sell 
commercial seed) are cumbersome. 
Financial laws and regulation. High tax 
rates—value added tax of 15% both on 
imported and locally produced seed—are 
encouraging "unbooked" seed sales.. When 
taxes are added, the cost of vegetable seed 
becomes prohibitively high. Farmers would 
prefer to buy "unbooked" seed that has been 
imported or locally multiplied illegally. 
Export incentives are not available. Credit for 
seed companies is available but involves 
complex procedures that lead to delays. 
Poor seed demand. Most farmers operate at 
subsistence levels, on small farms, and lack 
training in modern farming methods and/or 
the resources to invest in certified seed and 
other inputs. Consequently, demand for high-
quality, relatively expensive seed comes only 
from innovative and large-scale farmers. 
Market information. Reliable statistics on 
seed supply and demand are not available. 
The development of a comprehensive 
database containing information on production, 
processing, and market opportunities would 
improve efficiency in seed supply, and open 
up more opportunities for public and private 
sector organizations. 
Lack of training. The Turkish seed sector is 
still developing. The next stage is to improve 
research capabilities by building up a cadre 
of highly competent staff. However, no local 
institution conducts either pre- or post-
graduate training in seed technology. 
Recommendations for improvement 
• The government should continue to 
encourage the participation of private seed 
companies, both domestic and foreign 
• The public sector should continue its 
gradual withdrawal, where appropriate, 
from the seed market 
• Seed laws and regulations must be revised 
in line with national needs and inter-
national conventions as soon as possible 
• A strict and effective market control 
system must be established to reduce the 
flow of low-quality seed through 
unauthorized channels 
• Crop prices should be made more 
attractive and subsidies provided to small-
scale farmers to promote the use of 
quality seed 
• Value-added taxes on vegetable seed 
should be lowered (the government has 
responded to this need, and plans to lower 
VAT rates from 15% to 6% next year) 
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• Procedures for issuing low-interest credit 
for seed production, processing, and 
marketing should be simplified 
• Restrictions on seed export and import 
must be liberalized to create a stable 
platform for private sector investment 
• Local institutions must be established for 
pre- and post-graduate training in seed 
technology. 
The role of small-scale seed 
companies 
In Turkey the seed sector can be grouped 
under three broad categories. 
• Research and development institutions 
(government research institutes, private 
seed companies) 
• Seed producers, which may have both 
R&D and commercial components (state 
farms, private companies) 
• Traders, classified as either distributors or 
dealers depending on their scale of 
operations. 
Small-scale companies (the dealers in the 
third group) generally operate with limited 
amounts of capital. They do not undertake 
R&D, nor do they have production and 
processing facilities. Therefore, they cannot 
exert a "marketing pul l" effect, but must 
depend on trading opportunities. These 
companies import seeds or procure them 
from local producers. Since specialty 
products often involve royalty payments, 
such companies deal mainly with self-
pollinated and minor crops. 
Since Turkey is a large and diverse 
country, there are adequate niches for small-
scale seed traders, for example in areas not 
covered by large companies due to remoteness 
(poor access) or insufficient demand. And 
there are no serious institutional or regulatory 
constraints that prevent small-scale companies 
from operating efficiently. These companies 
would be in a position to supply seed at 
affordable prices to smallholder farmers. 
Therefore, it would be worth considering the 
possibility of supporting such firms through 
government or other means, so long as they 
can supply high-quality seed. These 
companies could also benefit from entering 
into partnerships with government research 
institutes or large private companies which 
provide improved varieties and technical 
support. The emergence of a strong small-
scale sector would greatly improve seed 
supply and make the market more 
competitive. 
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The Involvement of Small-Scale Private Companies in 
Seed Multiplication and Distribution in Southern Africa— 
a Case Study, Agricultural Seeds and Services (Pvt) Ltd 
Abstract 
A number of factors limit the involvement of Zimbabwe's small-scale farmers in 
producing seed of hybrid crop varieties. However, they are in a position to produce 
seed of open-pollinated varieties. Agricultural Seeds and Services, a small seed 
company, has established successful seed production of a number of crops (cowpea, 
sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut) with these farmers, totaling some thousands of 
tons per year. Various difficulties encountered by the company with respect to the 
farmers themselves or in other areas such as government regulations, finance, and 
marketing are reviewed. The present position of the company, and directions it 
might take in the future, are discussed. 
The niche for small-scale seed 
companies 
What niches can small-scale companies f i l l , 
and what difficulties do they face in pursuing 
these niches? Agricultural Seeds and Services 
(Agriseeds), a private company in Zimbabwe, 
was founded in 1988. Today the company 
tests, produces, processes, and markets seed 
of open-pollinated varieties in the domestic 
and regional markets. Agriseeds started 
experimenting with seed production on 
contract with smallholders in 1992 for beans, 
cowpea, sorghum, and pearl millet. It is 
different from most other seed companies 
because its core business is the production 
and marketing only of open-pollinated 
varieties. Seed production of open-pollinated 
varieties is unattractive to large-scale 
commercial farmers because both yields and 
unit selling prices are lower than for hybrids. 
Profitability therefore does not compare well 
with other agricultural alternatives. For this 
reason Agriseeds started exploring ways to 
produce seed through small-scale and 
communal farmers. 
The company began to promote 
smallholder seed growers by entering selected 
villages in different parts of the country 
through village-level governance structures 
(Chief, Village Headman) and the Department 
of Agricultural, Technical and Extension 
Services (AGRITEX). We established contracts 
with farmers, identified (in consultation with 
1. Agricultural Seeds and Services (Pvt) Ltd, PO Box 6766, Harare, Zimbabwe. 2. Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Extension, University of Zimbabwe, PO Box MP 167, Mt Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe 
Kelly, R.D. and Rusike, J. 1997. The involvement of small-scale private companies in seed multiplication and distribution in 
Southern Africa—a case study. Agricultural Seeds and Services (Pvt) Ltd. Pages 54-60 in Alternative strategies for 
smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional 
Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, 
A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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local authorities) as good growers. Agriseeds 
supplies seed to these farmers without asking 
for immediate payment, provides technical 
advice and supervision through its own staff 
and government extension workers, 
negotiates prices with farmer representatives, 
and contracts to buy all the seed crop at the 
agreed price. 
A major problem with smallholder seed 
production is that it is difficult to prevent 
cross-pollination because of the close 
proximity of multiple holdings. Also, farmers 
are not always reliable—they will often sell 
the seed crop to other buyers even when there 
are written agreements, despite the fact that 
Agriseeds supplied the initial seed and 
provided technical services. Because of this 
unreliability, smallholder farmers are 
generally regarded as too risky; but the 
experience of Agriseeds demonstrates that 
this is not an insurmountable problem. 
Success has been achieved by developing 
mechanisms that accommodate smallholder 
needs. The company sends its buyers to 
purchase seed from points within the villages, 
provides its own bags so that farmers can 
take their containers back, and pays farmers 
on the spot in cash. In addition, as a service 
to farmers, the company buys other crops 
such as sunflower for sale to oil expellers 
even though it is not engaged in the 
marketing of sunflower seed. As a result, 
farmers do not incur transportation costs, 
need not spend time and money on 
marketing, save money on grain bags, do not 
wait long periods to be paid, and are able to 
sell other crops in addition to the seed crop. 
Farmers have realized the advantages of this 
system. 
Trucks are sent regularly to collect the 
seed and transport it to Agriseeds' cleaning 
plant in Harare for processing. In 1994/95 the 
company produced 150 t of groundnut, 140 t 
of bambara nut, 400 t of pearl millet, 500 t of 
sorghum, and smaller quantities of various 
other seed, e.g., sunhemp, beans, and sesame. 
Agriseeds also purchases grain of some 
crops and cleans it into seed. Production in 
each year is different depending on rainfall 
and other factors, so Agriseeds works closely 
with AGRITEX extension workers. Using 
crop forecasts and our own experience, the 
company is able to identify (even before the 
harvest) areas where seed production is 
adequate, and plan buying points, trans-
portation routes, and production quantities 
before it buys seed. The extension workers 
enjoy working with the company because 
they feel they are doing something useful. 
Whenever Agriseeds personnel are in the area 
they provide transport for AGRITEX field staff. 
Agriseeds has also benefitted by working 
with farmers' groups already established by 
Cooperative Development for Rural 
Communities (COOPIBO), a Belgium-based 
NGO that operates in Mudzi, Mutoko, 
Uzumba, Maramba, and Pfungwe Districts. 
COOPIBO makes the initial investments in 
organizing farmers into groups, constructing 
sheds, storage space etc., and developing an 
administrative structure and organizational 
routes that could facilitate further 
development work. Agriseeds can enter an 
area, identify groups that COOPIBO has 
helped put in place, and work with committee 
members. For example, during the 1996 
agricultural marketing season, Agriseeds 
reached agreements with farmers' groups in 
Mutoko and Mudzi to purchase sorghum and 
pearl millet seed at Z$ 1 kg-1 and shelled 
groundnut seed for Z$ 5 kg-1, compared to Z$ 
0.85 kg-1 for sorghum and pearl millet grain 
and Z$ 3 kg-1 for shelled groundnut grain 
offered by the Grain Marketing Board. 
Although Agriseeds incurs additional 
costs in better meeting the needs of its 
smallholder seed growers, the company 
obtains products that it requires and farmers 
get services that they want. At first farmers 
did not believe that the company would 
actually come to buy their crops on the 
agreed dates. They had been let down by 
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others on many occasions and were reluctant 
to trust any buyers from "town". Reliability 
on the part of the purchaser is extremely 
important to smallholders. 
Agriseeds has recently begun to develop 
formal forward contracting arrangements 
with smallholders in irrigation schemes and 
small-scale commercial farm areas. The 
company had some initial success with 
farmers in the Nyanyadzi Irrigation 
Scheme. Because these farmers use flood 
irrigation, they can produce high-quality, 
disease-free bean seed. In 1994/95 
Agriseeds established production contracts 
with farmers in Nyanyadzi and provided 
seed and seed inspection services. 
However, the farmers sold part of the seed 
crop as food grain to commodity traders. 
Therefore, the company terminated the 
relationship in 1995/96. Farmers inter-
viewed in this study explained that they 
could no longer obtain access to large-
seeded, better tasting, high-yielding 
varieties as a result of the cancellation of 
these contracts. From this it is clear that 
reliability on the part of the farmer as well 
as the buyer is important. 
Agriseeds launched cowpea seed 
production on contract with 40 small-scale 
commercial farmers in Dewure during the 
1993/94 season. Because of drought, the 
company hardly obtained any production in 
its first year of operation. In 1994/95, 47 t 
of cowpea seed was produced from 460 ha 
planted. The company then started to 
negotiate incentive contracts with farmers 
under which the quantity of seed supplied 
to each farmer depended on his 
performance the previous season. This 
resulted in 1995/96 in the planting, of 650 
ha and delivery of 400 t of seed. In 1996/97 
over 1700 ha was planted and 1000 t is 
expected to be harvested. Farmers in 
Dewure interviewed in this study reported 
that they have benefited from Agriseeds' 
activities because cowpea is a crop they 
can easily grow, it is early maturing, and 
brings in cash early during the season to 
meet household cash requirements for 
school fees, hired labor, and fertilizer for 
the maize crop. 
During the 1995/96 season Agriseeds 
expanded its seed production operations in 
Dewure to include pearl millet PMV 2 and 
sorghum SV 2. However, both varieties 
proved difficult to produce because of 
heavy predation by birds. One constraint 
during the season was the temporary ban 
on exports of sorghum and pearl millet 
seed at a critical time by the Ministry of 
Agriculture even though there was a surplus 
in the country. Agriseeds was forced to stop 
buying sorghum and pearl millet that 
season to avoid ending up with carry-over 
stocks. This created serious cash flow 
problems for the farmers. 
Agriseeds sells most of its seed to donors 
who give the seed away for free. The market 
through normal commercial channels for 
sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut, and most 
other open-pollinated seed is small. In 
contrast, maize seed is sold on a large scale. 
This is because almost all available maize 
varieties are hybrids, maize is easier to grow 
than small grains (no bird predation), yields 
are higher when rainfall is good, and a large 
number of people seem to prefer to eat maize 
rather than sorghum or pearl millet. 
Institutional constraints to 
small-scale companies 
There are six institutional constraints that 
prevent small-scale companies from operating 
efficiently. 
• Regulatory obstacles, including compul-
sory seed certification, and uncertainty 
about current regulations 
• Restrictions on seed exports 
• Seed technology constraints 
• Difficulties with enforcing contracts 
• Lack of finance 
• Undeveloped marketing infrastructure. 
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Government regulations— 
compulsory seed certification and 
uncertainty 
To protect farmers from being sold poor 
quality seed and to ensure that all seed 
companies offer one class of high quality 
seed, the Zimbabwe government's Department 
of Seed Services introduced compulsory 
certification in Jan 1994 for 10 crops. The 10 
crops were maize, sorghum, pearl millet, 
wheat, barley, soybean, groundnut, sunflower, 
tobacco, and potatoes. This made farmer-to-
farmer seed sales and exchange technically 
illegal. When certification is compulsory, 
small-farmer seed groups have to hire their 
own seed inspectors, develop an administrative 
structure, and thus incur high overhead costs 
like commercial seed companies. 
Small-scale seed production is further 
constrained by the fact that self-help groups 
have limited access to Seed Services 
inspectors and to the national seed testing 
laboratory—under the existing legislation 
there is only one officially acceptable seed 
testing and analysis laboratory that can 
certify seed as meeting acceptable standards. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle in the way of 
small-scale and communal farmers producing 
certified seed is that certification involves 
verification of genetic purity, seed purity, and 
germination. This means that only registered 
varieties can be grown, and the seed to plant 
the seed crop must be from approved "mother 
stock". This makes the task virtually 
impossible for such farmers. It also precludes 
the production of unregistered landrace 
material. 
Currently there is considerable uncertainty 
and confusion about regulations, procedures, 
and requirements in force because numerous 
changes have been made to the Seed 
Regulations and Seeds (Certification) Notice 
of 1971 but have not been gazetted. In 
practice, noncertified seed continues to change 
hands out of necessity. Further confusion was 
caused when the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce sent a letter to seed companies 
instructing them not to sell open-pollinated 
maize seed in Zimbabwe. This regulation was 
never gazetted; it is not law and creates the 
question in the mind of anyone wishing to 
trade in open-pollinated maize seed as to 
what measures wil l be instituted against them 
should they do so. It is difficult to understand 
why there should be an official desire to 
prevent the sale or cultivation of open-
pollinated maize varieties. 
Restrictions on seed exports 
Recently, Seed Services has started insisting 
that companies obtain International Orange 
Seed Lot Certificates before they can export 
seed, even when these are not required by the 
importing customers or country. To export 
any seed it is mandatory for a company to 
obtain an International Orange Certificate 
issued by Seed Services, a Phytosanitary 
Certificate from the Plant Protection 
Research Institute, and an export permit from 
the Economics and Markets Branch of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
Because of shortages of personnel, 
transport, laboratory facilities, and funds and 
the reluctance of Seed Services to authorize 
private laboratories to issue seed analysis 
certificates, a company can wait for up to 16 
weeks to obtain an International Orange 
Certificate. Even in cases where the variety 
has not been officially released in Zimbabwe, 
has not been certified (and therefore cannot 
be sold into the local market under the 
existing legislation) or has been produced 
specifically for export, an International 
Orange Certificate is still required. Further, 
the Economics and Markets Branch may 
refuse to issue an export permit if the seed is 
perceived to be required for the government 
Drought Relief or Crop Pack Programmes. 
Restrictions on seed exports are a 
constraint to expanded seed production by 
small-scale farmers because, until they were 
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introduced 3 years ago, communal farmers 
were able to sell (amongst other seed) 
thousands of tons of pearl millet grain 
annually to commodity traders. The traders 
then cleaned the grain to seed standards and 
exported it to South Africa, where it was sold 
as a forage crop known locally as babala. 
Partly as a result of these export restrictions, 
traders have stopping buying pearl millet 
grain from smallholders. This has reduced 
interest in the crop and resulted in a 
shrinkage of the domestic demand for seed. 
Restrictions on seed exports have 
similarly constrained small-scale production 
of other crops such as short-season groundnut. 
Until the restrictions were introduced, 
production by smallholders was sold to seed 
companies who cleaned, treated, tested, and 
packed it for export markets. However, due 
to increasing government restrictions buyers 
outside Zimbabwe have begun to switch to 
alternative suppliers in the region. 
Seed technology constraints 
There are sometimes technology constraints 
to seed production, for instance for certain 
sorghum varieties. Seed of the sorghum 
variety SV 1 has been difficult to produce at 
acceptable germination standards because of 
physiological problems. Similarly, seed of 
the sorghum hybrid ZWSH 1 suffered from 
poor synchronization between parent lines. 
Difficulties with contract 
enforcement 
Smallholder farmers engaged in seed 
production do not always honor their 
contracts. If spot market prices exceed 
forward contracted prices, farmers wil l sell 
the crop to other buyers with cash in hand. In 
a drought year, farmers may consume seed 
crops even when the seed contractor has 
provided planting seed and services free of 
charge. This results in high uncertainty about 
delivery, even with signed contracts, and 
discourages seed companies from working 
with smallholder seed growers. 
Lack of financing 
To produce seed, farmers require considerable 
capital outlay for purchasing fertilizer, 
fungicides, insecticides, and sprayers, and for 
casual labor. Most small-scale farmers do not 
know how to go about finding finance. And 
even if they do, the difficulty they face in 
obtaining credit is a major limiting factor in 
small-scale seed production (and in the 
development of small-scale agriculture in 
general). Problems have arisen in the past 
because farmers have not repaid loans taken 
from the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
and debt collection costs are very high. 
Understandably, financial institutions are not 
willing to lend money where they deem the 
risks are too great. Also, smallholders 
generally lack suitable collateral. Several 
credit systems, including group lending 
schemes, have been tried but these have 
failed. In addition, the high rate of interest on 
borrowed capital mitigates against success 
unless the season is good and there is no 
difficulty in marketing. 
Undeveloped marketing 
infrastructure 
Because of poor marketing infrastructure— 
lack of information on demand for open-
pollinated seed, lack of warehousing 
facilities, limited and unreliable postal and 
telephone services, lack of transport facilities, 
high transportation costs—it is difficult for 
small-scale seed producers located in a 
surplus area to sell their seed to deficit 
areas. Seed firms generally sell through 
middlemen such as traders and dealers with 
accompanying difficulties, increase in price 
of seed, and other financial problems. 
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Earlier, supply and marketing cooperatives 
existed, which had depots throughout 
smallholder areas; these depots were used 
by companies to retail seed to farmers. The 
recent collapse of these cooperatives has left 
a void in the marketplace that is proving 
difficult to f i l l . 
Open-pollinated crops present a 
marketing problem in themselves for several 
reasons—they are mostly minor crops; a 
large part of their production is consumed at 
home by the producers themselves; farmers 
retain a part of their crop for seed and 
therefore have no need to purchase 
commercial seed. The commercial markets 
for both seed and grain are thus small and 
provide little incentive to anyone to become 
involved in the production and marketing of 
seed. In addition, it is relatively easy for 
traders to deal in and sell open-pollinated 
grain as seed to unsuspecting buyers. This 
makes it difficult for specialist seed 
companies, which have much higher 
overhead costs. 
Historically, the main markets for seed 
of open-pollinated crops have been exports 
to neighboring countries. These markets are 
unstable because they are funded by NGOs 
whose activities are dependent on disasters 
and the availability of donor funds. They are 
not sustainable because donors are unwilling 
to fund free seed distribution except to 
alleviate human suffering in times of 
disaster. For instance, donor-driven seed 
markets in Mozambique, which were once 
large, have disappeared because of the 
restoration of peace. Furthermore, recent 
droughts in Zimbabwe have led the 
government to restrict exports of various 
seeds, leading potential customers in 
neighboring countries to turn to other 
countries for seed, thereby further reducing 
market size. Nor are the Zimbabwe Drought 
Relief or Crops Packs Programmes a long-
term market. 
Operational constraints and 
opportunities for small-scale 
companies 
How do small-scale companies compete 
effectively with larger firms including 
international seed companies? Although large 
firms hold the greater part of the market 
share in hybrids, there are many segments 
where smaller companies have a role to play. 
The turnover of certain crops and varieties is 
too small to be of interest to large companies; 
and the profits from the sale of open-
pollinated varieties may be unattractive in 
comparison to profits from hybrids. Smaller 
companies also enjoy other advantages, for 
example lower overhead costs, the ability to 
rapidly adapt to change in the market place, 
and the ability to offer customers more 
personalized service. 
Identifying and evaluating the market. Small 
companies do not have the resources to 
undertake costly market research as the large 
companies do. In general, however, there is 
no need for them to do so since their niche 
markets are more easily identifiable and 
market growth is through personal contact, 
by word of mouth, and by limited advertising. 
What can be done to facilitate more 
small-scale seed companies? 
As for most new developments in the private 
sector, the establishment of a new seed 
company is the result of the initiative and 
entrepreneurship of an individual or a group. 
Government assistance in some specific areas 
would improve the probability of success of 
such initiatives: 
• Provision of adequate low-interest finance 
• Training in specific areas such as crop 
inspection and seed processing techniques 
• Making available the parent material of 
government-bred or other varieties for 
bulking and sale. Small seed companies 
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do not have the ability to conduct research 
and breed their own varieties and are 
therefore dependent on government or 
other public breeding programs. 
Current position and future for 
Agriseeds 
Due to three principal reasons—the small and 
unpredictable market for open-pollinated 
seed varieties, declining funds from NGOs 
and government for seed distribution 
programs, and the limitations and difficulties 
resulting from restrictive seed and export 
regulations—Agriseeds has had to examine 
its business prospects very carefully in order 
to reduce risk and enhance stability. 
Decisions have been made to: 
• Tread extremely carefully with respect to 
those seeds regarded by government as 
strategic 
• Concentrate on smaller volumes of high-
value seeds and thus achieve the same 
financial turnover and profitability as 
much greater volumes of low-value seeds 
• Increase business in those seeds for which 
there is low marketing risk 
• Maintain involvement in a wide range of 
seed types. 
The result of these decisions wi l l be a 
greatly reduced involvement in sorghum and 
pearl millet (being "strategic" and low value) 
and increased business in such seeds as 
cowpea, groundnut, bambara nut, and beans, 
all of which can be sold as food if problems 
are experienced in the seed market. The 
company wil l continue its interest in pasture 
grass and legume seed as well as in many 
minor crops such as sesame, okra, and 
sunhemp. The use of small-scale and 
communal farmers as seed producers wi l l be 
continued and expanded because the 
company believes that many crop types and 
varieties are well suited to their situation and 
cannot be adequately produced by large-scale 
commercial farmers. 
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Seed Systems and the Role of the Private Sector in the 
ECOWAS Region 
A Joshua1 
Abstract 
This paper reviews the basic features of seed systems in African countries and the 
constraints and opportunities for private seed companies. It highlights the need to 
encourage privatization and develop viable commercial seed operations as the basis 
for a strong national seed industry. A case study of the Nigerian seed system is 
presented. Strategies for strengthening both formal and informal seed systems in the 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) region are discussed, 
including the roles that donor agencies and international research centers should 
play. The paper argues for a unified seed system model, in which government, the 
public sector, private firms, NGOs, and farmers' organizations all have distinct and 
complementary roles. 
Basic features of seed systems in the 
ECOWAS region 
With some exceptions (e.g., Nigeria), seed 
systems in the ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African States) region in 
Africa are generally inadequate. Public sector 
or parastatal agencies play a dominant role. 
Simultaneously, the government regulates 
seed production and pricing, inhibiting the 
emergence of private firms. Breeding and 
variety testing programs are poorly funded, 
and are often limited to testing varieties 
developed by international research centers 
or by other countries. Most research and seed 
production programs focus mainly on food 
crops (maize, sorghum, rice) and to a much 
smaller extent on horticultural crops. 
Farmer involvement in variety develop-
ment and testing (even in on-farm trials) is 
limited, with correspondingly poor adoption 
of improved varieties. In many countries, 
there is neither a national seed policy, nor a 
coordinated seed development strategy 
involving the different agencies. Quality 
control is inadequate. There are no clear 
certification procedures and seed legislation 
is either non-existent or poorly enforced. 
There is also an acute shortage of trained 
staff (plant breeders, seed technologists). 
International research centers (e.g., I ITA) 
have developed a number of high-yielding 
varieties, many of which have been released. 
Although there is a growing awareness of the 
benefits from improved varieties, seed supply 
continues to be problematic. 
1. Premier Seed Nigeria Ltd, PO Box 1673, Zaria, Kaduna State, Nigeria 
Joshua, A. 1997. Seed systems and the role of the private sector in the ECOWAS region. Pages 61-67 in Alternative 
strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and 
Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van 
Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics. 
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The seed system in Nigeria 
Both the ADP and the National Seed Service 
conduct seed promotion activities through 
on-farm demonstrations, field days, adver-
tisements, and awareness campaigns on 
improved varieties. Recent efforts to develop 
Nigeria's seed sector use four strategies. 
• Support for variety development, regis-
tration, release, and multiplication 
• Improvement in the quality of seeds sold 
to farmers 
• Re-orientation of public sector agencies 
along commercial lines, with a cost-
recovery pricing policy 
• Encouragement of private sector partici-
pation. 
While considerable progress has been made, 
seed availability continues to be inadequate, 
for a number of reasons. Farmers differ 
widely in wealth and resource availability 
and no single approach is effective for all 
categories. Pricing is an important factor. 
The marketing network is poor. Many 
farmers are still unaware of the benefits of 
improved varieties. Farmers tend to save 
their own seed and/or obtain seed (of 
traditional varieties) through farmer-to-
farmer exchange. Where hybrid seed is 
distributed, farmers commonly recycle seed, 
planting F1, F2, and even F3 seed. As a result 
of these factors, private and public sector 
seed companies, seed projects, and ADP 
Seed Units sometimes reported stocks of 
unsold seed. While lack of demand could be 
due to a combination of lack of awareness 
and high seed prices, another important 
factor is mismatch between production and 
demand—a shortage of popular varieties and 
lack of demand in other varieties. 
The national seed strategy has been 
modified to further improve seed availability 
and meet the needs of different categories of 
farmers (Table 1). The poorest farmers are 
targeted by extension staff. Public sector 
agencies focus on the next category (still 
mainly resource-poor farmers who generally 
use the informal seed sector). Private com-
panies target community-based systems, en-
suring moderate production costs and timely 
supply through distributors at affordable 
prices. Large private firms and multinationals 
target commercial farmers, who are willing to 
invest in new varieties and hybrids. 
Premier Seed Nigeria Limited 
Established in 1984, Premier Seed is the 
oldest private seed company in Nigeria. It 
was formerly a subsidiary of the American-
based Pioneer Seed Company, known as 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Seed (Nigeria) Ltd. The 
company produces, packages, and markets 
maize, soybean, sorghum, wheat, cotton, rice, 
and cowpea seed, as well as about 20 
varieties of local and exotic vegetable seeds 
(tomato, olga, onion, pepper, cabbage, 
cucumber, carrots, lettuce, egg-plant). The 
company's products include cultivars 
developed by IITA, ICRISAT, CIMMYT, 
and national research institutes as well as a 
few privately bred proprietary lines. Facilities 
include a 34-ha research farm. Al l seed 
produced is field-inspected, lab-tested, and 
certified by the National Seed Service. We 
collaborate with ADP on multilocational 
testing and on-farm demonstration plots 
throughout Nigeria. The company markets 
seed in Nigeria through a network of 
distributors. In addition, it exports seed to 
other ECOWAS countries, and is planning to 
set up dealerships and seed production 
operations in collaboration with private firms 
and government agencies in other ECOWAS 
countries. 
The experience of Premier Seeds in 
Nigeria has shown that, to succeed, a private 
seed company must provide high-quality, 
moderately priced seed, and must be able to 
effectively market its quality advantages. 
Simultaneously, it must be cost-conscious, 
and flexible to respond to market demand. It 
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Table 1. Strategies for improving seed availability for different categories of farmers in Nigeria. 
Category Action plan Remarks 
Farmers who cannot purchase seed Responsibility of extension staff. 
Extension concentrates on 
farmer seed situation 
Informal seed system 
Farmers who could buy seed if Serviced by local seed producer/seller, Informal seed system, 
it were available on time i.e., community-level seed production 
and marketing 
non-certified seed 
Farmers willing to purchase Serviced by private seed companies, Farmers operate on a 
certified seed/hybrids which use their own dealers or larger scale with higher 
public sector marketing institutions investment, than 
previous category 
Small-scale but "high technology" Serviced by private seed companies This category has the 
farmers, medium and large-scale and multinationals highest levels of invest-
farmers ment in new varieties 
and technology. Brand 
names become 
important 
must have a sufficiently long-term commit-
ment to withstand business cycles. In 
addition, it must work closely with national 
and international research centers and with 
extension staff. Multinational firms in par-
ticular should give a priority to hiring and 
training local staff. 
Premier Seeds has been able to create a 
market (e.g., for hybrids), producing enough 
seed to meet demand, even though profit 
margins are very small initially. The 
company has launched community-level pilot 
projects to produce and deliver seed, which 
have shown encouraging results. 
Based on our 12 years of experience in 
Nigeria, the question for seed companies is 
not whether they have problems, but rather 
how to minimize these problems, how to 
work more closely with government institutes 
and agricultural departments, and what crops 
to focus on to ensure profitability and 
survival. 
Development of the private sector 
The development of private seed companies 
is vital for many reasons—reliability, 
sustainability, cost-effectiveness, responsive-
ness to farmers' needs, greater commitment to 
quality, and generation of employment. 
Privatization is particularly urgent in the 
context of liberalization and structural 
adjustment programs in many countries. Joint 
ventures between international companies 
and local firms wil l be particularly beneficial. 
This wil l provide an infusion of new 
technology, the experience of trained resear-
chers, and materials with genetic diversity for 
the development of more improved varieties. 
In addition, such ventures wil l increase the 
pool of investment in African seed supply 
systems, increase regional (and international) 
seed imports and exports, and force local 
firms to improve not only quality but also 
marketing and sales promotion. 
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Governments must therefore develop 
concrete, time-bound programs to phase out 
costly and inefficient direct public sector 
involvement in seed production and 
processing. However, turbulent change (over-
rapid privatization) can be equally disruptive, 
and must be avoided. We suggest a system in 
which the public and private sectors both 
play important roles, as in the "unified 
system" discussed below. 
Governments can encourage private 
sector development in several ways. For 
example, they should make firm indents for 
the purchase of seed from private firms (a 
predetermined proportion, say 10%, 20%, or 
30%, of national seed requirements). This 
wil l stimulate growth and simultaneously 
ensure the timely availability of seed for 
government distribution programs. The 
government should concentrate on creating a 
positive environment for private sector 
expansion by resolving the many constraints 
that impede private investment. 
Constraints to private seed sector 
development 
Private sector involvement in the ECOWAS 
region is constrained by a number of factors, 
many of which could be addressed by 
appropriate seed policies and government 
action. Governments (and international 
development agencies) often view private 
firms with suspicion about their profit 
motives. The market is often too small to 
attract significant private investment. Inputs 
(fertilizer, herbicides, seed bags) are in short 
supply. Facilities and equipment for seed 
treatment are limited. On the output side, 
marketing and distribution systems are often 
under government control. In many cases, 
poor adoption of hybrid seed is due to poor 
extension (sometimes because extension staff 
have misconceptions about hybrids). 
Plant breeders' rights legislation either 
does not exist or is poorly enforced. This 
keeps firms from investing in variety 
development or even in seed trading. Many 
regulations on importing and exporting seed 
(e.g., phytosanitary and quality requirements) 
are unrealistic and need to be liberalized. 
Seed legislation and rules must be clear and 
reasonable. A major problem for the 
emerging seed industry is lack of a stable, 
transparent set of rules. Business cannot 
succeed if private firms have no recourse to 
appeal against government decisions they see 
as being arbitrary or unfair. 
The government should support the 
private sector and the private sector should, 
in turn, respect government priorities. The 
best solution would be to constitute a national 
seed council, with representation from 
government, public and private sectors, and 
NGOs involved in seed projects. Discussions 
within the council would help identify and 
remove barriers to private sector expansion. 
Strengthening national seed systems 
Modern varieties wil l have little impact 
unless high-quality seed is freely available, 
on time and at moderate prices. The 
traditional "informal" system has many 
merits, but also disadvantages of limited 
impact in terms of diffusion of improved 
varieties. Often, this system is unable to 
guarantee quality or ensure varietal purity. 
Thus, an alternative system is needed, which 
wi l l involve all possible players—seed 
producers at all levels (small-scale, private 
firms, parastatals), research, extension, 
government agencies, and farmers, working 
together. 
In the envisaged "unified system", public 
sector institutes wi l l support applied research 
and development, while the private sector 
focuses on production, processing, and 
marketing. It is not a question of whether the 
private sector or the public sector is better at 
developing a country's seed industry, but 
rather how the two sectors can best comple-
ment each other's expertise. The government 
wi l l enforce quality standards, oversee 
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private competition, ensure that extension 
services are adequate, and provide financial 
support for private firms and small-scale 
seed growers. Most important, it wi l l 
provide a clear and reasonable set of rules to 
encourage the private sector. The public 
sector wi l l work closely with extension staff 
to transfer technology developed by both the 
public and private sectors. NGOs wi l l act as 
a bridge between the public and private 
sectors, providing technical assistance to 
small-scale seed projects, improving the 
supply of inputs, and bringing farmers' 
groups into the commercial system. 
Farmers' organizations wi l l participate in 
producing, distributing, and promoting 
improved seed. 
At a regional level, periodic workshops/ 
seminars need to be held, to meet four key 
objectives: 
• Identify priorities for collective action 
• Identify variety requirements and thus 
clearly define research targets 
• Develop closer research collaboration 
with ICRISAT, I ITA, and other inter-
national research centers 
• Attract more donor support. 
These workshops (which could be 
organized separately for English- and French-
speaking countries), wi l l help enunciate a 
regional policy, strengthen research and 
technology transfer, and exploit the strengths 
of international institutes and some national 
programs for mutual benefit. Even more 
important, they wil l ensure that seed pro-
duction and distribution is a high priority in 
all ECOWAS countries. 
Elements of a seed policy 
What seed policy is most appropriate for a 
particular country wi l l depend on the stage 
of development of seed markets and the 
seed industry in that country. But broadly, 
all policies must consider the following 
aspects. 
Forecasting 
• Build a database of past history to analyze 
trends and account for abnormalities 
• Study farmers' preferences and past record 
of adoption, compare what farmers say 
they wil l do with what they actually did 
• Evaluate seasonal effects 
• Improve researchers' knowledge of 
demand-forecasting methods 
• Study economic components—effect of 
pricing pattern, effect of policy decisions, 
correlation between economic indicators 
and seed uptake. 
Production 
• Maintain high quality standards through 
training for technical staff and investment 
in processing equipment and laboratory 
testing facilities 
• Offer clear-cut contracts and viable 
pricing to attract high-caliber farmers, 
build up a stable and reliable base of seed 
growers 
• Increase breeding research and testing to 
ensure a continuous flow of improved 
varieties 
• Hold down costs through improvements 
in technology and efficiency 
• Target export markets by developing and 
promoting high-quality varieties with 
specific traits. 
Packaging and distribution 
• Ensure that packaging provides adequate 
protection 
• Provide a range of pack sizes 
• Provide labels that not only conform to 
legislation, but also include information 
on seed dressing, sowing rate, special 
plant protection requirements, etc 
• Educate wholesale and retail distributors 
about seed care and storage 
• Increase promotional efforts, educate 
farmers on the cost/benefit ratios of new 
varieties 
• Encourage bulk buyers (e.g., farmers' 
groups). 
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The role of international institutes 
Both the public and private sectors have 
ready access to germplasm and improved 
varieties and hybrids developed by 
international research institutes. This factor 
has helped public sector seed organizations, 
and was equally crucial for private seed 
companies (for example, more than 85% of 
the improved varieties seeds sold by Premier 
Seeds were developed by ICRISAT, IITA, 
and CIMMYT). Without this access, it is 
doubtful whether any seed company would 
have begun operations in Nigeria due to the 
heavy investments (and high risk) needed to 
develop proprietary lines. IITA and ICRISAT 
have provided seed production training 
courses and study visits in Nigeria to staff 
from the national program and private firms. 
However, international research centers must 
expand their activities in Nigeria and 
throughout the ECOWAS if strong national 
seed systems are to develop. 
Breeder seed production is often a 
bottleneck. These institutes must greatly 
expand their efforts to produce and supply 
breeder seed of the varieties they develop, 
and provide training on seed production. 
International institutes should work not only 
with public research institutes but also with 
private seed companies, NGOs, and 
extension staff to overcome seed shortages 
and stimulate the adoption of improved 
varieties. Ideally, international institutes 
should set up seed units to work on seed 
technology research, training, seed produc-
tion, and provide advice on seed policy 
issues. Other areas of collaboration are the 
design and implementation of regional trials, 
and collection and dissemination of regional 
data on seed trade and variety performance. 
Roles for donor agencies 
Donor agencies can play a crucial role in 
helping to develop a strong private sector. 
Among other ways, they can: 
• Help governments develop national seed 
policies 
• Support the restructuring of public seed 
corporations and retraining of their staff 
• Encourage policy changes that wil l reduce 
or eliminate barriers faced by private firms 
• Link donor support for seed programs 
more closely to ongoing or planned 
support for other agricultural services, 
including research and extension 
• Provide greater support for research (inclu-
ding testing and variety maintenance) 
• Create regional seed technology centers 
and promote regional seed associations 
and regional seed trade 
• Strengthen training programs by provi-
ding support for training institutions, and 
sponsorships for seed technology training 
courses and study tours 
• Design and support programs for better 
coordination between the formal and 
informal sectors 
• Support pilot projects to strengthen 
informal, village-level seed production 
• Provide foreign exchange for the import 
of seed processing equipment. 
Models of seed production systems 
Four alternative models of seed production 
systems are discussed below. 
State/Parastatal—contract seed grower model. 
This is a "formal" seed production model 
suitable for both low- and high-risk crops. In 
this model, the public sector is involved more 
in coordinating production rather than in 
actual production. Researchers provide breeder 
seed to parastatals or state seed agencies, 
which then multiply the seed on their own 
farms and/or through contract growers. Sub-
sequently, seed cleaning, processing, and 
marketing are done by the parastatal or state 
agency. 
Private sector—seed cooperative model. This 
model is more commercial or profit-oriented 
than the previous model, with the private 
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sector (including cooperatives) playing the 
key role. Public researchers and private seed 
companies provide breeder seed to the 
private company that wil l multiply it to 
produce foundation seed and produce and sell 
commercial seed. Processing and seed 
marketing are performed by the private firm. 
Decentralized, farmer-based seed production. 
This is a bridge between the formal and 
informal seed systems—essentially informal 
production and distribution of improved 
varieties, using breeder/foundation seed pur-
chased from research institutes. It combines 
the technical advantages of research (improved 
varieties) with the cost advantages of farmer-
management. Researchers' involvement stops 
at producing breeder/foundation seed. Al l 
downstream activities—multiplication, cleaning, 
marketing—are done by the seed producer/ 
seller (e.g., farmers' group). Seed processing 
is done locally or subcontracted to a (small-
scale) commercial processor. The end 
product is non-certified but truthfully labeled 
seed that conforms to prescribed standards, 
and is sold to farmers. In addition, producers 
under this system can produce seed on 
contract for private seed firms (the second 
model) or unite to form a small-scale private 
firm. 
Unified system. A "unified system" that 
combines the three models discussed above, 
wil l help meet national seed requirements 
and enhance the impact of research results 
through improved seed supply. It must be 
noted that to ensure sustainability, all models 
(or all components of a unified system) must 
follow a cost-recovery pricing policy. The 
unified system would involve registration of 
seed growers (the possibility of being 
delicensed wil l force growers to maintain 
quality), and would encourage rural seed 
enterprises to function as contract growers to 
large private companies. Simultaneously, the 
private sector could be encouraged, through 
associations and partnerships, to integrate 
vertically (research, production, processing, 
distribution, promotion) to improve the 
movement of seed to farmers. 
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Abstract 
International agricultural research centers (IARCS) have been successful in 
developing new varieties in partnership with national agricultural research systems 
(NARS). However, adoption of these varieties has been low, particularly in Africa, 
where seed production and distribution systems are generally inadequate. IARCs 
have much of the infrastructure and staff needed to help improve the seed sector, but 
historically have focused on their core area of competence—research—rather than 
on development work (extension, seed production). These priorities are unlikely to 
change, in view of recent and continuing budget cuts. 
This paper discusses efforts made by six IARCs (CIAT, ICARDA, ICRISAT, IITA, 
ILRI, WARDA) to support the seed sector in their respective mandate regions. 
ICARDA is the only IARC with a currently functional seed unit. However, all IARCs 
participate in seed sector improvement in various ways, e.g., production of small 
quantities of breeder/basic seed; technical advice on seed production to NARS, 
public and private companies, NGOs, and farmers' cooperatives; monitoring 
adoption and seed production of released varieties; assessing constraints to seed 
multiplication and marketing; training of seed sector staff; information 
dissemination through brochures and seed production manuals; and provision of 
policy advice to governments. 
Introduction 
The need for strong seed programs has long 
been recognized by national and international 
organizations, because only with efficient 
seed programs can plant breeding research 
lead to improvements in crop production. The 
strength of seed programs varies from one 
country to another. But in general, with some 
exceptions in North and Southern Africa, 
seed systems in Africa are not as well 
developed as those in South America and 
South East Asia. 
In Africa, large areas are still sown to 
traditional varieties. Seed production and 
marketing is often affected by inadequate 
policies, poor management skills, and the lack 
of incentives, trained manpower, and facilities. 
1. IITA/GTZ Promotion of Seed Production and Marketing Project, PO Box 9698, KIA, Accra, Ghana. 2. Seed Unit, 
ICARDA, PO Box 5466, Aleppo, Syria. 3. Crops Research Institute, PO Box 3785, Kumasi, Ghana 
van Gastel, A.J.G., Bishaw, Z., and Asiedu, E. 1997. The role of international-agricultural research centers in supporting 
the seed sector. Pages 71-79 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference 
on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, 
Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D. Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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• Dissemination of improved varieties 
developed by national and international 
research institutions is too slow. (This is 
not necessarily due to deficiencies in the 
seed system, but also because the varieties 
do not meet farmers' needs.) 
• Procedures for evaluation and release are 
often bureaucratic and inappropriate, and 
hamper the release of new varieties. 
• When new varieties are released, research 
programs often produce insufficient 
quantities (and poor quality) of breeder 
and/or foundation seed. 
• Several national programs (e.g., Namibia 
and Botswana) have seed multiplication 
schemes on research farms or by contract 
growers. When well managed, these 
schemes have been reasonably successful. 
However, these schemes are generally 
subsidized by governments and effectively 
discourage genuine commercial production. 
In addition, these programs have limited 
future prospects due to budget uncertainties. 
• Governments and donors have funded 
seed distribution programs for drought 
and refugee relief, e.g., sorghum and pearl 
millet in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, 
and Angola. The commercial sustaina-
bility of these programs is not guaranteed. 
• Many governments are gradually 
restricting their activities to variety 
development and quality control, leaving 
a vacuum in the production and marketing 
of seed of improved varieties. 
• International seed companies have 
invested in a number of countries 
(Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Mozambique), often in joint 
ventures with national seed companies. 
However, in some countries (Ivory Coast, 
Ethiopia, Sudan) these companies have 
scaled down or suspended operations 
because of difficulties (e.g., small 
markets, high operating expenses, poor 
profitability, government regulations). 
• Smaller private national seed companies 
are also being established, for example in 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe. However, some 
of these firms rely on government and 
donor orders for seed for relief programs; 
the quality and sustainability of some of 
these operations remains in doubt. 
• Most private companies, whether inter-
national or otherwise, produce seed only 
of the most profitable crops (hybrid seed, 
vegetables). Seed production of the many 
self-pollinating food crops (bean, cowpea, 
sorghum, millet, pigeonpea) is less 
profitable, because the market is small— 
most farmers use farm-saved seed—and 
demand is inconsistent due to unreliable 
climatic conditions. Varieties with narrow 
local adaptation, targeted at specific areas, 
are of least interest to seed firms, although 
they are vital for small-scale farmers. 
• The formal (public and private) seed 
sector does not effectively meet the seed 
needs of smallholder farmers. Supplies 
are generally restricted to a few varieties, 
and cannot meet the specific varietal 
requirements of the many different 
ecologies in which smallholder crops are 
produced. 
• More and more emphasis is being placed 
on seed production in the informal sector. 
Small-scale, decentralized producer 
cooperatives have been established in several 
countries, but have rarely been successful 
(Ghana, Mali, and Uganda are exceptions). 
• A number of NGOs have invested in 
small-scale village seed production schemes 
(e.g., in Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, 
and Tanzania), often as a development 
activity after the recent droughts. The 
sustainability of these schemes when 
donor/NGO subsidies are withdrawn is 
not ensured. 
Even in countries where the seed sector 
appears to function well, large numbers of 
low-income, resource-poor farmers have no 
access to quality seed.of improved varieties 
and are unable to utilize the fruits of crop 
improvement research. This situation is even 
worse for root and tuber crops such as 
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cassava, yam, banana, and plantain. A 
sustained effort to support the formal and 
informal seed sectors is required to ensure that 
food production does not deteriorate further. 
This paper tries to assess what the 
institutions of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
are doing in Africa in the area of seed. Can 
they do more? Should they do more? 
The CGIAR 
The CGIAR is an informal association of 
countries, international organizations, and 
private institutions. It is cosponsored by the 
World Bank, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, 
the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), and the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP). The CGIAR's main 
objectives are to sustain food security in 
developing countries through support to the 
international agricultural research system. 
There are 16 international agricultural 
research centers (IARCs), located in different 
countries. Fourteen of these have a 
commodity orientation, and conduct research 
and training on crop improvement and 
natural resource management and conser-
vation. The mandates of the other two IARCs 
are more general. The International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) deals with 
food policy issues, while the International 
Service for National Agricultural Research 
(ISNAR) focuses on the management of 
agricultural research and on strengthening 
national programs. 
IARCs and seed program 
development 
Improved germplasm developed and supplied 
by IARCs has been widely released by 
national agricultural research systems 
(NARS) in a number of developing countries, 
but the impact of these materials has been 
limited by seed production and marketing 
constraints. Johnson Douglas, one of the 
pioneers of seed program development, 
commented in 1988 that "To reach the 
CGIAR's goal of contributing to increasing 
sustainable food production... requires the 
development of a more effective seed supply 
system than exists now... IARCs have much 
of the infrastructure and staff needed to make 
an impact in seed sector improvement." This 
is as valid today as it was during the 1980s. 
IARCs can contribute significantly towards 
seed sector development because they have 
considerable expertise in initiating and 
managing or backstopping seed programs in 
developing countries; are committed to long-
term involvement; and can utilize networks 
(often developed or supported by them) to 
deliver genetic material and other technology 
to almost all developing countries. 
This paper discusses efforts made by the 
different IARCs to support the seed sector in 
their respective mandate regions. Information 
was sought from eight Centers, of which 
six—CIAT, ICARDA, ICRISAT, I ITA, 
ILRI, WARDA—responded. No response 
was received from CIMMYT and IRRI. This 
information was supplemented with personal 
observations and the authors' experiences. 
Generally, all IARCs working with 
commodities encourage and promote new 
technologies which they develop in 
cooperation with national programs, with the 
aim of ensuring that these technologies reach 
farming communities. IARCs, as a matter of 
policy, are not involved in large-scale seed 
production. However, they participate in seed 
sector improvement in various ways. 
• Production of very limited quantities of 
breeder/basic (foundation) seed for 
distribution to NARS (mainly for 
evaluation), public and private companies, 
NGOs, and development agencies 
• Assistance to NARS in the production of 
small quantities of breeder seed of 
released and promising varieties 
• Technical advice on seed production to 
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various organizations (public and private 
companies, NGOs, cooperatives) 
• Monitoring adoption and seed production 
of released varieties, assessing constraints 
to seed multiplication and marketing 
• Training NARS and seed sector staff in 
variety maintenance, breeder seed produc-
tion, and other areas of seed technology 
• Preparation of training materials (slides, 
audio-tutorials, videos), brochures, and 
seed production manuals 
• Policy advice to governments on seed 
program development to ensure a 
continuous flow of improved varieties 
from researchers to farmers. 
Some IARCs support special seed 
production projects. For instance, I ITA has a 
German-funded special project, Promotion of 
Seed Production and Marketing in West 
Africa. WARDA has a seed project, Research 
on Accelerated Diffusion of Rice 
Technologies (RADORT). 
Very few IARCs employ seed scientists 
or seed program development specialists 
through their core budgets. CIAT and ILCA 
(now ILRI) did so in the past, but CIAT's 
Seed Unit was closed down in 1992, while 
ILCA's Seed Unit was merged with their 
Forage Genetic Resources Unit. At present, 
ICARDA is probably the only IARC that 
employs (some of the) staff of its Seed Unit 
through its core budget. In most cases, seed-
related activities are implemented by an 
individual scientist or a small team whose 
primary task is different (breeding, 
pathology, impact assessment, etc). 
WARDA 
The West African Rice Development Asso-
ciation (WARDA), headquartered in Cote 
d'lvoire, produces breeder seed for supply to 
national programs of member countries, 
NGOs, and development agencies. Sometimes 
WARDA, through its Task Force mechanism, 
provides small grants to national programs 
which submit projects to multiply seed of 
promising varieties for on-farm trials. WARDA 
provides technical support to NARS to set up 
or strengthen variety release and seed 
production schemes and is currently part of a 
panel responsible for establishing a variety 
release and seed multiplication scheme in 
Cote d'lvoire. WARDA has also developed 
technical seed production manuals that are 
distributed to NARS partners. 
Regional surveys are conducted of the 
different variety release mechanisms and 
seed production schemes in the subregion. 
WARDA has recently initiated a project on 
Research on Accelerated Diffusion of Rice 
Technologies (RADORT), which wil l work 
with extension agencies in Cote d'lvoire, 
Gambia, and Senegal to train contract farmers 
and technicians in seed multiplication. 
ICRISAT 
Scientists at the International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) have proposed a strategy with the 
following components. 
• Breeder seed—assist NARS with the 
production of breeder seed of released 
varieties, mainly through training of 
NARS staff. However, ICRISAT may 
directly produce limited quantities (up to 
100 kg) on behalf of a NARS for a period 
of not more than 2 years. 
• Foundation and commercial seed—should 
not be involved in the production of 
foundation or commercial seed, but could 
provide technical advice or training to 
public and private companies, NGOs, and 
small-scale seed companies willing to 
multiply and distribute newly released 
varieties. This involvement would also 
help ICRISAT verify the performance and 
acceptability of released varieties. 
• Monitoring seed production—develop and 
maintain a database on seed multiplica-
tion and distribution of released varieties 
of its mandate crops. 
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• Evaluating seed market constraints— 
periodically assess constraints to seed 
multiplication and distribution, by 
analyzing the structure of seed demand, 
the commercial constraints to seed supply, 
the relative contributions of public and 
private seed supply channels, and national 
seed security strategies. 
The Institute's breeders, economists, and 
technology transfer specialists are involved in 
these efforts, but as a secondary activity, in 
addition to their normal tasks. 
CIAT 
The Centro Internacional de Agricultura 
Tropical (CIAT), based in Colombia, was the 
first IARC to establish a Seed Unit. This was 
done in 1971, with support from the Swiss 
government, to strengthen the national seed 
programs primarily in Latin America and the 
Caribbean region. The Seed Unit, led by the 
late Johnson Douglas, was active in training 
(including development of training materials), 
breeder and basic seed production, and seed 
technology research, and forged strong 
technical cooperative linkages with national 
seed programs in the region. It is also well 
known for its pioneering work focusing on 
seed supply for small-scale farmers. 
In the authors' opinion the CIAT Seed Unit 
contributed significantly to seed sector 
development, and it was rather unfortunate that 
it was closed down in 1992. The closure was 
due to funding constraints, and because CIAT 
felt that support to the informal sector could be 
provided more effectively by decentralized 
activities rather than through a centralized Seed 
Unit. CIAT's strategy now centers on 
stimulating seed production of crops that are 
poorly served by the formal sector, particularly 
smallholder food crops and low-value crops. 
ILRI 
The International Livestock Research 
Institute (ILRI), Kenya, set up a Herbage 
Seed Unit in the late 1980s with financial 
support from the Swiss government. The Unit 
produced seeds of promising forage grass, 
legume, and fodder tree genotypes for distri-
bution to national programs for research and 
to establish national forage seed production 
capacity. It also conducted training courses in 
forage seed production, and developed training 
materials including a seed production manual. 
Once Swiss funding ended, the Seed Unit 
was amalgamated with the Forage Genetic 
Resources Unit in the mid 1990s. ILRI 
continues its seed production and training 
activities under the Genetic Resources Unit, 
but with far lower priority than before. 
I ITA 
The International Institute for Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA, Nigeria) initiated a special 
project in 1996 to support the seed sector in 
Western African countries, with financial 
assistance from GTZ. The project has begun 
training national seed staff in production and 
seed marketing. In collaboration with 
researchers, seed specialists, and the 
extension service, the project also supports 
the informal sector in northern Nigeria and 
Ghana. Seed of improved varieties is 
distributed to farm communities, and these 
communities are provided support to enable 
them to grow their own seed. Future plans are 
to set up a seed center (along the lines of 
ICARDA's Seed Unit) to support national 
and regional production of seed and planting 
material and promote further regional 
development and dissemination of know-how 
in the seed sector. Key areas of work wil l be: 
• Transfer of existing know-how through 
networking, training, information exchange, 
and provision of advisory services to all 
sectors (national seed organizations, seed 
producers, seed societies, farmers, NGOs, 
marketing organizations) 
• Strengthen the capacity of various 
organizations to produce seed and 
planting material 
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• Improve regional cooperation among 
countries through networking of national 
seed systems 
• Promote the development and introduc-
tion of appropriate varieties of seed and 
planting material 
• Promote propagation of root and tuber 
crops and plantain/banana. 
ICARDA 
The rest of this paper describes efforts by the 
International Center for Agricultural 
Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) to 
strengthen the seed sector in the West Asia 
and North Africa (WANA) region. These 
efforts provide a model for what should be 
done in certain other parts of the world, of 
course after modifications to suit local 
conditions. ICARDA is the only IARC with a 
currently functional Seed Unit. This is an 
independent unit within ICARDA, establis-
hed in 1985, supported by the Center's core 
budget and by the governments of the 
Netherlands and Germany for the past 10 
years. 
The Head of the Seed Unit is assisted by 
three senior staff and technical staff. The 
Unit is widely recognized throughout the 
region as a source of information on seed; it 
provides technical advice on production 
problems, conducts practical seed technology 
courses, and hosts the secretariat of the 
WANA Seed Network. In addition, the Unit 
also works in close collaboration with 
ICARDA's commodity programs. 
The Unit's overall objective is to 
strengthen national seed production organiza-
tions in WANA. Specific objectives are to: 
• Train public, private, and NGO staff in 
seed technology, develop training 
materials, and disseminate information 
• Strengthen national seed production 
infrastructure 
• Make available high-quality seed of 
ICARDA-related varieties 
• Conduct seed technology research related 
to the WANA region 
• Networking, informal seed sector activi-
ties, economics studies on seed and seed 
security (recently added). 
Training. Because well trained and educated 
staff are the "engine" that drives any 
successful seed program, ICARDA's Seed 
Unit allocates a major part of its resources to 
training. Over 100 staff from the region are 
trained every year. Several seed production 
training manuals and audio-tutorials have 
been produced; some have been translated 
into Arabic. Experience over the last 10 years 
has shown that a three-pronged approach is 
best—train-the-trainer courses for technical 
managers and technicians; training seminars 
for seed program managers; and post-
graduate studies in seed science and 
technology. 
Seed production. To stimulate seed 
production of ICARDA-related varieties, the 
Unit produces small quantities of breeder and 
basic seed for distribution in the region. This 
material is used for research purposes and to 
initiate seed multiplication of newly released 
varieties in WANA countries. On average, 
30 t of seed have been produced each year 
during the last 10 years. 
Institutional support. The Unit carries out a 
variety of activities aimed at strengthening 
national seed systems in the region. These 
activities include: workshops and discussions 
on specific problems and to formulate action 
plans; small country projects to support seed 
production; consultancies to advise govern-
ments on specific aspects (e.g., field inspection 
methods, seed and field standards, seed 
cleaning, seed treatment, strategies for 
developing the informal sector); assistance in 
morphological variety description; and seed 
surveys to determine farm-level problems. 
Seed technology research. Seed technology 
problems under harsh environments are often 
not well understood; there is a need for 
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additional research to address these 
problems. However, because training and 
infrastructure development was considered 
more critical than research, only a limited 
amount of practical seed-related research was 
conducted, mainly through post-graduate 
students. 
Networking. Cooperation among WANA 
countries on seed production and marketing 
is limited, and ICARDA's Seed Unit is 
playing a catalytic role to strengthen mutual 
cooperation through the creation of the 
WANA Regional Seed Network. This 
Network was established in 1992 and has 18 
member countries (Fig. 1) which make up the 
Network Council, as well as 10 regional and 
international organizations as observers. The 
18 members are—Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. 
The objectives of the Network are to promote 
cooperation and information exchange, and 
standardize seed production and control 
procedures to integrate national seed systems 
and promote regional seed trade. These 
objectives are achieved through: 
• Coordination and implementation of seed-
related activities among member countries 
• Promotion of cooperation among member 
countries for efficient use of resources, to 
ensure adequate seed supply through 
cooperation 
• Standardization of seed policy and the 
regulatory framework to harmonize 
procedures and operations across the region. 
Informal seed sector. The formal seed sector 
has been unable to deliver the results of crop 
improvement research to many farming 
communities in developing countries. In 
general, it is large-scale farmers rather than 
resource-poor smallholders who have 
benefitted from investment in the develop-
ment of improved varieties. Whether this is 
due to the inefficiency of the formal seed 
sector or because the approach to variety 
development was inappropriate for small-
scale farmers is a matter for debate. In any 
case, participatory plant breeding may well 
be a more suitable approach to reach the 
small-scale farmer. 
Although considerable information is 
available on variety development, seed 
production, and quality control in the formal 
Figure 1. Member countries of the WANA seed network. 
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seed sector, we lack information on 
traditional methods of plant selection, variety 
maintenance, and seed production and 
handling. Indigenous knowledge can be 
exploited, and local seed supply mechanisms 
studied and adapted to develop sustainable 
informal systems that meet the needs of 
small-scale farmers in developing countries. 
To understand the dynamics of seed 
supply (particularly the informal sector) in 
developing countries, it is necessary to study 
farmers' perceptions of modern varieties and 
seeds, and measure the adoption/impact of 
new technology. The Seed Unit has initiated 
several surveys in WANA (Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan) and intends 
to emphasize this aspect vigorously in the 
coming years. The objectives are to study 
various key parameters—adoption of modern 
varieties and technology; varietal and seed 
renewal rates, varietal change/deterioration, 
seed sources and seed quality, distribution 
of seedborne diseases and pests, local seed 
management and storage practices, and socio-
economic constraints to technology adoption. 
Preliminary results from these surveys 
provide interesting comparisons of quality 
of seed obtained from different sources. 
Economics of seed production. Seed 
programs are often implemented without a 
proper economic and financial analysis. The 
Seed Unit has initiated a research and action 
program focusing specifically on the 
economic efficiency of seed programs at the 
institutional, micro-, and macro-economic 
levels. Such information is essential to plan 
seed sector activities or judge the feasibility 
of private seed enterprises. The objective of 
the program is to improve the cost efficiency 
of national and regional seed supply systems, 
develop performance indicators, standardize 
methodologies for economic analyses of seed 
programs, and formulate policy and technical 
recommendations to improve seed supply. 
The program wi l l include country surveys and 
case studies in seed production economics. 
Seed security. Access to seed after disaster 
situations (e.g., drought) is critical to the 
success of rehabilitation efforts. Seed 
security strategies need to be in place in 
anticipation of such situations. The available 
resources and infrastructure are not sufficient 
to produce and store large quantities of seed 
of different varieties. However, seed security 
can be built into national seed programs by 
maintaining carry-over seed or buffer stocks 
of early-generation materials. It can also be 
strengthened by networking the national 
systems and sensitizing policy makers at the 
regional level. 
The ICARDA Seed Unit has commissio-
ned a study on seed security and has received 
funds from the United States Department of 
Agriculture to implement a small pilot 
project to study seed security in the region. 
The main aim of the project is to provide 
information on seed (availability, producers, 
varieties) and regulations (variety release, 
quarantine, seed trade) so that governments, 
donors, and NGOs can respond quickly in 
emergency situations. Country case studies 
have been completed in five countries— 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Yemen. 
Conclusions 
Many countries in Asia and Latin America 
have reasonably well-functioning seed systems 
for at least some crops, especially commer-
cially valuable crops. In sub-Saharan Africa 
(certainly when South Africa is excluded) 
the situation is different. Dissemination of 
improved varieties is slow. Governments are 
withdrawing from seed production but the 
private sector has not been successful as a 
replacement. Consequently, seed production 
and marketing is very limited, especially in 
food crops. Smallholder farmers are 
particularly affected. The formal seed sector 
(public and private) has been unable to 
significantly improve seed supply to these 
farmers, and the informal sector (e.g., small-
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scale, decentralized, producer cooperatives) 
can only supply small areas with a few 
location-specific varieties. A sustained 
effort to support both the formal and 
informal sectors is required to ensure 
that food production does not further 
deteriorate. 
Recommendations for IARCs 
Non-availability of seed remains one of the 
largest constraints limiting the impact of 
IARC research. IARCs have much of the 
infrastructure and staff needed to help 
improve the seed sector, but priorities need to 
be refocused. Currently, seed-related activities 
are considered of secondary importance, and 
implemented by scientists whose main task is 
different (e.g., breeding, pathology). Very 
few IARCs have seed scientists or seed 
program development specialists employed 
through their core budget. The seed units at 
CIAT and ILCA have been closed down, and 
ICARDA is the only IARC with a functional 
seed unit (IITA is initiating a West African 
seed project with support from GTZ). 
One problem throughout the CGIAR 
network is that seed-related activities are 
considered to be outside the core area of 
focus, and therefore receive little or no 
funding. Nevertheless, some way must be 
found to intensify IARC involvement in the 
seed sector, particularly because seed 
requirements of low-value food-security 
crops are unlikely to be met through formal 
public or private channels. Specifically, 
IARCs should: 
• Continue to produce small quantities of 
breeder seed directly 
• Provide technical support to NARS for 
breeder seed production 
• Provide support to NGOs and farmers' 
groups for small-scale seed production 
• Monitor adoption and seed production of 
released varieties of their mandate crops 
• Assess constraints to seed multiplication 
and marketing 
• Provide policy and technical advice to 
govern-ments and other actors in the seed 
sector. 
To strengthen national seed systems, 
IARCs must support both the formal and 
informal sectors. Support to the formal seed 
sector could be targeted at favorable areas 
and (mandated) "commercial" crops such as 
maize, wheat, and rice. This approach has 
already led to a number of successes with 
"better" farmers. Support to the informal 
sector—where IARC mandate crops play a 
vital role—would ensure that small farmers 
in remote areas or unfavorable environments 
also benefit from research results. 
In some regions (South America and 
South East Asia), the seed sector is relatively 
well developed. Private companies or joint 
private-public ventures are viable and self 
supporting, at least for the major commercial 
crops, and there is no need for centralized 
regional seed units. However, this is not the 
case in most countries in Africa, where 
national seed systems would benefit from the 
establishment of regional seed centers. Such 
centers, established with technical support 
from IARCs, would help to: 
• Develop coordinated seed strategies at 
national and regional levels 
• Link national seed systems into a regional 
network, and develop uniform seed 
policies and regulations across a region 
• Foster intra-regional seed trade 
• Facilitate seed technology research and 
training on regionally important areas 
• Stimulate seed production of smallholder 
food crops and crops of low commercial 
value, which are poorly served by the 
formal sector. 
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ICRISAT's Seed Multiplication Policy1 
D D Rohrbach2 
Abstract 
ICRISAT receives frequent requests from national research institutes, commercial 
seed companies, and NGOs for assistance with the supply of breeder, foundation, 
and commercial seed. This paper summarizes the Institute's recently drafted policy 
on seed supply. In keeping with its comparative advantage as a research institute, 
ICRISAT primarily targets the production and distribution of limited quantities of 
breeder seed. The Institute directly supports seed multiplication necessary for crop 
breeding and variety testing programs, but seeks to avoid involvement in the multi-
plication of larger quantities of seed for direct distribution to farmers. 
Technical assistance and training courses in seed production are available to 
scientists and technicians in national research institutes, NGOs, and small commer-
cial firms. Simultaneously, ICRISAT aims to expand its role in the evaluation of seed 
supply constraints by monitoring variety release, seed production, and market prob-
lems affecting its mandate crops. 
Introduction 
ICRISAT serves as the world repository for 
germplasm of five mandate crops—sorghum, 
pearl millet, groundnut, chickpea, and 
pigeonpea. Each year, thousands of 
kilograms of this germplasm are provided to 
breeders in public and private crop breeding 
programs throughout the world. As varieties 
are released, requests mount for assistance 
with the supply of breeder seed. In recent 
years, ICRISAT has also been receiving 
requests for foundation or commercial seed 
for distribution to farmers. These requests 
have increased as the range of agencies 
involved in seed multiplication and distribution 
has expanded. 
ICRISAT has an interest in facilitating the 
multiplication and distribution of seed for its 
mandate crops in order to increase the invest-
ment returns to national and international crop 
improvement efforts and the impact of these 
1. This paper draws from three regional ICRISAT discussion notes making suggestions for the Institute's seed 
multiplication policies 
2. SADC/ICRISAT Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program, PO Box 776, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
Rohrbach, D.D. 1997. ICRISATs seed multiplication policy. Pages 80-86 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed 
supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in 
Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). 
Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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programs. Further, ICRISAT's mandate is to 
improve the productivity of farmers who grow 
our mandate crops. This requires not simply 
the development but also the widespread 
adoption of better varieties of these crops. 
The growing number and size of requests 
for seed, in part, reflect the limitations of 
national seed multiplication and distribution 
systems for our mandate crops. The private 
sector is generally not interested in 
multiplying seed of open-pollinated varieties 
of sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut, 
chickpea, and pigeonpea. The public sector 
tends to be inefficient at this task. Yet 
ICRISAT's comparative advantage is as a 
research institute, not a seed multiplication 
program. As a result, the Institute is in the 
process of reassessing how it should best 
contribute to the diagnosis and resolution of 
seed multiplication and distribution 
constraints. A policy statement has been 
drafted that restricts our direct involvement 
in seed production to the provision of limited 
quantities of breeder seed. The policy, 
outlined below, also supports the provision of 
technical assistance to help other institutions 
produce seed. And it supports an expanded role 
in helping to evaluate seed supply constraints. 
The seed supply problem 
Poor seed multiplication and distribution is 
one of the largest constraints limiting the 
impact of ICRISAT's crop breeding research 
in Africa. New varieties of sorghum and 
pearl millet, in particular, have been widely 
released. However, most small-scale farmers 
still have no access to these varieties. Seed 
companies complain about the lack of 
consistent demand for open-pollinated 
varieties. They believe that once farmers 
obtain seed, they wil l not return to the market 
to purchase new supplies; and that 
consequently, commercial markets for 
sorghum and pearl millet seed are too small 
to justify investment in multiplication and 
distribution. Yet farmers continue to complain 
about their lack of access to new seed, and 
varietal adoption rates are low. 
Production of groundnut seed remains 
similarly constrained by uncertainty about 
commercial demand. In addition, low 
multiplication ratios, storage constraints, and 
difficulties in competing with commercial 
demand for high-quality grain limit 
commercial seed supplies. While adoption 
levels for groundnut seed are reasonably high 
in some countries in Western Africa (e.g., 
Senegal) due to government support for the 
commercialization of the crop, the adoption 
of new varieties remains limited in much 
of Southern Africa. The production of 
pigeonpea seed attracts even less interest. 
In recent years, several alternative seed 
supply channels have partially substituted for 
the lack of commercial interest in these 
crops. In some countries (e.g., Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Mozambique, Angola), government 
and donor investment in seed distribution 
under drought relief and refugee resettlement 
programs has reduced the severity of seed 
constraints. These emergency programs have 
even encouraged a degree of private sector 
investment in the provision of sorghum and 
pearl millet seed—some produced on 
company farms but much purchased from 
farmers for resale once the demand for seed 
becomes apparent. Responsibility for distri-
buting this seed remains with government 
and donor-funded programs. Distribution is 
done through extension agencies or NGOs. 
While offering the opportunity to distribute 
substantial quantities of seed quickly, such 
programs have not translated into the 
development of a commercial seed market. 
Several national agricultural research 
systems (NARS), for example Namibia and 
Botswana, have invested in seed multi-
plication on research farms and through 
contract farmers. These schemes are generally 
subsidized by governments to varying degrees. 
Where these schemes are well managed, they 
have had reasonable success. Seed of new 
varieties has been quickly and widely distri-
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buted to small-scale farmers. However, the 
prospects for further investment in such 
programs remains limited by government 
budget deficits and reductions in budget 
allocations to agricultural programs. 
A number of NGOs have begun to make 
small investments in village-level seed produc-
tion schemes (e.g., in Zimbabwe, Malawi, 
and Tanzania), again as a development 
activity in response to the recent droughts. 
These schemes badly need technical support 
and a consistent source of foundation seed. 
And the sustainability of these schemes when 
donor/NGO subsidies are withdrawn remains 
open to question. A few NGOs have also 
invested in promoting village seed banks as a 
means to promote the preservation of genetic 
diversity. However, such NGOs tend to be 
less interested in new varieties. 
International seed companies have started 
investing in a number of countries in 
Southern and Eastern Africa (e.g., Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Mozambique), commonly in joint ventures 
with national seed companies. But these 
investments are targeted primarily at hybrid 
seed, particularly hybrid maize. 
In sum, the African seed sector is evolving, 
but commercial interest in multiplying and 
distributing seed of ICRISAT's mandate 
crops remains limited. Investments by NGOs 
and special seed projects have contributed to 
short-term improvements in seed supply. 
However, the sustainability of such non-
commercial channels is questionable. Within 
this context, ICRISAT needs to carefully 
evaluate its role in assisting national and 
regional seed supply programs. This task has 
become more pressing as a result of the rising 
demand for direct assistance with training 
and the provision of seed stocks. 
ICRISAT's draft seed multiplication 
policy 
ICRISAT seeks to pursue a seed multipli-
cation policy consistent with its comparative 
advantage as a research institute. Corres-
pondingly, we expect to directly support seed 
multiplication necessary for crop breeding 
and varietal testing programs. ICRISAT wil l 
facilitate seed multiplication and distribution 
for on-farm trials and related demonstrations 
viewed as being necessary to verify variety 
performance and acceptability. 
ICRISAT wi l l not become directly 
involved in the multiplication of larger 
quantities of seed for distribution for 
commercial production by farmers. The 
Institute may encourage and even promote 
multiplication and distribution of released 
varieties of its mandate crops in order to 
achieve research impact. This may involve 
the provision of training in variety 
multiplication and hybrid seed production as 
well as the analysis of seed supply 
constraints, but the Institute seeks to avoid 
large commitments to seed production per se. 
The specific components of the proposed 
seed multiplication policy are as follows. 
1. Production of breeder seed. ICRISAT will 
assist NARS with the production of breeder 
seed of released varieties. ICRISAT may 
directly invest in the production of this seed 
on behalf of a NARS for a period of not more 
than 2 years. Quantities would be limited to 
less than 100 kg. ICRISAT should provide 
training to NARS to produce their own 
breeder seed. 
ICRISAT receives requests for seed from 
NARS, NGOs, private firms, farmers' 
organizations, and directly from farmers. 
Rather than producing this seed itself, the 
Institute seeks to develop national 
capabilities to produce and maintain breeder 
seed stocks. The Institute may help a national 
program build up a limited breeder seed stock 
for 1-2 years. However, repeated requests for 
seed over multiple years are discouraged. 
NGOs, in particular, are requesting re-
allocations of pure seed for their community 
seed distribution programs. Many of these 
schemes depend on the provision of pure 
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breeder seed either every year or every 2-3 
years. The Institute encourages national 
research programs to set up systems to 
maintain and distribute such seed stocks, 
ideally on a cost-recovery basis. However, 
this requires closer coordination between 
NGOs and national breeding programs or 
perhaps commercial seed companies. A 
frequent problem is that NGOs fail to look 
for seed until the beginning of the planting 
Season, and then complain about limited seed 
stocks. 
Periodic training courses on the mechanics 
of seed production are run for national 
scientists. Such courses may be backed by 
occasional field visits to national multi-
plication sites to check seed quality. The 
timing of these courses depends on NARS 
demand. During the past few years such 
courses have been run in Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique. 
ICRISAT wil l maintain minimum nucleus 
seed stocks that can be provided to national 
breeders in the event that national seed stocks 
are completely lost or contaminated. In 
addition, the Institute may provide assistance 
to re-establish breeder seed stocks following 
periods of civil strife. 
2. Production of foundation or commercial 
seed. ICRISAT should not be involved in the 
production of foundation or commercial 
seed. However, ICRISAT may provide 
technical advice or training to NGOs and 
small-scale private seed companies willing to 
multiply and distribute newly released 
varieties. This investment should he justified 
on the basis of the need to verify the 
performance and acceptability of released 
varieties. 
ICRISAT receives periodic requests for 
larger quantities of seed principally from 
NGOs and donor-funded drought relief or 
refugee resettlement programs. For example, 
in recent years we have helped provide 
commercial seed to Rwanda, Angola, and to 
Zimbabwe (after the severe 1991/92 
drought). The Institute may produce limited 
quantities of such seed on its own farms or 
contract national seed companies to produce 
larger quantities. However, these are generally 
viewed as unique efforts based on unusually 
pressing needs and special development 
funding. As with the production of breeder 
seed, the Institute seeks to encourage other 
agencies to produce commercial seed stocks. 
In this context, ICRISAT periodically 
offers short training courses and limited 
technical assistance to new agencies (such as 
NGOs) interested in commercial seed 
production. The courses cover the mechanics 
of crop production as well as the require-
ments for maintaining varietal purity. Such 
training may be backed by a field visit by 
ICRISAT staff during the course of the 
season to check the seed crop. But this 
assistance cannot extend to the full range of 
inspections necessary to ensure seed quality 
and certify the crop. ICRISAT has neither the 
manpower nor the comparative advantage to 
pursue such functions. Nor can we provide 
field visits to all NGOs interested in such 
assistance. Ultimately, this must be the 
responsibility of national research programs 
and seed quality/certification units. 
Nonetheless, we are concerned about the 
possibility that under-qualified NGOs (and 
perhaps small-scale seed companies) may 
market or distribute poor quality seed of 
varieties developed and released with 
ICRISAT assistance. The release of poor 
quality seed, which has poor germination or 
is contaminated, threatens the name of the 
variety and the reputation of the institutions 
responsible for developing it. This may limit 
the acceptance of varieties released and 
multiplied in the future. Thus, we are 
particularly inclined to monitor, as time and 
resources permit, NGO involvement in seed 
production, in collaboration with NARS in 
different countries. 
In addition, in Southern Africa, ICRISAT 
has been sponsoring national workshops 
targeting the development of action plans for 
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resolving seed multiplication and distribution 
constraints for sorghum and pearl millet. 
Thus far, workshops have been held in 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Discussions with 
multiple stakeholders about seed supply 
constraints have been held in Mozambique 
and Malawi. 
3. Monitoring seed production. ICRISAT will 
develop and maintain a chronological 
database on the levels of seed multiplication 
and distribution of released varieties of its 
mandate crops in order to assess 
multiplication efficiency and adoption. 
ICRISAT is making a substantial 
commitment to impact assessments both as a 
means to justify continuing investments in 
national and international research and as an 
opportunity to diagnose constraints to 
technology adoption. The primary targets for 
such impact assessments are crop breeding 
programs. These studies start with questions 
about the determinants of varietal adoption 
and the extent of adoption to be expected. 
Seed supply constraints are then evaluated, 
though the depth of such evaluations varies. 
Recent work in Zimbabwe has verified the 
acceptability of new sorghum and pearl 
millet varieties while highlighting the 
continuing limitations of seed accessibility 
(Friis-Hansen and Rohrbach 1995, Rohrbach 
and Mazhangara unpublished). Early analysis 
of the impact of a pearl millet variety in 
Namibia highlighted concerns about crop 
lodging in the event of heavy late-season rains 
and farmer complaints regarding grain 
storability. A study of pigeonpea impact in India 
noted the significance of varietal spillovers 
between neighboring states (Bantilan 1996). 
These initiatives are backed by efforts to 
maintain broadly focussed regional databases 
of technology development and adoption. 
These include information on seed release, 
and provide a comparison of actual versus 
target areas of adoption. In Africa, related 
studies are also collecting specific data on 
seed multiplication and distribution. Such 
data provide a useful basis for encouraging 
N ARS to make greater efforts to resolve seed 
multiplication and distribution constraints. 
4. Evaluating seed market constraints. 
ICRISAT should periodically assess constraints 
to the multiplication and distribution of seed 
of its mandate crops. This may involve 
analyses of the structure of seed demand, 
commercial constraints to seed supply, the 
contributions of public versus private 
channels of seed supply, and national seed 
security strategies. 
During the last 2 years ICRISAT has 
expanded its efforts to diagnose adoption 
constraints and evaluate seed supply options 
through alternative delivery channels. Studies 
would first assess whether low adoption 
levels are a result of the limited acceptability 
of new varieties or genuinely due to non-
availability of seed. Numerous examples exist 
of the release of varieties that ultimately prove 
of limited interest to farmers. This could 
occur particularly where varietal performance 
and release are judged purely on the basis of 
yield and related productivity factors. 
ICRISAT's technology transfer programs 
encourage a more broad-based evaluation; a 
range of grain and plant traits, including taste 
and ease of processing, are considered. Breeders 
can use information from such evaluations 
(both positive and negative feedback) to 
target specific variety trait priorities while 
developing the next generation of variety 
releases. ICRISAT can facilitate these broad-
based assessments both through participatory 
breeding (involving farmers in variety 
selection at an early stage of the breeding 
cycle) and through on-farm trials preparatory 
to variety release. 
Recent surveys have begun to assess the 
commercial demand for new seed. It is 
commonly said that farmers ought to replace 
sorghum and pearl. millet seed every 2-4 
years. Yet we have no data on the rate of 
variety degeneration, nor on the structure of 
demand for fresh seed. Commercial seed 
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companies continue to question the 
likelihood that farmers wil l consistently 
return to the market for pure seed. 
Collaborative surveys in Zimbabwe evaluate 
the willingness of farmers to purchase seed. 
This analysis is extended with a review of the 
structure and conduct of informal seed 
market transactions between farmers. 
Recognizing the limited incentives to 
pursue commercial seed production, ICRISAT 
economists are particularly interested in 
evaluating alternative marketing strategies 
for open-pollinated varieties of the Institute's 
mandate crops. These include seed supply 
through small private companies, government 
multiplication units, seed cooperatives, and 
NGOs, as well as informal farmer-to-farmer 
seed exchange. In Southern Africa, we are 
particularly interested in assessing whether 
historical patterns of community seed supply 
can be improved by encouraging better seed 
quality and sale on semi-commercial terms. 
Wil l farmers who are already known for their 
relatively higher quality seed stocks be 
willing to differentiate varieties and seed of 
varying quality for a cash market? The 
evidence on this question thus far is mixed. 
Finally, ICRISAT has supported pre-
liminary investigations of seed policies in 
Southern and Western Africa (e.g., Musa and 
Rusike 1997). These studies identify policy 
and institutional constraints to seed access. 
When these studies began, we were 
particularly concerned about variety release 
policies, because in many countries new 
varieties were simply not being released for 
multiplication. We have since determined, 
however, that release policies are less to 
blame than the limited initiative of national 
breeders or inconsistency of data to justify 
release. These problems can be resolved with 
additional technical support. Several other 
policy problems have been highlighted, 
however, which raise concerns. 
For example, conflicts appear possible 
between ICRISAT's policies of open access 
to the germplasm of its mandate crops and 
national efforts to enforce plant breeders' 
rights or intellectual property rights. National 
research programs seek intellectual property 
rights in order to obtain royalties for seed 
multiplication. These rights may be granted 
in the context of variety registration proce-
dures or through contracts with parastatal 
seed companies. If a single organization has 
monopoly rights over a variety, this could 
restrict seed access. In principle, ICRISAT 
provides germplasm to any party on the 
understanding that access to this germplasm 
wil l not be restricted. 
From time to time we receive requests 
from national and international seed firms 
asking for monopoly rights to particular 
varieties. Companies suggest the return to 
their investments in multiplication and sale 
depend on such rights because seed markets 
are not large enough to support multiple 
sources. Nonetheless, these requests have 
consistently been declined. 
In a related issue, ICRISAT is concerned 
that some countries demand tight restrictions 
on seed certification though they do not have 
the inspection services necessary to cope 
with the widening needs of the seed sector. In 
Zimbabwe, for example, no non-certified seed 
may be sold. Strictly speaking, this restricts 
NGO involvement in seed production. Seed 
companies have an incentive to restrict 
multiplication to sites readily accessible to 
seed inspectors. While we remain concerned 
about seed quality, we encourage the 
consideration of "truthfully labeled" seed and 
the licensing of private seed inspectors. 
Finally, given the prominence of seed 
flows through drought relief programs, we 
have initiated an analysis of the impact of 
recent programs in Zimbabwe. This wil l 
identify options for improving the efficiency 
of this seed supply channel. 
References 
Bantilan, M.C.S. and Joshi, P.K. 1996. 
Returns to research and diffusion investments 
85 
on wilt resistance in pigeonpea. Impact Series 
no. 1. Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, 
India: International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 36 pp, 
Friis-Hansen, E. and Rohrbach, D.D. 1995. 
Impact assessment of the SADC/ICRISAT 
drought relief emergency production of 
sorghum and pearl millet seed. Southern and 
Eastern Africa Region Working Paper 95/01. 
PO Box 776, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: Interna-
tional Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics, Southern and Eastern Africa 
Region. 68 pp. (Semiformal publication.) 
Musa, T .M. and Rusike, J. 1997. Constraints 
to variety release, seed production, and 
distribution: sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut, 
and pigeonpea in SADC countries. Southern 
and Eastem Africa Region Working Paper no. 
97/02. PO Box 776, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: 
International Crops Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics, Southern and Eastern 
Africa Region. 44 pp. (Semiformal publication.) 
Rohrbach, D.D., Obilana, A.B., and 
Monyo, E.S. 1995. Variety release, seed 
production, and research impact in Southern 
Africa. International Sorghum and Millets 
Newsletter 36:35-41. 
86 
Session IV 
The Role of National Seed 
Multiplication Units 

The Role of the Public Seed Sector in Syria 
J E Radwan1 
Abstract 
Agriculture forms 20-25% of the Syrian economy. A major government objective is 
to achieve self-sufficiency, particularly in major crops like wheat, barley, potato, 
sugar beet, and cotton. Seed of the major crops is produced almost exclusively by 
the General Organisation for Seed Multiplication (GOSM), a public sector organi-
zation established in 1975. Seed requirements of self-pollinated crops are generally 
met through domestic production. For crops like potato, sugar beet, and sunflower 
GOSM production is supplemented with imports. Seed prices are fixed by the 
government, and certified seed is sold at typically 60% above the price of grain. 
Seed quality control is GOSM's responsibility, and is carried out at various stages 
during seed production, processing, storage, and before distribution. Seed 
distribution in Syria suffers from several constraints. For vegetables and 
ornamental plants, and crops for which GOSM does not produce seed, private firms 
and private-public partnerships should be encouraged within the general framework 
of the government's agricultural policy. The government should review existing seed 
policies, and seek to eliminate some of the problems that hamper seed production 
and distribution. 
Introduction 
Syria covers an area of 18.5 million ha, of 
which about 5.7 million ha is cultivated. 
Most of the cultivated area (83%) is rainfed. 
Agricultural production forms 20-25% of the 
national economy. A major government 
objective is to achieve self-sufficiency, parti-
cularly in wheat, barley, potato, sugar beet, 
and cotton. Table 1 shows the area and pro-
duction of the major winter and summer crops. 
The government considers agriculture to 
be of strategic importance, and has therefore 
taken responsibility for production and supply 
of inputs, including seed. Seed production of 
the major food crops is exclusively a public 
sector activity, with no private or semi-
private firms (the private sector is active 
mainly in vegetable and flower seed). This 
was a conscious decision taken in order to 
avoid fluctuations and shortages in food 
production, which could have serious reper-
cussions. Seed is produced by the General 
Organisation for Seed Multiplication (GOSM), 
which was established in 1975 by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MAAR). 
1. General Organisation for Seed Multiplication, PO Box 5857, Aleppo, Syria 
Radwan, J.E. 1997. The role of the public seed sector in Syria. Pages 89-93 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed 
supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in 
Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). 
Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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The objectives of GOSM are to: 
• Organize seed multiplication of released 
varieties and establish seed processing 
and storage facilities 
• Market and distribute seed directly or 
through the Cooperative Agricultural Bank 
• Provide training on seed production and 
advisory services for farmers through 
field demonstrations. 
GOSM produces seed of wheat, barley, 
maize, chickpea, lentil, bean, soybean, cotton 
and potato; and imports seed of sunflower 
and (in limited quantities) sugar beet. Table 2 
shows seed sales by GOSM in relation to 
Syria's annual requirements in recent years. 
Seed requirements of self-pollinated crops 
are generally met through domestic produc-
tion. For potato, sugar beet, and sunflower 
GOSM production is supplemented with 
imports. Seed production figures for the 
period 1985-94 are shown in Table 3. 
Seed prices are fixed by the government. 
Seed is sold on a no-profit basis, but production 
and processing costs are recovered. Certified 
Table 2. Seed sales compared to national requirements1 in Syria, 1990-94. 
Seed sales (t) in different years 
Crop 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Wheat 146 000(72) 132 115(65) 163 282 (69) 162 665(67) 174 181 (66) 
Barley 11 649 (46) 5083 (2) 10 420(4) 13 812(7) 9600 (6) 
Maize 2850(117) 2416(92) 3285(127) 2054 (77) 1800(57) 
Faba bean 501(20) 774 (28) 2002(105) 1015(52) 130(4) 
Chickpea 690 (20) 183 (6) 916(22) 587(17) 253(11) 
Lentil 1344(10) 1171 (8) 2336(17) 1975(12) 1615(10) 
Groundnut 210(38) 86(16) 128(23) 14(2) -
Soybean 1263 (54) 1085 (83) 829(91) 544(61) 257 (27) 
Sesame 13(3) 18(6) 8(1) - -
Vetch 3169(143) - - - -
Cotton 25 200(161) 25 400(142) 29 250(195) 28 763 (148) 28 000(137) 
Potato2 35 987(56) 50 935 52 294(100) 34 500 (64) 36 284 (63) 
Sugar beet2 - - 45(5) 235 (29) 462 (56) 
Sunflower2 - - 70 82 92 
1. Figures in parentheses show seed sales as a percentage of requirement 
2. Part of potato and sugar beet seed, and the entire quantity of sunflower seed, is imported 
Table 1. Major crops in Syria, 1994/95 season. 
Area Production 
Crop ('000 ha) ('000 t) 
Cotton 207 651 
Wheat 1523 3862 
Barley 1663 1587 
Chickpea 81 81 
Lentil 165 155 
Broad bean 9.5 18 
Potato 25 530 
Maize 90 359 
Sugar beet 33.5 1340 
Soybean 11 27.5 
Sunflower 10 -
seed is sold at typically 60% above the price 
of grain. 
Variety development 
Agricultural research in Syria is the responsi-
bility of the Directorate of Agriculture and 
Scientific Research (DASR). Modern varieties 
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Table 3. Seed produced by GOSM, 1985-94. 
Seed production (t) in different years 
Crop 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Cereals 89 500 94 100 141 535 174 364 163 510 160504 139614 178 437 178 534 185 581 
Legumes 42 760 1857 3208 3848 4013 3299 6211 4135 1998 
Pea - - - - - 5 69 270 
Cotton 27 056 26 971 23 307 26 000 24 000 25 200 25 400 29 250 28 763 28 000 
Potato 27 266 28 967 32 693 39 556 46 377 35 987 50935 52 294 34 500 36 284 
Sugar beet - - - - - - 45 235 462 
Vegetables - - 20 333 628 983 24 -
Total 143 977 151 004 199 734 245 086 239 310 229514 220 254 264 894 246 437 252 325 
multiplied by GOSM are developed by 
DASR and the Cotton Bureau in Aleppo, and 
in collaboration with international centers 
like the Arab Center for Studies in the Arid 
Regions and Dry Lands (ACSAD) and the 
International Center for Agricultural Research 
in Dry Areas (ICARDA), both of which are 
based in Syria. GOSM also maintains old 
improved wheat varieties and multiplies seed 
of some local landraces of chickpea, sesame, 
and vetch for distribution to farmers. The 
source and number of varieties multiplied are 
indicated in Table 4. 
Variety release 
New varieties are released by the National 
Release Committee chaired by the Minister 
of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. The 
committee is composed of representatives 
from universities, GOSM, DASR, the 
Department of Plant Protection, the 
Department of Agricultural Affairs, and the 
Directorate of Planning and Statistics in 
MAAR. Promising varieties are tested (and 
compared with well-adapted commercial 
varieties) in yield and verification trials in 
Table 4. Number of varieties multiplied by GOSM. 
No. of varieties from each source1 
Crop DASR ICARDA ACSAD GOSM CB Imported Total 
Wheat 8 6 1 3 - . 18 
Barley 2 4 3 - - - 9 
Maize 2 - - - - - 2 
Faba bean 2 - - L2 - - 3 
Lentil 4 1 - - - - 5 
Soybean - - - - - 1 1 
Pea - - - 2 - - 2 
Groundnut 3 - - - - - 3 
Cotton - - - - 4 - 4 
Potato - - - - - 11 11 
Total 24 14 4 8 4 12 60 
1. DASR = Directorate for Agriculture and Scientific Research, ACSAD = Arab Center for Studies in the Arid Regions and 
Dry Lands, CB = Cotton Bureau 
2. L = Landrace 
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different agroecological zones. These trials 
are conducted by DASR in collaboration with 
ACSAD and ICARDA. A detailed report of 
the performance of the variety is prepared by 
the Directorate and submitted to the National 
Release Committee, which recommends the 
release of superior performers. There are no 
obvious bottlenecks in the release system. 
However, the entire process of variety 
development, evaluation, and release can take 
up to 14 years in wheat. After a variety is 
released, GOSM obtains breeder seed from 
the concerned research center to start initial 
seed multiplication. 
Seed production 
Breeder seed is supplied by research centers 
and then multiplied by GOSM on contract 
with private growers, farmers' cooperatives, 
and state farms. The stages in the 
multiplication cycle are breeder seed, basic 
seed, registered seed, certified seed 1, and 
certified seed 2. For self-pollinated crops, 
certified seed 2 is sold to farmers. For cross-
pollinated crops the multiplication ends one 
stage earlier—at registered seed, which is 
sold to farmers. In potato, imported elite seed 
is used to produce Class A seed. 
Quality control 
Seed quality control is GOSM's responsi-
bility, and is carried out at various stages 
during production, processing, and storage. 
Seed growers and fields are selected based on 
specific requirements to ensure proper crop 
rotation, isolation, etc. The selected fields are 
inspected at several stages—before sowing, 
during the growing period, and finally at full 
maturity, before the harvest. Harvesting, 
labeling, and transportation to processing 
centers are supervised by field inspectors. 
After harvest, samples are drawn from 
each seed lot in the field, tested, and 
compared with standards that are specified in 
the contract. Based on the results of these 
tests seed lots are accepted or rejected, and 
the price determined. A "price incentive" 
system ensures that growers get higher prices 
for high-quality seed. 
At receiving points and processing plants, 
all seed lots are tested for physical purity, 
other seeds, and noxious weeds before being 
cleaned. The results are compared with 
results obtained from samples drawn in the 
field. After processing, representative 
samples from each seed lot are analyzed for 
physical purity, germination, seed health 
(e.g., bunt), insect infestation, and treatment 
coverage. 
Seed processing 
Seed processing (for wheat, barley, maize, 
chickpea, soybean, and lentil) is carried out 
by GOSM at 11 plants in different agricultural 
zones of the country. These plants, with 
capacities of 8-10 t h-1 are located in Hassake 
(5), Raqqa (2), Aleppo (1), Hama (2), and 
Izra'a (1). The seed is cleaned, treated, and 
packaged in 50 kg polypropylene bags. 
Seed export and import 
During the past 5 years, GOSM has exported 
seed of wheat, barley, faba bean, chickpea, 
pea, maize, lentil, and potato to several 
countries; Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Turkey. On the other hand, Syria has 
imported seed of sugar beet, sunflower and 
elite seed of potato from western Europe to 
produce Class A potato seed. Moreover, 
private firms also import vegetable seed. 
Marketing and distribution 
After processing, seed is distributed through 
two main channels—GOSM branches and 
seed stores, which are spread all over the 
country; and the 108 branches and stores of 
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the Cooperative Agricultural Bank. The bank 
offers loans (at 7% annual interest) to farmers 
for seed purchase, and pays the money not to 
the farmers but directly to GOSM. 
Seed distribution suffers from several 
constraints. 
• Although seed is sold at cost price in 
order to encourage the use of certified 
seed, farmers still consider the price too 
high 
• Very large quantities of seed are required, 
and must be prepared and distributed 
within a short time 
• Neither GOSM nor the Cooperative Bank 
have enough storage facilities to store the 
processed seed until it is distributed 
• Shortage of transport vehicles causes 
delays in seed delivery to farmers 
• Seed processing plants are old, with 
obsolete or poorly maintained equipment. 
Achievements of GOSM 
GOSM has played a significant role in 
improving agricultural productivity in Syria 
by promoting the use of high-quality seed of 
modern varieties. For example, seed of high-
yielding varieties resistant to diseases (smut, 
septoria, etc) is available at relatively low 
prices—approximately 60% higher than grain 
price. GOSM has been able to meet the 
country's entire seed demand for some 
strategic crops (cotton, sugar beet), and about 
70% of demand in wheat and potato. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
In Syria, seed of the major crops is produced 
almost exclusively by the public sector. For 
strategic crops that are crucial to the 
predominantly agriculture-based economy, 
the public sector should be given additional 
financial support, allowing it to play an even 
greater role in improving seed supply. For 
vegetables and ornamental plants, and crops 
for which GOSM does not produce seed, 
private or joint private-public seed companies 
should be encouraged within the general 
framework of the government's agricultural 
policy. One possibility is to develop a "semi-
private sector" through partnerships between 
government seed agencies and a group of 
private firms (e.g., seed associations). These 
partnerships could be supported where 
appropriate with loans and access to 
processing facilities. 
The government should review the 
existing seed policies, and seek to eliminate 
some of the problems that hamper seed 
production; in particular, it should establish 
an independent seed certification agency. 
Such a review would also evaluate the 
effectiveness of existing multiplication and 
distribution systems, and identify areas where 
they can be strengthened. For example, 
private companies and NGOs could 
supplement the activities of government seed 
units. An integrated strategy that encourages 
exchange of seed between different areas, 
and focuses on both local and national issues, 
can help strengthen the seed sector throughout 
the country. 
Regional cooperation. National seed programs 
in the WANA region would benefit greatly if 
the various national programs were more 
closely integrated. For example, WANA 
countries with favorable environmental 
conditions and adequate expertise could 
supply high quality seed to other countries. 
GOSM is committed to this approach, and is 
willing to provide support for integration 
initiatives. 
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The Role of NGOs in Crop Improvement and 
Seed Multiplication 
J D DeVries and J O Olufowote1 
Abstract 
World Vision International (WVI) operates in 28 countries in Africa, with over 5000 
staff. Significant adoption and productivity gains have been obtained in a number of 
countries by obtaining seed of improved, adapted varieties from national and 
international research centers, testing them widely (both on-station and on-farm) in 
food- and seed-deficient areas, and facilitating the multiplication and distribution of 
farmer-selected varieties. WVI focuses on resource-poor smallholder farmers, 
providing support in various ways—training in seed selection, multiplication and 
storage, seed distribution in emergency situations, technical support to farmers able 
to experiment with new varieties, and facilitation of seed multiplication and 
exchange or small-scale trade through producer associations and farmers' groups. 
WVI conducted a survey to identify the factors that contribute to the success of 
seed programs. The results show that diploma-level staff, i.e., those directly involved 
in seed multiplication and on-farm trials, are the most critical component in such 
programs. The presence of at least one qualified scientist within the program, and 
interaction with national and international research centers were also important 
factors. 
Introduction 
World Vision International (WVI) recognizes 
that seed availability is a crucial factor in any 
efforts to ensure food security in Africa. 
Appropriate seed of varieties with genetic 
purity must be made available to farmers at 
affordable prices. The recent upsurge in 
research efforts to resolve stress-related 
productivity constraints is creating a new 
generation of products for African farmers, 
which need testing and dissemination. Sadly, 
in spite of widespread recognition of the 
problem, funding by national programs for 
technology transfer has not increased 
significantly. As a result of structural adjust-
ment programs and continued under-invest-
ment in the agricultural sector, national 
research and extension services responsible 
for technology transfer are at a low ebb in 
many countries. 
Although a range of productivity-enhancing 
technologies is available, these technologies 
are simply not reaching the farmer. Spencer 
1. World Vision International, PO Box 1490, Kaneshie, Accra, Ghana 
DeVries, J.D. and Olufowote, J.O. 1997. The role of NGOs in crop improvement and seed multiplication. Pages 97-102 in 
Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening 
National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., 
Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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(1986) estimated that less than 2% of the 
total sorghum, millet, and upland rice area in 
Western Africa is sown to varieties 
developed through modern research. This is 
the situation despite the involvement of 
bilateral donors for more than 30 years. The 
major objective of WVI's food security 
program in Africa is to make these improved 
varieties available to farmers through identi-
fication, multiplication, and distribution. 
Results from WVI programs 
WVTs agricultural recovery programs in 
several countries have helped improve the 
quality and availability of planting materials. 
The first successes were achieved in 
Mozambique during the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Since then, positive results have been 
obtained from concerted, NGO-promoted 
crop improvement programs in Angola, 
Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire. WVI was able to 
obtain good results (Table 1) simply by 
obtaining seed of improved, adapted Varieties 
from national and international agricultural 
research centers and testing them both on-
station and on-farm in food- and seed-
deficient rural areas. 
There has been speculation, both within 
and outside the organization, that these 
successes were not representative of results 
obtainable from other African countries, for 
two reasons. First, the dramatic percentage 
increases are due to low initial levels of 
agricultural development (because of disasters, 
civil strife, etc). Secondly, because of the 
emergency situations under which the programs 
were operating, bureaucracy was reduced, 
and WVI staff were able to interact directly 
with target farmers. However, these data cover 
a wide geographical area and we believe they 
provide clear evidence that high returns to 
development investment are possible in large 
parts, if not all, of sub-Saharan Africa. 
WVl's role in seed supply 
WVI operates agricultural programs in 28 
African countries. Most of our technology 
transfer efforts involve identifying and 
disseminating seed of improved varieties. 
WVI operates at the grassroots level, 
employing some 5000 staff in broad-based 
rural projects. These include 15 PhD-level 
and 20 MS-level agronomists, and about 100 
BS-level agriculturists. 
Since most of the farmers we work with 
are not serviced by extension agents and are 
unaware of varieties appropriate for their 
locality, we carry out wide testing of 
candidate materials along with farmers, and 
on their farms. Multilocational testing allows 
large numbers of farmers to become aware of 
Table 1. Impact of World Vision International's agricultural recovery programs. 
Country Crop Increase in yield Source 
Angola Maize 46% Nankam et al. 1996 
Mali Sorghum 24% Dembele et al. 1997 
Mozambique Sweet potato 61% White and Sitch 1994 
Maize 71% White and Sitch 1994 
Sorghum 133% White and Sitch 1994 
Senegal Cowpea 100% University of California 1994 
Sudan Maize 53% Janson and Kapukha 1995 
Zaire Maize 18% Asanzi and DeVries 1995 
Cowpea 108% Janson and Kapukha 1995 
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new technology, acting as a powerful tool for 
extension without the administrative and 
personnel costs of full-fledged extension 
programs. Farmers guide this process, ensuring 
that we are always aware of exactly the type 
of seed they need. 
Results and ideas from these trials are 
disseminated through a network of "contact 
farmers". Contact farmers receive training at 
field stations and at contact farmer 
demonstration sites, and are thus able to 
understand the significance of the trials and 
the extension activities they undertake. This 
network approach is particularly important 
given the diffused nature of these trials and 
the multiple varieties and methods being 
tested. Over time, the network also leads to 
the evolution of farmers' associations that 
can play crucial roles in marketing and 
information exchange. The decentralized 
nature of the trial network also provides 
regular opportunities for WVI agronomists 
and technicians to interact with farmers—in 
effect an institutionalized system for obtaining 
feedback that can be relayed to national and 
international researchers, and help identify 
specific research needs. 
Once a farmer-selected variety has been 
tested and found acceptable, WVI is often 
actively involved in multiplication and 
distribution. Many of the countries where we 
operate do not have a viable private seed 
supply system. Farmers' associations, individual 
farmers, local NGOs, and other organizations 
are therefore identified and contracted to 
produce seed. 
Recommendations for a new model 
Although considerable research has been 
conducted in Africa, large expanses of 
cultivated area have never been the focus of 
intensive multilocational testing programs of 
the type implemented in Mozambique, Rwanda, 
and Angola following their respective 
disasters. If donor funding and government 
support were to be made available for 
prioritized, well designed programs, positive 
results could be obtained elsewhere as we l l 
WVI's program "The Year of the Seed"aims 
to extend such programs to new areas. 
Through this privately-funded program, seed-
based development initiatives will be launched 
in 15 countries where WVI operates. In all 
such ventures, WVI wil l make use of the 
NARS-NGO-IARC (national agricultural 
research system, nongovernmental organization, 
international agricultural research center) 
model used in previous initiatives. The priority 
wi l l be to channel resources to farmers 
through WVI's Area Development Program. 
Characteristics of effective programs 
In preparation for an Africa-wide crop 
improvement campaign, WVI conducted a 
survey of its more successful seed-based 
programs to determine the key factors that 
contribute to success. Rating the success of 
agricultural recovery programs is a highly 
subjective task, partly because the success of 
a development initiative can be as much 
mental as physical—consensus among the 
community that success has been achieved 
creates momentum that wil l strengthen future 
activities. For example, in spite of a lack of 
concrete evidence of success from a seed 
distribution program in Sierra Leone (full 
evaluation was impossible at the time due to 
security concerns), a recent USAID assessment 
recommended a continuation of funding for 
seed activities, based largely on the 
perception that positive progress was being 
made towards project goals. 
Success or failure must also be judged in 
the context of working conditions. For example, 
the level of success attached to the program 
in Liberia depended largely on results 
obtained at a single, central agricultural 
research facility. But an important moral 
victory was gained by making that one, highly 
visible facility functional despite ongoing 
fighting in large parts of the country. Thus, 
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for the purposes of this paper, program 
success was measured with a mixture of 
tangible and intangible evidence. Six 
managers of seed-based initiatives currently 
being implemented by WVI in Africa were 
asked to rate the importance of 20 aspects of 
their projects on a scale of 1-5 (1 = most 
important, 5 = least important). 
The results of the survey (Table 2) show 
that diploma-level staff, i.e., those in front-
line duties, directly involved in seed multi-
plication and on-farm trials, are the most 
critical component in such programs. 
Likewise, the presence of at least one 
qualified scientist within the program, and 
interaction with I A R C S and NARS, scored 
high. In contrast, international input (support 
from multiple donor agencies, visits by 
consultants, presence of expatriate staff) was 
considered less relevant to the success of 
NGO-sponsored seed programs. 
WVI's approach to seed 
dissemination 
World Vision's NARS-NGO-IARC model 
focuses on resource-poor smallholder farmers 
normally not reached or targeted by 
commercial seed systems. These farmers are 
unable to benefit from conventional systems 
because they lack resources or are located in 
remote areas, or because normal seed support 
systems have been disrupted by war or 
natural disasters. These farmers fall into three 
broad categories. 
Resource-poor farmers in settled situation. 
These farmers simply cannot afford to buy 
commercial seed. Our emphasis here is to 
help them make the best use of their own 
seed stocks by training them to make good 
selections from their fields, multiply these 
selections, and store them properly. Given 
that an estimated 90% of farmers in most 
Table 2. Factors determining the success of World Vision programs. 
Factor associated with success Importance1 
Effective diploma-holder staff 1.0 
PhD level program leadership 1.2 
Strong on-farm research 1.2 
Effective BS/MS level staff 1.2 
Seed multiplication capacity 1.4 
Regular interviews with farmers 1.4 
Active field station research 1.4 
Collaboration with IARCs 1.5 
Comprehensive production packages relevant to the farming system 1.6 
Memorandum of understanding with NARS 1.6 
Regular contact with NARS 1.6 
Efficient commercial seed sector 1.8 
Active support of Ministry of Agriculture 2.0 
Farming systems training workshops 2.2 
Existing national database 2.4 
Support from multiple donors 2.6 
Secondment of Ministry of Agriculture staff 2.8 
Presence of expatriate team 3.2 
Involvement of other NGOs 3.4 
1. Rated on a 1 -5 scale, 1 = most important, 5 = least important 
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developing countries use farm-saved seed, 
this approach is the most cost-effective. 
Resource-poor farmers in crisis situation. 
Most WVI intervention in Africa is in this 
area. Crises could be the result of natural 
disasters (e.g., drought) or civil strife. There 
are two modes of intervention. 
• Direct donation of seed in the form of 
"Agpaks", preferably using varieties with 
proven adaptation to the area 
• Direct production of seed by WVI . This is 
done in two ways. For local varieties, 
seeds are selected for genetic purity and 
yield potential, multiplied, and distributed. 
For example, WVI staff visited Somalia, 
made selections, multiplied the seed 
elsewhere, and later distributed it in 
Somalia. For improved varieties, W V l 
multiplies breeder seed (obtained from 
diverse sources) to produce foundation 
seed. Certified seed is then produced 
either on WVI stations or through contract 
farmers. 
Farmers in non-relief countries. In most non-
relief countries, farmers can easily be 
persuaded to experiment with new 
technologies. WVI makes available selected 
varieties from different sources, for experi-
mentation by farmers under the guidance of 
WVI technicians or extension agents. 
Farmers select preferred varieties, and either 
multiply them for their own use and sell the 
surplus to other farmers, or purchase seed of 
these varieties from seed companies. In some 
instances WVI provides foundation seed and 
technical advice to seed producers, who 
multiply it into commercial seed for sale to 
other farmers. This seed is essentially 
unprocessed and uncertified, but of good 
quality and genetic potential, comparable to 
but cheaper than certified seed. 
Seed production 
World Vision emphasizes two main methods 
of intervention: through producers' associa-
tions and through a decentralized farmer-
based system. 
Producer associations. W V I facilitates seed 
production by farmers' associations or 
cooperatives. We obtain breeder seed from 
lARCs and some NARS and distribute it to 
cooperatives for multiplication into founda-
tion and commercial seed. A l l other 
associated duties (e.g., processing, storage, 
marketing) are done by the cooperative. The 
members of the cooperative produce the seed 
themselves, and in effect trade or exchange 
seed amongst themselves. Since the operation 
is based on specific needs of members, there 
are no problems of unacceptable varieties or 
excess/shortages of seed. 
Decentralized farmer-based approach. 
This approach is similar, combining the 
advantages of new technology with the cost 
advantages of farmer management. WVI 
obtains breeder seed from research institu-
tions, produces foundation seed on WVI 
stations, and distributes it to individual 
farmers, who then produce commercial seed 
for sale to other farmers. Multiplication, 
harvesting, drying, processing, storage, and 
marketing are done by individual farmers 
under the guidance of WVI technicians 
(e.g., ensuring proper isolation distances). 
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ENDA-Zimbabwe's Experience with Small-Scale Seed 
Production and Distribution 
D Shumba-Mnyulwa1 
Abstract 
A number of NGOs in Zimbabwe are involved in seed multiplication and distribution 
programs targeted at smallholder farmers. ENDA-Zimbabwe's seed-related 
activities include a collaborative project with the Seed Company of Zimbabwe (Seed 
Co), the country's largest seed producer. Seed Co provides breeder seed of 
improved varieties of sorghum, pearl millet, open-pollinated maize, short-season 
groundnut, and cowpea. ENDA subcontracts smallholder farmers on Seed Co's 
behalf to multiply this seed into certified seed, and coordinates seed production, 
delivery, and payment to growers. Seed quality is monitored by Seed Co and the 
government's Seed Inspection Services. 
The project, launched in the 1992/93 season, uses a participatory approach. A seed 
committee in each project area is responsible for selection of farmers, seed 
distribution, monitoring, and liaison with ENDA staff. Training (not only on seed crop 
management, hut also on project implementation and business management) 
constitutes 60-70% of the project staff time and budget. The issue of long-term project 
sustainability is being addressed in two ways—by building up local skills and 
organizational structures for seed production, and exploring the possibility of forming 
a small seed company with shares owned by Seed Co, ENDA, and the farmers. 
Introduction 
The private seed sector wil l generally 
concentrate on profitable crops. These are 
high-value, cross-fertilized crops with low 
seeding rates. The emphasis is usually on 
commercial farmers in easily accessible, 
high-potential areas. Most drought-tolerant 
crops, which are suitable for semi-arid areas 
where the majority of resource-poor farmers 
reside, are either self-pollinated or open-
pollinated, and on-farm seed retention of 
such crops is very high. Improved varieties of 
sorghum, finger millet, and pearl millet were 
released in Zimbabwe in the late 1980s, but 
the seed companies responsible for multi-
plication and distribution have found it 
difficult to market them within the country. 
As a result of these three factors—low 
profitability, low adoption rate of improved 
varieties, and marketing problems—a number 
of "minor" crops (sorghum, pearl millet, 
finger millet, cowpea, bambara groundnut) 
have not received sufficient attention. 
1. Environment and Development Activities (ENDA)-Zimbabwe, Box 3492, Harare, Zimbabwe 
Shumba-Mnyulwa, D. 1997. ENDA-Zimbabwe's experience with small-scale seed production and distribution. Pages 
103-108 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for 
Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, 
D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research In-
stitute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
103 
Table 1. Seed production under the ENDA-Seed Co project, 1992/93 to 1995/96. 
Variety 
Production (t) in different years 
Crop 1992/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 
Sorghum SV 2 30 4 116 313 
Pearl millet PMV 2 15 20 351 14.4 
Finger millet FMV 2 10 0.4 5 10 
Groundnut Bebiano Branco 10 13 10.8 -
Falcon/Plover - 66 112.9 143.3 
Cowpea - - 131 -2 
Maize open-pollinated Matuba - - 28.1 -
1. Entire crop rejected due to smut infestation 
2. Seed Co did not provide seed due to anthracnose infection 
A number of NGOs in Zimbabwe are 
involved in seed multiplication and distri-
bution programs targeted at smallholder 
farmers. Their initial efforts focused on free 
seed distribution. For example, World 
Vision, Christian Care, CARE International, 
and the Lutheran World Federation have 
distributed free seed packs to farmers as part 
of drought relief programs. However, several 
problems were encountered: 
• "Misuse" of seed—some farmers washed 
off the seed-dressing chemicals and 
consumed the seed, some sold the seed to 
neighbors in exchange for food 
• Farmers developed a dependency syndrome, 
expecting new, free seed each year 
• The costs of free seed distribution were 
high and unsustainable 
• These efforts focused on distribution but 
did nothing to encourage seed multiplication 
• In some cases standard seed or treated 
grain, rather than high-quality seed, was 
distributed. 
In the light of other NGOs' experiences, 
Environment and Development Activities 
(ENDA)-Zimbabwe launched a seed exchange 
program through an NGO network known as 
the Zimbabwe Seeds Action Network. ENDA 
multiplied seed of local landraces, which was 
then distributed through the network to 
farmers' groups. At the end of the season, 
seed plus "interest" (in the form of seed) was 
returned to ENDA for further distribution to 
other NGOs. 
The Seed Company of Zimbabwe (Seed 
Co)1 learnt about the success of this seed 
exchange program. In the 1992/93 season 
Seed Co approached ENDA and offered to 
contract us to further subcontract smallholder 
farmers to produce certified seed of improved 
varieties of various crops. The scheme 
involved five crops traditionally grown by 
smallholders—sorghum, pearl millet, open-
pollinated maize, short-season groundnut, 
and cowpea. 
Certified seed production 
Beginning in the 1992/93 season, farmers 
from ENDA's project areas started producing 
certified seed, initially of sorghum and pearl 
millet. The following season they diversified, 
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1. Seed Co, earlier known as the Zimbabwe Seed Cooperative (Seed Coop), was originally a cooperative of large-scale seed 
producers of mainly hybrid maize seed. It is now a private firm and the country's largest seed producer. 
Table 2. Expected seed production in the 1996/97 season. 
Allocated Area Expected Expected 
foundation sown yield production 
Crop Variety seed (t) (ha) (t ha-1) (t) 
Sorghum SV 2 5.9 591 1.2 710 
Pearl millet PMV 2 0.4 73 1.0 73 
Finger millet FMV 1 0.19 38 0.8 30 
Cowpea IT 18 3.8 189 1.5 284 
Groundnut Falcon 20.5 205 2.5 511 
producing medium-duration groundnut 
(varieties Falcon, Bebiano Branco, and 
Plover), cowpea, and open-pollinated maize 
in addition to sorghum and millets. Production 
figures for the past four seasons are shown in 
Table 1, while expected 1996/97 production 
is shown in Table 2. 
Production problems. The project areas lie 
mainly in semi-arid areas, and consequently 
drought is a major problem. Of the four 
seasons that the project has operated, rainfall 
was adequate and well distributed in only 
only one season (1995/96). Other problems 
encountered are: aphids on cowpea, poor soil 
fertility, labor shortages that delay weeding 
and harvesting, and diseases, e.g., smut on 
pearl millet and anthracnose on cowpea. 
The initial approach 
From the outset, farmers were closely involved 
in decisions on project implementation. The 
field assistants, who were responsible for 
implementing the project on the ground, were 
hired from among the local community and 
selected with the assistance of farmers. 
Selection of seed growers, distribution of 
foundation seed, and monitoring of crop 
performance (with assistance from the local 
extension worker) were all done by the local 
community. Initially Seed Co provided free 
foundation seed to ENDA, hoping to recover 
the cost from the sale of certified seed 
produced by the project. However, several 
problems surfaced. 
• Misuse of seed—some seed was consumed 
and some sold 
• Isolation distances—some farmers who 
were not part of the scheme deliberately 
planted the same crop on fields adjacent 
to the seed plots, using different varieties 
or inferior seed 
• The seed plots were often far apart, 
creating difficulties in monitoring and 
seed inspection 
• It was difficult to fully recover the cost of 
foundation seed since some seed crops 
failed completely. 
The modified approach 
From the lessons learnt during the first year 
of operation, a modified approach was used 
in subsequent years. The earlier approach 
depended on the efficiency of the field 
assistant, with the assumption that the 
community would cooperate with him. While 
cooperation was expected from the 
community as a whole, responsibilities and 
tasks were not specifically identified. In the 
modified approach, day-to-day imple-
mentation was done through seed committees, 
with committee members acting as links 
between farmers and ENDA staff. Committee 
members' specific responsibilities were 
discussed and agreed to by ENDA and the 
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local community. Using the participatory 
approach, a seed committee was elected by 
villagers in each project area. These 
committees were responsible for selection of 
farmers, seed distribution, and crop monitoring. 
They also acted as judges during field days, 
identifying the best seed crop in the area and 
forwarding the names of these farmers to 
ENDA for entry in the competition for best 
small-scale seed producer of the year. 
Project implementation 
Farmers were selected as seed producers 
depending on their willingness to participate 
fully in project activities, as indicated by 
their attendance at training sessions and 
meetings. This ensured that resource-poor 
farmers—the target group of the project— 
could participate if they were sufficiently 
interested, and would receive support to 
enable them to produce seed. Training of 
committee members and farmers is a vital 
component of the project, and accounts for 
60-70% of ENDA staff's time and 70% of 
the project budget. Farmers were provided 
training on agronomy of seed crops, pest 
control, quality control, and business 
management through demonstration plots, 
training sessions, field tours, farmer 
exchange programs, and field days. This 
training is conducted annually, by technical 
officers from ENDA. Committee members 
were trained on project implementation, seed 
production, and management. 
In the early years of the project, more 
than two-thirds of the participants were 
women, but most of them were registered 
under their husband's name. In 1995/96 only 
40% were women. This decrease is probably 
due to large-scale retrenchment in towns (as a 
result of the government's economic 
restructuring program) which has led to a 
sudden increase in male population in the rural 
areas. Since they are heads of households 
they then register in their own names. The 
tendency so far has been that women farmers 
choose to multiply cowpea and groundnut 
seed while male farmers prefer grain crops. 
The Seeds Action Project now operates in 
10 areas: Zvishavane District - Murowa ward 
communal area, Chipinge District - Checheche 
ward, Plumtree District - Emakhandheni ward, 
Mutoko District - Nyamustahuni and Kawere 
wards, Chivhu-Mboe and Gandami small-
scale commercial farming areas, Gweru-
Vungu small-scale commercial farming area, 
Mutare-Mukuni communal area and Rowa 
small-scale commercial farming area, Nyanga-
Nyarubvurwe resettlement and Plumtree-
Emakhadeni communal area2. 
Quality control 
Seed Co, being a commercial company that 
follows International Seed Testing Asso-
ciation (ISTA) regulations, has specified 
minimum quality standards for seed produced 
by the project. The project has been largely 
successful in training farmers to appreciate 
the difference in management requirements 
between a grain crop and a seed crop. To date 
only three batches of seed have been rejected 
by Seed Co. Pearl millet seed from Mukuni 
was rejected in 1994/95 because the crop was 
infested by smut (Ustilgo spp). Finger millet 
seed from Nyanga was rejected for two 
seasons due to poor germination (53% in 
1994/95, 58% in 1995/96), which was caused 
by late-season drought. 
Field inspections are carried out by the 
Department of Research and Specialist 
2. Areas are classified based on structure of ownership. Communal areas—land is communally owned but allocated to 
individual households for farming. Small-scale commercial—land owned by individual farmers. Resettlement area— 
large-scale commercial farms converted to communal areas. Size of landholdings (arable area per fanner) in the project 
was about 2.5 ha in communal areas, >50 ha in small-scale commercial farming areas, about 5 ha in resettlement areas. 
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Services' Seed Inspection Services. ENDA 
provides transport to inspection staff. In each 
area, 10% of fields are inspected. After 
harvest, 10% of the seed produced is sampled 
for laboratory tests before certification. 
Subsidies by ENDA to farmers 
In the first two seasons, 1992/93 and 1993/ 
94, ENDA gave the farmers free foundation 
seed. In 1994/95 the cost of foundation seed 
was "recovered" by deducting weight equal 
to the weight of foundation seed supplied. 
Some farmers achieved high gross margins, 
but about 5% of the groundnut producers 
made a loss. From the 1995/96 season onward, 
ENDA recovered the cost of foundation seed 
in cash, by deducting the value of the 
foundation seed from the money payable to 
the farmer for the certified seed delivered. 
ENDA delivers foundation seed to 
farmers without charging transport costs, but 
charges a nominal fee of Z$ 250 per ton 
(about US$ 24) to transport the certified seed 
to Seed Co depots. Farmers are given free 
packaging material. In the 1996/7 season 
Seed Co paid farmers the following prices 
per kilogram of certified seed: sorghum and 
millets Z$ 2, unshelled groundnut Z$ 4, and 
cowpea Z$ 4.40. This is about twice the 
market value of sorghum, millets, and 
cowpea, and about 50% more than the market 
value for unshelled groundnut. 
ENDA pays for training, monitoring, and 
seed inspection. These activities are 
expensive and together consume more than 
60% of the project budget. This project is 
funded by NOVIB, a Dutch organization. 
Project sustainability 
Sustainability is the major problem with most 
NGO-implemented projects. The project 
currently relies heavily on back-up support 
and technical services from ENDA, and there 
are concerns about whether the seed scheme 
can continue after ENDA pulls out. We are 
attempting to gradually build up to a point 
where the seed committees and farmers can 
manage the project on their own. The project 
proposal refers to the possibility of forming a 
small seed company at the end of the project, 
with shares owned by Seed Co, ENDA, and 
farmers. Such an arrangement would address 
the questions of quality control, technical 
advice, and marketing, and help ensure 
sustainability. 
Lessons learnt 
Training. It is essential that smallholder 
farmers be trained in seed technology and 
production, either by the extension services 
or through NGO agencies. Training schemes 
are expensive since they tend to involve large 
numbers of farmers. ENDA's experience 
suggests that given the limited resources of 
NGOs, it would be most effective to promote 
training through the government extension 
services. 
Participatory methodology. Without a 
participatory approach the project would 
have collapsed. Misuse of seed, for example, 
is normally difficult to control, but in a 
participatory scheme farmers police each 
other and report to the seed committee or the 
NGO any side marketing or consumption. 
Shortage of resources. Timeliness of field 
operations (sowing, weeding, pest control, 
harvest) is critical in a seed crop. Most 
resource-poor farmers lack the labor and 
other resources needed for timely operations, 
and require training on how to use available 
resources more efficiently, and to make them 
understand the importance of timeliness. 
Shortage of land. Some competent farmers 
are unable to expand seed production because 
their landholdings are small. 
Seed contamination. Fields of neighboring 
farmers in communal areas are often sown 
close to each other. As a result, a field close 
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to a seed crop may be sown (by another farmer) 
to a different variety of the same crop. This 
sometimes happens even when both farmers 
are involved in the project. ENDA encourages 
project participants to discuss their cropping 
plans with each other to avoid contamination. 
Inadequate foundation seed. Each season, 
Seed Co and ENDA agree on the seed crop 
area required for each crop/variety. ENDA 
then decides how much seed to allocate to 
each project area, and farmers accordingly set 
aside the required amount of land. However, 
the foundation seed eventually delivered by 
Seed Co is only one-third of the agreed 
quota, causing inconvenience and losses to 
the farmers. 
Late delivery of seed. Foundation seed is 
often delivered late, because Seed Co places 
a higher priority on delivering seed of more 
profitable crops to its large-scale commercial 
seed producers. 
Late cleaning of seed. Cleaning of seed 
(Seed Go's responsibility) is often delayed. 
This leads to increased postharvest losses and 
also delays payment. 
Conclusions 
ENDA's experience shows that smallholder 
farmers can produce high quality seed of 
open-pollinated and self-pollinating crops, 
given the right technical advice and back-
up. However, marketability remains a 
major problem. In most of these crops, 
seed is saved on-farm for up to five 
seasons. The domestic market is small. The 
export market (e.g., for relief seed) is 
uncertain and requires a high degree of 
organization. This aspect is critical to the 
sustainability of any small-scale seed 
project, and must be fully examined before 
such projects are launched. 
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ActionAid's Experience with Small-Scale Seed Production 
and Distribution in Malawi 
A Msimuko1 
Abstract 
ActionAid Malawi, a British-based NGO, is involved in efforts to diversify crop 
production and improve seed availability in Malawi through two projects, one for 
cassava and sweet potato, and the Malawi Smallholder Seed Development Project. 
Under the cassava and sweet potato project, planting material of improved varieties 
is grown in nurseries and distributed to smallholder farmers for further community-
level multiplication and distribution. There are 67 one-hectare community-managed 
nurseries and five central nurseries managed by ActionAid and the extension 
department. Eight additional primary nurseries are also being established. The 
Malawi Smallholder Seed Development Project is a community-based program that 
helps resource-poor farmers multiply seed on their own farms, with supervision and 
support from ActionAid and government agencies. The Project distributes seed and 
planting material on credit to community groups, provides training, and helps build 
community-level institutions to manage such projects. In 2 years of operation, 14 t 
of basic and certified seed of different varieties of eight crops (maize, soybean, 
groundnut, Phaseolus beans, cowpea, sorghum, pigeonpea, pearl millet) have been 
distributed. Currently, there are 3122 beneficiaries, of whom 77% are women. 
Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, Malawi has experienced 
annual dry spells and drought periods of 
varying severity in different parts of the 
country, which have threatened an already 
weak food security environment. The 1991/ 
92 drought was the most severe since 1949. 
Rainfall during the season (country-wide 
average) was only 623 mm, half of normal. 
Harvests failed completely in over half the 
country, and large-scale relief efforts were 
launched. The following season (1992/93) 
was one of the best in recent history, with a 
total grain harvest of 2.1 million t— 
sufficient to meet the national requirement of 
1.8 million t, with some surplus for reserve 
stocks or export. However, in 1993/94 the 
rains were late, erratic, and poorly distributed. 
The harvest was again seriously reduced, 
causing a massive food deficit, and substantial 
relief assistance was needed. 
1. ActionAid Malawi, PO Box 30735, Lilongwe, Malawi 
Msimuko, A. 1997. ActionAid's experience with small-scale seed production and distribution in Malawi. Pages 109-115 in 
Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening 
National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., 
Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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Since the 1991/92 drought, some effort 
has been made to diversify food production 
away from the single-cropping pattern 
dominated by maize, and to include more 
drought-tolerant crops such as sorghum, 
cassava, and sweet potato. ActionAid Malawi, 
a British-based NGO, has been active in 
these efforts, both in its Rural Development 
Project areas and through its national 
projects. ActionAid supports a wide range of 
activities; this report wi l l dwell on its seed 
multiplication and distribution programs in 
Malawi. 
The cassava and sweet potato 
nurseries project 
Demand for cassava and sweet potato 
planting materials is very high throughout 
Malawi. The cassava and sweet potato 
nurseries project was launched in Oct 1993 to 
facilitate crop diversification among small-
holder farmers through the adoption and 
dissemination of improved varieties of these 
two crops. The strategy was to promote 
community multiplication and distribution of 
planting materials in all eight Agricultural 
Development Divisions (ADDs) of the 
country: Blantyre, Karonga, Kasungu, 
Lilongwe, Machinga, Mzuzu, Salima, and 
Shire Valley. 
The project components included esta-
blishment of nurseries, training of extension 
staff on production techniques (isolation 
distances, roguing, rapid multiplication 
techniques), farmer training on multiplication 
and seed retention techniques, and sinking of 
shallow/tube wells for nursery irrigation 
during the dry season. The project was 
funded by ODA with a total of £ 69 500, 
managed by ActionAid in collaboration with 
the extension and research staff of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Livestock Development. 
Planting materials were supplied from 
nurseries managed by the Department of 
Agricultural Research and IITA/SARRNET 
(International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, 
Southern Africa Root Crops Research 
Network). By the end of the original 1-year 
project implementation period in Aug 1994, a 
total of 72 nurseries had been planted across 
the country. These consisted of 5 central 
nurseries managed by research staff and 67 
nurseries (1 ha each, 0.6 ha cassava and 0.4 
ha sweet potato) managed by community 
groups. The beneficiaries included 1616 
households. 
Primary and community-managed nurseries. 
The five primary or central nurseries, managed 
by researchers, ensure genetic purity of 
planting materials. The primary nurseries 
provide initial material to group nurseries, 
which then undertake further multiplication 
and distribution to individual farmers. 
Additional primary nurseries. Increasing 
disease incidence and dilution of purity have 
been noted in the five primary nurseries and 
the 67 community nurseries. Therefore, 
ActionAid plans to establish eight additional 
primary nurseries (15 ha of cassava, 9 ha of 
sweet potato), one in each ADD. These 
nurseries wil l be established using carefully 
selected material from the existing primary 
nurseries, with help from government 
researchers, and managed in collaboration 
with the Root Crops Unit of the Department 
of Agricultural Research. ActionAid wil l 
provide funding. So far we have already 
developed 10 ha of cassava plots and 4 ha of 
sweet potato. Non-availability of seed 
material and delays in channeling funds to 
research stations (as a result of cumbersome 
procedures) have delayed the development of 
the new nurseries. 
Once developed, these nurseries wil l 
provide disease-free planting materials to 
community nurseries in areas that are food-
deficient but have permanent water supplies. 
These nurseries wi l l be run by community 
groups of 10-30 members each. The groups 
wi l l receive planting material on credit 
(details of credit given under the Smallholder 
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Seed Development Project, below) and repay 
the loan through sales of planting materials to 
their neighbors. 
Training. The roots and tubers commodity 
training team from the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Livestock Development conducted 8 
courses for 141 extension staff and 12 courses 
for 360 members of community nursery groups. 
Tubewells. The provision of tubewells to 
irrigate the nurseries was delayed first by 
non-availability of equipment and then by 
drought, which drastically lowered the 
groundwater level. However, new and more 
powerful drilling equipment is being 
procured, which wil l be able to reach even 
the lowered water table. (In May 1995, the 
project was extended, without new funding, 
to enable ActionAid to complete these 
activities.) This will allow the establishment 
of additional permanent nurseries. 
Crop diversification. ActionAid Malawi is 
currently collaborating with the Bean 
Improvement Project of the Department of 
Agricultural Research at Chitedze in central 
Malawi. The objective is to disseminate five 
new released bean varieties. These varieties 
have been supplied to the community groups 
for them to grow (in the 1996/97 season), 
evaluate, and adopt the most preferred ones. 
Malawi Smallholder Seed 
Development Project 
The Malawi Smallholder Seed Development 
Project (MSSDP) is a community-based 
program to improve food security in 
smallholder farm households. The objectives 
of the project are to: 
• Improve and sustain seed availability of 
improved varieties of appropriate crops 
• Establish community groups to manage 
seed production and distribution within 
the communities 
• Train community groups, extension and 
project staff in seed production, quality 
control, group dynamics, and partici-
patory methodologies. 
The project was conceived in the 1991/92 
drought season when ActionAid Malawi, in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
distributed free seed to drought-affected 
communities. Non-availability of seed was a 
major constraint to resource-poor farmers in 
many communities. Private seed companies 
in Malawi (e.g., National Seed Company of 
Malawi, Lever Brothers, Pannar Seed) are 
not interested in multiplying seed of 
improved open-pollinated varieties, which 
farmers recycle for several years. Availability 
of certified seed is restricted mainly to 
hybrids, which are expensive. The MSSDP 
was therefore designed to help resource-poor 
farmers themselves multiply improved self-
and open-pollinated varieties of a range of 
crops (maize, groundnut, soybean, Phaseolus 
beans, pigeonpea, cowpea, sorghum, pearl 
millet, plus others as required). The 
government Seed Services Unit wil l monitor 
and provide advice on quality control. 
Project implementation 
MSSDP is implemented by ActionAid 
Malawi in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The project began in Dec 1995 
and wil l phase out in 2000, after which the 
Ministry of Agriculture wil l incorporate the 
activities of the project into its seed 
multiplication program. The project is being 
implemented in Mzuzu, Kasungu, Machinga, 
and Blantyre ADDs. It is funded by the 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 
under the British government with a total 
sum of £ 1.3 million. 
Supply of certified seed on credit 
The project operates through community 
groups, which are formed as follows. First, 
extension staff identify areas with food 
deficits. Communities in these areas are 
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asked to categorize themselves under three 
categories—poor, relatively better off, and 
rich. Groups of 10-30 members are then 
formed from among the first two categories. 
The emphasis is on selecting farmers who 
may have limited resources but are able and 
willing to work as a group. 
ActionAid obtains basic seed from 
research institutions and contracts church 
farms, universities, or individual farmers to 
multiply the basic seed into certified seed, 
which is inspected and certified by the 
government Seed Services Unit. The certified 
seed is distributed to the community groups. 
Each group receives certified seed and 
planting materials of at least two crops (one 
variety of each crop), which are planted on 
2 ha of land provided by the group. The group 
chooses which crop/varieties it will receive, 
and seed and planting material are provided 
on credit. The group multiplies this certified 
seed to seed of acceptable quality, termed 
here as "approved" seed, which is distributed 
to members of the group. Surplus seed is sold 
to neighbors for cash, and this cash is used to 
repay the credit plus 20% interest within one 
season. 
Seed is provided on credit only for the 
first season. Subsequently, each group is 
expected to be financially self-sustaining. 
Surplus cash is deposited into the group's 
bank account to form a revolving fund which 
the group can use to buy seed and other 
inputs in the second and subsequent seasons. 
(A group bank account is a prerequisite for a 
group to receive seed on credit.) If a group is 
unable to produce or sell seed due to 
conditions beyond its control (e.g., drought), 
credit seed is provided the following season. 
However, the group must repay—in cash— 
both seasons' seed credit during subsequent 
good seasons. 
Seed supply and production in 1995/96 
Seed production. In Dec 1995, 2243 kg of 
basic and certified seed of various crops and 
varieties were supplied on credit to 47 
community groups in the four ADDs. Because 
of shortage of certified seed, each group 
received only one variety of one crop. This 
was multiplied to produce 9.6 t of seed 
(Table 1). Credit repayment was poor—only 
15% of the total group loans had been repaid 
as of Dec 1996. Failure to repay may have 
been caused by unclear credit rules, which 
were finalized only after the credit had been 
disbursed. Only 13 of the 47 groups repaid 
their loans in ful l ; these groups were supplied 
with additional certified seed of varieties of 
their choice in the 1996/97 season. The 
remaining groups were not issued certified 
seed. Instead, they have replanted the seed 
they earlier received so that they can sell the 
seed for cash to repay their loans. 
Quality control. Because these groups do 
not produce certified seed, very stringent 
quality requirements would be counter-
productive. However, group members were 
provided training on isolation distances for 
various crops and roguing of off-types and 
diseased plants. They were also trained on 
grading, packing, and storage techniques. 
Regular inspections were conducted by 
ActionAid and government extension staff. 
Seed inspectors conducted random checks 
(because the number of fields was too large, 
not all could be inspected). 
Seed crop management. Management of the 
seed crops by the community groups was not 
of the required standard. This was partly due 
to lack of supervision by project staff—staff 
were recruited and posted only in Mar 1996 
(the project began in Dec 1995). 
Seed supply and production in 1996/97 
Seed production. In Nov 1996, 11 712 kg of 
basic and certified seed was distributed to 
140 community groups, with an average of 
20 members per group. Of the 140 groups, 71 
are purely women's groups, one is an all-
male group, and the other groups contain 
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Table 3. Reserve and carry-over seed stock, 1997. 
Crop Varieties Seed type Quantity (kg) 
Groundnut CG 7 Certified 49 (shelled) 
Basic and certified 6318 (in-shell) 
Basic 500 (estimated in-shell) 
Beans Kalima, Nasaka, Mkhalira, 
Kambidzi, Nyauzembe 
Basic and certified 5166 
Soybean Santarosa, Duocrop, Ocepara 4 Basic and certified 560 
Pigeonpea ICP 9145, ICPL 87105, 
ICPL 86012 
Basic 75 
Cowpea UCR 418,UCR 405 Basic 370 
Sorghum SPV 475, SPV 351 Basic 832 
Pearl millet Okashana 1, SDMV 89005 Basic and certified 1041 
Composite maize CCC, CCD Basic 941.5 
both men and women. In all there are 3122 
members, of whom 77% are women. Each 
group was supplied with two crops (one 
variety of each crop, crops and varieties of 
their choice, Table 2). Table 3 shows seed 
reserves and carry-over stocks in 1997. 
Of the 140 groups, 108 received seed of 
two crops for multiplication in the 1996/97 
season. Thirty-two groups continue to multiply 
seed they produced in the 1995/96 season. 
These groups did not receive additional 
certified seed because they did not repay in 
full the seed credit they received in 1995/96. 
Seed sales/utilization. A group's first 
priority is to repay its loans, by selling seed 
at prices slightly higher than commercial 
grain prices. Each group also retains enough 
seed to plant about 0.5 ha. In general, about 
20% of the seed produced by a group is 
shared among group members for individual 
use, 20% retained for group multiplication, 
and 60% sold to non-members. 
Crop preferences. Farmers were offered a 
choice of eight crops—composite maize 
varieties, sorghum, pearl millet, soybean, 
groundnut, Phaseolus beans, cowpea, and 
pigeonpea. Groundnut was the most popular, 
chosen by 85% of the groups; 49% chose 
soybean, 40% Phaseolus beans, 9% composite 
maize, and 3% of the groups chose pigeonpea. 
None of the groups chose pearl millet or 
sorghum. Most groups selected non-staple 
food crops. It therefore appears that selection 
of which crop to multiply was based on market 
value rather than on food security concerns. 
Seed crop management. Crop management 
has been satisfactory because project staff 
have been posted in project areas in all the 
four ADDs to monitor seed production. In 
addition, project staff, extension staff, and the 
community groups have been trained in seed 
production techniques. 
Sustainability of the project 
MSSDP is planning to link community seed 
groups with commercial certified seed 
producers under the European Union (EU) 
Programme. The community groups wil l use 
EU funds to purchase certified seed from the 
commercial producers, multiply it, and 
distribute it in their communities. This 
linkage, once developed, wil l help ensure the 
sustainability of the project. 
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Abstract 
Mvumi Rural Training Centre (MRTC) is located in Mvumi division in the semi-arid 
Dodoma region of Tanzania. Sorghum and pearl millet are the main food crops in the 
area, but seed shortages are common. MRTC launched a small-scale seed production 
project in the 1993194 season, distributing certified seed of improved sorghum and 
pearl millet varieties to farmers within and outside the division, providing seed at 
moderate prices and generally on credit. The scheme has benefited over 600 farmers in 
the past 3 seasons. The Centre's experience shows that NGOs can he sustainable 
alternative sources of seed supply, provided due attention is paid to the key factors 
influencing the success of such projects—funding, institutional interactions, transport 
facilities, pricing (including an element of subsidy), quality, an effective seed 
distribution system, and the creation of farmer awareness. 
Introduction 
Mvumi Rural Training Centre (MRTC) is 
located in Dodoma rural district, a semi-arid 
area in central Tanzania. It is funded by the 
Interchurch Coordination Committee for 
Development Projects (a Dutch NGO) via the 
Diocese of Central Tanganyika. MRTC's 
objective is to make Mvumi division self-
sufficient in food production. To this end, the 
Centre produces and distributes seed of new 
sorghum and pearl millet varieties that are 
drought resistant, early maturing, and high 
yielding. MRTC started operations in 1990, 
when the government banned livestock 
grazing in Mvumi division in order to control 
degradation. The Centre works in cooperation 
with the village extension workers of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and other government 
extension personnel in the division. 
Seed production 
In the 1991/92 season, MRTC started to work 
on ways to improve the cropping system in 
Mvumi division. One option was to promote 
the use of improved sorghum and millet 
varieties that are more drought-tolerant than 
the local landraces, mature earlier, and give 
higher yields. Under the guidance of MRTC 
and government extension staff, farmers 
established alley-cropping trials of two 
1. Mvumi Rural Training Centre, PO Box 38, Mvumi, Dodoma, Tanzania 
Makali, R.A. 1997. Mvumi Rural Training Centre's experience with small-scale seed production and distribution in Tanza-
nia. Pages 116-118 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Op-
tions for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe 
(Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops 
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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Scale Seed Production and Distribution in Tanzania 
R A Makali' 
improved varieties, Tegemeo (sorghum) and 
Serere 17 (pearl millet), at the MRTC station. 
The trials were conducted during the 1991/92 
and 1992/93 seasons. Seed harvested from 
these trials was distributed to farmers for 
sowing in the 1992/93 and 1993/94 seasons. 
In subsequent seasons, MRTC continued to 
distribute limited quantities of seed. This seed 
was obtained from different sources— 
produced on the MRTC farm, and from on-
farm trials conducted by the Ilonga Research 
Station. These on-farm trials, which were 
conducted in 1993/94 at Mvumi and elsewhere 
in Tanzania, involved four improved varieties, 
two sorghum and two pearl millet. Three of the 
four varieties were subsequently released— 
sorghum variety SDS 2293-6 was released as 
Pato, and two pearl millet varieties TSPM 
91001 and TSPM 91018 were released as 
Shibe and Okoa respectively. 
Introduction and popularization of improved 
varieties is a key objective of MRTC. The 
release of these varieties encouraged us to 
continue and expand seed production of Pato 
and Okoa, both of which received very positive 
farmer feedback about yield, palatability, and 
earliness. Foundation seed is obtained from the 
Ilonga Research Station, multiplied on the 
MRTC farm, and sold at moderate prices of 
US$ 0.33 kg-1 to local farmers. The seed is 
provided as a loan, to be repaid after harvest. 
Farmers have the option of repaying either in 
cash or in kind (in the latter case, they repay the 
quantity of seed originally loaned, plus 25% 
extra). This repaid seed is used neither for 
multiplication nor for crop production, but is 
sold for use as food. 
During the past three seasons (1993/94 to 
1995/96), nearly 3 t each of Pato and Okoa 
have been produced (Table 1). Yields are 
relatively low as a result of several factors— 
poor germination and crop establishment due 
to inadequate and/or uneven rainfall (the seed 
crop is dry-planted), drought, birds, and 
occasionally due to labor shortages that delay 
field operations. 
Quality control. Wherever possible, sorghum 
and pearl millet seed fields are isolated from 
other fields by a distance of 200 m in all 
directions. Where isolation is not possible 
farmers around the seed plots are given the 
same seed at reduced prices to sow in their 
fields. Off-type and diseased plants in the seed 
plots are rogued out before maturity. After 
harvest, the seed crop is dried in clean drying 
sheds. Care is taken to ensure that the threshing 
floor is clean and dry (first cleaned, then 
plastered with fresh cow dung and allowed to 
dry). The seed is then carefully winnowed, 
dressed with actellic super dust, and stored in a 
well ventilated store protected from rats and 
other pests. 
Marketing. MRTC charges farmers a fixed 
price for seed. The seed is cheaper than 
certified seed (only half the price) but costlier 
(four times as expensive) than grain. If 
production is low the approach is to limit the 
number of purchasers or the quantity given to 
each farmer, rather than increasing prices. 
Table 1. Sorghum and pearl millet seed production at the MRTC farm, 1993/94 to 1995/96. 
Season Variety Area (ha) Seed production (t) 
1993/94 Pato 0.3 0.5 
Okoa 0.3 0.4 
1994/95 Pato 0.6 0.9 
Okoa 0.8 0.9 
1995/96 Pato 1.2 1.5 
Okoa 1.4 1.5 
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Prices are set depending largely on what most 
farmers can afford to pay. After the price is set, 
seed is handed over to the MRTC Village 
Committee in each target village in Mvumi 
division. The committee in turn appoints one of 
its members to sell the seed to farmers. In 
addition, farmers can also buy seed directly (at 
the same price) at the Centre. 
Subsidized pricing. From our experience the 
cost of seed production increases every season. 
For example, the cost of labor for clearing land 
(not including plowing and other preparation 
activities) was US$ 13 ha-1 in 1995/96, and rose 
to US$ 17 ha-1 in 1996/97. If these and other 
costs are passed on to the small-scale farmer, 
he cannot afford to buy seed. Therefore in most 
cases NGOs must provide seed at subsidized 
prices. Gradually, as farmers are provided 
training and exposure to seed production 
methods, they wi l l be able to sustain local seed 
production schemes even without donor funding. 
NGOs as a sustainable, alternative 
source of seed 
After 3 years of experience in small-scale seed 
production, the Centre has been able to meet 
the entire seed demand for improved sorghum 
and pearl millet varieties in Mvumi division 
(admittedly, demand is not very high). In all, 
over 600 farmers have benefited—140 in 
1994/95, 219 in 1995/96, and 275 in 1996/97. 
Some seed has been sold outside the division 
and even outside the Dodoma region. 
Local farmers are now showing interest in 
producing seed themselves, and MRTC is 
helping to first stimulate such interest and then 
provide back-up support to implement and 
sustain small-scale seed projects. MRTC first 
conducts seminars for interested farmers. In 
the next stage, MRTC Village Committees in 
different villages help organize farmers and 
liaise between the newly formed farmers' 
groups and government extension staff, who 
provide technical advice. Simultaneously, 
MRTC produces and distributes inexpensive, 
high-quality seed of improved varieties, 
providing seed on credit to farmers unable to 
pay cash. The Centre also looks for markets 
where farmers can sell surplus produce. These 
schemes can be replicated elsewhere by NGOs 
and farmers' groups, with some modifications 
to account for differences in location, climate, 
and farmers' crop/variety preferences. 
The success and sustainability of these 
efforts—and of efforts by other NGOs— 
depend on several key factors. 
• Funding—availability of funds (working/ 
operational capital) for efficient farm 
operation and seed distribution 
• Efficient institutional interaction—NGOs 
must cooperate closely with government 
and other institutions operating in the same 
area. These institutions can help the NGO 
in several ways, for example advertising 
the seed and providing extension advice to 
farmers. Al l extension advice on how to 
grow Pato and Okoa in Mvumi is provided 
by government extension staff 
• Transport facilities—to transport harvested 
seed from the fields to the drying sheds, 
transport foundation seed and other inputs 
from distant places, and distribute seed to 
farmers 
• Seed distribution network—effective and 
timely seed distribution is a good way to 
advertise the seed, extend the market, and 
build farmer confidence in the NGO 
• Seed price—fair prices wil l encourage 
farmers to buy the seed and thus help the 
NGO to expand production 
• Seed quality—attention to technical details 
during seed production wil l ensure quality 
and therefore greater demand for seed 
• Creation of awareness—the NGO can 
organize field days and demonstrations to 
create interest and awareness. Unless 
farmers are convinced of the benefits from 
the new varieties, seed production wi l l 
serve no purpose. 
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Abstract 
This paper describes a seed multiplication and distribution project run by CARE 
International in Zambia s Southern Province. Seed and planting materials are 
distributed (on loan, to be repaid after the harvest) to farmers' groups, for 
multiplication for their own use and for exchange or sale to others in the 
community. In two seasons of operation, the project has distributed approximately 
50 t of seed and 3 t of cassava cuttings, and now involves JO 000 households. A 
community organizational structure developed jointly by CARE and local 
communities helps ensure proper implementation and repayment of seed loans, and 
facilitates training and extension. CARE conducts training on group management, 
book-keeping, crop management, and seed handling and storage. 
The project has substantially improved seed availability and food security, 
demonstrating that NGO-facilitated seed schemes can be successful provided they 
are based on a careful assessment of needs of the target community. Involving 
groups rather than individual farmers makes it easier to build local capacity 
through training and demonstrations; and group pressure helps ensure repayment of 
loans. In addition, farmers' groups can develop into effective community 
organizations. 
Introduction 
Zambia, like most countries in Southern 
Africa, has experienced recurrent droughts 
during the past 5-6 years. Food security in 
many regions has been severely affected. To 
avert starvation, the Zamrbian government, 
through a network of NGOs, implemented 
massive food relief operations in 1992, 1994, 
and 1995. Each season, an attempt was also 
made to distribute seed to enable farmers to 
recover from drought. This paper describes 
how CARE International, through the 
Livingstone Food Security Project, is helping 
improve seed availability in two districts in a 
drought-prone part of Southern Province. It 
also examines issues of concern regarding 
NGO involvement in seed supply. 
1. CARE International Zambia, PO Box 36238, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mitti, G.A. 1997. CARE International in Zambia—experiences with community-based seed supply systems. Pages 119-128 
in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for 
Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, 
D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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The Livingstone Food Security 
Project 
CARE has been engaged in drought relief 
activities in Zambia's Southern Province 
since the 1991/92 drought. At first, activities 
were restricted to delivering relief food and 
supervising food-for-work schemes. However, 
after the 1993/94 drought, CARE expanded 
its activities to help address the underlying 
causes of food insecurity and vulnerability to 
drought. CARE works with community 
partners on a series of activities collectively 
referred to as the Livingstone Food Security 
Project (LFSP). The Project has three major 
components: agriculture, water and natural 
resource conservation, and small enterprise 
development. It is based in Livingstone town 
but operates in Livingstone district and the 
southern and western parts of the adjacent 
district of Kalomo to the north. The total 
rural population involved is over 120 000. 
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) studies 
conducted during the 1-year pilot phase of 
the project (beginning Nov 1994) showed a 
marked lack of seed of improved varieties. 
Most farmers could not afford such seed; 
many had lost even the seed of local 
landraces due to drought. Farmers indicated 
that seed supply and water were the areas 
where they needed assistance most. 
The specific objectives of LFSP were 
formulated through an extensive participatory 
planning process with each local community. 
They are t o : 
• Build the capacity of community institutions 
to enable planning, management, and 
maintenance of a range of activities 
crucial to drought mitigation and household 
food security 
• Develop sustainable farming systems, 
particularly in terms of crop mix and 
varieties, soil fertility, soil conservation, 
and tillage practices 
• Improve water harvesting and utilization 
practices 
• Raise incomes, develop market linkages, 
and widen income-earning opportunities, 
particularly during the "hunger period". 
So far, activities have focused on the first 
three objectives. Under objective 2, seed 
activities and accompanying training have 
been the main focus. The seed-related activities 
here are described in greater detail in various 
LFSP documents (see reference list) and by 
Mitt i and Kalonge (in press). 
Seed production and distribution 
The highest priority among most communities 
during PRAs was to obtain drought-tolerant, 
short-duration varieties of different crops, 
including some crops (legumes, cassava) that 
many smallholder households had not grown 
previously. However, seed was unavailable 
as a result of drought. It was therefore 
necessary to initiate a local seed bulking 
system. Following consultations with farmers, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, and seed 
companies to confirm the suitability and 
availability of crops and varieties, CARE 
held a series of meetings with farmers to 
explain the nature and attributes of available 
crops and varieties. In most instances only 
limited quantities of seed were available, and 
farmers were unfamiliar with some of the 
varieties. Some farmers were also skeptical 
about new varieties for some crops. 
Consequently, only a few farmers participated 
during the first season (1994/95). 
During the pilot season (1994/95) only 
interested individual farmers were provided 
with seed, which was obtained from seed 
companies (sorghum) or research institutes 
(cowpea). Several conditions were agreed to 
before seed was distributed. Farmers would 
repay the same quantity of seed after harvest; 
recipients would not receive seed the 
following season; and farmers would sell or 
give away a part of their seed harvest to 
others. The program involved 330 households, 
each of which received 3 kg of sorghum 
(variety Kuyuma) and 2 kg of cowpea 
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(variety Lutembwe). Despite another drought 
that season, the loan scheme was very 
successful: the varieties performed well 
(those who planted local varieties experienced 
crop failure) and repayment rate was over 
70%. Participating households were able to 
harvest an extra 6 months' supply of sorghum 
compared with neighbors in the same wealth 
category. 
News about the performance of the new 
crops/varieties spread, leading to a rapid 
increase in demand the following season. In 
any case, after further crop failure, many by 
now had no seed while others had simply lost 
confidence in local varieties. 
Formation and involvement of 
community-based organizations 
In order to handle the increased demand 
(larger seed quantities and a much larger 
number of growers), a new and more efficient 
approach was required. The community needed 
to be involved more closely, but lacked an 
effective community organization through 
which participation could be channeled. The 
project sought to develop such a community 
organization. It facilitated the formation of 
seed groups (solidarity groups) in each 
participating village, based on the Grameen 
Bank Model1. Each group was to comprise 
four to seven households, who felt strongly 
that they could work together. The seed 
groups in each village were federated to form 
a Village Management Committee (VMC). In 
all, 180 VMCs were established representing 
1208 seed groups and 6800 participating 
farmers. In the 1996/97 season, the number 
of groups rose to about 1500, involving some 
10 000 households (Table 1). 
Pre-scheme conditions 
The following conditions were agreed with 
the participating communities beforehand: 
• Seed would be supplied through mutual 
solidarity groups, not individuals 
• Seed was for bulking, not consumption 
(i.e., this was not relief food) 
• The seed was a loan, to be repaid after 
harvest based on agreed rates 
• Seed bulked would be shared with those 
not participating that season 
• A household would not receive seed of 
the same variety the following season. 
Roles of the community groups, 
VMCs, and CARE 
Roles and responsibilities for CARE (LFSP) 
and for the community were clearly defined 
and agreed. The community agreed that it 
was each village's responsibility to form seed 
groups. Each group would agree on which 
crop/variety they would prefer. Members in 
each group would pay back on behalf of a 
defaulting member, and failure to repay 
would hinder any future entitlements to the 
group. The VMCs would be responsible for 
distributing seed to groups and later collecting 
seed repaid by groups. VMCs would be 
accountable to CARE and to the seed groups 
for any seed collected. They would monitor 
the performance of groups and their crops, 
and also promote and facilitate the formation 
of new groups. 
CARE would deliver to VMCs the type 
and amount of seed requested by each group, 
and monitor the performance of VMCs and 
of crops grown by each group. It would conduct 
training (e.g., group management, book-
keeping, crop management, seed handling and 
storage) for VMCs, and provide information 
on types of seed and quantities available. 
Repayment terms were also agreed to 
before seed was distributed. Each farmer 
received enough seed to sow about one-fourth 
of a hectare (e.g., 5 kg maize, 3 kg chickpea). 
The quantity to be repaid was calculated as: 
1. CARE has successfully used the Grameen Bank Model over the past 4 years to provide credit to support small enterprise 
development among traders and small manufacturers in Lusaka. 
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Table 1. Number of community-based organizations and participating farmers in each target area, 
1996/97 season. 
No. of No. of No. of local No. of Area No. of 
Area groups VMCs facilitators Committees beneficiaries 
Livingstone 
Makunka 158 30 4 1 948 
Sihumbwa 84 16 1 1 504 
Sinde 75 16 2 2 450 
Musokotwane 58 10 2 2 348 
Siakasipa 72 6 2 1 432 
Milangu 39 5 1 1 234 
Sekute 121 22 3 2 726 
Mandia 97 13 2 1 582 
Mandandi 88 13 1 1 528 
Siamasimbi 37 8 2 1 222 
Chabalanda1 12 2 - 1 72 
Katapazhi 106 17 4 1 636 
Libala 20 7 - 1 120 
Siandazya 44 8 3 1 264 
Mukuni 241 24 2 2 1446 
Total 1252 197 29 19 7512 
Kalomo West 
Bbilili 110 14 - 1 660 
Shindu 36 4 - 1 216 
7A -
2 
2 - 204 
Dundumwezi -
2 
4 - 496 
Total 146 24 - 2 1576 
Nyawa (Kalomo) - 1 
Mweemba 59 10 - - 35 
Muzumbwe 24 5 - - 144 
Busanga 14 2 - - 84 
Total 97 17 - 1 263 
Grand total 1495 238 29 22 9351 
1. Newly formed VMC in Phase I Project area 
2. No seed groups in this village, project implemented directly through VMC. No formal PRA conducted 
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enough seed for each group member to plant 
a similar area, plus enough seed (given to 
CARE) to allow one farmer from a non-
participating village to plant that area. 
After each meeting, the farmers formed 
groups, and each group elected a represen-
tative to serve on the VMC. The VMCs later 
elected office bearers, e.g., chairperson, 
secretary, and storekeeper. 
Where a government extension officer 
was available, a partnership was worked out 
with the project to enhance synergy and 
avoid duplication. (CARE later convened a 
workshop to formalize the partnership between 
CARE and the Department of Agriculture.) 
Where extension staff were not available 
(e.g., due to lack of housing), extension 
services were provided by a community 
facilitator nominated by the local community 
and trained by CARE and the extension 
department. 
CARE also held discussions with other 
NGOs and agencies working on seed to define 
geographical areas in which each would 
operate. Wherever possible, the extension 
department and development agencies are 
using the VMC structure to implement other 
development programs. 
Distribution of crops/varieties 
For the 1995/96 season, LFSP distributed 
approximately 25 t of seed—121 of sorghum, 
5 t of maize, 1.4 t of cowpea, 1.5 t of pearl 
millet, 5.6 t of groundnut—plus 3 t of 
cassava cuttings (Table 2). As far as possible, 
each group was given the crops and varieties 
they asked for. 
For the 1996/97 season, a further 25 t was 
distributed to new growers (Table 3). In 
addition, many more farmers were able to 
obtain seed of their choice from the groups or 
VMCs. Previous beneficiaries received seed 
only for crops they had not received the 
previous season. 
To ensure a reliable local supply of fresh 
seed, most communities agreed to appoint a 
reliable seed grower for crops or varieties of 
their choice. These seed growers wil l initially 
be assisted by CARE and to some extent by 
the community. They wil l first sell the seed 
to their communities, and later sell to farmers 
from other communities depending on 
demand. In future it is hoped that more 
farmers wil l become interested in growing 
seed crops as a business, e.g., participating in 
schemes to produce "quality-declared" seed 
Table 2. Crops and seed quantities distributed in 1995/96. 
Crop Variety Quantity (kg) 
Sorghum Kuyuma 
Sima 
3962 
8346 
Maize Pool 16 
MMV 602/GV 12 
MMV 400 
820 
1980 
2380 
Cowpea Lutembwe 1432 
Pearl millet Kaufela 
Lubasi 
1530 
91 
Cassava cuttings 3171 
Groundnut Chipego 
Natal Common 
120 
5570 
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or contracting for private seed firms. To 
ensure that demand remains high, the Project 
wi l l facilitate the flow of market information 
on both grain and seed, e.g., about people or 
organizations interested in a crop, and 
quantities of grain available in the project 
area. The VMCs wil l also be encouraged to 
form farmers' associations of one form or 
another to facilitate crop marketing and 
improve their access to credit. 
Impact on seed supply and food 
security 
Rapid spread of crops/varieties. Following 
a successful second season (1995/96), Kuyuma 
sorghum and Lutembwe cowpea have become 
extremely popular in the area, and their seed 
has spread widely. Although it is too early for 
a formal evaluation, there are clear indications 
that the scheme has facilitated farmer-to-
farmer seed diffusion in the project area. 
Group members are paying back their loans 
and willingly sharing and exchanging seed 
with other farmers. The new seed has even 
been found with farmers outside the 
participating villages. Part of the success is 
because the crops and varieties have done 
well under low-rainfall conditions, and farmers 
are convinced of their drought tolerance. 
Increased seed supply and access. By 
involving a large number of growers, seed 
has been made locally available to many 
people in a short period of time (over 10 000 
households in two seasons). This has been 
done at a much lower cost than would have 
been incurred if the project had purchased 
and distributed fresh seed each season. 
Food availability and diversity. The impact 
on food availability has been tremendous. A 
brief informal survey indicated that many 
Table 3. Sources and quantities of seed distributed in the 1996/97 season. 
Repaid seed No. of 
Crop Variety (kg) Purchased (kg) Total (kg) beneficiaries 
Maize MMV 400 3725 - 3725 373 
Maize Pool 16 425 5000 5425 543 
Sorghum Kuyuma 4410 500 4910 1228 
Pearl millet Lubasi - 500 500 125 
Pearl millet Kaufela 790 - 790 395 
Groundnut Natal Common 18 5000 5018 502 
Groundnut Chipego 176 - 176 88 
Cowpea Lutembwe 710 1000 1710 855 
Cowpea Bubebe - 500 500 250 
Green gram Siasa 204 - 204 204 
Pigeonpea ICPL 90024 - 15 15 
Sunflower 540 - 540 1080 
Cotton - 1000 1000 23 
Cedrella tree seedlings - 100 100 schools, clinics, 
VMCs 
Cassava cuttings - 0.5 ha material1 0.5 ha -2 
Sunhemp - 301 30 
Velvet beans - 391 39 
1. Obtained from Department of Agricultural Research for bulking and testing for suitability in the region 
2. Being produced by the project, to be distributed next season 
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participating farmers anticipate their harvest 
wi l l last them 7-8 months. This is a 
significant improvement from a situation of 
nearly no food at harvest in 1993/94, to 
enough food for 5 months in the 1994/95 
season, and now enough food for 7-8 months. 
Many households now have a variety of food 
crops; for example, many have at least two 
cereal staples among maize, sorghum, and 
pearl millet. Many households had not grown 
a legume crop in recent years; their 
consumption of cowpea (also groundnut) has 
increased dramatically. 
Loan repayment and collection. Except for 
one or two villages where a politician claimed 
falsely during an election campaign that he 
had asked CARE to cancel the loan, all 
VMCs were able to repay their seed loans. 
Group pressure (and mutual solidarity) 
encouraged high repayment rates. At the same 
time the structure of the scheme institutiona-
lized community participation and ensured 
that the community met their obligation to repay. 
Accountability was also high because of 
strict record keeping by VMCs and groups. It 
was possible for CARE staff to trace seed 
movement from the VMCs to the individual 
grower and vice versa. This was also possible 
because VMCs and group leaders were 
accountable to the community. Leaders found 
to be wanting are replaced by the community 
without any hesitation. 
Formation of new groups and VMCs. 
Some VMCs have—entirely on their own— 
helped form new VMCs in neighboring 
villages, even initiating training for the new 
VMCs and giving them a seed loan from 
their own stocks. The project is supplementing 
this effort to help the new VMCs. Thus, 
instead of CARE recruiting new growers, this 
is being done by experienced farmers, with 
CARE providing training, and sometimes 
fresh seed as well. 
Farmer-to-farmer extension. Most VMCs 
organized field days for members to leam 
more about "good" and "bad" agronomic 
practices. Some young and better farmers 
were appointed by fellow farmers to be 
trained as community facilitators, who would 
then play the role of extension agents, 
particularly for new crops. This farmer-to-
farmer extension was particularly useful 
because some areas are not serviced by 
government extension staff. These efforts 
helped to promote the use of improved seed 
and sound management practices, and to 
expand local supervisory capacity. 
Return of pride. Many households were 
willing to host field days and to invite CARE 
staff to visit their fields to see a successful 
crop, demonstrating a complete change in 
attitude. In the past such success would be 
kept secret, especially to outsiders, to ensure 
that relief food continued to flow. The 
farmers are regaining confidence in their 
ability to produce their own food rather than 
depend on relief food. This pride is very 
important to the farmers, yet is often 
overlooked in impact assessments. This 
transformation in attitude from dependency 
to self reliance is very important for the 
sustainability of the scheme. 
Lessons learnt 
The lessons learnt from this experience are 
relevant to concerns about small-scale seed 
supply systems, and specifically the involvement 
of NGOs in seed supply systems. CARE's 
experience provides examples of some 
important roles an NGO can play to facilitate 
seed supply in a sustainable way. 
Needs assessment. The adoption rate of 
many improved varieties remains low because 
the varieties do not meet farmers' 
requirements. It is therefore very important 
that researchers and seed producers identify 
what crops and varieties farmers really want. 
NGOs can help provide such information by 
conducting appraisal studies in their areas of 
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operation. CARE conducted extensive PRA 
studies at the beginning of the project, and 
this has led to rapid adoption of most of the 
crops and varieties introduced. 
Community mobilization and capacity 
building. Working with individual farmers 
may not be the best way to produce and 
market seed quickly and effectively. Working 
through farmer groups has many advantages. 
It facilitates assessment of demand and 
selling of the seed (e.g., through 
demonstrations). It makes it easy to provide 
training to build local capacity. Above all, if 
seed is provided on credit, particularly to 
resource-poor farmers with little or no 
education, group pressure may be the only 
effective form of collateral. NGOs can play a 
significant role in mobilizing farmers into 
community-based organizations (CBOs) to 
facilitate seed production and marketing. 
Such community organizations also create a 
channel for training and capacity building, 
and can form the basis for future small-scale 
seed producers. 
Market development. Farmers should be 
able to sell some of their surplus to raise 
money for school fees, medicine, etc. It is 
important that they be assisted to identify a 
market for their surplus crops. Farmers are 
likely to drop some of the crops currently 
being promoted if they cannot sell their 
surpluses. Conversely, marketability wil l 
encourage farmers to adopt a crop or a new 
variety. (For certain crops farmers only need 
to be linked to an existing scheme operated 
by a commercial company, such as Lornho's 
cotton scheme or BIMS schemes for various 
grain crops.) CARE has already started 
efforts to provide market information to 
farmers in the project area. Market possibilities 
can be enhanced by improving local processing 
and storage capacity. National and 
international research institutes may not have 
the capacity for grassroots level involvement 
in such activities; NGOs are more likely to 
be effective. 
Participatory research and extension. Some 
of the seed used by CARE came from 
breeders. For instance, during the first year 
CARE tested three cowpea varieties; one 
released, two at advanced stages of on-farm 
testing. Farmers preferred the former—those 
who had the other two traded them off for 
consumption in exchange for seed of the 
released variety. The breeder was accordingly 
informed about these preferences. In general, 
CBOs provide a well-defined channel through 
which participatory breeding and on-farm 
research can be conducted. The same can be 
said about participatory extension, which is 
often overlooked when participatory 
approaches are discussed. CARE is working 
with the Ministry of Agriculture to achieve 
both—technology testing with researchers 
and community-based extension with the 
Extension Department. 
Sustainability. It is important to put in place 
a mechanism to ensure that seed supply 
activities continue beyond the life of a 
project. CARE is trying to address this issue 
through capacity building at community 
level, e.g., development of a strong CBO 
structure. Examples are available elsewhere 
in Zambia, where after a project has ended, 
the CBO structure facilitated the formation of 
producer and marketing associations that 
have grown into small but self-sustaining 
seed entities. However, CBOs should be 
community (demand) driven for an agreed 
common purpose. Loose associations of 
farmers (often driven by credit suppliers and 
politicians) should be avoided. 
Subsidies. Subsidies cannot be completely 
eliminated because target farmers are 
usually the resource poor, and are often 
located in remote areas. However, subsidies 
should be well targeted in terms of 
participants or beneficiaries, and activities. 
For instance it is not sustainable for NGOs 
to directly multiply seed, or to provide free 
seed every yeah Instead, NGOs should 
source the seed from seed producers or 
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breeders and provide training to growers. 
Some cost should be passed on to the 
farmers, but gradually. CARE hopes that 
farmers wi l l have to pay for extra or fresh 
seed in areas where seed was originally 
given at somewhat subsidized rates. So far 
the VMCs have paid back substantial 
quantities of seed (Table 3), representing a 
major saving in our seed purchases for the 
1996/97 season. 
Quality control. Quality control has been a 
major concern in our scheme, especially for 
open-pollinated maize (the sorghum varieties 
used in the scheme are highly self-pollinated 
and thus less susceptible to contamination). 
The threat of contamination has not been 
serious so far for three reasons—many 
farmers had no other seed, most of the crops 
(e.g., legumes) are self-pollinated, and 
recycling is not a major factor because most 
of the seed has been introduced recently. 
However, during the past two seasons 
farmers were given training to help them 
maintain minimum quality standards. Many 
have very carefully selected seed materials 
from their crops for use in the following 
season. Isolation distance is not critical 
because most of the crops are largely self-
pollinated. In any case, seed is picked from 
the center of the field; and for open-
pollinated maize, recycling is discouraged 
unless the field in question was well isolated 
from other maize varieties. 
For the present, the farmers' own 
standards have applied, with no external 
checks. For the future, steps are being put 
in place to reinforce quality control as seed 
generations advance, and even more 
important, as farmers begin growing special 
seed crops. The "specialist" community 
seed growers strictly maintain isolation 
distances. Injections of fresh seed wi l l also 
help check seedborne diseases. During the 
1997/98 season, CARE wi l l organize 
training for seed growers, with assistance 
from seed specialists from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. However, we realize that 
certified seed production would be too 
expensive for the community and wi l l 
remain an option only for farmers contracted 
by external buyers. 
Conclusions 
The community participatory seed scheme, 
though still in its infancy, clearly shows 
promise in improving seed security. It has 
been possible to introduce new varieties in a 
very short period of time. Through mass 
bulking, the scheme has made it possible to 
improve local availability of seed in terms of 
both quantity and diversity. The key to this 
success is the use of solidarity groups where 
members have mutual obligations towards 
each other. This participatory approach also 
ensures that the community remains 
committed to the success of the scheme. 
Besides the tangible successes, the scheme 
has helped transform people's attitude from 
dependence to self reliance, a prerequisite for 
sustainable development. 
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The Seeds of Survival/Ethiopia Program 
T Bevene1 
Abstract 
Local varieties of indigenous food grains were in danger of disappearing from many 
parts of Ethiopia, largely as a result of drought. The Seeds of Survival/Ethiopia 
Program works with farmers to conserve genetic diversity in stress-prone areas, 
promote the cultivation of indigenous varieties, and support farmer-based seed 
multiplication and improvement of such varieties. To conserve diversity, formal, 
laboratory-based, ex-situ conservation was combined with a more informal, in-situ, 
community-based approach in which small-scale farmers grew landraces on their 
own fields, with technical support from the Program and local extension agents. 
Another key aspect is farmer-participatory evaluation, selection, and enhancement 
of landrace materials. The project has also conducted 11 training workshops for 
NGO and government research and extension staff. These workshops have led to the 
initiation of similar efforts in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Lesotho, Mali, and Nepal. 
Background 
Periodic droughts have caused large-scale 
destruction in Ethiopia. For example the 1984 
drought—the second major drought in a 
decade—caused widespread famine. Many 
farmers were forced to use seed stocks for 
food. Local varieties of indigenous food 
grains, the basis of food security in many 
regions, were in danger of disappearing from 
many parts of Ethiopia. 
As seed of traditional landraces dis-
appeared, farmers began using high-yielding 
varieties (HYVs) distributed through relief 
schemes or through breeding programs. And 
with the growing use of new varieties, 
already limited seed stocks of traditional 
varieties were further threatened. The HYVs 
were less adapted to local conditions and 
more genetically uniform than landraces. In 
general they were more susceptible than 
landraces to drought, pests, and diseases, 
putting farm families at greater risk. In 
addition they required expensive inputs 
(fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides). Farmers 
could not afford such inputs, and in many 
cases have gone into debt to pay for them. 
The Seeds of Survival/Ethiopia (SoS/E) 
Program was launched in 1989 as a result of 
concern that loss of crop genetic resources 
would seriously affect the food and livelihood 
security of small-scale farmers. A consortium 
of Canadian NGOs, led by the Unitarian 
Service Committee of Canada, provided 
funding support through Partnership Africa 
Canada for Phases I and II of the program 
1. Seeds of Survival/Ethiopia, PO Box 5760, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Beyene, T. 1997. The Seeds of Survival/Ethiopia Program. Pages 129-132 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed 
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(1989 to 1996). Phase I I I , currently being 
implemented, is funded by the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA). 
The program was launched in partnership 
with the then Plant Genetic Resources Centre/ 
Ethiopia, now known as the Ethiopian Bio-
diversity Institute. There were two objectives: 
• To work with farmers to conserve genetic 
diversity in stress-prone areas 
• To promote the cultivation of indigenous 
varieties in order to ensure food and 
livelihood security for small-scale farmers. 
Subsequently, activities have expanded to 
include support for farmer-based seed 
multiplication and improvement of traditional 
varieties. 
Evolution and development 
The SoS/E program has completed two 
successful phases and begun implementing 
its third phase. The primary focus of 
activities was different in each phase; 
however, the three phases integrate into an 
overall strategy to exploit local diversity 
(instead of using inappropriate HYVs) to 
improve crop productivity and food security. 
The three phases were as follows. 
• Phase I, 1989-93: Rescue and conservation 
• Phase I I , 1993-96: Selection, evaluation, 
and enhancement 
• Phase I I I , 1996-2001: Production and 
utilization. 
Phase I: Rescue and conservation of 
plant genetic resources 
Activities were coordinated by the Plant 
Genetic Resource Centre/Ethiopia, within the 
general framework of the national genetic 
resources program. Formal, laboratory-based, 
ex-situ conservation was combined with a 
more informal, in-situ, community-based 
approach in which small-scale farmers grew 
landraces on their own fields, with technical 
support from SoS/E scientists and local 
extension agents. The ex-situ component was 
conducted at the national genebank, where 
seeds were classified, characterized, and 
stored. These seeds were also provided to 
researchers for further observations, enhance-
ment, and multiplication, and eventually for 
distribution to farmers. 
Conservation efforts focused on wheat 
and sorghum. For wheat, the program targeted 
durum landraces in regions where they were 
once widely grown but had largely been 
replaced by new varieties. Composite (elite) 
populations of landraces were developed, 
which offered high yields—not merely for 
subsistence farming—while maintaining 
genetic diversity. Seed stocks of landraces 
were obtained from farmers and planted on 
farmers' fields at a large number of locations, 
to permit the expression of the full range of 
plant characteristics. The crop was grown 
using traditional management practices, and 
stored using traditional storage methods. 
Phase I I : Farmer-participatory 
evaluation, selection, and 
enhancement 
Evaluation and selection of landrace materials 
are conducted simultaneously. These activities 
are carried out on farmers' plots, jointly by 
farmers, SoS/E scientists, and extension staff. 
For example, elite wheat landraces were 
selected at the Debre Zeit Agricultural Research 
Centre, and then multiplied and evaluated on 
small-scale farms. 
Farmers and SoS staff identify the 
desirable characteristics in each variety, and 
establish criteria on the basis of which 
varieties are evaluated and selected. These 
criteria include resistance to drought, leaf 
rust, waterlogging, weeds, and pests; 
maturity duration; yield and yield stability; 
utility value; and storability. Selection is a 
continuous process, and farmers have been 
selecting while at the same time maintaining 
diversity. 
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Phase I I I : Production and utilization 
of indigenous varieties 
The early phases of SoS/E focused on genetic 
diversity, but the primary goal has always 
been, and wil l continue to be, food security. 
Approximately 40 million Ethiopians, or 
nearly 80% of the population, are subsistence 
farmers, operating in harsh environments 
with unpredictable rainfall and variable soil 
quality. The program has made major strides 
in restoring the diversity of indigenous food 
grains in the target areas, and in increasing 
diversity at farm level. Nevertheless, to ensure 
food security and long-term maintenance of 
diversity, farmers must value indigenous 
food crops sufficiently highly that they wil l 
grow them without outside support. 
Surveys of participating farmers have 
indicated that they have a strong preference 
for landraces, because they minimize the risk 
of crop failure, have better resistance to 
diseases and pests, are adapted to adverse 
growing conditions, and have multiple end 
uses. They can be grown with minimal 
inputs, freeing farmers from their dependence 
on external aid. However, distribution of 
indigenous varieties through local markets 
and farmer-to-farmer exchange is yet to be 
ensured. In addition, yields and value need to 
be further improved to encourage wide 
cultivation of these varieties. SoS/E continues 
to work with local farmers to identify, select, 
evaluate, and multiply elite landrace materials 
and composites to enhance yields and value. 
As yields of (and demand for) the elite 
materials increase, SoS/E involvement wil l 
decrease. Market forces wil l take over, 
ensuring the continuing availability of farmer-
preferred materials on a sustainable basis. 
The emphasis of current activities is therefore 
to improve yield and stability of landrace 
materials to the point where farmers can go 
beyond subsistence agriculture, selling a 
portion of their crop and storing some as a 
precaution against a poor future harvest. 
Program components 
The broad objective of the program is to 
maintain diversity while increasing produc-
tivity. Activities include multiplication and 
distribution of landrace varieties, promotion 
of landrace cultivation, enhancement of 
landrace materials, and improvement of 
traditional farming practices. The latter 
aspect is addressed through informal means 
(word of mouth, visits by SoS/E and extension 
staff) and formal farmer exchange programs 
and training courses. Farmers work closely 
with project staff on each component of the 
program. 
Multiplication of elite seed by farmers. The 
objective of the multiplication exercise is to 
improve seed availability and thus encourage 
the use of landrace varieties. SoS/E obtains 
small quantities of seed of selected, elite, 
landrace varieties. This seed is distributed to 
farmers for multiplication, after which SoS/E 
buys back a portion of the crop for distribution 
to other farmers. Seed is multiplied by 
farmers and SoS/E field staff, in consultation 
with the Scientific Advisor. 
Thus, farmers who wish to grow landraces 
can obtain seed from SoS/E, buy seed from 
the market, or obtain it from other farmers 
through purchase or exchange. SoS/E field 
staff provide advice on crop management 
practices, and on seed selection, cleaning, 
and storage for use the following season. The 
Senior Plant Breeder also works with farmers 
to record yields and evaluate the performance 
of the landrace varieties. 
Enhancement. Enhancement of landrace 
varieties is a key project component. These 
efforts differ from standard breeding methods 
in that they focus on maintaining diversity 
and the integrity of landraces, and use low-
input management even on seed plots. The 
objectives are to improve landrace performance 
by developing elite materials, adding desirable 
characteristics in response to specific 
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preferences or constraints, thus improving the 
market competitiveness of landrace-based 
materials. 
Farmers are closely involved in this 
process. They identify specific problems and 
determine what plant or grain characteristics 
are lacking in the existing material. Detailed 
plans for enhancement work are developed 
jointly by farmers, project staff, and resear-
chers from national research institutions, and 
implemented by all the partners working in 
collaboration. Enhanced materials thus 
developed are then multiplied on farmers' 
fields with SoS/E support. 
Replicating SOS/E's efforts 
To date, SoS/E has conducted eight inter-
national and three national training workshops. 
The international training workshops were 
attended by NGO staff and employees of the 
ministries of agriculture from several countries 
in Africa, Asia, and South America. The 
workshops, which typically lasted 2 weeks, 
included topics on biodiversity and sustainable 
agricultural development; the roles of farmers, 
women, and NGOs in conserving plant genetic 
resources; field visits to multiplication sites, 
etc. The most recent international workshop, 
held in Bamako, Mali , was attended by 
participants from francophone West Africa. 
The national training workshops have attrac-
ted considerable attention from NGOs based 
in Ethiopia, as well as government research 
and extension staff from different parts of the 
country. 
As a consequence of the international 
workshops, genetic resource conservation 
programs have been initiated in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Lesotho, Mali, and Nepal. Each of 
these countries has also begun to disseminate 
information on biodiversity and the conservation 
of indigenous seed, through training workshops 
and networks in their own regions. Thus, 
SoS/E efforts have served as a model for 
similar programs elsewhere. 
Three elements are crucial to the success 
of such programs—equal partnership with 
farmers in all project activities (planning, 
implementation, expansion), the degree to 
which the program can complement national 
efforts to improve food and livelihood 
security, and the effectiveness with which the 
project can combine farmers' indigenous 
knowledge with modern techniques to create 
a new knowledge base. 
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Session VI 
The Role of Cooperatives and 
Farmers' Groups 

Seed Multiplication and Distribution Through a Farmers' 
Cooperative in Namibia 
W R Lechner1 
Abstract 
Pearl millet is a staple food crop in Namibia. A breeding program was launched in 
1991, and small-scale seed production initiated the following year. All certified 
pearl millet seed in Namibia is now produced by a smallholder farmers' cooperative 
in northern Namibia, with technical support and quality monitoring by the 
government. Over the past three seasons, the cooperative has produced 323 tons of 
seed of Okashana 1. The cooperative obtains foundation seed from the government 
of Namibia and distributes it to members for multiplication into certified seed. The 
cooperative purchases this seed from members at N$ 2 kg-1, cleans it, and sells it at 
N$ 3 kg-1. Distribution to farmers is currently done by the government extension 
service, but the cooperative is negotiating with private firms to take over marketing. 
The success of this project has shown that if a farmer-preferred variety is available 
and technical support is provided, farmers organizations can economically and 
sustainably produce and market seed, even without subsidies. 
Introduction 
Namibia has a land area of 824 000 km2, a 
population of approximately 1.5 million, and 
population growth rate of 3.5% per year. It is 
one of driest countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Rainfall is very erratic and varies from 
650 mm annually in the Caprivi region in the 
northeast to zero in the Namib desert in the 
west. Namibia is the only SADC country 
where pearl millet (known as mahangu) is a 
staple food crop and also a part of the culture. 
Most pearl millet is grown in the northern 
part of the country, where about 60% of the 
population lives. The country's total pearl 
millet area, according to the FAO Early 
Warning System, is 340 000 ha. In view of 
the importance of pearl millet, the govern-
ment launched a breeding program in 1991, 
the first season after independence. 
The severe drought in 1991/92 high-
lighted the need for a strong program to 
ensure the availability of seed throughout the 
country. The government had three options— 
to produce seed itself, give the responsibility 
to farmers' organizations while maintaining 
government control, or leave seed production 
to one or more private companies. Previous 
experience has shown that seed production 
by the government cannot be sustained in the 
1. Mahanene Research Station, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development, PO Box 144, Oshakati, Namibia 
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long run because of lack of staff. Private-
sector production may not be viable, as 
Namibian seed requirements are too small to 
attract international seed companies, and a 
domestic private seed sector does not yet 
exist. The only option is for the government 
to support and encourage seed production by 
farmers' organizations. 
This paper wil l attempt to answer four 
questions: 
• Can farmers' organizations economically 
and effectively multiply and distribute 
seed? 
• What are the key factors influencing the 
success and sustainability of these efforts? 
• Must seed supply through farmers' groups 
be subsidized? 
• How is quality control maintained? 
Economics and sustainability 
Immediately after the 1991/92 drought, the 
government launched a project under which 
small-scale farmers produced seed of 
Okashana 1, an open-pollinated pearl millet 
variety that had been released in 1990. 
Funding was provided by FAO (US$ 28 000) 
and the European Union (N$ 150 000, or 
approximately US$ 30 000). The Namibian 
government contributed research and extension 
staff and the facilities at the Mahanene 
research station. The FAO funds were used to 
purchase equipment, including a walk-in 
germination chamber, containers, sand 
sterilizer, seed blower assembly, and storage 
tanks. The N$ 150 000 from the European 
Union was kept in a revolving fund, which 
was used to expedite payment to seed 
growers/Rather than having to wait until the 
seed they produced was sold the following 
season, they were paid soon after they delivered 
seed to Mahenene (typically within 1 week 
after delivery, after quality control tests). 
The project began with a 1-year pilot 
phase (1992/93), during which 21 t of seed 
were produced. In Sep 1993, a meeting was 
arranged between farmers and representatives 
of the government Department of Research 
and Extension. The objectives and the 
planned method of functioning of the project 
were explained, and interested farmers were 
asked to register. About 50 farmers registered 
as participants in the pilot phase. The final 
selection of seed growers was made after 
evaluating their knowledge of agronomy and 
visiting their fields to ensure that isolation 
distances and soil fertility were adequate. 
An FAO document made the following 
comment on the pilot phase of the project— 
"This project demonstrated in practical and 
concrete terms that organized seed produc-
tion by local farmers is possible in Namibia. 
The various actions taken by the project 
provide the basis for the development of the 
seed program in the country. Good quality 
seed at reasonable prices wil l make a clear 
impact on agricultural production and produc-
tivity and consequently on national food 
security." 
The pilot phase was followed by a 3-year 
bridging phase (1993/94 to 1995/96), for 
which the European Union provided an 
additional N$ 400 000. This phase was also 
successful, and culminated in the formation 
of the Northern Namibia Farmer Seed 
Growers Cooperative. During these years, the 
project was managed by the government 
Department of Research and Extension. Seed 
was produced by farmers, and government 
staff provided technical support and supervised 
management and accounting. Efforts to 
establish and register the cooperative began 
in 1995. The Cooperative Bi l l was gazetted 
on 20 Dec 1996 and the cooperative officially 
began operations on 1 Jan 1997—the same 
farmers continued to produce seed, but now 
under a formal association. 
The cooperative consists of 112 farmer-
members, and has recently hired a full-time 
manager rather than continuing to rely on 
government staff for management support. 
The profits generated during the 3 years of 
operation were plowed back into the 
revolving fund, which has grown from the 
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initial N$ 150 000 to currently N$ 500 000. 
This has enabled the project to continue 
making prompt payments to seed growers, 
and to sustain rapid growth. 
During the four seasons of operation, 
the cooperative has produced and sold 344 
tons of Okashana 1 (Table 1). The cooperative 
is Namibia's sole producer of certified pearl 
millet seed. Seed is purchased from growers 
at N$ 2 kg-1, cleaned, packed in 2 kg bags, 
and sold to other farmers for N$ 3 kg-1. 
The cooperative did not sell seed directly, 
but handed it over to the government 
extension services who sold it to farmers and 
paid the cooperative N$ 3 kg-1 for all seed 
sold. Thus, all marketing and distribution 
costs were borne by the extension service. 
However, this arrangement has now 
changed. Namibian government policy is to 
privatize seed production and distribution 
starting May 1997; the public sector w i l l 
concentrate on variety development and 
providing technical advice. The extension 
service wi l l no longer provide support (staff, 
vehicles, storage facilities, etc) for seed 
distribution. The cooperative is therefore 
negotiating with private firms to handle 
distribution. As a result, sale price to farmers 
is likely to rise from N$ 3 to N$ 5 kg-1 . 
Key factors influencing the success of 
seed projects 
There are four key factors that determine the 
success of small-scale seed projects: 
• Availability of an attractive variety 
• Confidence in the business 
• Government support 
• A policy of seed sales rather than free 
distribution. 
The most important factor is the 
availability of a variety that farmers find 
attractive—which we had in Namibia in the 
form of Okashana 1. This variety was 
selected by farmers in Mar 1987, long 
before everybody was talking about farmer 
Table 1. Seed production (tons) of Okashana 1 
in Namibia, 1992/93 to 1995/96. 
Pilot phase Bridging phase 
1992/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 
Govt research 
service 37 
Seed cooperative 21 
Total 58 
38 46 17 
35 74 214 
73 120 231 
participation in breeding. It is now grown 
on approximately 86 000 ha, about 25% of 
the country's pearl millet area. Two new 
varieties, SDMV 93032 and SDMV 92040, 
are scheduled for release in 1997/98. The 
Department of Research and Extension is 
now multiplying these two varieties in 
order to ensure that adequate seed is available 
at the time of release. After release, the seed 
cooperative wi l l take over multiplication. 
Once farmers are convinced about the 
superiority of a new variety and sufficient 
certified seed is available, the next stage is 
winning the confidence of potential seed 
growers. These could include farmers' 
groups, individual subsistence farmers, and 
commercial farmers who may be interested in 
seed multiplication. 
Another key factor, particularly in small 
grains, is government support. In many 
countries in the region, governments provide 
very limited funding and support for small-
grains research. Fortunately this problem is 
not serious in Namibia, because 70% of the 
country's politicians are from the northern 
region and have known mahangu from their 
childhood. This helps to ensure that the crop 
gets adequate government attention. 
Price subsidies and free distribution 
Must seed supply through farmers' groups be 
subsidized? Perhaps others at this workshop 
feel differently, but my opinion is that at least 
in Namibia, subsidies are not required. The 
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extreme form of subsidy—free seed 
distribution by the government or by other 
organizations—can severely hinder the 
development of a strong seed sector. There is 
currently no free seed distribution in Namibia. 
Quality control 
Quality control is the government's responsi-
bility. Field inspection is done by extension 
staff, for which some staff are provided 
special training. Seed testing is done by a 
small, separate government* unit. One 
important point is that additional resources 
are needed for training, especially for 
extension staff. 
At present, the Namibian government 
obtains breeder seed from ICRISAT and 
multiplies it into foundation seed for 
distribution to the cooperative. In the long 
run, it is essential that the national program 
takes over breeder seed production. Founda-
tion seed could be produced by the govern-
ment or contracted out under government 
control. This should be done under irrigation 
during the off-season, in order to prevent 
contamination. 
Seed marketing 
Seed is now distributed mainly through the 
extension service, particularly to smallholder 
farmers, but this service wi l l be privatized. 
It is clear that the private sector is keen to 
enter seed production and distribution as 
soon as the government moves out. But the 
private sector is unlikely to invest if it has to 
compete with subsidized government seed. 
Once the private sector takes over, seed 
prices wi l l rise—maybe from N$ 3 to N$ 5 
per kg—but farmers are wil l ing to pay if the 
variety is right, the quality guaranteed, and 
the seed available on time. The problem in 
Namibia appears to be insufficient produc-
tion rather than poor demand. Private producers 
are thus likely to find a profitable market 
even for open-pollinated pearl millet. 
Conclusions 
In the light of past experience and particularly 
the performance of ongoing seed projects, I 
think that farmer group involvement is not 
just possible but essential, particularly for 
open-pollinated small grains and to some 
extent also for legumes such as cowpea, 
bambara nut, and others. 
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The Role of Seed Growers' Associations in Seed 
Production and Marketing in Africa 
V K Ocran1 
Abstract 
Many farmer cooperatives and associations in Africa produce and distribute seed of 
traditional and improved varieties within rural communities. Some have developed 
into powerful cooperatives capable of determining seed prices of improved varieties 
and also acting as pressure groups in drawing attention to their needs. However, the 
majority of farmers1 groups require active government support to operate, e.g., 
germplasm, foundation seed, technical advice, and seed regulatory services from 
various public institutions. Considerable attention must be paid to educating seed 
growers and farmers' groups in seed production and quality control, enhancing 
their ability to distribute and market seed of improved varieties, and facilitating 
their access to farm credit. If this support is provided, farmers' groups can play a 
key role in seed industry development, and in enhancing food security at both local 
and national levels. 
Introduction 
The role of farmers' groups, associations, and 
cooperatives in seed production and 
marketing in Africa must be viewed against 
the background of a strong traditional 
(informal) seed system. This system supplies 
(through sale, barter, or gifts) farmer-saved 
seed of locally adapted, locally improved, 
and existing released varieties, and forms the 
backbone of the seed supply system in most 
developing countries. The success of 
farmers' groups in developing and sustaining 
a commercial seed sector depends on how 
governments draw on the experiences of the 
traditional system to support these associa-
tions in producing and distributing seed of 
improved varieties even to the most remote 
areas. 
Seed growers' associations and 
cooperatives 
Farmer cooperatives and associations have 
been formed in most countries in Africa. 
These groups manage small-scale projects to 
produce and distribute seed within rural 
communities. Some have developed into 
large-scale seed enterprises as in Zimbabwe; 
others are emerging as small-scale enterprises 
as in Ghana (Bockari-Kugbei 1994). In 
Zambia, the Seed Producers' Association 
1. National Seed Service, Department of Crop Services, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, PO Box M 37, Accra, Ghana 
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Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening 
National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., 
Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G.. eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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produces seed on contract for the Zambia 
Seed Company (Zamseed). The Association 
negotiates with Zamseed for the area to be 
cultivated and the price to be paid. Farmer 
groups market most of the seed, acquiring it 
from provincial centers and distributing it at 
the local level. In Zimbabwe, the Seed 
Company of Zimbabwe Limited, which is 
owned by large-scale commercial farmers, is 
the largest seed producer and distributor in 
the country. Seed Co deals mainly in hybrid 
maize which its members produce and sell to 
farmers at moderate cost. In Kenya, the Grain 
Growers Cooperative Union is the main 
marketing channel for improved seed 
produced by the Kenya Seed Company. The 
Union also sells fertilizer, pesticides, tools, 
and machinery. It operates branches 
throughout the country, supported by 
stockists. In Lesotho the Coop Lesotho 
purchases seed from the Seed Multiplication 
Unit, imports vegetable seed, and sells them 
to farmers. In Swaziland, the Central 
Cooperative Union (CCU) purchases seed 
produced by the Seed Multiplication Project, 
and sells directly to farmers or to societies for 
further distribution at farm level. 
The role of women in seed 
production and retailing 
Women participate extensively in crop 
production in developing countries. They 
constitute an estimated 46% of the total labor 
force in Africa, and their most important role 
is in food production (Fong and Perett 1991). 
However, their involvement in seed 
production is rather low as has been observed 
in Ghana and the Gambia. The situation is 
different for seed retailing. In the Gambia, for 
example, women seed dealers are reported to 
be more receptive to advice and demonstrate 
greater responsibility in the management of 
their businesses, especially in terms of loan 
repayment (Bockari-Kugbei 1994). Similarly, 
in Ghana some of the successful seed dealers 
and commission agents are women. Women 
have been successful in seed retailing 
possibly because of their previous experience 
in selling foodstuffs (Ocran 1995). 
Seed pricing 
In most African countries, seed prices are 
determined by the government. Seed is 
almost invariably subsidized. Private seed 
companies have not been successful because 
their profits are limited by subsidized prices, 
low purchasing power of farmers, and high 
operational costs. In a few countries where 
the seed sector has been privatized, prices are 
determined by seed growers, farmers' groups, 
or cooperatives. In Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland, and Ghana seed associations 
determine seed prices and operate efficient 
distribution networks that have helped 
introduce improved varieties to farmers. 
Competitive markets have developed in some 
of these countries, where market forces help 
to control seed prices. Seed pricing depends 
on various factors—production costs, 
marketing and managerial overheads, and 
farmers' ability to pay for good seed of 
improved varieties. Despite the constraints, 
opportunities do exist for profit and market 
growth (Ocran 1996). 
Setting Ghana's seed industry in 
motion 
Ghana has a total land area of approximately 
24 mill ion ha, of which 13.6 million ha is 
agricultural land. Agriculture contributes 
about 52% to the gross domestic product. 
The country's seed sector has undergone a 
series of transformations. These date as far 
back as 1958, when the Hybrid Seed 
Multiplication Unit was established as part 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Unit 
evolved through the Seed Multiplication 
Unit in 1961, contract growers system in 
1969, the Ghana Seed Company in 1979, 
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and eventually to the current state of 
privatization. 
The government closed down the Ghana 
Seed Company in 1989 to encourage private 
sector participation. The new policy in effect 
directed that the production and sale of 
certified seed should be a private sector 
commercial activity. Simultaneously, the 
government provided active support to the 
emerging private sector by developing and 
strengthening public sector institutions in 
various areas—research, foundation seed 
production, seed quality control and 
certification. The Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture launched intensive educational 
and promotional programs through the news 
media and the extension services to register 
potential seed growers and dealers. The 
private sector responded well, and now 
consists of small and medium-sized enterprises 
that produce and market seed. 
Public sector institutions supporting 
seed industry development 
New institutions were established and existing 
ones strengthened to perform specific 
functions to help development and growth of 
the seed sector. The National Seed Committee 
is the highest body in the seed industry. It 
addresses policy issues relating to both the 
public and private sectors. The National 
Seed Service provides leadership and 
technical support for seed production, seed 
sales, and the development of enterprises. It 
also coordinates the activities of all agencies 
involved in the seed sector, and advertises the 
location of seed growers/dealers in the 
country once a year. The Ghana Seed 
Inspection Division is responsible for 
registration of seed growers and seed 
enterprises, seed testing and certification, and 
training of seed producers in seed production 
and quality control. 
Breeder seed is produced by public plant 
breeders. Research institutions currently 
provide breeder seed of maize, rice, cowpea, 
sorghum, soybean, and groundnut. The 
Grains and Legumes Development Board 
produces foundation seed from breeder seed 
supplied by plant breeders. Extension 
Services staff promote the use of good 
quality seed and assist farmers in its use. 
The private seed sector in Ghana 
Farmers' groups and associations constitute 
the private sector. They have organized 
themselves into three associations (total 
membership about 350) based on the 
country's ecological zones. Each association 
has a separate elected executive body, and 
members meet to discuss matters relating to 
seed sector development. There are many 
formal and informal farmers' groups, which 
are being encouraged to affiliate themselves 
with the growers' associations and become 
recognized seed producers. A major element 
of the strategy is to collaborate with NGOs 
that have previous experience in community 
development and proven ability to deal with 
grassroots issues. It is important that the 
groups are organized in such a way that they 
can sustain activities in the absence of 
external support. Sasakawa Global 2000 
supports the seed growers' associations in 
seed production and in the development of 
effective distribution systems (Ocran 1996). 
Factors limiting seed marketing in 
Africa 
Seed replacement rate. With hybrids, farmers 
obtain fresh seed every season, so the 
replacement rate is always close to 100%. 
However, most farmers grow open-pollinated 
varieties, using farm-saved seed and 
purchasing fresh seed only every 4 years or 
more. In such a situation the replacement rate 
is about 20% (Venkatesan 1994). The 
replacement rate is low because farmers lack 
purchasing power, and are frequently unaware 
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of the benefits they could obtain by regularly 
planting fresh seed. This results in poor demand 
and insufficient profits for seed enterprises. 
Credit facilities. Formal banking institutions 
offer credit in various forms to farmers' 
groups and seed enterprises for seed production. 
However, the procedures are cumbersome 
and often delayed. In addition, high interest 
rates and bank charges and requirements that 
loan applicants must meet, discourage 
applicants from taking credit. 
Risks and uncertainties. These are caused by 
weather conditions, particularly rainfall, 
which is unreliable with respect to the onset, 
duration, distribution, and amount. As a 
result most farmers do not purchase seed 
until the onset of the rains. 
Access to improved varieties. Farmers in 
many remote areas and on marginal lands do 
not have access to good seed of improved 
varieties. Their needs have been so neglected 
in the past that they are ignorant of the 
potential benefits of new technology. 
The role of farmers' organizations in 
a changing seed sector 
Local level seed activities. Public plant 
breeding should seriously address the needs 
of resource-poor farmers. Breeders wil l need 
to involve farmers more closely in variety 
development, and farmers' organizations 
must facilitate closer interaction between 
individual farmers/farmers' groups and 
researchers. Farmers' organizations must also 
more vigorously exploit opportunities for 
promoting local level seed production. 
Farmers' groups should take advantage of 
support from NGOs to improve their 
performance. Local seed production groups 
wi l l need to strengthen their links with 
research institutes, extension agencies, and 
seed regulatory authorities to obtain new 
germplasm, foundation seed, and technical 
advice. Farmers' groups can act as a vehicle 
for providing resource-poor farmers with 
improved seed of modern varieties at affordable 
prices. However, to do this they require 
government support; farmers' organizations 
can play a key role in attracting this support. 
Production of good quality seed. Given 
adequate training, farmers' groups can produce 
good quality seed. This is evidenced by the 
fact that in many countries, contract seed 
growers produce most of the hybrid seed for 
private and public sector seed companies, and 
even sell such seed to neighboring farmers. 
For example, in Ghana it is envisaged that 
growers' associations wil l generate higher 
incomes when they start producing seed of 
hybrid maize varieties that wi l l soon be 
released. The associations wil l also then be in 
a better position to attract investment by 
multinational subsidiaries or enter into joint 
ventures with local firms. Farmers' 
organizations should identify and exploit 
such opportunities for collaboration with 
public and private firms. 
Extension initiatives. One of the best 
investments that extension programs can 
make is to increase their emphasis on seed 
sector development and promoting the use of 
good seed of improved varieties. In particular, 
they must assist in the development of local, 
small-scale seed producers/sellers. Extension 
programs could stimulate interest in the use 
of good seed of improved varieties through 
various innovative means—for example, yield 
contests for farmers, and the involvement of 
youth and school children in crop projects. 
Companies and seed associations should 
press for greater efforts by extension. 
However, in most cases the initiative must 
come from farmers' organizations, which can 
identify specific areas where extension efforts 
wi l l yield maximum benefits, thus providing 
models for similar efforts in other areas. 
Enterprise development. Market penetration 
should be increased by expanding the number 
of retail outlets. Seed enterprises should be 
encouraged to have several seed sellers 
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linked to them. Sellers must be trained to 
know their product, and should be given 
incentives to sell (for example, contests, 
bonuses, and prizes in addition to 
commissions). Seed sellers are an important 
part of any market intelligence program, and 
are valuable sources of information for 
forecasting market needs and identifying areas 
of potential expansion. The development of 
healthy seed enterprises wil l also provide seed 
growers with a guaranteed market—seed 
enterprises will contract seed production to 
growers, buy the seeds, and sell them. Again, 
farmers' organizations can catalyze these 
efforts, acting as an interface between seed 
sellers (existing and potential) and farmers. 
Input supply network. Farmers' groups in 
some countries (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria, 
Zambia, Ghana, Zimbabwe) have developed 
input supply networks that deal not only in 
seed but also in other farm inputs and 
consumer goods. This system enables them to 
work throughout the year, and can raise 
incomes significantly. Government support 
wil l enable farmers' groups in more countries 
to adopt this system. 
Credit facility. Government institutions 
should ensure the timely availability of credit 
to seed growers and dealers. Simultaneously, 
management and fiscal discipline (assessing 
loan requirements and seeking adequate 
collateral or guarantees) should be streng-
thened to minimize loan defaults. Better 
credit facilities should always be linked to 
educating farmers on the need to manage that 
money efficiently—poor financial management 
can quickly destroy farmers' groups. 
Farmers' organizations can lobby government 
authorities to provide training and credit, and 
also use their organizational reach to ensure 
better financial management and credit 
repayment. 
Public awareness. Sales promotion activities 
must be intensified. Information dissemina-
tion systems must be strengthened to 
inform farmers on sources and prices of 
seed of improved varieties. Continuous 
advertising in the national media just 
before and during the planting season, 
particularly in local languages, wi l l ensure 
that farmers are aware of where and how to 
buy seed. However, in some communities 
(and especially for low-value crops), infor-
mation dissemination may be inadequate or 
the information may be available only to one 
section of the community. Farmers' organiza-
tions could consider setting up their own 
informal "information networks" to ensure 
that information is effectively disseminated, 
particularly to smallholder farmers in 
communities with poor access to normal 
communication networks. 
Influencing agricultural development. Most 
farmers' groups are usually small, financially 
weak, and do not wield enough influence to 
ensure that their views receive attention. 
However, there are a few cases (e.g., the 
Grain Growers Cooperative Union in Kenya, 
Seed Co in Zimbabwe) in which they mature 
into independent, powerful cooperatives 
capable of drawing attention to their needs. 
By intensive lobbying and by acting as 
pressure groups, it is possible for organized 
farmers' groups to effect a change in policies 
so that agricultural development becomes 
more relevant to their needs (Carney 1996). 
Conclusions 
The role of farmers' groups and cooperatives 
in seed production and marketing is widely 
recognized. Governments must review their 
priorities on seed sector development and 
provide greater support to farmers' groups to 
enable them to play their potential role in 
agricultural development. 
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Session V I I 
Seed Supply through Drought Relief 
and Resettlement Programs 

World Vision's Experience with Seed Supply During 
Emergency and Resettlement Programs in Mozambique 
and Angola: Implications for the Future 
J Chapman, J White, and C Nankam1 
Abstract 
World Vision has provided large-scale assistance for resettlement and rehabilitation 
programs in Mozambique and Angola. Initially, externally sourced seed and planting 
material was distributed. Concurrently, a variety screening program was launched to 
ensure that the most appropriate improved varieties were distributed. On-station and 
on-farm trials in both countries identified locally adapted varieties of a range of grain 
crops, tubers, and vegetables. Varieties are screened, demonstrated, and multiplied 
at field stations operated by World Vision in close collaboration with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, on national research institute farms, by private seed companies, and by 
farmers' groups. Technical staff, contact farmers, and growers' associations 
comprise an informal extension network with training provided through courses and 
field days. Farm families are involved in every stage of evaluation and selection, 
ensuring that selected varieties address consumer preferences (e.g., taste) and 
consistently increase yields under low-input farming. This approach leads to 
relatively high adoption rates and improved seed production and distribution. 
Collaboration among different organizations is another key element— 
international research centers provide candidate varieties, commercial seed 
companies provide large-scale seed multiplication and packaging services, farmers 
screen varieties and provide feedback on acceptability. World Vision facilitates this 
process and ensures that new technology reaches small-scale farmers even in the 
most remote areas. Mechanisms are suggested to ensure the sustainability of this 
process of technology transfer and adoption. 
1. World Vision International, Box 1101, Florida 1710, Johannesburg, South Africa 
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Introduction 
Extended periods of disruption (war, drought, 
economic and social displacement) combine 
to weaken or destroy coping mechanisms for 
achieving and maintaining food security. In 
response to such situations in Mozambique 
and Angola, World Vision and other interna-
tional NGOs have provided large-scale food 
aid, support for crop production, and health 
care assistance to help resettle returning, 
displaced, and impoverished groups of people. 
Mozambique, statistically one of the 
poorest countries in the world, is currently 
politically stable and on the road to economic 
recovery. Angola is on the brink of peace, but 
could relapse into war if the Government of 
National Unity does not take hold. As a result 
of extended civil war, both countries face 
problems of discontinuity in agricultural 
research and development, and loss of 
information on cropping systems and 
varieties suitable for smallholder farming. 
The effect of civil strife can be compounded 
by natural disasters (drought, cyclones, 
floods, pest attacks). Seed and planting 
materials are therefore in short supply or 
unavailable. 
This paper summarizes World Vision's 
experiences in supplying seed over a period 
of 10 years in Mozambique, and a shorter 
period in Angola. These activities cover a 
transition from major destabilization of 
farming systems due to war and severe 
drought, to large-scale resettlement and long-
term crop improvement programs. 
Statement of problems 
When World Vision initiated its emergency 
interventions, it was apparent that while the 
provision of food aid to starving populations 
was an appropriate short-term response, in 
the longer term it could become a non-
sustainable and dependency-creating activity. 
Food aid and emergency health activities had 
to be integrated with the provision of basic 
agricultural inputs to hasten the restoration of 
food security. Supplying seed and tools is 
critical to the re-establishment of food supply 
systems. Getting farmers, and even non-
farmers, back into food production is part of 
an integrated response to emergency 
situations, refugee resettlement, and post-war 
reconciliation in rural areas. Seed distribution 
is the first step to greater self reliance in 
food production in the short term, and plays 
an important role in restoring hope and 
contributing towards social and economic 
reintegration. 
World Vision encountered various pro-
blems at the beginning of the agricultural 
recovery process: 
• Stocks of seed and planting material were 
lost or in short supply. This required an 
emergency injection of planting materials 
from external sources 
• Resettling families lacked the means to 
purchase agricultural inputs. Seed and 
tool "paks" were therefore distributed free 
of charge, along with food rations to tide 
people over until the harvest 
• Lack of information on adapted varieties 
led to large-scale imports of mostly 
inappropriate varieties that were later 
replaced by low-yielding local varieties. 
Several seasons were required to identify 
suitable varieties and multiply seed, 
slowing the pace of agricultural recovery. 
These problems highlighted the need to 
conduct field trials with farmer participation 
to evaluate varietal performances under farmers' 
conditions across a range of environments. 
Stage 1—Emergency distribution of 
seed and hand tools 
A series of field stations covering a range of 
agroecological conditions were therefore 
established in Mozambique to serve as focal 
points for evaluation trials, seed multi-
plication, demonstrations, and extension 
training. Research and extension technicians 
and leader farmers were brought in for 
training from areas that were relatively stable 
despite the ongoing civil war. The training 
used a practical approach with an emphasis 
on field demonstrations and a high degree of 
involvement by participants. In this way field 
trials also served as demonstration plots and 
in many instances as multiplication plots as 
well. Although the scope for extension 
support was limited by the emergency 
situation, it was clearly important to involve 
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community leaders, officials, and contact 
farmers in seed distribution and in local 
multiplication of perennial crops such as 
sweet potato. Thus a fledgling informal 
extension network was created. 
In parallel to these initiatives, as part of 
its emergency relief efforts. World Vision 
began importing seed of traditional crops for 
free distribution to war- and drought-displaced 
farmers in northern and central Mozambique. 
The composition of seed packs varied according 
to local conditions, but the predominant cereals 
were maize and rice. Regional seed suppliers 
bid for contracts, with ability to supply large 
quantities and price as the primary selection 
criteria. 
Widespread participatory variety testing 
led to a continuous improvement in our 
knowledge of adaptation of different varieties, 
and to better selection of varieties for distribution. 
For example, increasing quantities of a maize 
variety, Kalahari Early Pearl (KEP), were 
imported from Zimbabwe and distributed 
during five crop seasons, 1986/87 to 1990/91. 
Although KEP gave reasonable yields over a 
range of lowland and midland conditions it 
was very susceptible to postharvest attack by 
pests and diseases, and not sufficiently early-
maturing. World Vision agronomists and 
breeders sought to identify varieties better 
adapted to local conditions; and in 1990, 
began to select and multiply such varieties. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of KEP 
seed and the switch to lour adapted varieties 
of maize over 11 seasons in Mozambique. 
Evaluation over a range of locations and 
seasons has shown the short-duration maize 
variety Matuba to be particularly well adapted 
to lowland conditions, with characteristics 
acceptable to farmers. It is also relatively 
tolerant of late-season moisture stress. The 
other three varieties have higher yield potentials 
Figure 1. Distribution of maize varieties in Mozambique, 1986/87 to 1996/97. 
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Year 
86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
Kalahari 
SEMOC1 
Umbeluzi 
Manica/Manica SR 
Matuba 
109 000 112 000 
369 000 
161 000 
51 000 
38 000 45 000 40 000 
25 000 25 000 
5600 
Table 1. Seed distribution in Mozambique, 1990/91 to 1996/97. 
Season Quantity distributed Material generally adapted to local conditions 
(t) (as a proportion of quantity distributed) 
1990/91 1315 0% 
1991/92 1004 0% 
1992/93 1627 81% 
1993/94 3911 100% 
1994/95 8947 100% 
1995/96 2970 100% 
1996/97 456 100% 
and are more suited to farmers' needs in the 
upland regions of Mozambique. Table 1 
shows the progressive increase in the 
proportion of locally adapted varieties 
distributed by World Vision. 
Stage 2—Participatory variety 
selection 
To improve the quality and availability of 
seed, promising varieties had to be identified 
from germplasm stocks maintained by inter-
national centers, national seed programs, private 
seed companies in the region, and from 
farmers' existing seed stocks where available. 
These efforts are described in the three 
following sections: 
• Identification and initial testing 
• On-farm evaluation and community-based 
multiplication 
• Variety characteristics 
Identification and initial testing 
Based on a knowledge of agroclimatic 
conditions and farmers' preferences in the 
target areas, World Vision screened the most 
promising germplasm lines, on-station and then 
on-farm. In collaboration with the Ministries 
of Agriculture, we have established a number 
of field stations on rented land in Mozambique 
and Angola. (In Mozambique, we have also 
helped rehabilitate a number of government 
field stations, e.g., Sussundenga and Murrua.) 
These stations are used for initial variety 
screening for a range of crops—cereals (maize, 
rice, sorghum, pearl millet), legumes (groundnut, 
pigeonpea, cowpea, Phaseolus bean), oilseeds 
(sunflower, sesame), tubers and root crops 
(cassava, sweet potato), vegetables (onion, 
tomato, green pepper, Portuguese kale), and 
tree crops (cashew). Varieties are evaluated for 
agronomic and consumer preference charac-
teristics in replicated trials (four replicates) at 
approximately ten sites that represent the 
range of agroecological conditions in central 
and northern Mozambique (see Sperling et al. 
1995 for some results of maize testing). 
Irrigation facilities are available for off-
season testing and multiplication, and two 
cycles of evaluation are possible in one year. 
On-farm evaluation and 
community-based multiplication 
After initial testing, one or two of the most 
promising varieties undergo multiplication 
and are rapidly progressed into thousands of 
on-farm trials (1-2 replicates) for exposure to 
a wider range of conditions and regional 
farmers' preferences. Both technician-
managed and farmer-implemented trials are 
conducted. They are organized in collaboration 
with INIA and the Department of Agriculture 
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at the provincial and district levels, through 
the "Farm Family First" extension network 
(see Sitch et al. 1997 for some results from 
maize on-farm trials). Decentralized sites for 
the local multi-plication of perennial crops 
(sweet potato and cassava) are established at 
strategic locations for further community-
based dissemination. This process has made 
it possible to disseminate farmer-selected 
varieties (FSVs) to remote areas of rural 
Mozambique over a period of 2-3 years. 
Similar results are anticipated in Angola 
through the Angola Seeds of Freedom Program 
(ASFP). ASFP is a partnership involving the 
Ministry of Agriculture, five international 
agricultural research centers (IARCs), and 
eight NGOs. During the first cropping season 
(1996/97), ASFP established 1030 farmer 
trials of maize, sorghum, pearl millet, and 
beans in 13 of the country's 18 provinces. 
Foundation seed of adapted and acceptable 
varieties of maize, cassava, sweet potato, and 
groundnut is being multiplied for distribution 
to contract seed producers. The IARCs produce 
and maintain stocks of breeder seed. World 
Vision produces foundation seed, which is 
then multiplied by individual farmers, farmers' 
groups, and (for large-scale production) seed 
companies. 
Improved farming practices such as 
timely sowing and weeding, optimum plant 
spacing, and natural methods of pest control 
are demonstrated and discussed during farmer 
field days at substations located throughout 
the project area, helping to maximize benefits 
from the use of FSVs. 
Variety characteristics 
Improved yield alone is not a sufficient 
criterion to recommend a particular variety 
for seed multiplication and distribution. 
Instead, all varieties are examined for various 
characteristics, and farmers select the 
varieties that best meet their food preferences 
and requirements. Typical criteria include: 
• Early maturity—short-duration varieties 
reduce the "hunger period" between harvests. 
They are generally more tolerant of 
terminal drought and can offer greater 
flexibility in sowing date. Short-duration 
maize varieties are of particular interest 
because they can be harvested and sold 
during the period when prices are usually 
at their highest 
• Pest and disease resistance—since chemical 
control is not a viable option in disaster 
situations, crops must have reasonable 
levels of genetic resistance as part of a 
strategy for integrated pest control 
• Drought tolerance—new varieties must 
give reasonable yields even under drought 
stress 
• Adaptation to low fertility—soils in 
Mozambique and Angola are often low in 
natural fertility, and chemical fertilizers 
are generally unavailable 
• Taste/cooking quality—flavor and texture 
are important criteria, and can be even 
more important than yield when families 
have sufficient access to food. 
Stage 3—Multiplication and 
dissemination 
Variety identification, testing, and selection 
result in a continuous stream of FSVs ready 
for wider multiplication and distribution. 
Extension staff receive regular training to 
help them identify and successfully work 
with farmers' groups, and develop activities 
appropriate to community needs. Participating 
farmers receive technical on-the-job training 
through a series of field days designed to 
identify problems and demonstrate improved 
techniques for seed saving. Multiplication is 
done through a combination of three 
mechanisms. 
Contracting with private seed companies. 
W V I has entered into contracts with several 
regional and national private seed companies 
to multiply and package FSV seed for 
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distribution. In Feb each year, WVI issues a 
carefully specified competitive tender for the 
supply of seed. Bids are evaluated in Apr, 
seed delivered during Aug-Oct, and distri-
buted from Oct to Dec. Firms that WVI has 
worked with successfully in the past are 
National Tested Seeds and Seed Co in 
Zimbabwe and SEMOC in Mozambique. 
World Vision production. Another alter-
native is for WVI to produce the seed itself. 
SEMOC initially produced seed for the 
Mozambique Agricultural Recovery Program, 
but is now in the process of downsizing and 
refocusing its activities on the emerging 
commercial farming sector. As part of this 
process, SEMOC is willing to rent part of its 
production facilities to WVI. This will enable 
seed production for our Mozambique program 
and also possibly for Angola, servicing the 
temporary needs in both countries until 
alternative seed supply mechanisms are 
developed. 
Community-based seed multiplication. World 
Vision also works with individual contact 
farmers and with farmers' groups. This decentra-
lized approach will be particularly important 
for future seed production of open-pollinated 
maize varieties. Three community-based 
schemes have been initiated to multiply FSV 
seed through farmers' groups that WV Angola 
has formed in Dondo, Ndalatando, and 
Malange. Group members receive training in 
seed production techniques, seed selection, 
quality control, and group organization. The 
sustainability of these groups depends upon a 
continuous supply of foundation seed from 
the national research programs, appropriate 
government policies (seed certification), and 
the emergence of seed markets. In Angola, 
the National Seed Service issues a list of 
varieties for each agroecological zone, and 
NGOs operating in that zone are authorized to 
distribute seed of those varieties. Large-scale 
farmers in Gurue district, Zambezia, have 
multiplied Matuba maize under contract; 
WVI supplies basic seed and credit for inputs. 
Distribution 
Tools and FSV seed are packaged by World 
Vision or private seed suppliers for distribution 
to a large number of farmers in seed and tool 
"Ag-Paks" and "Veg-Paks". During the 1994/ 
95 season, Ag-Paks and Veg-Paks containing 
over 6 million individual seed packets were 
distributed in Mozambique to 316 000 
farming families. From 1994 to 1996 in 
Angola, Ag-Paks were distributed to 91 000 
farmers and Veg-Paks to 33 445 farmers. 
Tables 2 and 3 show seed distribution in 
Mozambique over a period of seven seasons. 
Results 
Improved FSVs gave appreciably higher 
yields than the commonly used local varieties 
in Mozambique (Fig. 2). This was tested in 
replicated trials during the 1992/93 season 
Figure 2. Yield advantage from improved varieties 
in replicated on-farm trials in Mozambique, 
1992/93. Sweet potato TIS 2532, maize Matuba, 
sorghum Chokwe, pearl millet SDMV 89005, 
cowpea Namuesse, groundnut Natal Common. 
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Table 3. Seed distribution in Mozambique, 1992/93 to 1996/97. 
Quantities distributed (t) in different years 
Crop 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 
Maize 813 1216 4680 1569 226 
Rice 153 854 1720 18 127 
Millet 65 860 430 364 1 
Sorghum 269 316 584 355 6 
Bean 0 46 230 37 25 
Cowpea 130 236 520 260 31 
Groundnut 160 278 580 241 29 
Pigeonpea 37 55 123 53 5 
Sunflower 0 50 80 69 7 
Total 1627 3911 8947 2970 456 
under farmers' conditions (no fertilizer or 
crop protection chemicals). Variety evaluation 
has enabled the Agricultural Recovery 
Program in Mozambique to identify a 
number of improved varieties with wide 
adaptability and high yield potential, often 
outyielding local varieties by 50-200%, 
offering better pest and disease resistance, 
and meeting farmers' preferences in terms of 
maturity duration and palatability. Among 
the varieties of interest are: Matuba, Manica, 
Keran and SEMOC 1 (maize), Chokwe 
sorghum, SDMV 89005 and SDMV 91018 
pearl millet, Bebiano Branco groundnut, 
Namuesse and Brahman cowpea, TIS 2534 
and 15 Dias sweet potato, and Mucudo 
Meuvia and Mulaleia cassava. 
Recent WVI surveys indicate that 
between 58% and 84% of farmers save seed 
of FSVs and new crops distributed through 
the extension network (Sitch 1996). 
Lessons learned—positive aspects 
Emergency situations offer opportunities. 
Farmers short of seed are receptive to 
receiving, sowing, and adopting new varieties 
on a large scale. In contrast, they are far less 
likely to adopt new technology when they 
have adequate quantities of planting material. 
Therefore, emergency seed distribution, if 
properly implemented, is an opportunity to 
introduce improved varieties over a wide 
area, with a major impact on production. 
Conversely, the distribution of grain as seed 
causes quality control problems and lowers 
productivity. This cheap and quick option is 
actually quite expensive when the value of 
missed yield benefits through replanting over 
a number of years is taken into account. 
Farmers' preferences. Adoption can be 
maximized by selecting varieties with charac-
teristics that match farmers' preferences. 
Taste, color, grain hardness, resistance to 
storage pests, and ease of processing are 
important criteria, and can result in the 
rejection even of a high-yielding variety. A 
participatory approach to variety selection, in 
which farmers rather than agronomists decide 
on the relative importance of each charac-
teristic, helps ensure high adoption and high 
replanting rates. 
Combating drought through early maturity. 
The introduction of short-duration crops and 
varieties is an effective strategy for disaster 
mitigation. Examples include pigeonpea and 
short-duration pearl millet and sorghum 
varieties that perform relatively well despite 
late-season moisture stress. 
154 
Cost effectiveness. The introduction of FSVs 
is a highly cost-effective intervention, 
increasing productivity and reducing the 
period for which food aid is needed. It is 
inherently sustainable and re-establishes 
family productivity, food security, and 
livelihoods. 
Partnerships. A key feature of the successes 
in Mozambique and Angola has been the 
partnership among different organizations, 
each playing the role to which it is best 
suited. IARCs and national agricultural 
research systems (NARS) provide candidate 
varieties, farmers help screen these varieties 
and provide feedback on suitability and 
acceptability, seed companies provide seed 
and packaging services, and NGOs help 
implement and facilitate the entire process. 
Issues and constraints 
In the initial stages of an emergency 
intervention, information about what varieties 
are suitable for local conditions is limited or 
non-existent; and appropriate varieties are 
often unavailable in adequate quantities. It is 
essential to identify appropriate crops and 
varieties for a range of agroclimatic and socio-
economic conditions so that initial and sub-
sequent distributions are as effective as possible. 
Another constraint is that opportunities 
for distributing seed of improved varieties are 
limited. Emergency seed distribution is 
temporary. Once emergency donor funding 
ceases, farmers revert to saving and 
exchanging seed of open- and self-pollinated 
crops in the traditional manner. Commercial 
seed channels do not exist, and farmers find it 
difficult to obtain seed of an improved 
variety even when they are aware of its 
potential. Gradually, World Vision wi l l try to 
develop links between farmers interested in 
buying seed of commercially available 
varieties and provide incentives to seed suppliers. 
This, however, does not solve the short-term 
problem of non-availability of seed. 
It is not clear who should "take over' 
responsibility for technology development 
and transfer as NGO activities diminish or 
shift toward areas of greater need or potential 
impact. Due to funding and other constraints, 
public sector research and extension 
organizations have not been shown to be 
capable of implementing effective programs. 
Implications for future seed supply 
strategies—emergency situations 
Participatory varietal evaluation involving 
NGOs, NARS, and IARCs should be initiated 
as soon as it becomes evident that a large-
scale emergency situation is likely to 
develop. An NGO involved in these efforts 
must have proven logistical and implemen-
tation capability in the target areas. In order 
to meet the demand for seed during post-war 
resettlement, several steps are necessary. 
• IARCs provide improved germplasm in 
response to feedback on farmers' needs 
• NARS/NGOs push IARC and locally 
available germplasm rapidly through on-
station and on-farm trials with a high 
degree of farmer participation 
• NARS/NGOs accelerate the process by 
identifying and exploiting environments 
for off-season evaluation 
• NARS expedites the registration and 
approval of FSVs 
• National or regional seed companies 
undertake multiplication, treatment, and 
packaging 
• Donors provide timely and adequate 
funding, allowing NGOs to plan seed 
procurement in advance. 
The experiences in Mozambique and 
Angola constitute a model for similar programs 
in other African countries where restoration 
of food security is a priority. Maintaining a 
development perspective (to the extent the 
situation allows) while operating in an 
emergency context hastens the transition, 
maximizes benefits to the target populations, 
155 
and reduces the time and cost of food 
assistance efforts. 
Implications for the future— 
non-emergency situations 
Within the non-emergency context and in the 
aftermath of a period of extended civil strife, 
there are two major conclusions. 
Longer term strategy. A national or regional 
strategy must be developed to ensure 
adequate supplies of appropriate seed against 
the background of periodic natural disasters 
such as drought. Integrated Disaster 
Mitigation Projects (IDMPs), if adequately 
funded, would help ensure the ongoing 
dissemination of varieties that perform well 
under drought conditions, give higher yields, 
and resist storage pests. IDMPs would also 
help to develop and maintain strategic seed 
stocks that could be rapidly multiplied when 
needed. 
Open-pollinated varieties. Open-pollinated 
varieties are unattractive to large-scale 
commercial companies due to limited sales 
volume, low bearable market price, and lack 
of breeders' rights. It is therefore necessary 
to develop channels through which seed of 
improved open-pollinated varieties can be 
produced and distributed. This in turn wil l 
need strong linkages between IARCs (who 
would provide backstopping) and NARS. In 
particular, NARS need to strengthen supply 
channels for new seed stock and ensure that 
foundation seed is available to small-scale, 
decentralized seed producers. Large-scale 
multiplication of FSVs could be done by 
private seed producers and commercial 
distributors. Government policies should 
facilitate the development of community-
based and local private sector seed 
production, including small-scale enterprises 
developed with NGO assistance. An essential 
feature of this initiative wil l be impact 
assessment, by tracking a sample of farmers 
receiving seed, conducting follow-up surveys, 
and monitoring rates of adoption and renewal 
of seed stocks. 
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Emergency Seed Supply in Afghanistan 
N S Tunwar1 
Abstract 
Following the signing of the Geneva Accord in 1988, various aid agencies launched 
agricultural rehabilitation programs in Afghanistan. The FAO Programme for the 
Rehabilitation of Afghanistan Agriculture sought to expand and sustain the use of 
improved seed through various activities—on-farm trials, selection, production, 
outside procurement, networking, distribution, and popularization of certified seed. 
Fertilizer was also distributed to maximize the benefits offered by the improved 
seed, and some assistance was provided to restore traditional irrigation systems. 
The Programme also formulated guidelines for procurement and distribution of 
seed, covering various areas including bidding procedures, quality standards, 
prices, and terms of payment. 
A number of constraints had to be overcome—identification of suitable varieties, 
risk of exotic diseases and pests, delays in seed delivery due to poor security and 
transport, unscrupulous implementing partners, lack of trained staff, and difficulties 
in advance procurement due to lack of long-term commitments from donors. Despite 
these constraints, over 90% of the inputs did reach the farmers. By 1995, the 
Programme had distributed more than 24 500 t of winter crop seeds and 4335 t of 
summer crop seeds, mainly through NGOs and private voluntary organizations. 
Introduction 
Afghan agriculture—the most important 
sector of the economy—has been ravaged by 
the 18-year long civil war. Irrigation systems, 
rural roads, and bridges have been destroyed 
or damaged, fields and grazing lands sown 
with land mines, houses and animal shelters 
demolished, domestic animals including draft 
oxen slaughtered. Nearly a million hectares 
of cultivated land have been abandoned. 
Public delivery mechanisms have broken 
down, severely hampering the flow of 
essential inputs, and resulting in stagnation 
and decline in production and yield. 
Following the signing of the Geneva 
Accord in 1988 various aid agencies 
including FAO (the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations) launched 
emergency programs for agriculture in 
Afghanistan. It was clear at the outset that 
significant improvements in crop production 
were required to feed the increasing 
population of the country and to reduce the 
necessity for food aid. Seed was one of the 
essential tools to achieve this goal, and was 
1. FAO Afghanistan, PO Box 1476, Islamabad, Pakistan 
Tunwar, N.S. 1997. Emergency seed supply in Afghanistan. Pages 157-161 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed 
supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in 
Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). 
Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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therefore a major priority in all agricultural 
rehabilitation programs. The policy had two 
main components—to support returnees and 
restore food production through a package of 
inputs. 
To encourage displaced populations and 
refugees to return to formerly productive 
agricultural areas, two requirements were 
paramount: 
• To help rehabilitate neglected and 
abandoned irrigation systems, because 
agriculture in these regions is particularly 
dependent on irrigation 
• To ensure that, as far as possible, 
returnees and resident farmers had access 
to good quality seed of high-yielding, 
disease-resistant varieties of crops 
suitable for local conditions. 
To get the best results from the seed 
supplied, it was also necessary to provide 
appropriate quantities of fertilizer. 
The FAO Programme 
One apparent consequence of the breakdown 
of the agricultural system has been a 
degeneration in the genetic potential of 
principal field crops due to the lack of timely 
replacement with new seed. The initial aim of 
the FAO Programme for the Rehabilitation of 
Afghanistan Agriculture has therefore been to 
get as much good seed of suitable varieties to 
as many farmers in the region as possible, 
and depending on availability of resources, to 
help restore traditional irrigation systems. 
Distribution of seed and fertilizer was 
restricted by many factors, particularly in the 
first years of the program and still to some 
extent, 5 years later. 
The FAO Programme sought to expand 
and sustain the use of improved seed through 
various activities—on-farm trials, selection, 
production, outside procurement, networking, 
distribution, and popularization of certified 
seed in various parts of the country. Three 
agencies were involved—primarily FAO, but 
also UNHCR (operating through FAO), the 
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), 
and USAID (through a contracting agency, 
Development Alternatives Inc, DAI). UNDP/ 
Office of Project Support also supported the 
program through its extension and training 
activities for NGOs. FAO played a leading 
role in the seed component, in addition to 
being involved in other key areas. 
The program was operated from Pakistan 
and provided seed and fertilizer to farmers in 
17 border provinces of the East, East-Center 
and South. These activities were backstopped 
internationally through an informal network 
for early-generation seed. This network, 
developed by the program, comprised 
organizations from the public and private 
sectors, including CGIAR institutes. 
Activities were concentrated in eleven 
provinces—Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, 
Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni, Wardak, Logar, 
Zabul, Kandahar, and Nimroz. Inputs were 
distributed mainly through 55 selected NGOs 
and private voluntary organizations. 
Distribution of inputs 
By 4995, more than 24 500 t of winter crops 
seeds and 4335 t of summer crop seeds had 
been distributed (Table 1). In addition, 
fertilizer (Table 2) and root stock, cuttings, 
and saplings of commercally important trees 
(Table 3) were also distributed. Besides FAO 
and UNHCR (their distribution programs use 
FAO guidelines), SCA and DAI also distri-
buted improved seed and other essential 
agricultural inputs. 
SCA was involved in three major areas, 
education, health, and agriculture. Activities 
in agriculture included food production, crop 
protection, animal development, and the 
Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan. The 
agency had been involved in seed 
multiplication in Afghanistan since the mid 
1980s, and had conducted seed trials 
involving spring and winter wheat, rice, 
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Table 1. Seed distribution (tons) under the FAO Programme, 1989/90 to 1994/95. 
Winter crops 
Season Wheat Barley Peas Vegetables Berseem 
1989/90 6470 . . 0.228 -
1990/91 4371 - - 0.975 -
1991/92 3259 8.0 - 0.635 -
1992/93 3805 - - 0.475 -
1993/94 3417 9.7 - 2.000 1.70 
1994/95 3143 8.6 0.5 0.700 1.85 
Total 24 465 26.3 0.5 5.013 3.55 
Summer crops 
Season Rice Maize Greengram Groundnut Sugarcane Sesame 
1989/90 - 224 - - - -
1990/91 25.0 280 - - - -
1991/92 36.2 243 35 - - -
1992/93 38.0 284 47 2 800 -
1993/94 50.5 304 88 - 800 0.5 
1994/95 51.5 169 55 3 800 -
Total 201.2 1504 225 5 2400 0.5 
Table 2. Distribution of diammonium phosphate (DAP) and urea fertilizer, 1989/90 to 1994/95. 
Season DAP (t) Urea (t) 
1989/90 - 5500 
1990/91 - -
1991/92 1853 1500 
1992/93 3229 -
1993/94 2000 2000 
1994/95 2050 3550 
Total 9132 12 550 
maize, and food legumes in eight provinces1. 
It always maintained a working relationship 
with FAO and the Cereal Crop Research 
Institute of Pakistan, sharing technologies for 
application in Afghanistan. 
DAI carried out a seed multiplication and 
distribution program in the provinces of 
Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, Ghazni, Logar, 
Wardak, Nangarhar, Bamyan, Parwan, Baghlan, 
and Takhar. The seed was sold to farmers 
1. This component was transferred to FAO in 1996 and is now part of the Integrated Crop and Food Production Programme 
in Afghanistan (AFG/94/002). 
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Table 3. Distribution of saplings, apple root stock, and poplar cuttings, 1989/90 to 1994/95. 
Season Saplings' Apple root stock Poplar (Populus nigra) cuttings 
1989/90 - - -
1990/91 207 770 16510 120 000 
1991/92 414 650 10000 -
1992/93 359 650 6000 10000 
1993/94 309 600 11000 40 000 
1994/95 52 800 - 50 000 
Total 1344 470 43 510 220 000 
1. Saplings of apple, pear, apricot, peach, plums, cherry, almond, and persimmon trees 
through existing market mechanisms. However, 
USAID closed down its Afghanistan operations 
in 1994. 
The United Nation's strategic objectives 
were to continue providing substantial 
assistance to Afghanistan, to provide a 
platform from which key programs could be 
jointly funded by donors. As the situation in 
the country improved, the focus changed 
from emergency assistance to rehabilitation 
from 1995 onward. The major components 
of crop production—seed, fertilizer, crop 
protection, extension, and irrigation—were 
combined in the Integrated Crop and Food 
Programme (AFG/94/002) launched in Apr 
1995. 
Legal issues 
Because the administrative machinery has 
collapsed, Afghanistan has no regulations or 
legal policy governing seed quality. To 
ensure that farmers obtained good quality 
seed, the FAO program formulated guidelines 
for procurement and distribution of seed 
(guidelines not listed here due to lack of 
space, but are available from the author). 
These cover various areas: 
• Guidelines for soliciting bids 
• Technical specifications—minimum stan-
dards specified for quality declared seed 
were followed 
• Terms of payment 
• Prices—maximum justifiable prices were 
defined for export quality seed. 
Constraints 
Emergency seed supplies are made in 
response to a food crisis. In such a situation 
speed of response is critical, and blanket 
distribution of commercial/certified seed is 
the only practical solution. This carries 
various risks—introduction of exotic pests 
and diseases, poor performance of the 
selected varieties, and of course looting of 
seed stocks. The major constraints faced 
during the FAO emergency seed supply were 
as follows. 
Identification of suitable varieties. This 
proved to be a very difficult task. Although 
varieties were selected from neighboring 
countries on the basis of agroecological 
overlap, some varieties performed poorly. 
To ensure some degree of performance, a 
number of wheat varieties were field tested 
in Afghanistan for large-scale introduction. 
These varieties were of international 
(mainly CIMMYT) origin, selected and 
developed by the Pakistan national program. 
Risk of exotic diseases and pests. During the 
later stages of the program, the varieties 
distributed were mostly those released and 
cultivated in India, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. 
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They were already being grown in 
Afghanistan to some extent, either as a result 
of previous seed distribution programs or 
through introduction by farmers in border 
areas. Thus, the risk of introducing exotic 
pests and diseases was minimized. Even so, 
some scientists were apprehensive that wheat 
varieties introduced from India and Pakistan 
might create a bridge between Turkey and 
Pakistan for the spread of new races of rust. 
Similarly, there was a risk of introducing 
Karnal bunt (Neovossia indica) and carrot 
grass (Phalaris minor) along with the wheat 
seed from neighboring countries. 
To avoid over-reliance on a narrow 
genetic base (a potentially serious problem 
with some wheat varieties), the Programme 
has from the beginning included a number of 
alternative varieties. Every individual project 
includes at least small quantities of different 
varieties. This also helps to maintain genetic 
diversity. Other disease-resistant and potentially 
high-yielding varieties have been field tested 
through NGOs, who employ competent Afghan 
agronomists. As a result, variety selection has 
been possible with the minimum of risk. 
Ad hoc planning. In most cases, donors 
committed funds for only one or two seasons. 
Consequently, advance planning and procure-
ment was not possible. In such cases, 
procurement and distribution was restricted by 
non-availability of stocks of suitable varieties. 
Timely supply of seed. Seed and fertilizer 
were stocked in staging areas near the 
Afghan border well in advance of sowing 
time. However, seed delivery to target areas 
within the country was difficult and risky due 
to poor security and poor transport; donkeys 
were sometimes used to deliver to remote 
areas. Despite these constraints, over 90% of 
the inputs did reach the farmers. 
Security risks. FAO had been unusually 
lucky in this respect. No lives were lost due 
to shooting or mines. However, project staff 
(an international staff member along with 
national staff) were once taken hostage for 
several days. Such risks were always present. 
Unscrupulous implementing partners. Another 
problem during the early years of the program 
was the scarcity of reliable partners who could 
undertake even simple seed/fertilizer distri-
bution, let alone anything more complicated. 
During the first two seasons the program was 
dependent on the assistance and cooperation of 
less than 20 organizations countrywide, mainly 
international NGOs who had established 
project bases inside Afghanistan and had the 
necessary resources (funds and technical compe-
tence). From 1991 onwards, however, the number 
of national Afghan NGOs increased—there 
were 90 NGOs in 1995. 
Funding shortages. Seed and fertilizer were 
to be distributed as a package, because 
fertilizer was essential if the seed was to be 
used effectively. Funds were sufficient for 
seed, but not for fertilizer—the project 
obtained funds sufficient to supply only 25% 
of fertilizer requirements. 
Lack of trained staff. Most of the educated, 
trained staff had left the country, and it was 
difficult to find trained persons in Afghanistan 
to assist in seed production and distribution. 
This also severely hampered efforts to train 
farmers to grow new varieties and to select and 
save good quality seed for use in the next season. 
Future plans 
Lack of sustainability of seed projects is a 
common and serious problem. This aspect 
was given considerable attention at the planning 
stage of the Programme. Seed was not distri-
buted free, but sold at 10% above cost, thus 
obtaining a surplus after recovering production, 
distribution, and overhead costs. This surplus 
has grown steadily during the years, and now 
amounts to over US$ 1 million. The funds 
wil l be used to purchase seed processing 
equipment and build storage facilities for use 
by the emerging government seed enterprises. 
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Abstract 
Cassava and sweet potato are important crops in Malawi, but shortages of planting 
material were becoming more acute as a result of recurrent drought. In late 1992, a 
program of accelerated multiplication and distribution of cassava and sweet potato 
planting materials was launched as a drought-recovery measure. The program 
involved farmers, government agencies, NGOs, and donor agencies, with 
backstopping from IITA/SARRNET. Ministry of Agriculture estimates show that 
between 1991/92 and 1995/96, area and production of both crops increased 
significantly as a result of this program. Other studies confirmed these results— 
between 1994 and 1995 alone, cassava area and production increased by 31%, 
while sweet potato area increased by 63% and production by 92%. These increases 
have improved food security, nutrition, and incomes in farm communities and 
ensured government support for the promotion of cassava and sweet potato as 
drought-tolerant, food-security crops. The project has also forged synergistic and 
durable partnerships among farmers, NGOs, church groups, village groups, and 
research and extension administrators, creating a base on which to build similar 
activities in future. 
Introduction 
Maize is the main staple food in Malawi. In 
1993/94, the area sown to maize was slightly 
over 1 million ha, while cassava was grown 
on about 72 000 ha and sweet potato on 
37 000 ha (MOALD/FEWS 1994). Although 
less cassava is grown and consumed than 
maize, current trends indicate that the gap 
between these two crops is narrowing 
rapidly. The importance of cassava and sweet 
potato as food security crops is becoming 
more and more apparent with changes in the 
physical and socioeconomic environments: 
persistent drought and increase in the prices 
of farm inputs caused largely by the 
devaluation of the Malawi kwacha. The latter 
has resulted in escalating prices of fertilizer, 
which is an essential input in maize 
production (IITA/SARRNET 1995b). 
1. Agricultural Policy Research Unit, Bunda College of Agriculture, PO Box 219, Lilongwe, Malawi. 2. SADC/IITA/ 
SARRNET, PO Box 30258, Lilongwe. 3. Crop Science Department, Bunda College of Agriculture, Lilongwe. 4. USAID 
Mission, PO Box 30455, Lilongwe. 5. Lurryangwe Research Station, PO Box 59, Mzuzu, Malawi 
Minde, I.J., Teri, J.M., Saka, V.W., Rockman, K., and Benesi, I.R.M. 1997. Accelerated multiplication and distribution of 
cassava and sweet potato planting material in Malawi. Pages 162-167 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: 
proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and 
West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 
502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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Accelerated Multiplication and Distribution of Cassava 
and Sweet Potato Planting Material in Malawi 
Cassava in Malawi was traditionally 
grown in the lakeshore areas, but is now 
rapidly expanding into new areas. Sweet 
potato occupies a smaller area, but is more 
widespread. The Malawi government started 
to multiply and distribute cassava and sweet 
potato planting materials on a very small 
scale before 1992. In response to the 
catastrophic drought in 1991/92, the 
government greatly expanded these efforts 
with financial assistance from USAID 
channeled through IITA/ESARRN and later 
through IITA/SARRNET (International 
Institute for Tropical Agriculture, Southern 
Africa Root Crops Research Network). 
Malawi has more experience than other 
countries in Southern Africa in the multi-
plication and distribution of cassava and 
sweet potato planting materials as a drought 
recovery and diversification measure. Consi-
derable experience has been gained since the 
1992/93 season in nursery establishment and 
management, distribution of planting materials, 
establishing linkages and partnerships, and 
training. The objective of this paper is to 
summarize these experiences and draw 
lessons that can be applied to similar projects 
elsewhere. 
Methodology 
The information used in this paper came from 
three main sources. 
a) The program on accelerated multipli-
cation and distribution of cassava and sweet 
potato planting materials was evaluated in 
Oct 1994 to identify general strengths and 
weaknesses and assess the linkages between 
the program and research, extension, 
NGOs, policy makers, and farmers, 
Evaluators visited fields in the northern, 
central, and southern regions to document 
area sown, varieties grown, and manage-
ment practices used. Sixteen out of 21 
primary and secondary multiplication sites 
were visited. This was followed by semi-
structured interviews with a variety of 
collaborating partners: Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock Development 
(MOALD) staff, donors, UN agencies, 
NGOs, and churches. Different question-
naires were used for each group, reflecting 
their different roles in the program. In 
addition, 25 farmers (men and women) 
were selected randomly and interviewed. 
b) In Apr 1995, MOALD and IITA/ 
SARRNET organized a 2-day workshop 
to consider the recommendations made in 
the 1994 evaluation and assess the impact 
of the project. Program Managers from all 
eight Agricultural Development Divisions 
(ADDs) presented detailed reports on area 
expansion and current status of the two 
crops, particularly in drought-prone areas 
(IITA/SARRNET 1995b) 
c) An adoption and impact assessment was 
undertaken between Sep and Nov 1995. 
Unstructured questionnaires were adminis-
tered to NGOs, development agencies, 
research and extension administrators, 
research technicians, and extension agents. 
In addition, structured questionnaires were 
administered to 15 farmers' groups, 60 
households that participated in the program, 
and 30 non-participating households. 
Results 
Several million meters of cassava stakes and 
sweet potato vines were distributed through 
the program, and have made a very positive 
impact. 
Expansion in area and production. Cassava 
and sweet potato areas have grown 
significantly in the past three seasons (Table 
1). Year-on-year percentage increases have 
been particularly impressive for the two most 
recent seasons. Preliminary estimates for 
1996/97 show a continued increase. Cassava 
production was 20% higher than in 1995/96, 
while sweet potato production was 19% 
higher (MOALD/FEWS 1992-97). Between 
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1992/93 and 1994/95, cassava was multiplied 
at 10 primary and 5 secondary sites while 
sweet potato was multiplied at 8 primary and 
6 secondary sites. In the 1994/95 season 
these sites covered 91 ha of cassava and 
34 ha of sweet potato. It was estimated that if 
all materials produced at these sites were 
distributed, they would be sufficient to plant 
2000 ha of cassava and 3500 ha of sweet 
potato, benefiting about 10 000 and 350 000 
families respectively. These figures are based 
on multiplication ratios of 1:20 for cassava 
and 1:100 for sweet potato, and an average of 
0.2 ha of cassava and 0.01 ha of sweet potato 
per family. By 1994/95, 2200 ha of cassava 
and 4500 ha of sweet potato were planted. 
Capacity building. Training at all levels was 
an important component of the program. The 
program strengthened research, extension, 
NGO, and farmer capacity in multiplying and 
distributing improved planting materials. 
Some 281 research, extension, and NGO staff 
have been trained to date. In addition, 15 
farmers' groups (over 350 farmers) received 
training on nursery establishment and manage-
ment. The program provided these farmers 
with facilities to produce healthy planting 
materials. Posters and pamphlets were used 
to publicize awareness about these crops. As 
result, both crops are now expanding into 
non-traditional areas as cash crops. 
Higher incomes, better nutrition. Program 
beneficiaries reported income increases of 
25% from the sale of cassava roots, sweet 
potato tubers, cassava leaves, and planting 
materials. They used this extra income to buy 
fertilizer for maize, medicines, pay school 
fees, and purchase other items to improve the 
quality of life. Family nutrition improved as a 
result of increased intake of cassava and 
sweet potato (both are high-energy foods, and 
the leaves in particular are a good source of 
vitamin A, iron, and calcium). Fourteen out 
of 15 villages interviewed reported widespread 
consumption of cassava and sweet potato 
leaves. Reduced length of the hunger period 
(severe food shortage which occurs when 
households run out of food stocks and do not 
have sufficient cash to buy food on the 
market) was widely noted in villages where 
improved planting materials had been 
distributed. Growers estimated that the 
hunger period decreased from 5 months to 3 
months, and was even eliminated in some 
areas as a result of the program. 
Program implementation, roles, and 
responsibilities 
Multiplication of cassava and sweet potato 
planting materials is organized at three levels. 
Primary multiplication nurseries are located 
Table 1. Area and production of cassava and sweet potato in Malawi, 1990/91 to 1995/96. 
Cassava Sweet potato 
Season Area (ha) Production (t) Area (ha) Production (t) 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 
71 619 
63 965 
75 050 
72 149 
94 731 
116 523 
167 818 
128 827 
216 005 
250 066 
328 424 
534 549 
na 
19 886 
na 
37 151 
60 701 
68 804 
na 
43 074 
na 
165 322 
317714 
596 469 
na = information not available 
Source: MOALD/FEWS 1994-96 
164 
on agricultural research stations, established 
and managed by research station staff. 
Financial support is provided by USAID 
through IITA/SARRNET. Secondary multi-
plication nurseries are established mainly in 
areas under the jurisdiction of the Agri-
cultural Development Divisions (ADDs). 
Extension staff are responsible for monitoring 
and supervision; research staff provide advice 
and technical support, particularly on disease 
and pest monitoring. 
Secondary sites can also be established in 
a farmer's field. In such cases the farmer 
enters into a "contract" specifying his/her 
responsibilities and receives financial and 
technical support. NGOs and church groups 
are involved in the establish-ment and 
management of secondary sites under similar 
"contract" conditions. 
Tertiary multiplication nurseries are 
established and managed mainly by farmers' 
clubs—particularly women's groups—and 
individual farmers. Although no direct 
financial support is provided, such groups 
receive material support (e.g., watering cans, 
hoes, and other tools) from the Department of 
Agricultural Research and Extension or 
NGOs. Farmers' clubs, particularly women's 
groups, have proved to be a reliable and rapid 
method of disseminating planting materials 
(Saka and Minde 1994). NGOs have played a 
crucial role at the secondary and tertiary 
levels in multiplication/distribution and training 
of farmers on crop management practices. 
The strength of this system lies in the 
synergistic benefits that come when a wide 
range of partners is involved. Eight research 
stations, 8 ADDs, 12 NGOs, several church 
groups, IITA/SARRNET, donor groups, and 
an estimated 200 000 farmers were involved. 
Each collaborator performs a specific role 
within the overall group effort. Each 
collaborator is fully integrated into the effort 
and has tried to recognize and respect the 
comparative advantage of other partners. For 
example, NGOs and churches generally have 
better grassroots contacts with farmers than 
other organizations. The partners and their 
roles are briefly described below. 
The program is implemented by SADC/ 
IITA/SARRNET and managed by USAID 
Malawi. The national research and extension 
services has primary responsibility for under-
taking the agreed tasks in collaboration with 
the other partners. It coordinates program 
activities, provides land and irrigation water 
for nurseries, manages primary sites, trains 
field staff and farmers, and monitors and 
supervises all multiplication sites. Development 
agencies (e.g., FAO and UNICEF) play a role 
in mobilization, provide financial support at 
tertiary level, and assist in the distribution of 
planting materials to farmers. NGOs and 
churches provide land, financial support, 
labor for multiplication at secondary sites, 
monitor and backstop secondary and tertiary 
sites, and distribute planting materials to 
secondary sites and farmers. They also 
mobilize farmers at grassroots level. Bunda 
College of Agriculture (University of Malawi) 
and Natural Resource College provide land, 
irrigation water, and technical staff to 
supervise the multiplication sites on their 
campuses. Farmers' groups manage tertiary 
sites, multiply materials on their land, and 
distribute materials to other farmers. USAID 
provides financial support. 
Constraints 
Although the program has been extremely 
successful, two areas in particular need 
further attention. 
Livestock damage. Livestock damage to 
cassava and sweet potato crops is a threat to 
the success of the program. For example, in 
some of the sites surveyed in 1994/95, over 
half the cassava fields were damaged. Village 
authorities and individual farmers are trying 
to apply sanctions to reduce the problem, but 
livestock owners, although few in number, 
are wealthy and have strong ties with the 
local chiefs. A multifaceted approach including 
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community education, community sanctions, 
fines, and fencing of gardens needs to be 
introduced. Fencing is a practical solution 
because cassava fields are generally small 
enough (average 0.4 ha) to be fenced. Many 
farmers are constructing elaborate fences 
around their fields to keep out livestock. 
Training. Training of frontline extension 
staff, agricultural research technicians, NGO 
field workers, and farmers needs to be 
expanded. For example, many of the field 
assistants interviewed during the surveys said 
they had insufficient knowledge of pests and 
diseases, and would like to receive training. 
An earlier country-wide study (IITA/SARRNET 
1995a,b) showed that farmers lacked 
knowledge about East African common mosaic 
disease (an important cassava disease), and 
rarely selected mosaic-free plants for cuttings. 
Record keeping also needs improvement. 
Better records wi l l allow the program to 
follow up on trainees' activities in later years. 
Lessons learned from the Malawi 
experience 
The lessons learned from the Malawi 
multiplication and distribution program can 
easily be applied to similar programs in the 
region. Some of the key issues are outlined 
below. 
Collaboration and policy support. The 
Malawi program has benefited from a 
participatory approach involving a wide range 
of partners, and organizational flexibility to 
help overcome traditional institutional barriers. 
Most important, it benefited from govern-
ment policy support for the promotion of 
cassava and sweet potato. 
Location of multiplication sites. The 
optimum spatial distribution of multiplication 
sites depends on the size of the country, roads 
and transport facilities, and the availability of 
scientists and technicians for monitoring. In 
Malawi, multiplication sites were established 
throughout the country. This helped to reduce 
distribution costs, ensure rapid distribution 
(large quantities of planting materials must 
be distributed within a short period of time), 
and made it easier for farmers to visit 
demonstration sites. The disadvantage of 
decentralized production is that too few 
scientists and technicians may be available to 
adequately supervise production at a large 
number of scattered sites. Sites must be 
inspected almost fortnightly for rogueing; 
some technicians are inadequately trained 
and need help from experienced scientists on 
pest and disease identification. 
Preservation of planting materials. For such 
programs to succeed, farmers must have the 
ability to preserve or otherwise obtain planting 
materials each season. In Malawi, cassava is 
normally harvested at the beginning of the 
rains, and the next crop planted immediately; 
planting material is therefore easily available. 
The problem arises when cassava is 
harvested in the dry season and planting 
material must be preserved for several 
months, until planting time. There is a similar 
problem with sweet potato, which is usually 
harvested in May-June and planted only in 
Dec-Jan. In such cases, small quantities of 
the crop must be grown with "irrigation" 
(e.g., using waste water from the kitchen) in 
order to have planting material for the main 
season. However, this practice is rarely 
followed, and instead farmers request planting 
materials each season. This is clearly not 
sustainable. The only sustainable method is 
for the farmers to have their own nurseries to 
provide "seed" stock for the following 
season. However, there should be a periodic 
replenishment of stock to prevent build-up of 
pests and diseases. 
Commercialization of the program. For a 
program to be sustainable, materials from all 
multiplication sites, whether primary, 
secondary, or tertiary, wi l l need to be sold 
albeit at a nominal cost. Past experience has 
shown that giving away planting materials 
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creates an attitude that the materials wil l be 
available free next year at the same site. 
Programs therefore need to develop the 
capacity to manage sales. 
Training. This is a vital component, and in 
most cases should receive a large share of the 
program budget. Farmers as well as research 
and field technicians need to be trained. 
Research and extension administrators also 
need to be sensitized to appreciate the 
importance of pest and disease management 
for root crops. 
Expected adoption rate. Multiplication of 
cassava and sweet potato planting materials 
is fairly simple once farmers have been 
trained; the major input required is family 
labor. Adoption rates wil l depend on the 
physical and socioeconomic environment. In 
areas with low and unreliable rainfall, 
cassava and sweet potato wi l l be preferred to 
food crops with high moisture and input 
requirements (e.g., maize). 
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Session VI I I 
Farmer-to-Farmer Seed Supply 

Farmer-to-Farmer Seed Movements in Zimbabwe: 
Issues Arising 
D D Rohrbach1 
Abstract 
This paper reviews the structure and performance of village seed markets in 
southern Zimbabwe. 
There is limited private sector interest in multiplying and selling seed of open-
pollinated varieties of such crops as sorghum and pearl millet. The village market 
represents an important alternative seed supply channel. Seed distribution under 
drought relief programs offers new seed stocks; local markets can maintain and 
further distribute this stock. 
In the case of sorghum and pearl millet, small-scale farmers will generally select 
seed from their previous harvest. Seed shortages are resolved through seed trade 
between farm households. Most of these transactions are free of charge. This limits 
the feasibility of investment in localized seed multiplication and sale. Suggestions 
that seed distribution under drought relief programs have wiped out local varieties 
are incorrect. Despite multiple years of drought and over 4 years of free seed 
distribution, most households continue to plant an array of traditional varieties. 
Several recommendations are offered for improving the village seed market. 
Introduction 
In recent years, seed for open-pollinated 
sorghum and pearl millet varieties in 
Southern Africa has been produced and 
distributed almost entirely through 
government and donor-sponsored drought 
relief programs. Private seed companies have 
expressed limited interest in these crops, 
except to supply the drought relief efforts. 
The lack of commercial interest in sorghum 
and pearl millet seed trade has prompted 
interest in exploring alternative seed supply 
channels. One alternative is the village seed 
market. Farmers already produce much of 
their own seed stocks and exchange seed 
among themselves. Village seed markets 
could also be employed to distribute new 
varieties. 
Several NGOs in Southern Africa have 
developed projects to encourage seed 
production on-farm and to stimulate farmer-
to-farmer seed exchange (see papers from 
CARE Zambia and ActionAid Malawi earlier 
1. SADC/ICRISAT Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program, PO Box 776, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
Rohrbach, D.D. 1997. Farmer-to-farmer seed movements in Zimbabwe: issues arising. Pages 171-179 in Alternative 
strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and 
Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van 
Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics. 
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in this volume). The probability of success of 
such projects can be improved if they build 
on existing patterns of seed exchange in the 
village market rather than creating new 
institutions. This paper reviews the structure 
and performance of such village seed markets 
in southern Zimbabwe. The analysis indicates 
that most sorghum and pearl millet seed is 
traded as gifts. When cash sales take place, 
seed prices are often equal to those for grain. 
As a result, the returns to investments by seed 
traders in improving the quality and range of 
their product are limited. However, technical 
support can facilitate improvements in seed 
management across the wider rural 
community. Such initiatives can facilitate the 
spread of new varieties and the maintenance 
of a wider range of local germplasm. 
Data sources 
Data were drawn from a survey of 220 
households distributed across 11 smallholder 
farming areas in southern Zimbabwe. These 
areas were chosen at random from a listing of 
more than 30 communal areas in which at 
least 20% of land was sown to sorghum and 
pearl millet. Two villages were sampled 
within each communal area (22 villages in 
total) and 10 farmers were interviewed in 
each village. This survey was carried out in 
June 1996, approximately 1-2 months after 
the 1995/96 harvest. The previous cropping 
season offered a favorable harvest in areas 
prone to frequent drought. 
One major source of bias affected the 
survey results. The Government of Zimbabwe 
distributed free maize, sorghum, and pearl 
millet seed to small-scale farmers at the 
beginning of each of the previous four 
cropping seasons under its drought relief 
programs. Most of the maize distributed was 
hybrid seed. Much of the sorghum and pearl 
millet was of mixed varieties purchased as 
grain, processed, and distributed as seed. In 
the year previous to the survey, a large 
shipment of grain, converted to seed, was 
obtained from neighboring Botswana. Only 
smaller quantities of certified seed of several 
recently released sorghum and pearl millet 
varieties were distributed, particularly in 
1992. Roughly one-half of the households in 
the sample had previously received sorghum 
or pearl millet seed through the drought relief 
programs. 
Local seed supply and household 
seed stocks 
Despite substantial government investments 
in the distribution of sorghum and pearl 
millet seed under drought relief programs, 
small-scale farmers draw the largest share of 
their planting seed from their own stocks. 
Even following the extremely severe 1991/92 
drought—commonly described as the worst 
in the past 100 years—the majority of 
farmers in southern Zimbabwe still had 
sorghum or pearl millet seed for planting the 
following season (Friis-Hansen and 
Rohrbach 1995). Recent SADC/ICRISAT 
surveys in Zimbabwe and Botswana suggest 
that it is rare for a village to run out of seed. 
Under severe drought conditions, a small 
proportion of farmers may lose their seed 
stocks. However, this loss can generally be 
offset by larger seed stocks held by better-
than-average farmers. 
The main sources of sorghum and pearl 
millet seed for farmers in southern Zimbabwe 
are outlined in Table 1. In 1995, the 
Government of Zimbabwe distributed 1775 t 
of sorghum seed and 100 t of pearl millet 
seed. These quantities were sufficient to plant 
almost 100% of the smallholder sorghum 
area and about 10% of the pearl millet area. 
Despite this, only 56% of the households 
growing sorghum planted the drought relief 
seed. Since the pearl millet seed was 
distributed largely in the southern parts of the 
country, almost one-quarter of smallholder 
households planted the drought relief 
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Table 1. Proportion of households obtaining seed from alternative market sources, southern 
Zimbabwe, 1995/% [and expected seed source in 1996/97]. 
% of farmers obtaining sorghum % of fanners obtaining pearl millet 
Source of seed seed from each source seed from each source 
Local store 2.8 [3.4] 0 [2.3] 
Distant town 4.0 [2.3] 1.5 [1.5] 
NGO 4.0 [0] 3.8 [0] 
Neighbor 6.8 [1.7] 10.0 [1.5] 
Friend/relative 25.7 [2.3] 20.0 [1.5] 
Drought relief 56.3 [11.4] 23.8 [2.3] 
Own stock 43.8 [91.4] 65.4 [97.5] 
Source: SADC/ICRISAT Seed and Fertility Management Survey, 1996 
allotment. The survey indicated that just 
under one-half of all farmers drew sorghum 
seed from their own stocks. This proportion 
would undoubtedly have been higher without 
the free seed shipments. Two-thirds of pearl 
millet producers drew seed from their own 
stocks. 
Concerns about a growing dependence on 
drought relief shipments are not justified in 
these data. Only a small minority of sorghum 
and pearl millet growers expected to receive 
seed from drought relief programs in the 
coming 1996/97 cropping season1. More than 
90% planned to draw seed from their own 
stocks. 
The main alternative source of seed in 
local communities is neighboring friends and 
relatives. If drought relief seed is not 
available, farmers can readily turn to 
neighbors for small quantities of seed. 
Following the 1994/95 drought, roughly 30% 
of the farm sample obtained seed stocks 
through this channel. This includes relatives 
who may be living in other parts of the 
country. However, dependence on this source 
of supply drops sharply when rains are 
favorable and households expect to cover 
their own needs, e.g., after the 1996 harvest. 
Sorghum and pearl millet seed are only 
rarely available through local retail shops, 
and seed purchase in more distant towns is 
expensive. These channels are under-
developed because most commercial companies 
do not perceive a profitable market for open-
pollinated varieties of sorghum and pearl 
millet. Rural retailers are reluctant to stock 
this seed because they similarly perceive a 
lack of demand. Past deliveries of free seed 
through national drought relief programs 
have likely further discouraged the 
development of this market. 
Yet hybrid maize seed is widely available 
in village shops. Small-scale farmers recognize 
the need to purchase hybrid seed each year 
and most wi l l readily do this. These same 
farmers also realize they can replant open-
pollinated varieties of sorghum and pearl 
millet obtained from their previous harvest. 
Seed purchases are perceived to be unnecessary. 
Transactions on the village seed 
market 
Village market transactions are dominated by 
free gifts. Almost 80% of the sorghum and 
pearl millet transactions were free of charge 
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1. Nonetheless, over 1500 t of sorghum and 100 t of pearl millet seed were again distributed free. 
Table 2. Distribution of seed trade transactions, 1995/96 planting season. 
% of seed market transactions in the form of 
Cash sales Barter Gifts 
White sorghum 
Red sorghum 
Pearl millet 
All crops 
2.8 
0 
0 
2.8 
11.1 34.7 
0 9.7 
6.9 34.7 
18.0 79.1 
Source: SADC/ICRISAT Seed and Fertility Management Survey, 1996 
(Table 2). It was difficult to determine the 
extent of reciprocal obligations inherent in 
these transactions. However, farmers have 
consistently indicated that such obligations 
do not exist. Rather, seed should be provided 
to neighbors in need as a community responsi-
bility. This responsibility is reinforced by 
family ties, as most of these transactions are 
between relatives. 
The proclivity to provide sorghum and 
pearl millet seed freely is probably encouraged 
by the small quantities involved. Seed-to-
grain multiplication ratios are high and 
seeding rates are low. Most transactions 
involve less than 2 kg. In contrast, village 
seed transactions for a more valuable crop 
with lower multiplication ratios, like 
groundnut, are generally in the form of cash 
or barter transactions. 
The one-fifth of transactions in the form 
of barter commonly involve the trade of one 
seed variety for another (although some 
barter transactions involved the trade of grain 
for seed). Such transactions are encouraged 
by the diversity of varieties within a local 
community (Table 3). The survey identified 
approximately 30 different varieties of 
sorghum and 20 different varieties of pearl 
millet being grown2. Within any given 
community (communal area), farmers 
distinguished an average of six varieties of 
sorghum and four varieties of pearl millet. 
Approximately 30% of the farmers in any 
given community grow more than one 
variety. 
The relatively small proportion of farmers 
growing more than one variety was surprising 
given the common view that farmers desire 
2. This reflects farmers' perceptions of varietal differences. A botanist would undoubtedly identify a substantially larger 
number of genetically unique cultivars. 
174 
Table 3. Diversity of sorghum and pearl millet varieties grown in southern Zimbabwe, 1995/96. 
Average no. of varieties grown 
per smallholder farming area 
No. of varieties grown 
per farmer 
Sorghum 
Pearl millet 
6.4 varieties 
3.8 varieties 
71 % of farmers grow one variety 
17% grow 2 varieties, 12% grow 3 varieties 
73% of farmers grow one variety 
25% grow 2 varieties, 2% grow 3 varieties 
Source: SADC/ICRISAT Seed and Fertility Management Survey, 1996 
more genetic diversity. Several NGOs in 
Zimbabwe are promoting inter-regional seed 
movements and the broader exchange of 
landrace varieties on the assumption that 
individual farmers seek to grow many 
varieties for both multiple end uses and as a 
means to offset production risks. These percep-
tions are reinforced by anecdotal evidence of 
"lost" varieties or of farmers searching for 
varieties that had been grown in previous 
years. 
While it seems likely that individual farmers 
lose seed from time to time, ICRISAT's 
reconnaissance surveys and related impact 
studies following the severe 1991/92 drought 
suggest it is rare for a community to run out 
of seed. Farmers do not commonly complain 
that they have lost needed varieties of 
sorghum or pearl millet. Further research is 
merited on the value local communities place 
on varietal diversity. However, initial enquiries 
indicate that the interests of a few farmers in 
"lost" varieties cannot be generalized. The 
survey evidence suggests that a few farmers 
wil l grow a range of germplasm, but most 
farmers are satisfied with growing one variety. 
Farmers who grow multiple varieties are 
more likely to act as community seed 
sources. Roughly 20% of households within 
any given farm community provide seed into 
the local market (Table 4). Most of these 
farmers are involved in only one or two 
transactions, most commonly to relatives and 
close neighbors. However, a few seem to act 
as seed stockists for their communities. These 
farmers are willing to grow and provide 
several different varieties and are viewed by 
local communities as sources of seed if other 
more localized sources fail. 
Such farmers may offer the basis for 
developing seed trading systems in local 
communities. Yet the fact that most transac-
tions are made free of charge suggests there 
are no returns to individual investments in 
maintaining community seed stocks. If seed 
is sold, a premium can be charged for the added 
costs of maintaining multiple varieties and 
storing seed stocks. But without cash transac-
tions, seed production and stockholding 
decisions remain a subsistence calculation. 
This view of the market is reinforced by 
limited evidence of the willingness of 
smallholders to purchase sorghum or pearl 
millet seed on the commercial market (Table 
5). Survey respondents were asked the 
hypothetical question whether they would be 
willing to purchase sorghum and pearl millet 
seed from local retail outlets in the same way 
they almost universally purchase hybrid 
maize seed. The interpretation of this 
question is almost inevitably biased by the 
fact that sorghum and pearl millet seed have 
not been available through local retail shops 
in the past. Further, many farmers had received 
free sorghum or pearl millet seed through 
drought relief programs during the previous 4 
years. The combination of possible biases 
notwithstanding, at least 90% of the respondents 
claimed they would never purchase sorghum 
or pearl millet seed from a local shop. 
Table 4. Proportion of households trading seed as gifts, barter, and sale, southern Zimbabwe, 
1995/96. 
% of households 
Source of seed growing sorghum 
% of households 
growing pearl millet 
Providing seed as gifts 14.2 
Offering seed on barter 4.5 
Selling seed 1.1 
19.2 
3.1 
0 
Source: SADC/ICRISAT Seed and Fertility Management Survey, 1996 
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Table 5. How often will farmers growing SV 2 sorghum or PMV 2 pearl millet be willing to 
purchase this seed at a local retail shop? 
% of farmers 
Frequency of expected purchase growing SV 2 
% of fanners 
growing PMV 2 
Never 89.5 
Only after drought 5.0 
Every other year 1.4 
Every year 3.2 
Other 0.9 
97.2 
0.9 
0.5 
0.5 
0.9 
Source: SADC/ICRISAT Seed and Fertility Management Survey, 1996 
The lack of interest in commercial seed 
sales cannot be attributed to a lack of demand 
for varieties being produced by the seed 
companies. In several years of previous 
surveys, small-scale farmers have consistently 
voiced interest in the new varieties of 
sorghum and pearl millet being produced by 
these companies. Lack of access to seed is 
cited as the principal constraint limiting wider 
adoption of the sorghum variety SV 2 and the 
pearl millet variety PMV 2. 
At least one seed company argues (S B 
McCarter, personal communication 1997) 
that such responses would change if seed was 
in fact available in local shops. This company 
suggests that farmers would be willing to pay 
for higher quality, pure seed of the newly 
released varieties. But local retailers refuse to 
stock this seed because of their perception of 
a lack of demand. As long as retailers refuse 
to stock the seed, the level of demand for 
high-quality commercial seed wi l l remain 
untested. 
Improving rural seed trade 
The combination of widespread dependence 
on own seed stocks, availability of free seed 
when stocks run short, and the apparent lack 
of retail trade demand suggest limited scope 
for investment to develop rural seed markets 
for sorghum and pearl millet. At best, there 
may be a small premium market for traders 
offering particular varieties to meet local 
demand. This may include new varieties that 
are not yet widely available in rural 
communities. It may also include specialized 
varieties with particular end uses which have 
been "lost" after several drought years. The 
survey results suggest, however, that even 
these markets merit only limited investments. 
The most valuable contribution to the 
development of rural seed trade may come 
from helping a wide cross-section of small-
scale farmers become better at seed selection 
and storage for their own use. By improving 
the seed stocks of individual households, the 
stocks of each village community can be 
improved. Rather than promoting seed trade 
per se, such a strategy would improve the 
opportunity to trade when demand arises. 
Importantly, household investments would be 
primarily geared toward improving each 
farmer's cwn productivity. Such investments 
would not depend on the consistency of seed 
demand or the magnitude of the seed price 
premium. 
One opportunity for improving household 
(and village) seed stocks is to improve the 
timing and criteria of seed selection. Farmers 
responding to the survey generally select 
their seed after harvest and before the grain is 
threshed (Table 6). Most households make 
selections on the basis of head size, seed size, 
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and color. While there is a degree of 
correlation between these characteristics and 
the plant type and variety, this relationship 
could be better tracked with seed selection in 
the field just before harvest. This would 
allow a farmer to select seed on the basis of 
the growth characteristics of the plant and not 
simply the characteristics inferred from the 
appearance of the grain panicle. 
High payoffs may also be gained from 
development assistance to improve seed 
storage practices. The survey responses 
indicate 40% of respondents apply no seed 
treatment (Table 7). This strategy may be 
reasonable for landrace varieties with hard 
grain. However, one common complaint 
about the newer varieties is that they do not 
store as well. Varieties such as SV 2 and PMV 
2 have softer grains than most landraces and 
greater care may be required for maintaining 
seed—particularly for periods longer than the 
few months between the harvest and the 
immediate planting season. 
A range of seed treatments are used inclu-
ding ash, smoke, and manure. Ten percent of 
the respondents use chemical insecticide. The 
relative efficacy of these options merits 
further investigation. 
Similarly, there is scope for evaluating the 
relative performance of alternative seed 
storage sites. One-third to one-half of all 
households simply store their seed in the 
granary (Table 8). This includes many of 
those households that do not treat their seed. 
Such a strategy may increase the likelihood 
of insect infestation. Storage in the kitchen is 
linked with the use of smoke to keep insects 
out of the hanging panicles. Storage in the 
Table 6. Proportion of respondents selecting sorghum and pearl millet seed at different times of the 
harvest, 1996. 
% of farmers selecting 
white sorghum 
% of farmers selecting 
pearl millet 
In the field 
After harvest and before threshing 
After threshing 
24.8 
74.4 
0.8 
22.8 
77.2 
0 
Source: SADC/ICRISAT Seed and Fertility Management Survey, 1996 
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Table 7. Proportion of households applying various treatments to sorghum and pearl millet seed, 
1996. 
% of farmers growing % of farmers growing 
white sorghum pearl millet 
Untreated 38.0 44.7 
Ash 31.0 24.4 
Insecticide 10.5 13.8 
Smoked in the kitchen 12.2 12.2 
Goat manure 5.3 2.4 
Other 3.0 2.4 
Source: SADC/ICRISAT Seed and Fertility Management Survey, 1996 
Table 8. Proportion of households storing sorghum and pearl millet seed in alternative locations, 
1996. 
% of farmers growing 
white sorghum 
% of farmers growing 
pearl millet 
Separate bag in the granary 
In the kitchen 
In the house/bedroom 
Other1 
33.9 
39.2 
19.3 
7.6 
52.8 
25.2 
13.8 
8.2 
1. Includes storage in a tin, in a jar, etc 
Source: SADC/ICRISAT Seed and Fertility Management Survey, 1996 
home or bedroom is commonly in a small 
bag left in a corner. Again, further research 
can evaluate the magnitude of losses 
associated with each practice. Farmers may 
also benefit from advice on options for 
maintaining seed stocks over a longer period. 
Targeting assistance to the rural seed 
market 
In sum, commercial sorghum and pearl millet 
seed trade in the smallholder farming areas of 
southern Zimbabwe is virtually nonexistent. 
While at least one company believes this 
market is still worth testing, most agree that 
the retail market is not particularly profitable 
(see Kelly and Rusike, this volume). Informal 
village seed markets offer an alternative 
channel for seed supply for most farmers, and 
have provided consistency of supply well 
before the recent history of drought relief 
programs. 
Significant levels of private investment in 
seed production and trade for sorghum and 
pearl millet are unlikely unless this trade 
becomes more fully monetized. Free seed 
wi l l not justify investments in improving 
seed quality or maintaining seed stocks. Such 
investments can only be justified as a strategy 
pursued by individual households to do a 
better job of maintaining their own seed 
supplies. Research and extension efforts can 
target improvements in seed selection 
practices, seed treatment, and seed storage. 
Currently, no such assistance is even 
attempted. 
The development of rural seed trade may 
best be fashioned around the dissemination of 
new varieties. Farmers are always looking for 
better-performing varieties. Insofar as new 
sorghum and pearl millet varieties, or higher 
quality seed of existing varieties, offer 
significant productivity gains compared with 
the seed available in local communities, at 
least a small market niche should exist. This 
is evident in the consistency of the rural 
market for hybrid maize seed. 
Finally, the regularity of droughts in 
southern Zimbabwe argues for the 
improvement of community capacities to 
maintain longer-term seed stocks of a wide 
range of varieties. One strategy is to 
encourage those few farmers currently 
choosing to produce multiple varieties to 
invest in keeping larger seed stocks in multi-
year storage. However, the justification for 
maintaining community seed stocks may 
depend on the development of a market for 
such seed. Investment in local information 
systems connecting seed buyers (including 
NGOs and government organizations) and 
seed sellers may facilitate such investment. 
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Abstract 
The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) has developed a number of 
improved cowpea varieties in collaboration with national programs. Of these, eight 
varieties have been released for general cultivation in Nigeria. However, due to 
various constraints, these varieties are not being multiplied and distributed in 
sufficient quantities. IITA's Kano Station is therefore working closely with farmers 
to study their traditional seed systems and develop strategies to improve seed 
production and distribution of improved varieties. This paper describes the 
traditional cowpea seed distribution system in northern Nigeria; analyzes three IITA 
interventions (involving intercropped, sole, and irrigated cowpea) that have 
catalyzed the rapid spread of improved varieties; and proposes strategies and an 
action plan to promote and strengthen farmer-to-farmer diffusion of cowpea seed. 
Introduction 
Few countries in Africa have all the 
components needed for modern agriculture— 
improved seed, adequate amounts of fertilizer 
and chemicals, good farm management 
practices, and sufficient infrastructure for 
storage and marketing of farm produce. Most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa have neither 
a well organized plant breeding program nor 
a fully functional seed industry (Venkatesan 
1994, Tripp 1995, Cromwell 1996). The few 
countries that do have such programs concen-
trate mainly on major food crops like maize. 
Collaborative research between international 
agricultural research centers (IARCs) and 
various national programs in Africa has led to 
the development and release of a range of 
improved varieties of many important crops. 
However, due to various constraints, these 
varieties are not being multiplied and distri-
buted* in sufficient quantities. Consequently, 
most farmers continue to grow traditional 
varieties in their traditional manner. This contri-
butes to stagnation in agricultural productivity 
and a decline in per capita food availability. 
Food production can be substantially 
increased simply by ensuring seed availa-
bility of available improved varieties. Several 
countries in Africa are in the process of 
developing and strengthening the formal seed 
sector (Venkatesan 1994, Cromwell 1996). 
1. International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Kano Station, PMB 3112, Sabo Bakin Zuwo Road, Kano, Nigeria 
2. IITA/GTZ Promotion of Seed Production and Marketing Project, PO Box 9698, KIA, Accra, Ghana 
Singh, B.B., Ajeigbe, H., Mohammed, S.G., and van Gastel, A.J.G. 1997. Farmer-to-farmer diffusion of cowpea seed in 
northern Nigeria. Pages 180-187 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Con-
ference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, 
Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: Interna-
tional Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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Simultaneously, it would also be useful to 
study and strengthen the traditional channel 
of farmer-to-farmer seed distribution, so that 
this channel can also be used to distribute 
seed of improved varieties. This is particularly 
important for self-pollinated crops, for which 
seed companies are reluctant to produce seed 
(Grisley 1993, Sperling 1996). This would 
involve studying the existing seed systems, 
analyzing constraints, and developing a 
suitable strategy to strengthen the system. The 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
(IITA) has developed several improved 
cowpea varieties for both sole and inter-
cropping systems, and is working closely 
with farmers to enhance seed production and 
distribution of these varieties. This paper 
discusses the existing system of farmer-to-
farmer cowpea seed distribution in northern 
Nigeria and suggests ways to improve it. 
Traditional cowpea cultivation and 
seed system in northern Nigeria 
Most cowpea in Nigeria is intercropped with 
sorghum, millet, and groundnut in various 
spatial and temporal arrangements that have 
evolved over centuries of experience to 
ensure maximum use of rainfall and available 
resources for food and fodder production 
(Ntare 1990, Singh 1993). The predominant 
crop mixtures are millet-cowpea, sorghum-
cowpea, millet-sorghum-cowpea, millet-
cowpea-groundnut, and sorghum-cowpea-
groundnut. Cowpea is normally sown in 
alternate rows with the cereals, and occupies 
30-50% of the field. The plant population is 
low, ranging from 2000 to 6000 hills ha-1. 
Farmers often grow grain and fodder type 
cowpea varieties in alternate gaps between 
cereal rows in the same field. Due to shading 
by cereals and susceptibility to diseases and 
insects, mean grain yields of cowpea are low, 
ranging from 0 to 150 kg ha-1 (Singh 1993). 
Depending upon the farmer's economic 
condition and pressure for cash and home 
use, most of the cowpea produced is either 
sold or consumed. Little or no seed is 
retained for sowing the next season. This is 
particularly true for farmers who have small 
landholdings and produce limited quantities 
of cowpea. Also, since the seed requirement 
for cowpea for intercropping is relatively 
low, most of the seed that small farmers 
purchase from the market is damaged by 
bruchids. Even those farmers who save seed 
use traditional storage methods that do not 
completely prevent bruchid damage. 
Damaged and poor quality seed results in 
poor germination, which causes low yields. 
A survey of 105 farmers from 15 villages 
in the northern part of Kano state, where 
traditional cowpea intercropping is still 
practiced, indicated that 58% of farmers save 
cowpea seed for the next season's sowing, 
38% purchase seed, and 4% obtain seed as a 
gift from others. Of the 58% farmers who 
save seed, 36% have enough only for their 
own use, while 22% have small surpluses 
(often less than 10 kg) for sale to others. 
Genetic purity of farmer-saved seed 
Samples of cowpea seeds were obtained from 
59 farmers' fields covering 11 villages 
representing the Sudan Savanna and Sahel in 
Kano and Jigawa states. The samples were 
studied for genetic diversity in terms of seed 
color, hilum color, seed size, photosensitivity, 
and maturity duration. The results are 
summarized in Table 1. Of the 59 samples 
studied, only 4 were genetically pure, 18 
were 75-99% pure, 19 were 50-74% pure, and 
18 were less than 50% pure. The genetic 
mixtures were with respect to seed color, hilum 
color, and seed size as well as photosensitivity 
and maturity duration. 
Even though there was considerable 
genetic diversity, the predominant type was 
white, medium-sized seed with a grey hilum, 
which probably represents "Dan lla", a popular 
photosensitive grain type variety. The next 
largest group had white, medium-sized seeds 
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Table 1. Genetic purity and diversity in local cowpea varieties in northern Nigeria. 
Percentage Photosensitivity 
Seed Hilum Genetic No. of (out of 100-seed and maturity Other seed 
color color purity (%) samples 59 samples) mass (g) duration mixtures 
White gray 100 1 1.7 12 PSE nil 
White gray 100 1 1.7 15 PSE nil 
Speckled gray 100 1 1.7 13 PSE nil 
White brown 100 1 1.7 14 PSE nil 
White gray 75-99 10 17 10-15 PSE+PSM+ 
PSL 
wbl+wbr+ 
sp+wg 
Speckled gray 75-99 4 6.7 14-16.5 PSE wg+br 
Brown self color 75-99 4 6.7 13-17 PSE wbr+sp 
White gray 50-74 12 20 11-19 PSE+PSM+ 
PSL 
wbl+wbr+ 
sp+wg 
White brown 50-74 5 8 15-27 PSE+PSM+ 
PSL 
wbl+wbr+ 
sp+wg 
Speckled gray 50-74 1 1.7 13-16 PSE wbr+wg 
Brown self color 50-74 1 1.7 12-22 PSE wbl+wbr+ 
sp+wg 
Mixed <50 18 31 9-29 PSE+PSM+ wbl+wbr+ 
samples PSL+NPS sp+wg+br 
PSE = Photosensitive early, PSM = photosensitive medium, PSL = photosensitive late, NPS = non photosensitive 
wbl = white-black-hilum, wg = white-gray, wbr = white-brown-hilum, sp = speckled, br = brown 
with a large brown hilum representing "Aloka 
local", another photosensitive grain type variety 
widely grown on both sides of the Nigeria-
Niger border. The large white seeds with 
small brown or nearly black eye are mostly 
photosensitive and late-maturing, representing 
local varieties Kanannado, IAR 1696, and 
others. Both the speckled and brown-seeded 
varieties are originally from Niger and grown 
along the Nigeria-Niger border. The brown-
seeded variety is TN 5-78, known as Jan Wake 
(red bean) in Hausa. The mixed samples 
contained some non-photosensitive types, 
which are either mixtures from varieties grown 
in the Lake Chad region or outcrosses with 
improved varieties from I ITA and the Institute 
for Agricultural Research (IAR). A few small 
smooth seeds were also observed. These 
could have originated from outcrosses with wild 
cowpeas, which are widespread in the region. 
Thus, there are four major varieties—Dan 
lla, Jan Wake, Aloka, and Kanannado—with 
several intermediates between them resulting 
from outcrossing, mechanical mixtures, and 
selections over the years. A l l these varieties 
were of the spreading type and photosensitive, 
but represented three maturity groups—early 
(80-90 days), medium (90-100 days), and late 
(100-130 days). The late types are grown 
mainly for fodder; most have large seeds 
(100-seed mass 1.8-27 g). These observations 
indicate that farmers are able to maintain 
seed of popular local varieties with reasonable 
genetic purity. This may be due to obvious 
differences in plant type, maturity duration, 
seed size, seed color, and hilum color. 
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Improved cowpea cultivation and 
seed systems in northern Nigeria 
During the last few years, strip cropping with 
1-2 rows of cereals to 4-6 rows of cowpea as 
well as sole-cropped cowpea are becoming 
popular with some farmers who have the 
means to purchase insecticides and periodically 
obtain improved seed from research stations, 
the National Seed Service (NSS), or seed 
companies. Irrigated cowpea is also gaining 
popularity in some areas. However, the 
number of such farmers is rather low because 
of non-availability of seed and insecticides 
within a reasonable distance and in reasonable 
quantities. (Sole cowpea is very profitable 
and therefore cost of inputs is not a major 
constraint.) 
Limited amounts of improved cowpea seed 
are multiplied by NSS, research institutes, 
and a few seed companies (Olorunnipa 1984, 
A. Joshua 1997, personal communication). 
Total annual production may be less than 60 t, 
sufficient to plant about 2000 ha of sole 
cowpea. Cowpea cultivation can be increased 
several-fold if seed of improved varieties can 
be multiplied and distributed through dealers 
located throughout the cowpea-growing 
regions, particularly in cotton-growing areas, 
where insecticides are readily available. 
Some farmers do retain seed for sowing and 
also sell small quantities to their neighbors, 
but the quality of this seed is poor and 
distribution is limited. 
Strategies to improve seed supply at 
farm level 
Possible strategies to improve the informal 
seed sector through farmer-to-farmer 
diffusion are discussed below. The discussion 
is based on results from three types of inter-
ventions that I ITA has made in collaboration 
with IAR and Kano Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority (KNARDA) to 
popularize cowpea in Kano state. 
Farmer-participatory evaluation of 
improved cowpea varieties 
This program was initiated in 1993 in 
Gezawa and Minjibir local government areas 
of Kano, where 99% of the farmers grow 
cowpea as an intercrop with millet or 
sorghum. Seed of improved grain and fodder 
varieties was distributed. Each farmer 
received about 400 g of seed—200 g each of 
one grain type and one fodder type. Different 
farmers received different grain varieties, but 
all received the same fodder variety. The 
scheme involved 10 improved grain type 
varieties and 70-100 farmers each year, of 
whom about 40% were "regular" participants, 
receiving seed each year. We ensured that the 
"regulars" received seed of a different variety 
each year. 
The farmers were asked to grow these 
varieties using the same methods and in the 
same field they used for their own varieties in 
traditional intercropping systems, and compare 
the performance of the two. A follow-up 
survey has indicated that the new varieties 
are spreading steadily, and farmer feedback 
has been very positive. Since 200 g cowpea 
seed wil l produce only 5-10 kg when 
intercropped, most smallholder farmers either 
sell it for cash soon after harvest or consume 
it—they do not save seed even if the new 
variety performs better than the local ones. 
However, 30-50% of farmers did save 
seed of the best varieties and planted larger 
areas the following year. They also gave 
away and/or sold some seed. A few of these 
farmers are knowledgeable about cowpea 
production and storage, and also try to 
maintain genetic purity of varieties by 
removing off-type seeds after harvesting and 
threshing. (The varieties distributed by IITA 
can easily be distinguished because of their 
differential plant type, maturity duration, 
seed color, hilum color, and seed size.) If 
these farmers are periodically supplied with 
seed of new varieties, they can become key 
sources of seed for their communities. 
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Sale crop on-farm demonstration by 
KNARDA 
In 1982, KNARDA initiated demonstrations 
of sole crop cowpea on farmers' fields. Seed 
of two improved varieties, TVx 3236 and 
ITA-60, was obtained from 1ITA. Seed, 
fertilizer, and insecticides were provided to 
farmers on credit, and recovered in kind. The 
repaid seed was then distributed to other 
farmers. The project started with about 130 
farmers in 1982 and rose to 5000 farmers in 
1983 and over 9000 farmers in 1984 
(Harkness et al. 1985). Due to a change in 
policy in 1985 regarding the supply of inputs, 
this project could not continue. However, 
several farmers continued growing improved 
cowpea on their own and some of them have 
now developed into well known seed growers. 
In a recent survey we identified 49 farmers 
who sell between 100 kg and 500 kg of 
improved cowpea seed each planting season 
to hundreds of farmers in their vicinity. 
Introduction of improved cowpea for 
a special niche in the dry season 
Northern Nigeria has the potential for large-
scale cowpea production during the dry season 
(Nov to May) using the existing irrigation 
facilities and residual moisture in wetlands 
and river beds. Farmers currently grow wheat 
and vegetables, but the wheat sowing is often 
delayed by late harvesting of the rainy-season 
crop, and vegetable prices fluctuate 
depending on the season. Farmers were 
looking for a more dependable and profitable 
alternative, and cowpea appeared to be the 
solution. It can be sown as late as 15 Jan to 7 
Feb and matures in April to mid May, well 
before the onset of the rains. However, thrips, 
aphids, and nematodes are major pests and all 
the local varieties are susceptible. I ITA has 
developed varieties combining resistance to 
these pests and tested these varieties in the 
dry season beginning Jan 1991. Results of the 
trials from 1991 to 1993 indicated that if 
sown between 15 Jan and 7 Feb, improved 
cowpea varieties (IT84S-2246-4, IT89KD-
288, IT89KD-374, IT90K-76) can yield up to 
1.9 t ha-1 of grain and 4-6 t ha-1 of fodder with 
little or no use of insecticides. The crop is 
harvested from the end of Apr to mid May, 
when grain and fodder prices are at their 
peak. Therefore, cultivation of improved 
cowpea varieties in the dry season can be 
very profitable. 
While the I ITA trials were still going on, 
an irrigation official (who is also a farmer) 
from Bunkure village in Kano took 200 g 
seed of IT89KD-288 cowpea in Apr 1993 for 
observation. He arranged to multiply the seed 
in the 1993 rainy season, and together with 
six relatives and friends, planted these seeds 
in Jan 1994. The results were so encouraging 
that 47 farmers planted this variety in Jan 
1995, over 230 farmers in Jan 1996, and over 
1000 farmers in Jan 1997. IT89KD-288 is re-
sistant to aphids, thrips, bruchid, and nematodes, 
and has large white seeds similar to those of 
the local varieties. Its fodder production is 
also good. In 1995, we estimated yields (20 
farmers) ranging from 0.8 to 1.9 t ha-1 of 
grain and 1.1 to 2.9 t ha-1 of fodder, which 
was sold to cattle herders for in situ grazing. 
IT89KD-288 has spread mostly from 
farmer to farmer. At least three farmers had 
about 2 t of seed each in Dec 1996 for sale to 
farmers in Jan 1997. Several farmers also 
came to IITA's Kano Station between 1995 
and 1997 to obtain small quantities of fresh 
seed of this variety. Total seed production in 
May 1997 is expected to be more than 200 t, 
from the initial 200 g distributed in 1993—all 
through farmer-to-farmer diffusion. This 
variety is now spreading to other parts of 
Kano where irrigation facilities are available. 
Essential elements for the success of 
farmer-to-farmer seed diffusion 
The three examples described above indicate 
that several factors influence the success and 
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effectiveness of farmer-to-farmer seed 
diffusion. Some of the essential elements are 
briefly described below. 
Genetic superiority. The new varieties 
should be noticeably superior to local 
varieties in yield or other attributes like 
disease resistance, insect resistance, faster 
growth, better adaptation to special niches, 
better quality, etc. These differences should 
be visible even under low-input management. 
When change of variety alone makes a 
perceptible difference to the farmer, the seed 
itself becomes the main driving force for 
diffusion. 
Breeding behavior. Maintenance and 
diffusion of varieties is easier in self-
pollinated crops than in cross-pollinated 
ones. High multiplication ratios and low seed 
requirement per unit area wil l also facilitate 
rapid diffusion of a new variety among 
farmers. 
Distinguishing characteristics. The new 
varieties should be easily distinguished from 
local varieties, both in the field and in 
storage. A distinct morphological character— 
e.g., leaf type, flower color, pod color, seed 
color, hilum color, or seed size—enables 
farmers to maintain the genetic purity of a 
new variety particularly if they are impressed 
by its performance. 
Ease of cultivation. The new varieties should 
not require any extra purchased inputs or 
major change in cultivation practices 
compared to the local varieties. However, we 
have recommended that new cowpea 
varieties be sown at higher densities than 
local varieties; farmers have experimented 
with this practice, obtained significant yield 
increases, and accepted the change. 
Technical backstopping and training. 
Research and extension staff should monitor 
the diffusion of new varieties and provide 
guidance to farmers. Establishing demonstra-
tion plots wi l l allow farmers to observe new 
varieties and acquaint themselves with 
specific management requirements (plant 
density, sowing date, etc). Farmers also need 
advice on how to maintain genetic purity and 
viability in farm-saved seed. 
Periodic infusion of fresh breeder seed. In 
order to ensure a reasonable level of genetic 
purity over time, fresh breeder or foundation 
seed should be periodically provided to 
selected seed growers who are the key seed 
sources within a community. The frequency 
of such infusions wil l depend on the availa-
bility of breeder or foundation seed and the 
popularity of the new variety. Such efforts 
are particularly important for varieties that 
are widely popular. 
Awareness campaign. Information about the 
benefits of growing new varieties and on 
availability of seed with farmers in different 
local government areas should be widely 
disseminated. This could be done through the 
media (radio and television) and through other 
communication channels (women's groups, 
religious groups, traditional leaders, etc). 
The formal seed industry. We see little 
competition or conflict between the formal 
and informal seed sectors. Farmer-to-farmer 
diffusion wil l become more effective as a 
strong formal seed industry develops, because 
of the added emphasis on seed multiplication 
and distribution. A combination of strong 
formal and informal sectors wil l result in 
faster diffusion of improved varieties because 
every farmer who purchases seed of a new 
variety becomes a potential source of seed to 
many other farmers. 
Strategy to strengthen farmer-to-
farmer diffusion of cowpea seed in 
northern Nigeria 
A 2-year action plan has been developed to 
facilitate the rapid diffusion of improved 
cowpea and soybean varieties in northern 
Nigeria. Various organizations worked together 
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to develop this plan—IITA, the IITA/GTZ/ 
Crops Research Institute (Ghana) Project on 
promotion of seed production and marketing 
in West Africa, Sasakawa Global 2000, IAR, 
and KNARDA. The general strategy is to 
multiply sufficient quantities of breeder seed 
and give it to selected farmers. The farmers 
wil l be selected for their farming skills and 
familiarity with soybean/cowpea, and further 
trained on seed multiplication and mainte-
nance of genetic purity. In addition, demons-
tration plots of these varieties wi l l be 
established, where farmers wi l l be brought 
for group discussions and training. The 
movement of seed from the selected seed-
growing farmers to other farmers wi l l be 
monitored. Six activities are involved. 
1 Identify one farmer in each of three 
villages in three states to sow demons-
tration plots of improved cowpea and 
soybean varieties. These demonstration 
plots (9 soybean, 9 cowpea) wi l l be sown 
in Kano, Jigawa, and Katsina states for 
cowpea, and Kano, Jigawa, and Kuduna 
for soybean. Suggested varieties are TGX 
1448-2E, TGX 894-313D, and TGX 
1485-1D for soybean; IT89KD-374, 
IT90K-277-2, and IT86D-719 for cowpea. 
2 Another three farmers in each of these 
villages wi l l individually produce seed of 
one of the three varieties of cowpea and/ 
or soybean on 0.25 ha, making a total of 
27 farmers growing cowpea seed and 27 
farmers growing soybean seed. 
3 I ITA and IAR wil l produce about 200 kg 
of breeder seed of each of the 3 varieties 
of cowpea (IITA) and soybean (IAR). 
This seed wi l l be used to sow the 1998 
demonstration plots and seed production 
fields. Farmers wi l l have to pay for the 
seed they receive, and the money wi l l be 
used to establish a revolving fund to 
sustain the annual production of breeder 
seed. 
4 Prepare and distribute brochures, videos, 
slide presentations, etc on seed production 
methods. 
5 Organize training for extension staff and 
field days for farmers, and monitor all 
demonstration and seed production plots. 
6 Study farmers' reactions to the new varieties 
and monitor the spread of these varieties. 
Future prospects and 
recommendations 
Even if a formal commercial seed sector does 
develop, many self-pollinated crops such as 
cowpea and soybean wi l l remain a much 
lower priority than hybrid maize. Farmer-to-
farmer seed distribution wil l thus continue to 
play an important role in promoting improved 
cowpea and soybean varieties. Therefore, 
research institutions, NGOs, and extension 
agencies in Africa should make concerted 
efforts to strengthen both informal and formal 
seed sectors. Together, the two sectors can 
ensure rapid adoption of new varieties, 
increase productivity, and ensure household 
food security. 
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Farmer-to-Farmer Seed Supply: Case Study of Pigeonpea 
Seed Distribution in Kenya 
J M Muli1 , P A Omanga2, and R B Jones3 
Abstract 
In the semi-arid Makueni district in Kenya, smallholder farmers traditionally 
intercrop their staple cereal with long-duration pigeonpea. Short-duration 
pigeonpea varieties developed by ICRISAT and the Kenya Agricultural Research 
Institute can give high yields and escape drought, but require non-traditional 
management practices (e.g., sole-cropping, spraying against insect pests). Field day 
demonstrations generated considerable interest in these short-duration varieties, 
particularly among groups of women farmers. A woman farmer who had 
successfully grown the new varieties, and was a member of a women's group 
herself started to multiply and sell seed. She distributed some seed free, as a 
promotional effort, and provided free agronomic advice to all customers. Adoption 
of short-duration pigeonpea in the region has been encouraging. Demand for seed is 
increasing, as a result of these promotional efforts and efforts by ICRISAT to 
introduce and popularize improved pigeonpea processing and utilization techniques. 
Introduction 
This paper describes how smallholder 
fanners in the semi-arid district of Makueni, 
Kenya, have developed a system for the 
multiplication and distribution of improved 
pigeonpea seed. Pigeonpea is a traditional 
crop in the district, grown both for food and 
as a cash crop. The tender green peas are 
favored for food while the whole dried grain 
is both consumed and sold. In recent years, 
commercial processors have been exporting 
both whole pigeonpea and processed dhal 
from Kenya. The country is now the world's 
second largest producer of this crop (after 
India, which produces 90% of the world's 
pigeonpea). 
The introduction of short-duration 
pigeonpea 
The local varieties are classified as long-
duration, and the growing period spans both 
the short rains (Oct-Dec) and the long rains 
(Mar-Jun). The major constraint to crop 
production in Makueni is rainfall. The long 
1. PO Box 97, Kathonzweni, Kenya. 2. Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), National Dryland Fanning Research 
Centre-Katumani, PO Box 340, Machakos, Kenya. 3. ICRISAT-Nairobi, PO Box 39063, Nairobi, Kenya. Al l correspondence 
to RB Jones 
Mull, J.M., Omanga, P.A., and Jones, R.B. 1997. Farmer-to-farmer seed supply: case study of pigeonpea seed distribution 
in Kenya. Pages 188-191 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on 
Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, 
Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
188 
rains are unreliable and in dry years, long-
duration pigeonpea fails to yield any grain. 
ICRISAT has developed short- and medium-
duration pigeonpea varieties that mature in 
120-180 days. The short-duration varieties, in 
particular, differ significantly from traditional 
Kenyan varieties. Apart from their different 
phenology, they are short in stature and must 
be monocropped, rather than intercropped 
with a tall cereal. They are also more 
susceptible to insect attack than long-duration 
pigeonpea. 
In Oct 1994, a field day was conducted at 
the Kiboko Research Station, where farmers 
from Makueni district were shown short-
duration pigeonpea being grown under high 
management. There is a strong demand for 
early-maturing crops in the semi-arid areas of 
Kenya, and many of the visiting farmers 
requested seed they could test on their own 
farms. Although short-duration pigeonpea 
varieties can produce high yields in dry areas, 
non-traditional management practices (e.g., 
spraying, monocropping) are needed. It was 
therefore essential that farmers be provided 
with a technology package as well as seed if 
they were to succeed with this crop. 
Kenya has an extension service, but staff 
and resources are limited. However, the district 
has a well developed network of women's 
groups (e.g., 30 groups in Kathonzweni Division 
alone, with 15-25 members per group), which 
are well organized, with legal recognition from 
the Ministry of Social Services and support 
from the extension service. It was therefore 
decided to promote short-duration varieties 
through these groups. Following the field 
day, seed was provided directly to women's 
groups that were interested in experimenting 
with the crop. ICRISAT, the Kenya Agri-
cultural Research Institute (KARI), and the 
extension service provided agronomic advice. 
Promotional efforts and seed sales 
On-farm trials were conducted on fields 
belonging to members of women's groups, 
using seed supplied by ICRISAT and KARI. 
These farmers obtained high yields from the 
new varieties, and began to plant larger areas 
with the seed they produced. In addition, 
other farmers who visited the trials expressed 
interest in growing short-duration pigeonpea, 
and sought to buy seed from farmers who had 
participated in the trials. 
The first author of this paper was among 
those who participated in the trials. She 
received seed from ICRISAT, and sowed it 
during the long rains in Mar 1994. The 
harvest was sufficient to provide a surplus for 
sale. However, rather than selling the seed at 
a premium price and making a quick profit, 
she provided 500 g of free seed to each of 75 
women farmers from three women's groups 
for sowing in the short rains, Oct 1994. She 
also provided the groups with extension 
advice through a combination of methods— 
inviting members to see the crop on her own 
farm, visits to the farms of group members, 
and group meetings. 
In addition to the free distribution, she 
sold 400 kg of seed to non-group members at 
US$ 0.90 kg-1 i.e., double the price of grain. 
She provided free extension advice on cropping 
methods and pest control to all farmers 
(group members and non-members) and also 
offered to buy back a portion of the crop at 
the end of the season. This entrepreneur 
made efforts to ensure that recipients of seed 
grew the crop successfully—over 30 farms 
were visited at least once and the majority 
were visited twice, at sowing and flowering. 
These promotional efforts, together with 
strong additional support and promotional 
efforts from ICRISAT, ensured that demand 
for seed increased steadily. In 1994, she 
distributed 37.5 kg free, and sold over 400 kg 
of seed, sufficient to plant 10 ha of short-
duration pigeonpea in pure stand. In 1995, no 
free seed was distributed; 600 kg was sold. In 
1996, 25 kg was given free to 50 members 
from two women's groups and 900 kg sold to 
non-group members. Thus, in a period of 
3 years, a single farmer has been able to 
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distribute 62.5 kg of free seed and sell an 
additional 1900 kg. To date all the seed 
requirements have been met from the 
improved varieties grown on her own farm, 
but when farmers have come from far away 
requesting seed, they have been referred to 
other farmers who grew the crop with advice 
from her and were known to have surplus 
seed for sale. 
Marketing of pigeonpea grain 
There is considerable demand for pigeonpea 
from processors and exporters in Kenya, and this 
entrepreneur has made contact with several 
potential buyers. Because of her regular 
interactions with pigeonpea growers in the 
area, she can easily mobilize them to set up 
collection points through the women's groups. 
This wi l l be done in future both for green 
peas and dried grain. In Kibwezi division of 
Makueni district, traders have purchased 
green peas for export from farmers who grow 
the improved short-duration varieties. 
Promotional efforts by ICRISAT 
Although there is a ready market for whole 
grain, it is important to widen the utilization 
base (local consumption patterns favor green 
peas over whole dried pigeonpea) and add 
value to the crop so that farmers get a better 
return on their investment. ICRISAT carried 
out a survey of pigeonpea processing and 
utilization in the region in 1993, and 
introduced a range of technologies to improve 
on existing practices. The most important of 
these is the use of a simple grinding stone 
(chakki) to remove the seed coat and split the 
cotyledons. The resulting product (dhal) is 
more palatable and requires only half the 
cooking time when compared with whole 
dried grain. 
In 1996, among other promotional efforts, 
ICRISAT trained 10 women, including this 
entrepreneur, in this technolpgy. An NGO, 
World Vision International, contracted the 
entrepreneur to train another 320 women. 
This training has created a further demand for 
seed—this entrepreneur has received orders 
from 50 farmers for the 1997 season. In Feb 
1998, ICRISAT wi l l conduct training courses 
on seed production (communities are already 
in the process of identifying farmers who wi l l 
be trained). This training wi l l improve the 
ability of pigeonpea seed growers in each 
community to obtain high yields and produce 
grain that is true to type. 
Conclusions 
This paper described how an enterprising 
woman farmer was able to develop a business 
through the provision of seed and agronomic 
advice. Short-duration pigeonpea was a "new" 
crop and required new management methods. 
Even so, the superiority over traditional long-
duration varieties in this environment—early-
maturing varieties escape drought, and provide 
food during the period when food supplies 
are lowest—was sufficient incentive for 
adoption. 
Adoption was stimulated by two factors. 
First, the ready availability of seed and good 
extension advice delivered in an under-
standable way by someone with credibility in 
the community. Second, strong support from 
ICRISAT, KARI , and World Vision through 
promotional efforts, training, and technical 
advice (to this entrepreneur as well as other 
farmers) on crop management. 
Seed multiplication does not pose any 
special problems. In an area where short-
duration varieties have only just been 
introduced, there is virtually no possibility of 
cross-pollination and so the seed wi l l be true 
to type. Pigeonpea, and other legumes, are 
highly susceptible to storage pests but the use 
of chemicals to control these is familiar to 
farmers and highly effective. The main threat 
to the long-term viability of local or 
community-based seed businesses is that seed 
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of a new variety can be sold at a premium 
only for one or two seasons; after that, 
farmers wil l recycle seed saved from their 
own harvests, unless local stocks are wiped 
out (e.g., by drought). 
Seed multiplication was only one of several 
small-scale business opportunities created by 
the introduction of short-duration pigeonpea. 
Other opportunities (as a result of processing 
and utilization training) include grinding 
whole grain into dhal, and the manufacture of 
grinding equipment (stone chakkis). Already 
local artisans have produced a dozen 
prototype stone chakkis for which they are 
seeking a market. 
The empowerment of individuals and 
communities with knowledge can bring about 
rapid change when that knowledge leads to a 
significant economic benefit. In this case 
investments in knowledge (in the form of 
agronomic advice to farmers) resulted in 
profits from seed sales. Further empower-
ment of farmers with appropriate knowledge 
can strengthen this system further. 
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Between States and Markets—Innovations for Small-Scale 
Seed Provision 
Abstract 
The recent shift away from reliance on public seed enterprises has directed interest 
towards small-scale seed projects. However, there is little guidance available 
regarding the organization or potential scope of small-scale seed provision. This 
paper reviews experience to date and provides guidelines for analyzing the potential 
of various seed provision options. The nature of seed demand varies tremendously, 
and this has a strong bearing on the choice of seed provision strategy. It also must 
be recognized that seed provision is a complex process involving a series of 
specialized tasks. Most small-scale seed activities will require the interaction of 
several different organizations from the public, commercial, and voluntary sectors. 
Attention should be focused on the organization, source of funding, and incentives 
for each stage of the process. Of equal importance, successful small-scale seed 
provision will depend on the development of effective interactions among the 
various organizations involved in the process. 
Introduction 
The most prominent feature of current 
agricultural development policy is the shift in 
emphasis from the state to the market. Until 
recently the state has played the leading role 
in most developing countries, supporting 
agricultural research and extension, providing 
such inputs as seed and fertilizer, and often 
managing the marketing of agricultural 
produce. There is now widespread agreement 
that the balance must be shifted away from 
the state and towards the market. The 
prevailing mood among policy makers and 
donors is that, despite inevitable problems, 
"imperfect markets are better than imperfect 
states" (Colclough 1991:7). 
This shift is particularly relevant to 
national seed systems. Formal seed provision 
in most developing countries has been 
dominated by the state, but recently private 
commercial seed production and plant 
breeding have begun to make their mark. 
Most seed policy analysts expect this trend to 
accelerate, and predict a predominant role for 
the private sector (Pray and Ramaswami 
1991, Jaffee and Srivastava 1994). Evidence 
of this trend is already available (Rusike 
1995, Pray et al. 1991). 
This paper is not concerned with the 
nature of state or commercial seed systems, 
but rather explores the transition between the 
two. It addresses the following questions: 
What can the state do to foster the emergence 
1. Overseas Development Institute, Portland House, Stag Place, London SWIE 5DP, UK 
Tripp, R.B. 1997. Between states and markets—innovations for small-scale seed provision. Pages 195-210 in Alternative strategies 
for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional Seed 
Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). 
Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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of effective commercial seed enterprises? 
What are the remaining state responsibilities 
in national seed systems? And what is the 
role of other agencies, such as NGOs and 
farmer organizations, in developing equitable 
seed provision that fills "the institutional gap 
between flawed markets and failing govern-
ments" (Wiggins and Cromwell 1995:420)? 
The paper is divided into three parts. The 
first part is concerned with definitions. It 
begins with a brief look at the nature of seed 
demand, and draws implications for the 
organization of seed provision. This is 
followed by an outline of the stages of seed 
provision and a sketch of the various actors that 
might contribute to each stage. The second 
part of the paper presents an analysis of 
alternative ways of organizing seed provision. 
It focuses on competencies and incentives; it 
also emphasizes the importance of the tran-
saction costs that characterize collaboration 
among different types of organizations. The 
final section presents some conclusions on 
institutional responsibilities. 
Some Definitions 
Many discussions of seed sector reform 
suffer from imprecise terminology. Concepts 
such as "seed demand" and "seed production" 
are discussed as if they were homogeneous, 
undifferentiated entities, while in fact they 
are much more complex. Similarly, the 
organizations that play major roles in the 
seed sector are usually described in broad-
brush terms (e.g., "the private sector" or 
''NGOs") that mask considerable diversity. 
Seed demand 
Any analysis of seed provision alternatives 
should logically begin with an understanding 
of seed demand. Although seed provision 
should be tailored to specific needs, many 
seed projects are designed and implemented 
with only a vague notion of the nature of 
seed demand. 
Seed is certainly the primary agricultural 
input, and as the embodiment of the farmer's 
future harvest it provides considerable 
symbolic value for many development 
projects as well. It is important to remember, 
however, that the majority of the world's 
seed is managed by farmers themselves, in 
household stores or through indigenous 
provision in local communities and markets. 
Precise figures are not available, but most 
estimates for developing countries indicate 
that about 90% of seed is provided through 
informal mechanisms (Almekinders et al. 
1994). It is sometimes overlooked that even 
in industrialized countries the figures from 
are not much different for crops where hybrid 
technology is not widely used. More than 
half of the wheat, barley, and oats sown in 
the USA is farm-saved seed (Jaffee and 
Srivastava 1994). Half of all seed in France 
and Germany, and 30% in the UK, is farm-
saved (Ghijsen 1996). 
There are certainly many opportunities for 
expanding the proportion of formal seed 
provision in developing (and industrialized) 
countries, but it is important to bear in mind 
that seed demand is not universally high, and 
that formal seed provision wil l often compete 
against well-developed informal alternatives. 
Farmers seek seed in the formal sector for 
specific reasons, which fall into four 
categories: 
• Seed demand due to poverty 
• Seed loss caused by disaster 
• Seed management problems at farm level 
• Interest in acquiring a new variety. 
These categories may sometimes overlap, 
and the classification is not comprehensive, 
but it should serve our purpose. Each of these 
types of demand has distinct characteristics, 
and distinct implications for seed provision. 
Seed demand due to poverty. Much of the 
seed demand in developing countries is a 
consequence of poverty. Farming conditions 
are so tenuous for many households that the 
harvest does not provide adequate seed. Debt 
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or other household requirements may force 
the farmer to sell produce that would have 
otherwise been retained for seed; household 
food shortages close to sowing time may 
cause saved seed to be consumed. In many 
areas, this type of poverty-related demand is 
chronic and widespread. Currently this 
demand is met largely by various informal 
seed provision mechanisms including loans, 
bartering, purchase, and sharecropping. It is 
not likely to be addressed to any significant 
extent by commercial (or state) enterprises. 
Its ultimate resolution depends on better 
access to resources and on improvements in 
farming conditions and technology, but 
meanwhile the households that suffer this 
type of seed demand must be an important 
focus for seed policy. 
Seed loss caused by disaster. Seed demand 
can be expected to increase in times of 
emergency (civil war, drought, floods). Seed 
demand during emergencies is usually more 
widespread than that associated with chronic 
poverty, but usually a more temporary pheno-
menon. Considerable caution is required in 
addressing emergency seed demand, however. 
A recent review has shown that even in severe 
emergencies local seed systems are surprisingly 
resilient, and that individual households or 
local markets may be able to supply a 
significant proportion of the required seed 
(ODI 1996). The same study shows that in 
many cases emergency programs have 
provided seed of inappropriate type or quality. 
It concludes that emergency seed provision 
should be based on the use of local resources 
and seed, or on collaboration with well-
established and knowledgeable commercial or 
public seed enterprises. 
Seed management problems at farm level. 
Difficulties in seed management can cause 
farmers to acquire seed off-farm. Seed may 
be difficult to store (e.g., soybean in tropical 
conditions) or the environment may be 
unsuitable for the production of a seed crop 
(e.g., seed potato in virus-affected zones). 
The crop may be harvested before seed 
develops (e.g., forage crops) or farmers may 
sell their entire harvest of a commercial crop 
and not wish to invest in seed storage. In 
certain cases seed conditioning problems 
(e.g., separating weed from crop seed) may 
also motivate seed purchase. 
The most important example in this 
category of seed demand is the use of hybrids, 
which (theoretically) require the farmer to 
acquire fresh seed each season. Maintaining 
varieties of cross-pollinated crops (e.g., pearl 
millet or maize) may also be difficult at times, 
requiring the farmer to purchase fresh seed 
periodically. This category is admittedly a 
diverse mixture of cases, but the common 
thread among them is a relatively stable agri-
cultural situation in which a predictable seed 
demand can be met by formal seed sources. 
Interest in acquiring a different variety. The 
fourth type of seed demand is related to the 
availability of different varieties. Farmers 
acquire a new variety by acquiring seed of 
that variety. However, once a variety is 
acquired, the farmer may be capable of 
maintaining it indefinitely, without further 
recourse to the formal seed market. Demand 
for new varieties presents one of the most 
difficult challenges for seed provision. The 
demand for seed of a new variety depends on 
the performance of the variety (it wil l not be 
accepted simply because it is "new" or 
"improved"), and on the proportion of a 
farmer's crop that is likely to be planted with 
this specific variety. 
In addition, once a new variety is being 
grown by a number of farmers, other farmers 
may prefer to acquire seed from their neighbors 
rather than from formal sources. Varieties 
(both local and modern) often spread from 
farmer to farmer, without the intervention of 
formal seed provision. A considerable proportion 
of the diffusion of Green Revolution varieties 
of wheat and rice in Asia has taken place not 
through formal seed provision but by farmer-
to-farmer seed movement (e.g., Heisey 
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1990). Even though demand for a new 
variety may be high, justifications for a 
formal, commercial seed enterprise to meet 
this demand may be lacking. 
Table 1 summarizes the different classes 
of seed demand, and their implications for 
seed provision. Such a summary is admittedly 
crude, but it is sufficient to show how seed 
provision systems depend on demand. Most 
demand related to seed management (including 
the use of hybrids) can be met by commercial 
provision, either by conventional seed 
companies or innovative small-scale schemes. 
Emergency seed provision is obviously a 
continuing responsibility for governments 
and voluntary agencies. Meeting seed demand 
related to poverty—where farmers are often 
unable to exert effective demand in the 
market—or demand related to variety (which 
may be transient) is more problematic. Most 
instances in both these categories wil l require 
collaboration between public and private 
(commercial or voluntary) sectors. 
Seed Provision 
One of the unfortunate features of many 
discussions on alternative seed supply 
strategies is an undifferentiated view of seed 
provision. This contributes to a tendency to 
focus on only certain aspects of the seed 
provision process. But as Jaffee and 
Srivastava (1994) point out, decisions about 
the division between public and private 
responsibilities in seed provision must look at 
the individual steps in the process. There are 
a number of ways of partitioning seed 
provision, but the following divisions wi l l be 
used in this discussion. 
Plant breeding and variety selection. Seed 
provision begins with variety development. 
Seed may be of a modern variety or a local 
variety, but it is important to identify the 
organization(s) responsible for plant breeding 
or variety selection. 
Source seed production. Several stages are 
usually required to move from the small 
amount of seed produced by the breeder to 
quantities sufficient to be used for seed 
multiplication. There are several nomen-
clatures in use to describe these stages; the 
OECD scheme identifies breeder, pre-basic, 
and basic seed as stages preliminary to the 
production of certified seed. Even where 
local varieties are the focus of formal seed 
provision, decisions must be made about how 
source seed is to be maintained and produced. 
Seed multiplication. Most discussions of seed 
provision focus on seed multiplication. 
Although this is obviously a key stage in the 
process, it is only one aspect of seed provision. 
Quality control. This is not really a discrete 
stage, but includes activities that are carried 
out during several other stages. It is 
important enough, however, that it should 
receive separate treatment. Activities may 
include some type of official certification 
(including field visits) and seed testing after 
harvest, as well as quality control procedures 
used by seed producers and merchants. 
198 
Table 1. Seed demand. 
Nature of demand Response 
Source of demand Effective Continuous 
Poverty 
Emergency 
Seed management/hybrids 
New variety 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
? 
Govt or voluntary programs 
Commercial seed provision 
? 
Seed conditioning and storage. After seed is 
harvested it must be dried, graded, and 
cleaned. In many crops, seed must be stored 
for a considerable time before sale or 
distribution, and adequate storage facilities 
must be available. 
Seed marketing and distribution. Appropriate 
mechanisms must exist for delivering seed to 
farmers. This may require a complex 
marketing or distribution network. 
Farmers. The final "stage" in seed provision 
is farmers' utilization of the seed. This is an 
appropriate place to recall that seed must 
respond to farmers' specific demands, whether 
for a particular variety or for a specific type 
and quality of seed. 
The actors 
Innovations in small-scale seed provision 
include alternatives to public sector seed 
programs and conventional commercial seed 
operations, but participants may be drawn 
from both state and market sectors. In addition, 
sectors commonly described as "NGOs" and 
"the community" are frequently mentioned. 
These sectors are briefly examined below. 
The State. It is difficult to define the precise 
character and limitations of public sector 
involvement. Although there is general 
agreement that government's role in seed 
production and distribution should give way 
to more private participation, there are still a 
number of activities, including agricultural 
research and seed regulation, for which the 
state wil l retain some responsibility. The 
division between public and private is also 
blurred by the increasingly commercial 
character of some state seed enterprises, 
which may have partial private ownership, or 
may contract some operations to private 
agencies (Hubbard 1995). In addition, public 
research and extension are being encouraged 
to develop their own sources of funding. 
Many public breeding programs attempt to 
earn royalties on their varieties, and there are 
various schemes for privatizing agricultural 
extension (Schwartz 1994). Finally, state 
agencies are often recipients of donor 
funding and international technical assistance 
which significantly influences the character 
of public seed activities. In short, "the state" 
is a much more diffuse entity than is 
generally acknowledged. 
The Market. The nature of the private sector 
is similarly ambiguous. Commercial activity 
may refer to multinational corporations, 
private seed companies operating at the 
national level, small family seed production 
or marketing enterprises, or even an 
individual farmer who occasionally sells 
some seed in the local market. Cooperatives 
are best included in the commercial category 
as well, although they include everything 
from some of the world's largest seed 
producers to nascent local groups dependent 
on donor funds. 
NGOs. There has been a rapid growth of NGO 
participation in seed activities. Farrington and 
Bebbington (1993) propose criteria for a 
classification of NGOs that include location 
(North-based or South-based), scale (community 
level or supra-community), ownership (non-
membership or membership), and orientation 
(profit-driven or value-driven). The range of 
organizations that may be considered NGOs 
is remarkable. As Brett (1993) remarks, a 
number of large North-based NGOs are 
similar to parastatals. Some NGOs are 
particularly dependent on donor funds, and it 
may be difficult to distinguish their activities 
from those of consulting firms or university 
consortia that are contracted by donors to 
manage agricultural development projects. At 
the opposite end of the scale are the many 
grassroots organizations that Uphoff (1995) 
argues should be considered a separate 
"membership sector". There are few examples 
to date of unassisted grassroots organization 
activities in formal seed provision, however. 
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The Community. The "community", like the 
"market", is an abstraction, but this does not 
prevent frequent references to "community 
seed projects". Discussions of (formal or 
informal) community seed provision must pay 
close attention to representation and coverage. 
Community seed provision is not necessarily 
socially equitable nor the expression of a 
"moral economy"; seed provision may form 
part of patron-client relations (Louette and 
Smale 1996), and knowledge about new 
varieties may move in restricted pathways 
(Green 1987). Similarly, it is not unusual for 
community seed projects to benefit only a 
small proportion of farmers. Therefore the 
description of a seed project as "community-
level" only defines its scale, not its adequacy 
or equity. 
Analysis 
The components of small-scale seed 
provision 
Any analysis of the various options for seed 
provision must account for difficulties in 
categorizing the potential participants, the 
complex nature of seed provision, and the 
multiple sources of seed demand. At a 
minimum, we must recognize that innovative 
seed provision wi l l almost always require 
coordination among different types of organiza-
tions. Various seed policy analyses (Douglas 
1980, Kelly 1989, Jaffee and Srivastava 1994) 
have stressed the importance of collaboration 
between the public and private sectors, but 
we must be much more specific in assigning 
particular responsibilities for performance 
and communication. 
An analysis of each component of seed 
provision should include three aspects (see 
also Thirtle and Echeverria 1994). 
• Organization and ownership of the re-
sources needed 
• Source of funds (government, donor/volun-
tary, commercial) 
• Incentives for performance (government 
service, voluntary service, commercial 
incentive). 
The viability of any seed provision option 
depends on the efficiency and incentives of 
each individual component. 
The following discussion examines a 
number of small-scale seed projects. It 
examines each of the components of seed 
provision, and focuses on the organization 
and support for various alternatives. 
Plant breeding and variety selection. Despite 
the growth of private seed companies, public 
sector plant breeding remains important for 
many crops in industrialized countries 
(Knudson 1990). Developing countries wi l l 
also depend on public plant breeding, 
especially for open-pollinated crops. Public 
varieties wi l l be particularly important for 
small-scale seed projects, but the priorities of 
resource-poor farmers must be addressed by 
public plant breeders more effectively than 
they now are. Seed projects are frequently 
based on overly optimistic assumptions about 
the demand for the modern varieties that are 
currently available. 
Farmer participation in variety testing and 
selection can be linked to seed provision 
(Eyzaguirre and Iwanaga 1996). In 
Colombia, farmers' groups that were formed 
to collaborate with research and extension in 
participatory technology development identi-
fied new crop varieties that performed well. 
Several of these groups received training and 
assistance for small-scale seed production 
and were able to sell seed of these varieties in 
local shops and markets (Ashby et al. 1995). 
Groups of farmers who participate in variety 
testing with the Adaptive Research Planning 
Team in Zambia are given assistance in 
multiplying seed of preferred new varieties 
that can be used by group members and sold 
locally (Lof and Nchemba 1994). 
Small-scale seed provision can also focus 
on local varieties. The MASIPAG project in 
the Philippines combines university resear-
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chers and farmers in the selection, improve-
ment, and distribution of local rice varieties 
(Salazar 1992). Such projects require 
considerable external input from NGOs or 
public researchers in order to manage the 
selection and distribution process. 
Source seed. Source seed production requires 
particular care and supervision. The state wil l 
continue to play an important role in 
producing source seed of modern varieties 
for small-scale seed projects. Source seed 
production may be the responsibility of a 
research institute, university, or other public 
organization. In Brazil, the national maize 
research center (CNPMS) provides inbreds of 
public hybrids to an association of small-
scale commercial seed producers (Lopez-
Pereira and Filippello 1995). Because public 
funds are limited, there must be a clear 
strategy for supporting source seed 
production in the future, and most small-scale 
seed projects wi l l have to be prepared to pay 
the full cost of the source seed they use. As 
national seed systems develop, commercial 
seed companies wi l l take increasing respon-
sibility for source seed production of the 
public varieties they market. 
Seed multiplication. Most commercial firms 
multiply seed through contract farmers. 
Although much public seed production was 
once done on state farms, the general 
consensus is that it more efficient to contract 
individual farmers (Abeygunawardena et al. 
1990). Small-scale seed projects usually rely 
on individual farmers to multiply seed, 
although multiplication is occasionally done 
on community plots (Cromwell and Wiggins 
1993). 
There are instances where NGOs have 
been able to help farmers become contract 
seed growers. In northern Pakistan, farmers 
in high-altitude areas are particularly well 
situated for seed potato production. An NGO 
was able to organize and train local farmers 
to produce seed potato for commercial 
companies that market the seed in the south 
of the country. The Federal Seed Certification 
Department established an office in the area 
to manage quality control (Alain and Saleemi 
1996). 
The organization of contract seed multi-
plication may present several dilemmas for 
NGOs. Farmers who are able to do 
commercial seed multiplication are likely to 
have more resources and skills than average, 
and hence there is a question of balancing the 
NGO's equity goals with the opportunity to 
develop a local enterprise. There is also a 
debate about the effects of contract farming. 
Some studies report significant advantages 
for farmers who are able to produce seed, 
particularly of high-value horticultural crops 
(Benziger 1996). Other analysts are 
concerned about the risks of contract 
farming, especially when subsistence food 
production is replaced by dependence on 
unstable commercial markets (Little and 
Watts 1994). 
Whether seed multiplication is done on 
commercial contract or is part of a small-
scale scheme, the participating farmers usually 
require considerable training and advice 
(Lepiz et al. 1994, Benziger 1996). 
Seed quality control. Most small-scale seed 
projects require technical advice rather than 
official policing by state quality control 
agencies. In some projects, NGO or extension 
staff have been deputed to provide advice and 
supervision (Joshi 1995). In several seed 
projects in the Gambia, the government Seed 
Technology Unit (STU) shared field inspection 
duties with NGO staff, and seed samples 
were sent to STU for testing (Cromwell and 
Wiggins 1993). In Ghana, the Seed Inspection 
Unit provides training, advice, and inspection 
for small-scale producers (Bockari-Kugbei 
1994). 
Seed quality control agencies in Bolivia 
are organized by region, and each agency has 
considerable autonomy (Garay et al. 1988). 
The agencies offer technical advice and 
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training to seed project staff and farmers. A l l 
formal seed production in Bolivia is subject 
to official certification, but small-scale 
operations are allowed considerable 
flexibility. In one case, a cooperative pays for 
the certification of bean seed that it sells outside 
the community, but is able to sell uncertified 
seed locally (at a lower price), based on the 
cooperative's reputation (Rosales 1995). 
Whether official agencies offer technical 
advice or more comprehensive inspection for 
small-scale seed projects, the funding of 
these activities must be considered. In many 
cases, national seed quality control services 
charge only a fraction of their actual costs, 
but this cannot continue. More efficient 
means of quality control, by official agencies 
and seed producers themselves, wi l l have to 
be developed. 
Seed conditioning and storage. Formal seed 
production usually requires training for 
farmers as well as access to specialized 
equipment and facilities. One important 
decision for any seed operation is the degree 
to which seed conditioning facilities wil l be 
centralized or dispersed. Equipment is 
available to match various scales of 
operation, but the costs, maintenance, and 
replacement of such equipment must be 
factored into project budgets. In some cases, 
small-scale projects may be able to rent state-
owned processing facilities, as happened in 
Ghana when private producers replaced the 
parastatal Ghana Seed Company (Bockari-
Kugbei 1994). 
Storage is an equally important concern, 
and errors in the siting or capacity of storage 
facilities can add considerably to the final 
cost of seed (Cromwell et al. 1992). In a 
"producer-seller" project in Nepal, where 
farmers were trained in seed production 
techniques and were then expected to manage 
seed sales within their communities, one of 
the key inputs was metal storage bins 
provided to participating farmers (Bal and 
Rajbhandary 1987). 
Marketing and distribution. Mechanisms for 
marketing seed produced by small-scale 
projects are often overlooked. In some cases 
it is assumed that seed of a new variety made 
available to a few farmers wi l l automatically 
find its way to many others in the community, 
but this is overly optimistic (Sperling and 
Loevinsohn 1993). The assumption that 
farmers who produce extra seed wi l l easily 
find a market within their communities is 
similarly unfounded, and has been the cause 
of more than one seed project failure. 
KOSEVEG, a successful seed production 
project in Nepal, found that it needed to 
establish a separate organization to deal with 
marketing (Joshi 1995). One of the principal 
factors in the success of the Lahaul Potato 
Society, a cooperative producing seed potato 
in Himachal Pradesh, India, has been its 
aggressive marketing strategy (Baumann and 
Singh 1996). Training for merchants who 
wi l l begin selling seed is also advisable. 
In Rwanda, local merchants have been 
successful in selling small packets of seed of 
new bean varieties (Sperling et al. 1996). 
Market sellers are often sources of 
information and seed of new varieties in 
Ghana (Bortei-Doku Aryeetey 1995). Grisley 
(1993) is surely correct that well-planned 
distribution of small quantities of seed of new 
varieties is more cost-effective than 
launching a full-scale seed production 
project, but precise strategies to achieve 
widespread and equitable access have yet to 
be determined. 
Transaction costs in seed provision 
The organization, funding, and incentives for 
the various stages of seed provision are not 
the only concerns for the development of 
small-scale seed projects. Equal attention 
must be given to transaction costs—the costs 
of acquiring information, establishing contracts, 
and developing trust—between the individuals 
and organizations responsible for different 
stages of seed provision. Transaction costs 
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can be divided into three categories: "search 
and information costs, bargaining and decision 
costs, and enforcement costs" (Dahlman 
1979:148). The total costs of production for a 
commodity such as seed are the sum of 
transformation costs and transaction costs 
(North 1990). 
Transaction costs are important in the 
interaction between farmer and seed provider 
(Wiggins and Cromwell 1995:414). Farmers 
need information about the type of seed that 
is available, access to a location where they 
can obtain seed, and assurances about seed 
quality. Although these factors may be 
difficult to include in a budget, they are 
nevertheless real costs to the farmer. They 
add to the actual cost of seed and, if they are 
too high, discourage demand for seed. 
Transaction costs are also relevant to the 
interactions among the components of the 
seed provision system. Producers of source 
seed require information on varietal demand 
from seed multipliers; clear contracts are 
required between seed producers and seed 
merchants; and seed producers need some 
guarantee of the quality of the source seed 
they acquire. With the exception of the work 
done by Rusike (1995), little has been done 
on transaction costs in seed provision, 
although lack of attention to transaction costs 
is a major reason for the failure of many 
small-scale seed schemes. 
Transaction costs are particularly relevant 
while planning changes or "innovations" in 
the seed system. One theory holds that the 
growth of firms is determined in large 
measure by the nature of transaction costs; 
the establishment of a firm serves to lower 
the transaction costs that characterize 
contracting among individual enterprises 
(Williamson 1979). Large commercial seed 
companies can be seen as firms that 
incorporate most of the components of seed 
provision within their boundaries. At the 
opposite end of the scale, traditional local-
level seed provision, where farmers take 
responsibility for everything from variety 
maintenance to seed utilization, is also an 
integrated process with low transaction costs. 
On the other hand, most of the small-scale 
seed provision options considered in this 
paper involve interactions—and transaction 
costs—among many different organizations. 
The choice between integration (within a 
single firm) and contracting (between enter-
prises) is not simply a question of scale, but 
also a matter of costs and opportunities for 
specialization. The cost of developing and 
maintaining specialist skills may be higher 
than the transaction costs of contracting for 
those skills, as recent trends in the dis-
aggregation of firms illustrate (Miles and 
Snow 1996). Specialists may be contracted 
when particular skills are required that a firm 
does not wish to develop. For example, a 
large seed company may use an outside 
laboratory for certain types of quality control, 
or obtain foundation seed from a specialist 
producer. 
Communication between farmers and 
breeders. Demand for seed of new varieties 
depends crucially upon the suitability of 
those varieties for farmers' conditions. Much 
work remains to be done in modifying public 
plant breeding programs in order to increase 
communication with farmers and decentralize 
variety testing (Ashby and Sperling 1995). In 
addition, better communication is needed 
between seed merchants and breeders 
regarding farmers' demands. There are costs 
involved in making these adjustments, but 
they wil l yield significant benefits in 
improving the flow of seed of acceptable new 
varieties. 
Communication between seed growers and 
source seed providers. Most small-scale seed 
operations depend on a public agency for 
source seed. In many seed projects, NGO 
staff establish relationships and make the 
contacts necessary for acquiring the source 
seed each season. If projects are to become 
independent, it is crucial that these respon-
sibilities be transferred to members of the 
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farmers' group or cooperative. Gathering 
information about what type of source seed is 
available, transmitting demands for source 
seed of particular varieties, and establishing a 
relationship of trust between seed grower and 
source seed provider all represent significant, 
and unavoidable, transaction costs. 
Contracts with seed growers. Even the 
largest commercial seed company must bear 
the transaction costs of contracting with seed-
growing farmers. There are risks on both 
sides of these contracts. Seed growers may be 
tempted to sell their harvest to another buyer, 
if the timing or sale price is more attractive 
than the original contract. On the other hand, 
seed producers may be disappointed by the 
company's refusal to buy all their output, by 
excessive quality discounting, or by late payment. 
Both growers and enterprises must invest 
considerable resources in developing and main-
taining a productive contractual relationship. 
Communication between seed growers and 
quality control agencies. Quality control 
agencies may interact with small-scale seed 
projects in order to provide technical advice 
or because of the requirements of national 
seed regulations. Growers need to be in 
constant contact with certification officials to 
ensure that they are able to reach the 
production plots for the requisite inspections. 
The relationship between producers and the 
quality control agency may be difficult. 
Mandatory seed certification presents many 
opportunities for rent seeking, which adds to 
the cost of seed (Tripp and van der Burg in 
press). On the other hand, compromises by 
the quality control agency jeopardize the 
reputation of all formal seed production. 
Communication between seed growers and 
merchants. Most formal seed sales in 
developing countries are handled by 
government agencies, farmers' cooperatives, 
or large dealerships. Small-scale seed 
provision wi l l increasingly need to tap into 
local-level marketing channels. When seed 
producers begin dealing with merchants who 
wi l l sell their seed, mutually acceptable 
arrangements must be established (e.g., to 
what extent unsold stocks may be returned, 
or how the merchant wi l l promote the 
product). The development of effective 
relations between seed producers and 
merchants requires considerable investment. 
Joshi (1995) describes problems of mistrust 
and lack of communication that characterize 
relations between small-scale seed growers 
and seed merchants in Nepal, and points to 
ways of improving coordination between the 
two groups. 
Communication between seed suppliers and 
farmers. Seed producers and merchants must 
pay significant costs to establish their 
reputations with farmer clients (Cromwell 
1996). Investments in brand names and 
advertising wil l be necessary. A relationship 
of trust needs to be established in which 
farmers can rely on seed providers for 
information about new products, and where 
farmers feel that their concerns and 
complaints are respected. The development 
of trust requires time and investment. 
Developing such relationships between 
farmers who rarely buy formal sector seed 
and merchants who have little experience in 
marketing seed is particularly challenging. 
Merchants could also establish links with 
extension agents, who can help arrange 
demonstrations and field days. 
A l l these examples of interaction between 
different components of the seed provision 
process are characterized by significant 
transaction costs. Agencies involved in 
developing small-scale seed provision 
alternatives must pay particular attention to 
lowering these transaction costs if their 
projects are to achieve viability. In many 
cases, external agencies such as NGOs bear 
many of these costs, without accounting for 
them in an analysis of project viability. 
Table 2 shows several examples of small-
scale seed projects. Each example is 
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characterized by key interactions between 
components. The level of the associated 
transaction costs helps determine the viability 
of the project. Table 3 describes the organiza-
tion, funding, and incentives for the cases 
cited in Table 2. These examples illustrate 
the wide range of organizations that contribute 
to the management and support of various 
components. Most of these projects are still 
in progress, and few can yet be judged as 
successes or failures. But it should be obvious 
that a clear assignment of responsibilities, and 
an understanding of participants' expectations, 
will be necessary for sustainable seed provision. 
Conclusions 
Formal seed supply in developing countries 
is in the midst of a transition from dependence 
on public seed systems toward greater private 
sector involvement. But the speed and degree 
of completeness of this transition wil l depend 
on the type of crop and the nature of seed 
demand. A significant proportion of seed 
demand wil l not be addressed by large 
commercial seed operations, but alternative 
pathways are not yet defined. 
Small-scale seed provision is certainly a 
possibility (even in industrialized countries, a 
large number of seed businesses are small, 
often family-owned operations) but even small-
scale seed enterprises require considerable 
investment and expertise. 
Different organizations, both public and 
private, must collaborate in the seed provision 
process. This requires that competencies and 
incentives are well defined for each stage, 
and that adequate channels of communication 
exist among the various stages in the process. 
It is clear that there are certain areas of 
seed provision where the state wil l continue 
to have important responsibilities (plant 
breeding, source seed production) and others 
where its mandate wil l significantly decline 
(seed production) or disappear (marketing). 
There are also areas (quality control) where 
careful decisions wil l have to be made about 
state participation. 
There is also much that seed policy can do 
to foster the development of small-scale seed 
operations. Seed laws should encourage 
innovation and should not impose unrea-
sonable restrictions on the release of new 
varieties or the sale of seed. Quality control 
agencies should support and encourage 
small-scale seed initiatives. Seed policy can 
also promote the availability of adequate 
training opportunities for seed project 
personnel. Import barriers for germplasm and 
seed conditioning equipment should be 
removed. Public extension agencies can play 
an important role in helping to organize the 
testing and demonstration of varieties offered 
by private seed enterprises. The state also can 
foster the development of seed producer 
cooperatives and associations. 
External agencies also can contribute to 
small-scale seed production. The major 
players to date have been non-membership 
NGOs and donors that sponsor seed projects. 
But these organizations must spell out the 
nature of their involvement in a seed project. 
If they hope to establish a sustainable seed 
provision option, then a plan for operational 
and financial independence should be 
described. On the other hand, if the activity is 
motivated by welfare considerations, and 
external funds are used to support seed 
provision that could not be sustained by local 
resources, this justification should be articulated. 
Finally, it is appropriate to close with the 
reminder that the success of any small-scale 
seed operation depends on the skill and 
efficiency with which operations are performed, 
and on the capacity of the participating organi-
zations, public and private, to establish effective 
working relationships with each other. 
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Public Policy, Public Investment, and Private Investment 
in Seed Supply—Experiences in Turkey and India 
C E Pray1 
Abstract 
Many African countries have sought to encourage private sector participation in the 
seed industry by liberalizing input markets and privatizing government parastatals. 
However, in many cases the private sector has been unable to respond fully to these 
initiatives, either because policies have not actually been reformed or because the 
private sector is not yet sufficiently developed. This paper draws on recent 
experiences with seed policy reform in India and Turkey to identify the key policy 
and institutional reforms that encouraged growth in the private seed sector. 
The reforms in Turkey and India allowed seed prices to rise, permitted new firms 
to enter the seed industry, and reduced restrictions on imports of varieties and seed. 
Large-scale private firms entered the most profitable sectors (hybrid seed), while 
less profitable sectors were left to small seed companies, farmers, and the public-
sector. In some cases, as in Punjab, the combination of small seed companies and 
farmers was more efficient than the public sector in rapidly spreading new varieties. 
The liberalization process in Southern and Eastern Africa, with a few exceptions, 
has not advanced very far. A number of policy restrictions militate against private 
sector development. We conclude that private companies in Southern and Eastern 
Africa will supply seed of hybrid crops if governments lift seed price controls; allow 
grain prices to rise to near world market levels; eliminate government monopolies 
on varietal research, seed production, and marketing; and develop clear and stable 
policies. Government parastatals need not be privatized, but their subsidies should 
be reduced to allow the private sector to compete. Public research must continue to 
develop, import, and test new varieties of open-pollinated crops, where substantial 
private investment is unlikely. In addition, governments must continue to multiply 
early-generation seed, to ensure that enough seed is available for small seed 
companies, farmers, and other seed producers to multiply. 
1. Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, Rutgers University, PO Box 231, New Brunswick, 
NJ 08903-0231. USA 
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Introduction 
Many African countries have recently 
responded to past government failures in the 
provision of agricultural inputs by libera-
lizing trade in agricultural input markets and 
privatizing government parastatals. Some 
supporters of privatization have suggested 
that if the government would just step aside, 
the private sector would take over all the im-
portant services now provided by the govern-
ment—research, variety testing, seed supply, 
etc. In many African countries, however, pri-
vate firms have not replaced the public sector 
in providing agricultural inputs (Rusike 
1995). Is this because policies have not actu-
ally been reformed or is it because the private 
sector is incapable of providing these ser-
vices? One key question is whether further 
policy changes wi l l encourage the private 
sector to increase its role in providing seed of 
open-pollinated varieties in Africa. A second 
important question is: what is the role of gov-
ernment investment if the private sector does 
play a larger role? 
This paper does not attempt to answer 
these questions directly. Instead, it draws on 
recent experiences with seed policy reform in 
India and Turkey to identify the key policy 
and institutional reforms that encouraged 
growth in the private seed sector. It identifies 
activities and crops where private investment 
is unlikely and public investment is still 
needed. The paper then identifies policy areas 
that could constrain the development of the 
private seed industry in Southern and Eastern 
Africa. 
Demand, Prices, and Policy 
Factors 
Farmers' decisions on seed purchase can be 
broken down into three component decisions— 
how much area to plant under that crop, 
which Variety to plant, and how much seed of 
that variety to buy to meet their target area. 
The variety decision is based on the eco-
nomically important genetic characteristics 
of the variety, such as yield, yield variabil-
ity, disease/pest resistance, grain quality, 
and cost. Superiority of a new variety wi l l 
depend on these qualities, and the speed at 
which these qualities are lost as the variety 
become genetically mixed or resistance 
breaks down. Farmers wi l l not buy new va-
rieties unless they give a marginal return of 
at least 100% ($1 in additional seed cost 
must give $2 in increased profits) and some 
private firms feel that the increase must be 
at least 300% (Lopez-Pereira and Filippello 
1994:16). Once the farmer chooses a vari-
ety, he must determine how much of his 
farm to allocate to production of that crop. 
If the farmer is interested in maximizing 
profits, the land allocation is optimum 
when, at the margin, profits are equal for all 
different crop activities. 
After deciding on the variety and the 
area of the crop, farmers wi l l decide how 
much seed of the variety to buy. This deci-
sion depends on how fast farmers can mul-
tiply the seed themselves and how many 
years they should retain farm-saved seed 
before they purchase fresh seed again. 
Most farmers buy new seed of hybrids each 
year because yields may decline by up to 
30% if seed is re-used. Many farmers in de-
veloping countries buy a small amount of 
seed of varieties of open-pollinated crops 
which they multiply for several seasons un-
ti l they have enough to plant the desired 
amount of land. 
Private companies wi l l not enter a new 
industry or expand unless they believe that 
there wil l be sufficient demand (and therefore 
sufficient profits) and their share of the mar-
ket wi l l be sufficiently large. Thus, a f irm 
must offer seed that is considerably superior 
to seed that farmers produce and store them-
selves. At the early stages of seed industry 
development, when farmers do not have 
much confidence in commercial seed firms, 
the superiority must be particularly great. 
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This implies that firms must sell either high-
yielding varieties or hybrids. 
Firms are responsive to changes in seed 
prices. In the early stages of the industry, 
supply may be somewhat inelastic because it 
takes time to effectively set up and coordinate 
the different functions and because the seed 
industry is quite risky. Therefore increased 
demand wil l increase prices, but it is pre-
cisely these higher prices that attract invest-
ment and accelerate the growth of the seed 
industry. 
Government policies wil l also affect the 
speed at with the private sector expands. If 
governments hold down prices through price 
controls, if they reduce the size of the 
market by supplying seed through govern-
ment agencies, if they drive up the firms' 
costs through taxes or regulations, fewer 
firms wil l enter the industry and some wi l l 
drop out. If the rules of the game—property 
rights, legal system, taxes, and regula-
tions—are not clear, fewer firms wi l l enter 
the industry. 
Foreign companies wil l supply seed and 
transfer technology if they expect to make 
profits in that country and can repatriate 
some of the profits. They need a return on 
investment that wil l be larger than alternative 
investments in other countries. If foreign 
firms transfer technology and conduct local 
research, they must be assured that the costs 
of transfer wi l l not exceed the income they 
make from transferring that technology. To 
make profits from research or technology 
imports, three requirements must be met: 
• The time required to develop or adapt a 
new, farmer-acceptable variety must be 
relatively short (1-5 years) 
• The firm must be able to charge a 
sufficiently high price for products that 
embody the new technology (appropria-
bility) 
• The market must be large enough to 
justify the investments in research and 
adapting the technology. 
Seed Industry Growth in India 
and Turkey 
Situation before the reforms— 
Turkey 
The demand for commercial seed in Turkey 
was created by imports and local develop-
ment of improved varieties, particularly 
wheat varieties in the late 1960s. In collabo-
ration with CIMMYT, US, Soviet, and Euro-
pean scientists, Turkish government institutes 
introduced varieties of semidwarf spring 
wheat, improved winter wheat, sunflower, 
and cotton in the 1960s and 1970s. Govern-
ment scientists also worked on maize hybrids 
and open-pollinated varieties from the 1950s, 
but none of the government maize varieties 
or hybrids had much success. Successful re-
search and technology transfer in semidwarf 
wheat created demand among farmers for 
large amounts of commercial seed for the 
first time in Turkish history. 
The Turkish government responded to 
this demand by importing high-yielding 
wheat varieties for a few years in the late 
1960s and establishing a seed component of 
the government's agricultural input supply 
agency, now called TIGAM (General 
Directorate of Agricultural Enterprises). 
TIGAM held a monopoly on the production 
of seed of early generations of new varieties. 
Distribution of seed to farmers was in the 
hands of government-sponsored cooperatives. 
The national seed law, passed in 1963, 
gave the Ministry of Agriculture control over 
seed production, domestic trade, imports, and 
exports. Seed prices were fixed by the 
government based on costs of production. No 
imports were allowed except through the 
government seed agency. Al l new varieties 
had to be tested and approved by the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Only public research institutes 
and universities could enter varieties into the 
tests, which gave the public sector a monopoly 
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on variety development Al l commercial seed 
had to be quality-certified by the government 
before it could be sold. 
Situation before the reforms—India 
In India the modern varieties produced by the 
Green Revolution stimulated the growth of 
the seed industry. Research institutes of the 
Indian central and state governments 
produced a steady stream of wheat, rice, 
cotton, coarse grain, and sugarcane varieties 
after Independence. Green Revolution wheat, 
rice, maize, millet, and sorghum varieties 
along with hybrid cotton were all developed 
in the 1960s by government research 
agencies—often working in collaboration 
with scientists from the USA, UK, and 
international agencies such as FAO, 
Rockefeller Foundation, CIMMYT, and 
IRRI. Before the 1960s the demand for early-
generation seed of new varieties was filled by 
government research and extension services. 
These agencies were inadequate to meet the 
huge increase in demand created by the 
Green Revolution. 
In response to the increase in demand the 
Indian government established a National 
Seeds Corporation (NSC) that was supposed 
to assist state governments and private 
companies to expand seed production. 
However, NSC soon concentrated most of its 
resources on expanding its own seed 
production and distribution system. Early-
generation seed of improved varieties was 
produced at research institutes and 
universities. NSC contracted private growers 
to produce commercial seed, and marketed 
the seed through government cooperatives. 
State governments also established state seed 
corporations (SSCs) modeled after NSC. The 
government and Ford Foundation imported 
seed of some high-yielding wheat and rice 
varieties for a few years starting in 1966. But 
as the capacity of NSC, SSCs, and local 
private companies expanded, the government 
banned import of commercial seed (except 
vegetable seed) and restricted exports. Two 
pieces of legislation in 1969 and 1973 re-
stricted seed industry participation to rela-
tively small, Indian-owned firms. Firms with 
assets over Rs 1 billion (then worth approxi-
mately US$ 80 million), or with over 40% 
foreign equity, were not allowed to invest in 
the seed industry. 
Unlike in Turkey, local private companies 
were allowed to introduce their own varieties, 
and government certification of quality was 
never mandatory in India. The National 
Seeds Act was passed in 1966 and imple-
mented in 1968, establishing a voluntary 
variety testing and certification system. 
Government variety testing and seed quality 
certification was established throughout 
India, but it was mandatory only for 
government varieties and government seed 
production. Uncertified seed can be sold as 
"truthfully labeled"—the name of the variety, 
germination rate, and purity of the seed must 
be mentioned on the label. If the seed fails to 
meet that standard the firm can be prosecuted 
by the government or by farmers. 
In the 1960s NSC did provide some 
technical assistance to local entrepreneurs 
and farmers who wanted to enter the seed 
business. NSC also used these companies as 
contract seed producers, giving them an 
assured market in the early stages of 
production. The individuals who were 
assisted by NSC became the pioneers of the 
seed industry and now run the largest private 
seed companies in India. The government 
controlled seed prices by fixing the price of 
seed supplied by NSC and SSCs, and seed 
prices for government varieties. These prices 
were often below the true costs of production, 
processing, and distribution. Consequently, 
NSC and many SSCs suffered large deficits. 
Seed sector reforms in Turkey and India 
Seed industry reforms started in 1982 in 
Turkey and in 1986 in India. In both coun-
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Table 1. Seed industry structure and regulation before and after reforms in India and Turkey. 
Turkey pre-reform Turkey after reform India pre-reform India after reform 
R&D Govt monopoly Govt and private, 
incl MNCs 
Mainly govt, 
some private 
Govt on OPVs and hybrids, 
private on hybrids 
Seed 
production 
Govt monopoly on 
improved varieties 
Govt and private, 
incl MNCs 
NSC, SSCs NSC, SSCs, and 
private incl MNCs 
Seed 
marketing 
Govt, coops monopoly 
on improved varieties 
Govt, coops, and 
private, incl MNCs 
Private companies; 
no big firms or MNCs 
NSC, SSCs, and 
private incl MNCs 
Variety 
registration 
Mandatory testing Mandatory testing Voluntary testing Voluntary testing 
Seed 
regulations 
Mandatory 
certification 
Mandatory 
certification 
Voluntary 
certification 
Voluntary 
certification 
Price 
regulations 
Govt sets prices of 
improved varieties 
No price controls Govt control on 
public varieties 
No price controls 
Seed imports 
and exports 
Only govt Private with govt 
permission 
Only govt or with 
govt permission 
Vegetables unrestricted. 
New varieties of oilseeds 
and coarse grains for 
2 years. No imports of 
wheat, rice, or cotton seed 
MNCs = multinational corporations, NSC = National Seed Corporation, SSCs = State Seed Corporations 
tries the reforms allowed new companies into 
the seed industry and opened parts of the in-
dustry to international trade. The Turkish 
government made a commitment in 1980 to 
liberalize the entire economy; liberalization 
of the seed industry followed a few years 
later. In India the seed industry was liberal-
ized somewhat earlier than the rest of the 
economy. The government did not make a 
commitment to general liberalization until 
1991, while seed reforms had begun in 1986. 
Table 1 summarizes the structure and 
regulation of the Indian and Turkish seed 
industries before and after reforms. 
Reforms in Turkey 
In Turkey, seed industry reforms started in 
1982. The government monopoly on com-
mercial seed supply was gradually dis-
mantled. Maize was the first crop affected by 
these changes. First, the government tested 
many private (foreign) varieties and imported 
and distributed seed of these varieties 
through 1984. Although firms were officially 
allowed to set prices from Dec 1993, maize 
seed prices were controlled by government— 
first at a seed:grain price ratio of 3:1 through 
1984, and 10:1 for the next 2 years when the 
government still controlled maize seed im-
ports. In the late 1980s the government 
stopped interfering in markets; in 1993 the 
ratio reached 24:1 for some of the most popu-
lar hybrids (TEBD 1994). 
Starting in 1985 the government allowed 
companies to establish their own distribution 
network, sell seed, and set their own prices. 
Imported varieties still had to pass through 
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the government variety testing system but the 
time required to test a variety dropped from 
about 5 years to 1 year. Local production of 
commercial seed was encouraged by govern-
ment subsidies and by linking seed import 
licences to the company's seed exports. 
Recently subsidies have been withdrawn 
for local production, and imported varieties 
are allowed in with a minimal amount of 
local testing. However, imports of commer-
cial seed are still subject to restrictions 
through the licensing system. 
Public investments in the seed industry 
have declined. Government plant breeding 
research is currently (1995) being starved by 
lack of funds. The government seed corpora-
tion, after growing during the 1980s thanks to 
a World Bank project, is now getting less 
money from the government. Thus, it is 
under pressure to be profitable and could 
perhaps be privatized. 
Reforms in India 
The government started to look more 
favorably on private sector development in 
the early 1980s. Private companies were 
allowed to set their own seed prices for 
varieties developed in their own breeding 
programs. However, they were not allowed to 
raise prices on public varieties. Private 
companies developed their own hybrids of 
pearl millet, maize, sorghum, and cotton, and 
several companies made very large profits 
(particularly on hybrid cotton) under the 
liberalized pricing system. This was 
especially obvious to people within these 
companies. Many of them split off to 
establish their own seed companies. 
In the late 1980s, the government reduced 
barriers to entry of foreign firms and large 
Indian companies, and liberalized regulations 
on imports and introduction of new 
agricultural technology. In 1986, the seed 
industry was opened to foreign-owned firms 
and large Indian conglomerates. In 1988 a 
new law allowed firms to import commercial 
vegetable seed with no trade restrictions (ex-
cept a small tariff) and to import commercial 
seed of foreign varieties of coarse grains and 
oilseeds for 2 years, after which seed firms 
had to produce the seed inside India. Restric-
tions on imports of varieties and germplasm 
for research purposes were greatly reduced. 
In 1991 the whole economy began a massive 
process of liberalization, which has reduced 
regulations on technology transfer and on the 
role of foreign firms. 
The government continues to invest 
heavily in research and seed distribution. The 
Indian research system continued to increase 
in size in real terms until 1994, when it 
leveled off. Investment in government seed 
production has also grown, although from the 
mid 1980s through the 1990s the central 
government and some of the state govern-
ments have been pressing NSC and the SSCs 
to at least cover their production costs if not 
make a profit. In some states (e.g., Punjab) 
there has been a substantial reduction in the 
government subsidy and thus a reduction in 
size of the SSC. 
Summary of reforms 
The reforms did not privatize the government 
seed corporation in either country. In the 
1980s government seed production grew in 
both countries, thanks in part to loans from 
the World Bank. However, in the 1990s both 
governments are cutting back on their 
subsidies to government seed companies, 
placing them under increasing pressure to be 
efficient. In some parts of India (e.g., Punjab) 
the provincial government has decided that 
large SSCs are no longer essential. The 
Punjab SSC plays only a small role in founda-
tion seed production and in the production 
and distribution of commercial seed. 
In India and Turkey the reforms left in 
place restrictions on seed trade. In India 
"canalized items"—seed of groundnut, 
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cotton, sunflower, soybean, safflower, and 
rapeseed—-can be imported only through 
agencies designated by the central govern-
ment. Restricted items—seed of castor, cotton, 
fodder crops, jute, onions, and others—can be 
exported only with government permission. 
Import of rice and wheat seed is still not 
allowed. In addition, samples of imported 
varieties and inbred lines have to be 
deposited with the Indian government's 
National Board for Plant Genetic Resources. 
In Turkey seed importers must obtain 
government licenses that are allocated to 
firms that agree to produce locally for export. 
Cotton seed sale is still restricted to coopera-
tives that are controlled by the government. 
In summary, the reforms consisted of 
three main changes. First, seed prices were 
allowed to rise. Second, new firms were 
allowed to enter the seed industry—in 
Turkey the government monopoly was 
broken; in India foreign firms and large 
Indian companies were allowed to conduct 
research and supply seed. Third, restrictions 
on imports of varieties and germplasm were 
greatly reduced and bans on import of 
commercial seed were lifted in both 
countries, although major restrictions on 
commercial imports remain in both 
countries. 
In addition, several important pre-
conditions were in place which allowed 
private seed companies to prosper. First, the 
success of Green Revolution varieties of 
wheat, rice, and coarse grains led to demand 
for large quantities of seed of improved 
varieties of major field crops. Second, both 
governments made major investments to 
develop human and physical capital for 
agricultural research and the seed industry. 
Third, complementary inputs such as fertilizer, 
irrigation, and pesticides were available. 
Impact of Reforms 
The impact of reforms fits in well with expec-
tations based on economic theory. Private 
competition grew rapidly in profitable sectors 
of the seed industry but not in other sectors. 
Private firms provided farmers with new 
technology—in Turkey, technology developed 
in other countries; in India, technology 
developed by Indian research programs using 
foreign and local germplasm. This section 
looks at the patterns of private sector activity 
and what caused them. 
Private seed supply 
In Turkey, private companies moved rapidly 
to supply seed of hybrid maize, soybean, and 
vegetables. Table 2 shows that by 1985 the 
private sector had already taken over most 
hybrid maize and vegetable seed production 
and was producing over 40% of the soybean. 
By 1990 it was producing 80% of the seed 
potatoes and soybean seed, two-thirds of the 
sunflower seed, and a small share of the 
wheat seed. TIGAM, the government seed 
company, still dominates wheat and barley 
seed, while government cooperatives provide 
almost all the cotton seed. 
In India, as in Turkey, reforms appear to 
have been particularly important in 
increasing the supply of hybrid seed, but they 
also probably increased seed sales of open-
pollinated varieties. Commercial seed sales 
by the public and private sectors grew rapidly 
from 250 000 t in 1980/81 to 484 000 t in 
1984/85 and 764 700 t in 1992/93 (Agrawal 
1997). Industry sources indicate that the 
share of the private sector has remained at 
approximately 50% from 1984/85 to the 
present. 
Accurate estimates of current production 
by the public and private sectors are not 
readily available, but Table 3 gives an idea of 
the sources of seed used by farmers in India. 
In 1987 less than 10% of seed came from the 
commercial sector. The rest was produced by 
farmers themselves or by very small seed 
companies. Within the commercial sector, 
production was split equally between private 
firms and the government. This is still the 
217 
case today, according to officials of the Seed 
Association of India. The private sector tends 
to specialize in hybrid seed of sorghum, 
maize, pearl millet, cotton, and sunflower, 
while wheat and rice varieties make up the 
bulk of public sector sales. However, even 
for rice the private sector supplies most of the 
seed. Public hybrids and public varieties are 
also sold by private firms. Large firms want 
to be able to provide their customers a ful l 
line of varieties and so they supply public 
varieties if they do not have their own 
hybrids. Many small firms and farmers also 
produce and distribute public varieties. 
Research and technology transfer 
Many of the varieties supplied by the private 
sector embodied new technology that was 
either imported or developed by private 
companies. In Turkey there was an influx of 
new varieties from abroad (Table 2). Maize, 
sunflower, potato, and vegetable varieties 
were particularly important Companies 
found that their varieties which were 
developed for the USA or Europe did so well 
in Turkey that there was no need to establish 
local breeding programs. A l l that was needed 
were locations where they could test these 
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Table 2. Commercial seed production (tons) by registered seed companies in Turkey, 1980-93. 
Crop Sector 1980 1985 1990 1993 
Wheat Private 0 <1000 7 000 10 000 
Public 49 000 188 000 124 000 103 000 
Barley Private 0 0 0 300 
Public 13000 35 000 16000 10 000 
Hybrid Private 0 80 2600 3 500 
sunflower Public 0 10 30 40 
OPV sunflower Public 2 500 4 800 1000 200 
Hybrid maize Private 
900 
1 800 4 500 7 200 
Public 300 200 200 
Sugarbeel Private na 3400 na 3 300 
Public na 0 na 3 300 
Cotton Private 0 0 500 300 
Public 35 000 27 000 30 000 31 000 
Potatoes Private 
200 
800 4 200 2 200 
Public 6 300 900 200 
Chickpea Private 0 0 0 90 
Public 0 200 200 70 
Soybean Private 0 800 3 200 3 600 
Public 0 1 100 600 200 
Vegetables Private 
191 
300 600 700 
Public 30 30 30 
na = data not available 
Source: Turkish Seed Industry Association 
Table 3. Seed requirements and commercial supply of major field crops in India, 1987. 
Total seed 
sown 
Commercial seed 
Quantity Value Public supply 
Crop ('000 t) ('000 t) (Rs million)1 ('000 t) 
Wheat 2088 158 650 105 
Paddy rice 1025 132 550 52 
Sorghum 992 25 400 19 
Maize 150 13 150 4 
Pearl millet 110 15 150 6 
Pulses 677 23 250 14 
Groundnut 635 38 300 14 
Other oilseeds 176 16 200 9 
Total 5853 420 2650 223 
1. Exchange rate in 1987 approximately US$ 1 = Rs 28 
Sources: Pray 1990, World Bank 1987 (public sector seed) 
Table 4. Hybrid seed production (tons) by the private and public sectors in India, 1993/94 to 
1995/96. 
Crop Source 1993/94 94/95 95/96 (expected) 
Sorghum x sudangrass Public 
Private 
Share of Private 
0 
8400 
100% 
0 
7200 
100% 
0 
16 000 
100% 
Sunflower Public 
Private 
Share of Private 
600 
4500 
89% 
900 
4800 
84% 
700 
4900 
87% 
Pearl millet Public 
Private 
Share of Private 
5600 
9400 
63% 
6500 
11 300 
64% 
4600 
11 200 
71% 
Sorghum Public 
Private 
Share of Private 
11000 
4600 
30% 
9200 
3900 
30% 
17 600 
11 200 
39% 
Cotton Public 
Private 
Share of Private 
3000 
600 
16% 
5900 
1600 
21% 
7700 
2500 
25% 
Maize Public 
Private 
Share of Private 
14000 
17 000 
55% 
15000 
25 000 
63% 
15 000 
27 500 
65% 
Source: Seed Association of India 
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varieties. Only one firm, Pioneer, established 
a research program in Turkey to develop new 
sunflower hybrids resistant to orobunki, an 
important parasitic weed. 
In India the reforms stimulated local 
research. The number of companies conducting 
research rose from 20 in 1985 to 41 in 1995 
(Agrawal 1997) and real investment in 
research tripled between 1986 and 1995 
(Pray 1997). Subsidiaries or joint ventures 
with multinational companies—which had 
been excluded before the reforms—accounted 
for 36% of all private seed industry research 
in 1995. Another reason was that local firms 
and multinationals started research programs 
on rice and mustard which now account for 
16% of total research (Pray 1997). This built 
upon previous research successes—practical 
ways of producing hybrid rice seed, 
developed by public research, and methods of 
producing hybrid mustard, developed by both 
public and private researchers. 
The results of private research are apparent 
from the increase in area under proprietary 
hybrids. Figure 1 shows that proprietary 
maize hybrid sales increased rapidly in the 
1990s. Multinational firms developed proprie-
tary hybrids combining local germplasm with 
germplasm developed by the firm outside 
India or from CIMMYT (Singh et al. 1995). 
The Seed Association of India recently 
estimated the share of private hybrids based 
on information from both public and private 
corporations. Their estimates (Table 4) 
indicate that private hybrids make up the 
largest share of the market in fodder (sorghum 
x sudangrass), sunflower, pearl millet, and 
maize. Private hybrids also have an important 
and growing share of the market in cotton 
and sorghum. 
Technology was transferred through 
different paths in the two countries. In Turkey 
it was primarily through imported hybrids 
and there were large imports of seed in the 
early stages of liberalization. In India most 
hybrids were developed by private companies 
using imported inbred lines or germplasm— 
Figure 1. Sales of hybrid maize seed in India, 
1981-92 
imports of commercial seed were not 
important. Thus, it appears that openness to 
technology rather than actual technology 
imports is the crucial factor. 
Impact on farmers 
Maize yields have increased in both countries 
as improved varieties became available. 
Figures 2 and 3 show that yields were 
stagnant in India and growing slowly in 
Turkey befpre the reforms. In Turkey average 
maize yields nearly doubled after the reforms 
in the early 1980s. In India public maize 
hybrids were already in use before the 
reforms, but yields increased in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, partly due to the 
increase in private research and the adoption 
of private hybrids. In Turkey the impact on 
sunflower was equally important, although 
harder to document. A l l the popular 
sunflower varieties had lost their resistance to 
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Proprietary 
Public 
8000 
7000 
6000 
5000 
4000 
3000 
2000 
1000 
0 
1981 82 84 86 88 90 92 
Year 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1.0-
0.8-
0.6-
0.4-
0.2-
0-
1960 65 70 75 80 85 90 94 
Year 
Figure 2. Maize yields in India, 1960-94. 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1-
0 
1961 66 71 76 81 86 91 92 
Figure 3. Maize yields in Turkey, 1961-92. 
Year 
orobunki, a parasitic weed, and yields and 
acreage would have been expected to decline. 
With the new hybrids, both yields and acreage 
increased (Gisselquist and Pray 1997). 
Impact on seed industry structure 
In both countries, opponents of trade liberal-
ization and privatization feared that the local 
seed industry and local research would be 
overwhelmed by imports. In Turkey, imports 
were much higher in crops with less liberal-
ization and privatization. During the 5-year 
period 1989-93, annual average-seed imports 
by government agencies and cooperatives 
were—wheat 9326 t, barley 1001 t, and pota-
toes 5150 t. Imports were much lower for 
crops where the seed trade was liberalized— 
on average 159 t of maize and 151 t of sun-
flower (TEBD 1994). This outcome is not en-
tirely due to the market. Government policies 
encouraged local seed production by restrict-
ing imports and subsidizing local seed pro-
duction. 
Another concern was that the local seed 
industry would be dominated by foreign-
owned firms. In Turkey foreign firms did 
capture an important share of the crops that 
were liberalized, but local firms have also 
increased their production and the govern-
ment continues to control wheat and barley. 
One indication is the share of planned seed 
production (Table 5). Subsidiaries of six for-
eign firms produced about half the hybrid 
maize and sunflower. Most of the remainder, 
and 98% of the soybean seed, was produced 
by six Turkish firms that have joint ventures 
with foreign firms. 
Unofficial estimates from the firms we 
interviewed suggest that the market share of 
the largest firm is about 30% in maize and 
25-30% in sunflower. There does appear to 
be free entry into these segments of the 
industry because the largest firm selling 
maize seed reports that their market share is 
being eroded by small firms that are 
undercutting prices. 
In India foreign imports and multinational 
firms had less impact on the structure of seed 
sales. Commercial seed imports are still 
primarily for vegetables. The market share of 
foreign firms has undoubtedly increased since 
1987. Cargill, Ciba-Geigy, Unilever, and 
Zeneca entered the market since then and as 
noted above, they are doing more than a third 
of the research, which should enable them to 
increase their share in the near future. 
However, the market leaders in terms of sales 
are still Indian companies led by Maharashtra 
Hybrids. Unfortunately, no precise data is 
available on market share held by foreign 
companies. However, a recent study of maize 
found that "Fears that the industry would soon 
be dominated by a small number of trans-
national companies thus far have proved to be 
unfounded (Singh et al. 1995:13)". 
Table 5. Seed production plans (production in tons, percentage share in parentheses) by type of 
firm, Turkey, 1994. 
Type of firm Maize Sunflower Soybean Wheat 
Subsidiaries of foreign firms 
Joint ventures 
Other private firms 
Govt firms 
Total 
6200(50%) 
5500(45%) 
400(3%) 
310(2%) 
12400 
1500 (48%) 
1500(49%) 
0 
110(3%) 
3100 
0 
3100(98%) 
0 
70(2%) 
3200 
2500(1%) 
0 
6800 (2%) 
275 000(97%) 
284 000 
Source: Calculated from MARA 1994 
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Limits of reform: non-impact on small 
markets and open-pollinated crops 
Seed supply. When the policy reforms took 
place in the 1980s private companies, particu-
larly multinationals but also local firms, 
moved in fairly rapidly to supply hybrid 
seed—maize and sunflower in Turkey, 
cotton, maize, sorghum, pearl millet, and 
sunflower in India. Large private companies 
have moved much more slowly to supply 
seed of open-pollinated crops such as wheat 
and rice and into areas with less than ideal 
growing conditions such as the maize areas 
along the Black Sea coast in Turkey. 
This does not mean that farmers who 
grow wheat and rice in India or wheat and barley 
in Turkey cannot get good seed. Parastatal 
seed companies continue to supply seed for 
these crops and more importantly, to small 
local companies and farmers. Table 3 shows 
that farmers provide most of the seed of open-
pollinated crops in India and parastatals also 
have a major role, particularly in wheat. Yields 
of these crops continue to rise, suggesting 
that the combination of government supply 
and farmer supply has been effective. 
Impact on research 
Policy reform did not lead to a major increase 
in research in Turkey. Private companies 
conducted varietal trials primarily to identify 
the best US and European varieties of hybrid 
maize and sunflower. The market did not 
require research because maize hybrids from 
the US corn belt and Europe grow very well 
in irrigated and high-rainfall regions of 
Turkey. The market for maize seed on the 
Black Sea coast was too small to justify a 
research program. 
Reform did induce private companies to 
invest in research in India. Almost all this 
research was on hybrids. The crops listed in 
Table 6 are all hybrids, and the "others" 
category is almost entirely hybrid vegetables. 
Private firms have started breeding rice and 
rapeseed and mustard in India recently, 
because of breakthroughs in the production 
of hybrids in these crops. India is a much 
larger market for hybrids than Turkey, and 
agroclimatic conditions are considerably 
different from those in the main markets of 
multinational companies. 
Table 6. Private sector plant breeding research in India, 1987 and 1995. 
No. of firms 
with R&D 
Research expenditure 
(million 1995 Rs) 
Share of research 
expenditure (%) 
1987 1995 1987 1995 1987 1995 
Sorghum 10 27 7 21 17 14 
Pearl millet 12 30 8 20 19 13 
Maize 6 24 4 23 11 15 
Sunflower 10 26 7 21 18 14 
Cotton 9 27 4 27 11 17 
Mustard 1 9 1 10 2 6 
Rice 0 15 0 16 0 10 
Others 9 20 9 16 22 10 
Total 40 154 
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Role of government for open-polli-
nated crops1 
Government seed companies continue to 
operate in both India and Turkey. However, 
the experience in Punjab suggests that large 
government seed companies are no longer 
needed, and that farmers and the private sector 
can be the primary distributors so long as the 
government continues to develop new varieties, 
provides foundation seed, and does not 
interfere greatly with seed markets. 
In Punjab new varieties of wheat spread 
through a combination of university production 
of breeder seed and production of "commercial" 
seed by farmers and small seed businesses. A 
new variety is first tested for 3 years on 
Punjab Agricultural University (PAU) experi-
mental stations, and then in six nonreplicated 
trials on farmers' fields in each district. Three 
trials are managed by PAU extension agents 
and three by Department of Agriculture 
extension agents. At the same time PAU 
starts multiplying seed of the new variety. 
If a variety performs very well in the 
trials, farmers immediately start multiplying 
the produce from the trials. The variety is 
submitted to the State Variety Release 
Committee for approval for cultivation within 
Punjab. PAU provides breeder seed to the 
Punjab State Seeds Corporation (PSSC) but 
also keeps at least 25% of the breeder seed 
for direct sale to farmers. It is sold in packets 
of 1-2 kg at farmers' fairs which are held 
twice a year at four places around the state. 
Farmers and small seed companies 
multiply superior varieties very rapidly. The 
most efficient farmers plant 12-25 kg ha-1 of 
seed and produce 4 t, a multiplication ratio of 
1:320 compared to a ratio of 1:40 at PAU and 
even less by the PSSC. A few companies have 
winter nurseries so that they can produce two 
crops a year. Companies then sell the new 
variety at a premium. Farmers who produce 
1. Information on Punjab taken from Ministry of Agriculture (1989). 
new varieties keep some for themselves, give 
some to their friends and relatives, and sell 
some. Officials from small seed firms in 
Ludhiana said that they had to multiply the 
crop quickly because they could charge a price 
premium only during the first two seasons 
after a new variety is available to farmers. After 
that, farmers produce enough for their own 
needs; and as demand declines, the market 
price falls to a level where seed companies 
can just cover their production costs. 
PSSC plays only a small role in the spread 
of wheat varieties because it does not start 
selling certified seed until after farmers have 
multiplied the variety for several years. 
PSSC's slowness also makes it difficult for it 
to find markets for its seed and to realize a 
profit. 
Public Policy And Investment 
Issues for Africa 
Policy and investment constraints in 
Africa? 
Are public policies or lack of public 
investment constraints to seed supply for 
open-pollinated crops in Africa? Two recent 
studies of institutional structure of African 
seed industries suggests they could be, and 
thus need to be studied further. Seed laws in 
most African countries require that varieties 
be tested and registered, and all commercial 
seed be certified. These regulations make it 
difficult to move varieties from one country 
to another (Gisselquist 1997). This contrasts 
with India, where registration and certification 
are voluntary; and Turkey, which has reduced 
variety testing to 1 year at several company-
run sites. 
Countries in Southern and Eastern Africa 
are starting the same liberalization process 
that Turkey and India are involved in. How-
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ever, with a few exceptions (e.g., South Af-
rica), liberalization has not advanced very 
far. Table 7 summarizes seed policies in five 
countries in Southern and Eastern Africa. In 
all these countries except Zimbabwe, seed 
supply of improved varieties and hybrids of 
the major field crops is a parastatal monopoly 
or near monopoly. In Zimbabwe, a 
cooperative with close ties to the government 
had 92% of the hybrid maize market in 1993 
(Rusike 1995:123). Most of the major 
multinationals including Cargill, Pioneer, 
Unilever, Zeneca, and others are active in the 
region, but have very small market shares. 
Prices were controlled in all five countries 
until recently; Tanzania lifted price controls 
in 1990, Zambia and Zimbabwe in 1993. 
Only Zimbabwe and Kenya have plant breed-
ers' rights (PBR) in effect, but the other three 
countries have passed PBR legislation or are 
currently discussing such legislation. Tanza-
nia and Zambia began major reforms in the 
1990s—special laws guaranteeing the right of 
private firms (domestic and foreign) to par-
ticipate in the seed industry, and tax breaks to 
attract foreign companies (Rusike 1995). 
Private sector investments in research in 
Africa may not be as potentially profitable as 
in India and Turkey. The only readily 
available data is for maize, which overstates 
Table 7. Policies and institutions that affect the seed industry in five countries in Southern and 
Eastern Africa. 
Kenya Malawi Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe 
Seed law enacted 1972 None 1967 1952, 1965 
Variety registration Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory 
Seed certification Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory 
R&D Govt R&D Govt R&D Govt R&D Govt R&D Govt R&D 
monopoly until 
Pioneer enters 1985 
Seed production Parastatal Parastatal and Parastatal Monopoly prod Seed Co monopoly 
and marketing monopoly Cargill until monopoly until by ZamSeeds, on sales until 
1989. Unilever 1990. Cargill distribution 1980s. 
enters 1991 enters 1991, through coops Seed Co now 
Pioneer and until Pioneer produces 92% 
Pannar 1993 1991, Cargill, 
Pannar 1992, 
Carnia 1993. 
ZamSeeds now 
produces 96% 
of maize seed 
of maize seed 
Seed price policy Govt Govt sets most Prices Hybrid maize Prices 
controls prices decontrolled prices decon- decontrolled 
prices 1990 trolled 1993 1993 
Plant Breeders' Not None None None 1973 
Rights implemented 
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the role the private sector would play in other 
crops. Substantial public investments (and 
some private investments) in breeding have 
been made in Africa. However, the investments 
are much smaller (relative to production) 
than in Asia and Latin America (Table 8). 
Lessons from Turkey and India 
First, if African governments lift seed price 
controls; allow grain prices to rise to near 
world market levels; eliminate government 
monopolies on varietal research, seed 
production, and marketing; and develop clear 
and stable policies, private companies wi l l 
supply seed of hybrid crops. The market for 
hybrid maize is large enough to attract 
foreign and local companies to sell seed and 
to conduct regional research. Government 
parastatals need not be privatized, but their 
subsidies for the production of commercial 
seed should be reduced to allow the private 
sector to compete. When this happened in India 
and Turkey, the private sector rapidly took 
over the hybrid seed market from parastatals. 
Second, private companies could deliver 
new hybrid seed technology as they did in 
Turkey if barriers to importing germplasm, 
inbred lines, and commercial seed are 
reduced. Zimbabwe and South Africa have 
long been exporters of maize varieties and 
seed to other countries in the region. Thus, 
many countries could benefit from imports of 
technology if new varieties are not slowed by 
quarantine systems that act only as trade 
barriers, mandatory variety testing that takes 
years, and limits on commercial imports of 
seed. 
Third, public research must continue to 
develop, import, and test new varieties of 
open-pollinated crops. Even with the passage 
of PBR legislation private companies are not 
likely to invest much money in breeding or 
importing and testing open-pollinated crops. 
This legislation is difficult to enforce in 
developing countries. 
Fourth, appropriability—and therefore 
private research—can be strengthened for 
crops that are presently open-pollinated by 
developing inexpensive methods for pro-
ducing hybrids. In India the development of 
hybrid tropical rice and hybrid mustard has 
stimulated many private companies to start 
working on rice and mustard, crops they had 
previously ignored. 
Fifth, if scientists are successful in identi-
fying or developing new varieties, the govern-
ment must invest some money in multiplying 
early-generation seed. There must be enough 
seed available so that small seed companies, 
farmers, and other seed producers can obtain 
small amounts of seed to multiply. 
Sixth, the government can provide the 
private seed industry with technical assistance 
and foundation seed of public varieties, 
following the Indian pattern. The Indian 
government, with technical assistance from 
the Rockefeller Foundation and USAID, 
Table 8. Public and private sector maize scientists in less developed countries. 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Asia 
(excluding China) 
Latin 
America 
No. of public maize breeders 86 
No. of other researchers 188 
No. of private researchers 38 
Breeders per million ton maize production 5.4 
175 
240 
169 
12.9 
180 
85 
108 
10.3 
Source: Byerlee et al. 1994 
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provided business and technical training and 
foundation seed to private entrepreneurs who 
wanted to enter the seed business. In the mid 
1960s the government began training farmers 
on seed production; these training programs 
were continued by state seed corporations 
when they were established in the 1970s. 
This process developed a large pool of 
technically skilled farmers, who could be 
contracted by private or public companies. 
Seventh, the goal of a regulatory system 
in a market economy should be to encourage 
private companies to introduce new varieties 
and high quality seed and to ensure that the 
industry is competitive. This requires a fun-
damental change in attitude—regulators in 
many countries see private companies as the 
enemy to be controlled and restricted. Both 
Turkey and India went through changes of 
this sort in parts of their bureaucracy. Variety 
testing and seed certification are still 
mandatory in Turkey, but are now conducted 
in such a manner as to ensure that the 
procedures are no longer a barrier to variety 
imports and seed production and distribution. 
In India the 1988 New Seed Policy explicitly 
acknowledged the importance of the private 
sector and reduced restrictions on importing 
varieties for testing or use in breeding. Equally 
important, government officials started to 
work with the industry, not against it. 
A checklist of issues for policy reform 
If African policy makers wish to encourage a 
larger role for private seed companies, the 
experience of Turkey, India, and other 
countries suggests they need to look at the 
issues listed below. This could be used as a 
checklist of issues which any policy reform 
program would have to address. 
Barriers to reform 
• What barriers to the entry of private 
industry are still in place? Trade barriers 
to varieties and commercial seed? Barriers 
to private investment? to foreign invest-
ment? Are seed prices controlled? 
• Which interest groups are trying to 
preserve these barriers? How can they be 
brought into the reform process? 
• If a seed parastatal is to be privatized, 
how can a country ensure that it is not 
turned into a private monopoly? 
• Do parastatals still receive major subsidies? 
Are these subsidies for the provision of 
seed to promote equity or some other goal 
of society, or are they simply to give the 
parastatal a cost advantage over private 
competitors? 
• Do plant quarantine, variety registration, 
and seed certification really reduce the 
risk of disease and pests and help farmers 
choose the best varieties and seeds? Or do 
they only act as barriers to entry into the 
industry? What would be the costs and 
benefits of eliminating these regulations 
or making them voluntary? 
The provision of public and club goods 
• What is the potential social benefit from 
public financing of research on open-
pollinated crops? Who could be taxed or 
organized to pay for research with high 
pay-offs but low appropriability? 
• What are the potential social benefits 
from government provision of foundation 
seed of new varieties of open-pollinated 
crops? 
• Can seed companies or farmers be 
organized to provide foundation seed or 
conduct research? Could the government 
help organize such groups? Would a 
government subsidy be needed? 
Conclusions 
The experience of Turkey and India suggests 
that if African countries remove policy and 
regulatory barriers, private firms w i l l enter 
the seed industry provided markets are big 
enough and there is some appropriability, as 
in the case of hybrid seed. In addition, 
farmers and small companies can provide 
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seed of self-pollinated crops if the govern-
ment provides new varieties and basic seed 
and allows prices to fluctuate with supply and 
demand. Thus, there still are important roles 
for government research—providing new 
varieties of self-pollinated crops but also 
supporting private research in hybrids by deve-
loping disease-resistant lines, developing new 
ways of producing hybrids, and running (volun-
tary) tests of private hybrids and varieties. 
The Indian and Turkish cases suggest that 
two other policy changes—complete privatiza-
tion of public seed supply corporations and 
plant breeders' rights legislation—are less 
important for the initial development of the 
private sector in Africa. Private firms can compete 
so long as public firms do not have large 
subsidies that prevent unfair competition. 
The absence of breeders' rights legislation 
did not stop private firms from developing in 
India; and several African countries already 
have breeders' rights legislation in place. 
Finally, the paper provides a checklist of 
issues that reformers should look at when 
proposing seed policy reform or seed 
industry projects. These wil l hopefully assist 
African policy makers to develop more 
efficient markets in the future. 
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Regulatory Constraints to Seed Multiplication and 
Distribution Through Alternative Seed Systems 
D Gisselquist1 
Abstract 
In many developing countries, seed regulations hinder the development and 
functioning of a competitive private seed sector and thus limit the flow of new 
varieties to farmers. This paper analyzes policy constraints, and suggests specific 
reforms for governments, international agricultural research centers (lARCs), 
NGOs, and governments. Governments can make four key policy changes to 
stimulate private sector involvement—lower barriers to seed company entry, make 
variety registration optional or automatic, enforce truth-in-labeling and make other 
seed quality assurances available hut optional, and establish standard procedures to 
give seed companies access to material developed through public research. lARCs 
could improve farmer access to IARC lines by challenging government claims to 
monopoly distribution of these lines, strengthening legal mechanisms to ensure that 
these lines remain public goods, and marketing IARC lines and germplasm at cost to 
all comers, rather than distributing them free. 
NGO seed projects could promote the establishment of small seed companies, 
thus ensuring sustainability when projects end. Donors could link aid for 
agricultural research to regulatory reforms to give the private sector greater 
freedom to introduce new varieties. Donors could also modify seed relief programs 
to promote sustainable private seed systems by distributing seed vouchers rather 
than seed. 
Introduction 
Farmers in many developing countries, and 
especially in smaller African countries, have 
limited access to the flow of new varieties 
developed by public and private research 
organizations around the world. In many 
countries, inappropriate and over-protective 
seed regulations are part of the problem, 
impeding market entry for new companies 
and varieties. The recommendations made in 
this paper challenge governments, donors, 
NGOs, and international agricultural research 
centers (IARCs) to change regulations and 
policies to more effectively foster the 
emergence of small seed companies and 
competitive seed markets in developing 
countries. 
1. Consultant, World Bank. 29 West Governor Road, Hershey, PA 17033, USA 
Gisselquist, D. 1997. Regulatory constraints to seed multiplication and distribution through alternative seed systems. Pages 
229-244 in Alternative strategies for smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an international Conference on Options for 
Strengthening National and Regional Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, 
D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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Alternative seed systems 
In this paper, the terms "alternative seed 
systems'' and "small seed enterprises" (SSEs) 
refer to all small and medium private seed 
producers and traders (including farmers who 
sell seed to neighbors), NGOs, and small seed 
companies. This definition excludes parastatals, 
multinationals, and other large seed companies. 
Most SSEs are in the private sector. Some 
SSEs, such as farmers, are informal in that they 
do not interact with government organiza-
tions that regulate commerce or seeds. On the 
other hand, small seed companies, by defini-
tion, work within the framework of formal 
commercial markets and seed regulations. 
Why include small seed companies in the 
definition of alternative seed systems? 
Compared to developed countries, many 
developing countries have a conspicuous lack 
of small and medium seed companies. The 
emergence of such companies is crucial to 
the development of a competitive seed industry 
supplying seeds for all crops to all farmers. 
One path or vision for seed system develop-
ment is for informal producers—private 
farmers who sell seed to neighbors or produce 
seed in collaboration with NGO programs— 
to join the formal sector, i.e., to become 
small seed companies. The character of seed 
industry regulations can make this trans-
formation easier or more difficult. 
What can SSEs do? 
Wherever regulations allow, SSEs can be 
expected to: 
• Identify new varieties that farmers value, 
by screening potential varieties from 
various sources including foreign and in-
country public and private research 
• Sell seed of new varieties to farmers. 
Identify new varieties 
For all formal and informal seed enterprises 
in the private sector, SSEs as well as large 
companies, the ability to identify new seed 
technology that farmers want and are willing 
to pay for is crucial. In developed countries, 
the market life for new varieties is seldom 
more than 5-7 years, as breeders continuously 
deliver newer and better varieties; market life 
may be longer in developing countries with 
weaker flows of new varieties. In any case, 
successful SSEs and companies are those that 
are good at identifying what farmers want. 
Companies do this through tests and demons-
trations. SSEs may rely on a few local 
farmers testing new varieties and talking to 
neighbors. Larger seed companies (and larger 
NGOs) may organize hundreds or thousands 
of test and demonstration plots every year. 
From where do SSEs access their 
varieties? Without paying anyone royalties or 
licensing fees, SSEs can select varieties that 
are in the public domain, including traditional 
varieties and varieties from in-country and 
foreign public breeding (national agricultural 
research systems or NARS, lARCs, univer-
sities, parastatals, etc). SSEs may also 
arrange contracts with large foreign research-
based companies to introduce their varieties; 
for example, a small seed company in 
Zambia could contract with one or more 
foreign seed companies to test and introduce 
varieties for vegetables or field crops. 
Deliver seed of new varieties 
Most SSEs have lower overhead costs than 
parastatals and large research-based private 
companies. Low overheads give SSEs an 
edge in secondary crops, relatively low-value 
non-hybrid seed for pulses, maize open-
pollinated varieties (OPVs), self-pollinated 
grains (wheat), tubers, etc. For these crops, 
potential seed sales and profits from new 
varieties may be too small to attract large 
research-based companies. 
Wi l l farmers buy seed for beans, cereals, 
and other non-hybrid crops without subsidies? 
This depends heavily on the supply of new 
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varieties and on seed production costs. For 
non-hybrid seed, faster farm-level turnover of 
varieties increases seed sales and profits. A 
continuous flow of new varieties can create 
stable markets for non-hybrid seed. In 
addition, lower production costs allow lower 
seed prices, which can encourage farmers to 
replace seed more often, increasing seed sales 
and profits. 
Delivering seed of public varieties to 
farmers. Many seed experts dealing with 
developing countries identify SSEs as an 
important (potential) link between public 
sector breeders and farmers, with SSEs 
taking varieties from public research and 
multiplying seed for farmers. This paper 
endorses that vision, with an additional 
feature: part of the task of delivering seed of 
new varieties to farmers is to winnow and select 
from among all new public varieties those 
that are of interest to farmers. 
Many experts ask or expect that SSEs wil l 
accept experts' decisions about which varieties 
to introduce. With this approach, experts in 
NARS, IARCs, national seed committees, etc, 
recommend a relatively short list of tested 
varieties or even identify specific varieties. At 
the same time, governments and NGOs may 
provide some subsidies to seed producers. 
For example, they may give credits or inputs 
to farmers who grow seed, or buy seed from 
growers for resale to other farmers at prices 
that do not fully cover costs. These arrange-
ments have some basic problems. If SSEs are 
to be sustainable, then they must offer seeds 
that farmers want. However, years of 
experience in many countries provide solid 
evidence that experts often recommend 
varieties that farmers do not want. An SSE 
that decided what to produce based on public 
sector or NGO recommendations alone would 
probably lose money. 
For anyone producing seed, poor foresight 
about what varieties farmers want leads to 
low prices and unsold stock. With govern-
ments and NGOs involved, poor judgement 
can be off-set by subsidies. Subsidies can cut 
seed prices to a level at which farmers wi l l 
buy, and cover the cost of unsold seed. Such 
solutions allow organizations to continue to 
waste attention and resources on inferior 
varieties. One good reason to get away from 
seed subsidies is to allow expert-endorsed 
varieties to fail, so that attention can shift to 
varieties that farmers value. 
Arguably, SSEs must make their own 
decisions about what to produce if they are to 
produce what farmers want. With multiple 
SSE entrepreneurs making decisions about 
what farmers want, the market rewards those 
that make the best decisions. This process 
leads to steady improvement in SSE variety 
selection and seed supply over time. A vision 
with SSEs making decisions about what 
varieties to introduce shifts all public sector 
and NGO breeders and experts from directing 
to supporting roles. In this vision, scientists 
in NARS, universities, IARCs, and NGOs 
breed and offer their best lines and varieties. 
Then, based on SSE tests and on-farm demons-
trations, entrepreneurs in SSEs pick and 
choose what they think is worth multiplying. 
Enlarging the pool of varieties for SSE 
selection. Allowing SSEs to choose from 
among new varieties from both foreign and 
in-country research improves choice and flow 
of new varieties to farmers. However, 
enlarging the range of varieties from which to 
choose entails designing seed regulations to 
allow SSEs access to a wide range of lines 
from in-country and foreign breeding, and to 
give SSEs the authority to introduce (i.e., sell 
seed of) new varieties that NARS and govern-
ment seed committees have not yet tested and 
approved. 
SSEs in Peru and Turkey 
Emergence of formal SSEs in Peru. In the 
late 1980s, Peru decentralized implementa-
tion of government seed regulations. State-
level public-private committees were created 
231 
and made responsible for promoting new 
private seed companies and certifying seed 
(however, certification was voluntary). These 
committees controlled seed processing 
facilities, making them available to small 
seed companies that did not have their own 
equipment. With these arrangements, the number 
of seed companies in Peru increased from 11 
in 1988 to 44 in 1991 and 178 in 1995. Signifi-
cantly, these arrangements allowed seed-produ-
cing farmers to register as small seed companies: 
in 1995, from a total of 178 seed companies, 
98 produced less than 10 ha of seed each, 
while only 21 produced over 60 ha of seed. 
SSEs introduce new varieties in Turkey. In 
the early 1980s, the government of Turkey 
lowered barriers to entry for new seed 
companies and also to private introduction of 
new varieties. With these reforms, the number 
of companies increased from only a few 
vegetable seed companies in the early 1980s 
to about 80 companies in the early 1990s 
producing and trading seed for all crops; 
many of these new companies had formal 
associations with one or more seed multi-
nationals. New companies, and in particular 
new channels to the international seed industry, 
led to a large increase in the number of 
varieties available for all crops, from grains 
to fruits and vegetables. 
While Turkey has some very large multi-
national and national seed companies, introduc-
tion of new varieties is not limited to the giants. 
Medium-scale companies test and introduce 
new varieties, including varieties from foreign 
public breeding (e.g., IARCs and foreign 
universities) and from foreign private breeding 
(through licensing or other arrangements with 
foreign companies). In 1990, companies selling 
seed for as little as 4000 ha managed testing 
programs to identify new varieties of six field 
crops for introduction into Turkey (Table 1). 
Many of the varieties coming out of these 
testing programs would be grown on much 
less than 4000 ha, since companies offer 
multiple varieties. 
The experience in Turkey suggests that 
even relatively small companies can 
contribute to technology transfer, testing and 
selectively introducing appropriate varieties 
from foreign public and private breeding. In 
other countries, the scale of seed sales 
required to support a testing program may be 
even smaller than in Turkey, since Turkish 
seed regulations force companies to pay 
some unnecessary costs for variety 
registration and seed certification (both of 
which remain compulsory rather than 
voluntary for major crops). 
Designing Government 
Regulations to Facilitate SSE 
Activities 
In many developing countries, seed regula-
tions inhibit SSEs from contributing to 
agricultural development through selection of 
new varieties and sale of quality seed. This 
section recommends that governments should: 
(a) lower entry barriers for small seed 
companies, (b) lower entry barriers for new 
varieties, (c) reduce the costs that SSEs must 
pay to meet seed quality requirements, (d) 
give SSEs access to NARS and IARC 
germplasm. 
Preliminary comments on regulatory 
reform 
Reforms for small companies. Many 
discussions on regulatory reforms confuse the 
issue by focusing on whether or not to allow 
multinationals to enter and operate 
companies in a given country. Whether or not 
to allow a handful of multinationals is no 
longer the issue. Overall trends away from 
socialism ensure that parastatals wi l l shrink 
and multinationals wi l l enter seed markets. 
However, the entry of a few large companies 
does not mean that seed regulations wi l l 
assure a competitive private seed industry. 
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Incomplete regulatory reform may simply 
lead to oligopoly. By selling high-value 
products for major crops (such as hybrid 
maize), large private companies can generate 
sufficient profits to operate in difficult 
regulatory environments. 
This paper calls for regulatory reforms to 
allow a full range of small to large private 
companies selling seed for a full range of 
major and minor crops. Large private seed 
companies have sometimes supported 
restrictive regulations that block entry and 
competition for other companies. But there is 
at least one good reason for large companies 
to support reforms that lower barriers to entry 
for new large and small seed companies: the 
resulting broad-based private seed industry 
can be a powerful force against bureaucratic 
interference, allowing both large and small 
companies to operate in a secure commercial 
environment. 
Reforms through ministries or parliaments. 
A number of government controls on private 
investment and international trade were 
removed during the reforms process. Before 
these reforms, governments (particularly 
ministries of agriculture) in many developing 
countries controlled the seed industry through 
general controls on private investment, access 
to foreign exchange for imports, permission 
to export, etc. When governments relax overall 
controls on private investment and trade, 
some controls on private seed industries still 
remain, in the form of regulations on 
phytosanitary import controls, seed quality, 
and other aspects of seed production and trade. 
These regulations are sometimes, but not 
always, based on seed laws that grant specific 
authority to ministries of agriculture. 
The regulatory reforms discussed in this 
paper are generally within the authority of 
ministries of agriculture under existing 
legislation; which often includes seed laws. 
In some cases, reforms might entail a change 
in existing laws, which would require 
parliamentary action. 
Four recommendations for 
government regulatory reform 
This paper argues for four specific reforms to 
stimulate private-sector involvement. 
• Lower barriers to seed company entry 
• Make variety registration optional or 
automatic 
• Enforce truth-in-labeling and make other 
seed quality assurances available but 
optional 
• Establish standard procedures to give seed 
companies access to public sector 
varieties, lines, and germplasm. 
Recommendation 1: Lower barriers 
to seed company entry 
Seed laws commonly give ministries of 
agriculture the authority to approve companies 
to sell, produce, or import seed. Ministries 
may issue regulations setting objective criteria 
for registration of seed companies. They may 
also reserve authority to exercise discretion, 
approving or denying registration whether or 
not a company meets whatever objective 
criteria have been set. 
Who is able to produce seed? Seed 
producers do not need to own equipment 
(they can hire seed processing services from 
anyone who owns equipment) or land (they 
can contract farmers to grow seed). The 
proper concern of government is that farmers 
are able to buy truthfully-labeled seed in 
competitive markets (with some minimum 
quality standards, such as absence of noxious 
weed seeds). There is no objective way to 
determine a priori whether a proposed new 
company wi l l be able to produce seed that 
meets market demand and is truthfully 
labeled. Therefore, governments can be 
encouraged to make registration of new seed 
companies a pro forma exercise, with modest, 
objective criteria and little or no room for 
registering officers to exercise discretion in 
deciding whether or not to register any 
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prospective company. At the same time, 
ministries can boost capabilities and efforts 
to monitor retail seed sales to ensure truth-in-
labeling. 
Governments also regulate who can 
import, wholesale, and retail seeds. These 
regulations can limit competition among 
importers and also inhibit the development of 
wholesale-retail networks to deliver the full 
range of seed to small farmers through 
competitive and accessible private markets. 
Ministry authority to register seed 
companies can be an important barrier to 
entry and competition. In Turkey, for 
example, only companies that produce seed 
are allowed to import seed. This restriction 
forces companies that produce vegetables for 
export (often producing the specific variety 
that foreign buyers demand) to import seeds 
through a seed company, which takes a cut, 
increasing seed costs. 
In Zimbabwe, for another example, the 
Seeds Act gives the Minister of Agriculture 
authority to register seed sellers and seed 
laboratories. From 1992/93, ENDA, an NGO, 
has organized communal farmers to grow 
certified seed for millet, sorghum, groundnut, 
and cowpea. Seed is collected and delivered 
to the Seed Company of Zimbabwe (formerly 
Seed Coop) for processing and packaging, 
after which it is often exported. Except for 
groundnut and cowpea, this seed does not 
come back into the market. These arrange-
ments take improved seed out of commu-
nities and away from Zimbabwean farmers. It 
is unfortunate that the government (at least 
through early 1996) had not registered small 
seed companies among communal farmers 
that ENDA was supporting. Communal seed 
growers could work with small local entre-
preneurs to establish new companies, package 
and sell seed, and build local markets over 
time. If seed quality is a concern, ENDA or 
some other organization could provide 
technical support to communal farmer-based 
companies for seed processing and quality 
testing. 
Advocates for strict government limits on 
who can produce and trade seed argue that 
seed is a sensitive commodity, that quality is 
important, and that these restrictions wi l l 
ensure quality. These arguments are weak at 
several points. Limiting entry reduces 
competition, which tends to reduce market 
pressures for quality. Also, seed is no more 
sensitive than many other goods and services 
for which most governments allow competitive 
private markets to operate. For example, 
governments allow thousands of small shops 
to repair brakes on trucks and buses and 
thousands of small stalls to prepare and serve 
food, even though bad brakes and bad food 
could kil l much faster than bad seed. For 
vehicle repair and restaurant services, 
governments trust regulations (e.g., restaurant 
inspections and licenses) and competitive 
markets to enforce quality, allowing 
thousands of small-to-large firms to compete. 
Recommendation 2: Make variety 
registration optional or automatic 
Throughout the world, countries generally 
follow one of three practices with respect to 
variety registration: optional variety regis-
tration, multi-country lists of allowed varieties, 
or single-country lists of allowed varieties. 
Optional variety registration. One common 
regulatory pattern (possibly the most common) 
is that governments offer registration as an 
option, but allow companies to sell seed of 
unregistered varieties. This pattern is 
followed in India, the USA, and many other 
countries. In these countries, companies that 
want to sell seed of a new variety can sell it 
as truthfully labeled seed, without having to 
get any government agency to test, approve, 
or even recognize the variety. 
Multi-country lists of allowed varieties. In 
contrast to the previous system, countries in 
the European Union (EU) require variety 
registration before seed is allowed for sale, 
but these countries automatically accept 
235 
(register) varieties that have been registered 
in any other EU country. Companies that 
want to sell seed of a new variety in one or 
more EU countries must get at least one EU 
government to test and approve the variety. 
Seed samples are tested for 2 years to 
determine whether or not they constitute a 
new variety (tests for DUS = distinctive, 
uniform, stable) and whether or not the new 
variety has value to farmers (tests for VCU = 
value in cultivation and use). Once one EU 
government has registered the variety, it goes 
into an EU Common Catalogue, and seed of 
the variety can be sold throughout the EU 
without any further testing. 
Single-country lists of allowed varieties. In a 
third pattern, governments require variety 
registration as in the EU. However, unlike the 
EU, varieties registered in another country 
are not automatically accepted—they must be 
tested in the country where registration is 
sought. Among developed countries, Canada, 
Australia, and some others follow this pattern 
(at least for some crops). Among developing 
countries, the pattern is common in Africa 
and can be found in Asia and Latin America. 
In some cases, lists of allowed varieties are 
limited to major crops (e.g., hybrid maize and 
coffee in Malawi; rice, wheat, potatoes, 
sugarcane, and jute in Bangladesh), with no 
controls on varieties of vegetables or other 
minor crops. In some countries, lists of allowed 
varieties may be extended to essentially all 
commercial seed. For countries and crops 
with single-country lists of allowed varieties, 
a company that wants to sell seed of a new 
variety has no choice but to invest the time 
and expense to register the variety in each 
country where seed is to be sold. 
In countries where variety registration is 
required before seed sale is allowed, the time 
and expense involved in variety registration 
inhibit private companies from testing and 
introducing new varieties. Companies 
balance market size and expected revenues 
against costs—for countries and crops with 
small markets and modest expected revenues, 
costs and time for compulsory testing and 
variety registration can stop all private 
introduction of new varieties. Compulsory 
registration is a more forbidding obstacle in 
smaller countries, and for lower value seeds 
and minor crops. 
Options for reform. As already discussed, 
costs associated with compulsory variety 
registration are particularly troublesome for 
minor crops and low-value seed, which are 
particularly important for SSEs. In order to 
reduce the costs that SSEs must pay to 
register and introduce new varieties, procedures 
must be liberalized to make registration 
either optional or automatic. 
Make variety registration optional. 
Opponents of this reform often raise concerns 
about possible damage from new varieties of 
major crops. If these objections cannot be 
overcome, reforms introducing voluntary 
variety registration can begin with all other 
crops. In Bangladesh, for example, the 
government in 1990 made variety registration 
optional for all but five crops. 
Make variety registration automatic. There 
are several ways to do this. For example, 
variety registration could be a pro forma 
exercise (as in Zimbabwe). Or a government 
could announce that variety registration is 
automatic for varieties registered in a few 
other specified countries (for example, 
Romania allows automatic registration for all 
varieties in EU Common Catalogues). 
Often, seed laws give ministers of 
agriculture the authority to limit seed sales to 
approved varieties, but the laws do not require 
that ministers do so, nor do they elaborate 
how ministers are to decide what varieties to 
allow. In most cases, reforms away from 
compulsory variety registration can be 
introduced by ministers of agriculture with 
authority from existing seed laws and without 
amending those laws. 
Reform away from compulsory registra-
tion is particularly important in many African 
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countries, where small markets and uncertain 
commercial environments already discourage 
private investment in seed. Under such 
circumstances, anything short of near-
automatic registration can be expected to 
severely discourage private sector contributions 
to research and technology transfer, even for 
major crops and high-value seed. 
If registration is optional, will companies 
introduce varieties without testing? Normally, 
the number and range of tests and demons-
trations that seed companies carry out for 
their own purposes—to determine perfor-
mance and market demand—far exceed the 
limited and formal testing that governments 
require for variety registration. As already 
discussed, even when SSEs are forced to 
choose from a short list of varieties tested 
and approved by public sector scientists, any 
SSE that wants to stay in business wil l do its 
own tests and demonstrations on those 
varieties. Many varieties approved through 
public testing are not valued by farmers. 
Furthermore, even "good" varieties are not 
appropriate for all environments and seasons; 
no matter how much governments might try 
to regulate allowed varieties, companies and 
farmers have to exercise judgement about 
where to sell and when to plant. Voluntary 
registration allows companies to spend less 
time and money talking with registration 
agencies, leaving more time and money to 
find out what farmers want and to identify 
and introduce new varieties. 
Biodiversity and landraces. Another 
objection to compulsory registration is that it 
forces companies to reduce genetic diversity 
in traded seeds. If companies cannot sell seed 
except for registered varieties, then it is 
illegal to sell seed of landraces (which are 
genetically diverse collections of seed). To 
meet DUS criteria so that a collection of seed 
can be registered as a variety, companies that 
want to sell seed of a landrace are forced to 
select specific sub-populations with limited 
genetic diversity. With optional variety 
registration, companies could continue to sell 
seed of landraces depending on market 
demand, and this would tend to maintain 
genetic diversity in commercial seed and on 
farmers'fields. 
Recommendation 3: Enforce truth-
in-labeling and make other seed 
quality assurances available but 
optional 
Most governments enforce some regulations 
to assure farmers that the commercial seed 
which they buy meets a minimum set of 
standards. Some seed quality regulations are 
required for all seed, while other regulations 
are required only for certain classes of seed. 
For example, quality requirements would 
need to be stricter and more extensive for 
foundation seed than for certified seed. 
Essentially all countries enforce truth-in-
labeling for all commercial seed, specifying 
information that must be on the label and 
requiring that seed conform to that 
information. 
At the next level of quality control, many 
countries set minimum standards for analytical 
quality (e.g., germination, presence of other 
seeds or non-seed material), which can be 
determined by laboratory tests. These minimum 
standards may be optional. Zimbabwe, for 
example, sets minimum quality standards for 
"standard grade" seed, but allows the sale of 
"substandard" seed that does not meet these 
standards but is accurately labeled. Some 
governments allow companies to do their 
own laboratory tests, while others, such as 
Malawi and Zimbabwe, demand that seed 
samples be tested in government or govern-
ment-licensed laboratories before seed can be 
sold. 
The next level of quality control is 
certification, which means that some extra-
company authority visits seed crops in the 
field to ensure that seed is of the variety that 
is stated on the label In many countries, such 
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as the USA and India, certification is 
voluntary for all crops. In Zimbabwe, seed 
certification is voluntary for all but 11 crops. 
In Malawi, it is voluntary for all crops except 
hybrid maize and tobacco. In the EU, 
certification is required for most field crops. 
Governments may license or allow local 
governments or private organizations to 
manage certification schemes. 
While private certification can be an 
attractive option, government regulations 
surrounding such systems can create serious 
problems for competitive markets. For 
example, if a government requires certification 
for one or more crops, and then gives 
exclusive variety registration or certification 
authority to a private group, the result may be 
official sanction for a private oligopoly. This 
is a danger with current efforts to privatize 
certification in Zimbabwe. 
Options for reform. Whatever a government 
tries to do about seed quality, regulations are 
ineffective unless companies are will ing to 
produce seed that meets those standards. 
Standards can be so high and quality assurance 
procedures so onerous that companies cannot 
meet them without seed costs exceeding what 
farmers are will ing to pay. If commercial 
seed is not available, farmers plant relatively 
low quality farm-saved seed. Thus, unrea-
sonable quality regulations can actually 
encourage farmers to use low-quality seed. 
The cost of complying with government 
quality regulations can be a particularly 
important consideration for SSEs and the 
relatively low-value seed in which they have 
a comparative advantage. 
Requiring government quality assurances 
(certification, prior testing) entails company 
interaction with bureaucrats or other highly 
paid experts. The costs of these interactions 
can be more easily met by large companies 
that produce large quantities of high-value 
seed and maintain head offices in the capital 
than by small companies producing smalt 
quantities of relatively low-value seed (minor 
crops, non-hybrid seed) and with head offices 
in small towns or villages. For example, 
hybrid maize often sells for 20 or more times 
the price of grain, which leaves room to pay 
for costs associated with compulsory certifi-
cation. In contrast, seed prices for wheat and 
other small grains may be less than double 
grain prices, leaving much less room for 
companies to pay the legitimate costs for 
compulsory certification, to say nothing of 
any extras that may be required to get 
government inspectors to visit scattered and 
remote fields. 
With respect to seed quality, the best 
option in developing countries is to make 
certification optional for some or all crops. 
When certification and other quality tests are 
optional, companies and farmers are able to 
decide through markets whether or not they 
value government quality assurances enough 
to pay for them. Normally, when certification 
is optional, companies wi l l forego govern-
ment certification, but wi l l set and meet their 
own quality standards that are at least as high 
as government standards. On the other hand, 
when governments require certification, there 
is no way for markets to indicate the relative 
value that farmers place on government or 
company quality assurances; also, certifi-
cation agencies are able to demand bribes to 
pass even good seed. 
Another option is to move away from 
compulsory prior testing of seed lots in 
government laboratories and towards own 
testing. The arguments in favor of allowing 
companies to do their own seed tests are 
similar to the arguments for voluntary 
certification. 
Does the relatively weak legal framework for 
consumer protection in developing countries 
justify more aggressive upstream govern* 
ment controls on seed quality? Whatever 
upstream standards government may set for 
seed quality, regulations are ineffective 
unless government is able to enforce truth-in-
labeling at the point of retail sale. If 
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companies are able to sell seed that is 
mislabelled or out of date, they can ignore or 
evade even the most stringent certification, 
quality, and testing standards. Thus, weakness 
of consumer protection at the retail level in a 
developing country is a poor argument to 
justify excessive government interference in 
seed production and processing. 
Recommendation 4: Establish 
standard procedures to give seed 
companies access to public sector 
varieties, lines, and germplasm 
In many developing countries, public sector 
research continues to provide a large share of 
the new varieties that go to farmers' fields. 
Without parastatals to multiply and distribute 
seed of these new varieties, public research 
agencies increasingly rely on private companies, 
and in particular SSEs, to multiply and 
deliver seed. 
For these new systems to work efficiently, 
NARS and other public research organizations 
(e.g., universities) can set standard procedures 
to release (sell) results from their research to 
SSEs and other private companies. Without 
standard procedures, sales arrangements may 
be ad hoc and subject to high-level decision, 
which can hinder the flow of research results 
to SSEs and eventually to farmers. 
Standard procedures may differ for 
different products. For example, governments 
may allow public research agencies to sell 
most germplasm, breeder seed, and foundation 
seed at cost without any licensing limitations. 
These arrangements would be suitable for 
crops and varieties intended for communal or 
small-scale farmers for which donors and 
government have deliberately subsidized 
research; for the most part, these are the 
crops in which SSEs dominate. On the other 
hand, for germplasm expected to have an 
international market (e.g., a gene for disease 
resistance or an inbred line for sunflower or 
another important crop) governments could 
ask research agencies to negotiate special 
contracts for each transaction, and to submit 
these contracts for high-level review by 
ministries of agriculture. 
Suggestions for I A R C s to 
Improve Distribution of 
Research Results to Farmers 
Public lines coming from any NARS wi l l 
normally have been developed by the NARS 
itself, NARS in other countries, or IARCs. In 
many countries, governments do not allow 
SSEs and companies to establish direct 
access to germplasm from IARCs and other 
foreign public institutions. Also, countries 
with compulsory variety registration do not 
allow SSEs or companies to market seed of 
foreign public lines (including IARC lines) 
unless governments have explicitly approved 
each variety. This section recommends steps 
for IARCs to improve SSE and farmer access 
to IARC lines. 
The Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) organizes 
financial support for IARCs and provides 
guidance on policies and research focus. 
CGIAR objectives and principles envision 
wide and free distribution of results from IARC 
research, so that farmers can adopt new techno-
logy and improve production and incomes. 
The 1995/96 CGIAR Annual Report (page 8) 
asserts that research supported by the CGIAR 
must "be aimed at producing ... international 
public goods." 
From their plant breeding activities, 
IARCs distribute lines rather than varieties, 
but many of their lines are suitable for release 
as varieties with no further breeding. As 
allowed by the governments of countries in 
which they work, IARCs distribute lines and 
other research results to companies and NGOs 
as well as to public research organizations 
(NARS). 
However, governments of many developing 
countries closely control the dissemination of 
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IARC lines, forcing IARCs in those countries 
to work exclusively with and through public 
sector NARS. These controls severely limit 
farmer access to IARC lines and to benefits 
from IARC research, which also cuts returns 
to donor investment in IARC research. 
Another threat to the distribution of IARC 
lines within developing countries comes with 
the extension of Plant Variety Protection 
(PVP) legislation. PVP legislation offers 
some important benefits. However, there can 
be problems in the details: depending on the 
design of PVP laws and regulations as well 
as government policies, IARCs may have 
difficulty ensuring that lines remain public 
goods. 
The following recommendations ask 
IARCs to improve and defend farmer access 
to IARC lines by: (a) challenging government 
claims to monopoly distribution of IARC 
lines, (b) reviewing and strengthening legal 
mechanisms to ensure that IARC lines 
remain public goods, (c) establishing formal 
commercial arrangements to market IARC 
lines and germplasm at cost to all comers. 
Recommendation 1: Challenge 
governments to allow free access to 
all IARC lines and unrestricted sale 
of seed from all IARC lines 
In many developing countries (those with 
compulsory variety registration) governments 
do not allow seed companies to introduce 
varieties from IARC lines without explicit 
approval by some government committee. In 
such countries, seed derived from most IARC 
lines is contraband; it is illegal for companies 
to import such seed or even to multiply and 
sell it in-country. These arrangements have 
delayed the introduction of useful varieties in 
many developing countries. 
Many agricultural experts have stories to 
tell about problems faced in introducing 
IARC varieties (or varieties from IARC 
lines). In Turkey, for example, government 
scientists in the 1960s refused to permit the 
introduction of new CIMMYT varieties of 
spring wheat despite positive results from 
years of testing. In 1965, a private Turkish 
farmer received about 25 kg of seed of a 
C IMMYT variety from an agricultural expert 
at the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), who had smuggled it 
from Pakistan through the US diplomatic 
pouch (seed sale of these varieties; was 
illegal). The farmer's field, which was 
prominently located near a major road, 
yielded more than twice as much as 
neighboring fields. Seeing the field, more 
than 100 local farmers asked for permission 
to import C IMMYT seed. A senior official in 
the Ministry of Agriculture who saw the field 
facilitated approvals for import of this seed, 
and the government subsequently supported 
widespread introduction of CIMMYT wheat. 
IARC breeding programs work mainly on 
low-value seed (e.g., non-hybrids for cereals, 
tubers) and secondary crops (pulses). Access 
to these lines is particularly important for 
SSEs, which have a comparative advantage 
in low-value seed and secondary crops. 
Government limits on the dissemination of 
IARCs lines through SSEs block the 
development of small and medium seed 
companies, force farmers to continue with 
relatively poor varieties, and cut returns to 
IARC research. 
In many developing countries, IARCs 
have for years worked exclusively through 
NARS, delivering lines to one government 
agency and relying on that agency to select 
and distribute lines within the country. This 
approach—working through a monopoly— 
almost ensures expensive delays in the 
delivery of research results to farmers. 
Moreover, these monopoly agencies may 
never approve some valuable lines for 
distribution. 
If IARCs are to fulf i l l their charge to 
improve technology at the farm level, then it 
is reasonable for them to aggressively and 
repeatedly protest regulatory obstacles that 
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prevent farmers and SSEs from accessing all 
available IARC lines. The options include: 
(a) challenging governments to do away with 
compulsory variety registration, at least for 
IARC crops; (b) challenging governments to 
automatically register varieties from IARC 
lines that have been registered in any other 
country in the region. 
Recommendation 2: Review legal 
arrangements for ensuring that 
IARC lines can be kept in the public 
domain in developing countries that 
adopt PVP legislation 
IARCs have established some policies and 
strategies to deal with the spread of PVP 
legislation. The guiding policy to date has 
been to continue to maintain public access 
(deny private ownership or exclusive private 
use) for lines brought into or coming out of 
IARC research programs. 
The core strategy to implement this policy 
has been to "register" new IARC lines in the 
public domain in the USA by publishing 
descriptions of the lines (e.g., in Crop 
Science). This process for "registering" lines 
allows IARCs to challenge and block anyone 
else (e.g., a company) who might subsequently 
try to claim invention and ownership of an 
IARC line under PVP law. Within the USA, 
other public research organizations such as 
universities and the Agricultural Research 
Service (ARS) of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture use the same strategy to 
place their new lines in the public domain. 
One incident has been reported in the USA 
where a company tried to register ownership 
of germplasm coming out of an IARC 
(CIMMYT). After out-of-court discussions, 
the company agreed not to register ownership. 
However, "registration" in the public 
domain by describing new lines in a US journal 
does not ensure that lines remain in the 
public domain in other countries. Jim Elgin, 
an expert with the ARS, reports six incidents 
of companies complaining that foreign 
countries have registered private ownership 
of varieties that are in the public domain in 
the USA. In a typical incident, a US company 
tries to export seed of a public variety to 
Spain, meeting objections from another 
company that has registered private ownership 
of that variety in the EU. In these incidents, 
the company which wants to defend the 
public goods nature of the variety lodges a 
complaint with the US office that represents 
OECD Seed Schemes (which lists varieties 
registered in all cooperating countries). The 
US office raises the issue with the Spanish 
office for OECD Seed Schemes. 
In six incidents to date, the US office for 
OECD Seed Schemes has been able to 
establish competitive entry in other countries 
for varieties that are in the public domain in 
the USA. However, this process only works 
with countries that take part in OECD Seed 
Schemes. Also, no case has gone to court. 
And finally, the process has only been used 
for lines out of US public research, not for 
any IARC lines. 
It has not yet been established in many 
developing countries whether and how 
"registration" in the public domain can be 
legally established and defended. Also, incidents 
can be found in developing countries where 
companies have been able to claim exclusive 
use of IARC lines. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
for example, long-term government-company 
agreements to give results from government 
research to one or another private company 
could result in these companies gaining 
exclusive rights to a broad range of IARC 
lines. When countries such as Zambia and 
Zimbabwe move from socialist control of 
research and/or seed production to market 
systems, distribution of IARC lines should 
move into competitive markets, but this 
might not happen. If not, are IARCs and the 
CGIAR system ready to advise and protest? 
Several incidents have been reported in 
Zimbabwe in recent years in which the 
government has blocked one Or more private 
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companies from selling seed of several maize 
QPVs distributed through C IMMYT as well 
as an ICRISAT pearl millet hybrid on the 
grounds that PVP rights had been assigned to 
another company, even though CGIAR policy 
is that IARC varieties remain in the public 
domain. These incidents raise some troubling 
questions for C IMMYT and ICRISAT and 
more generally for the CGIAR system. Are 
there any procedures established under 
Zimbabwe's PVP legislation for ICRISAT or 
another IARC to defend the public goods 
character of their lines? Are ICRISAT or the 
CGIAR prepared to defend public access to 
their lines in Zimbabwe or any other 
developing country? Are there, within IARCs 
and the CGIAR Secretariat, strategies, internal 
processes, staff responsibilities, or legal 
resources available to defend public access to 
IARC lines in developing countries? 
Recommendation 3: Establish formal 
commercial arrangements to market 
IARC lines and germplasm at cost to 
all comers 
According to current policies and practices, 
IARCs distribute breeder seed and other 
germplasm free to NARS and other organiza-
tions, which may include NGOs and private 
companies. Free distribution entails the 
exercise of discretion on the part of IARC 
managers to decide who wil l get how much 
seed. 
Discretionary distribution of free seed 
does not take advantage of the potential for 
efficient multiplication and distribution of 
IARC lines through competitive seed markets. 
With a host of small companies, NGOs, and 
farmers' groups involved in seed multipli-
cation and sale, how can IARC managers 
decide which ones are going to be effective 
in multiplying and distributing seed? If 
managers cannot decide, and if there are 
many companies, then free distribution does 
not work. If breeder or foundation seed is 
sold at cost—higher than the cost of 
commercial seed for sowing—it wil l be bought 
only by those who can effectively multiply it 
for sale. If seed were distributed free, it could 
be taken by people who are unable to realize 
its full value in seed production, but simply 
sow it for a commercial crop. 
Formal markets for IARC breeder seed 
and germplasm may be supplied from seed 
produced by IARCs, by private companies 
with IARC supervision, or by some combi-
nation of these arrangements. For example, 
C IMMYT could contract with one or more 
private companies to produce and sell 
breeder seed for CIMMYT lines to all comers 
according to terms agreed with CIMMYT 
(prices, cut-off dates for advance orders, etc). 
Suggestions for NGOs 
Recommendation 1: Promote and 
support small formal seed companies 
Many NGOs, particularly in Africa, are 
active in seed production and trade. They 
may support small and medium farmers as 
seed growers, provide technical assistance, 
and in some cases buy and then retail their 
seed. In working with seed growers, NGOs 
could promote the emergence of small formal 
seed enterprises. Depending on country and 
circumstances, this could involve: 
• Setting up seed processing equipment and 
selling processing services to small 
companies 
• Setting up (licensed) seed testing 
laboratories and selling testing services to 
small companies 
• Offering legal and logistic assistance for 
seed-producing farmers and local entrepre-
neurs to register new seed companies 
• Working with government officials and 
private seed associations in each country 
to propose and promote seed regulatory 
reforms that lower barriers to market 
entry for new companies and cut costs for 
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small companies to introduce new varie-
ties and satisfy quality control rules. 
Promoting the emergence of small formal 
seed companies is one way for NGOs to 
ensure the sustainability of their efforts to 
improve seed systems. If NGOs leave a crop 
or a region without establishing new seed 
companies, how wil l the benefits be sustained? 
Without new seed companies, how wil l 
farmers with new seed-growing skills continue 
to gain access to new varieties, and how wil l 
they expand their activities to involve and 
train more people? 
Suggestions for Donors 
Donors support many agricultural programs 
that could, with some redesigning, serve as 
channels to promote seed regulatory reforms 
and to strengthen competitive seed sectors. 
The following paragraphs discuss two areas 
where donors might consider revising 
ongoing programs. 
Recommendation 1: Link aid for 
agricultural research to regulatory 
reforms allowing private technology 
transfer 
Aid organizations have long supported public 
sector agricultural research in developing 
countries. For many years, these organizations 
have virtually ignored government regulations 
that block private sector technology transfer, 
forcing all technology to go through aid-
supported government research organizations 
and associated regulatory agencies. The 
resulting systems which donors have built 
and supported for introducing new agricultural 
technology into developing countries are 
often far different—more centralized and 
controlled—than the corresponding systems 
in donor countries. 
If the objective of aid for agricultural 
research is to improve the flow of new tech-
nology to fanners, then additional funding for 
agricultural research can reasonably be linked 
to requests for governments to relax controls 
in order to make it easier for the private 
sector to introduce new varieties and other 
new technology. 
Recommendation 2: Revise programs 
for distributing emergency seed to 
promote sustainable commercial seed 
systems 
In recent years, donors have paid for distri-
bution of seed in many African countries 
after civil conflicts (e.g., in Rwanda) or 
drought (Zimbabwe, Malawi) and also in 
response to economic recession and poverty. 
Typically, donors pay for an NGO or 
government agency to buy and distribute 
seed. These arrangements have had some 
problems. In some cases, the varieties 
distributed have been inappropriate for the 
environment; reportedly some maize did not 
mature in Rwanda, and some sorghum did 
not flower in Malawi's Shire Valley. Another 
problem is that large-scale government 
purchases can disturb normal marketing 
channels, pulling large quantities of seed off 
the market during the peak marketing season 
while companies wait for governments to 
award tenders. In addition, free seed distri-
bution to farmers reduces demand for seed 
from existing commercial marketing channels. 
When disaster strikes or donors for some 
other reason wish to support distribution of 
seed into a country, distribution arrangements 
could be designed to support the expansion of 
sustainable commercial marketing systems as 
follows. 
(a) Instead of paying for governments or NGOs 
to purchase and distribute seed, donors 
can pay for distribution of vouchers. 
Farmers can use these vouchers to buy 
seed from registered seed companies and 
dealers, which would include NGOs, 
SSEs, and all available companies from 
target and neighboring countries 
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(b) Donors can challenge governments to 
allow entry for new companies and 
varieties, either by removing variety 
controls altogether or by allowing entry 
for varieties from neighboring countries. 
Distribution of vouchers that allow farmers 
to choose seed of varieties (or even crops) 
would reduce the risk that farmers would end 
up with inappropriate varieties. Distribution 
of vouchers would attract the attention of 
seed companies in neighboring countries, and 
deregulation would allow them to enter. 
Normally, any regional or other foreign 
company that wanted to build a sustainable 
business in the target country would look for 
local collaborators and would take steps to 
set up seed production in the target country. 
Market entry and new business alliances 
would help to build a sustainable and 
competitive private seed industry. For minor 
crops and low-value seeds, small and 
medium seed companies (along with NGOs) 
could be expected to sell a large share of the 
seed and to end up with a large share of 
vouchers for redemption. 
With more companies, including regional 
companies, producing seed for a particular 
country, seed supply would be more secure 
against future disruptions from whatever 
source. Competing companies that have 
experience with the market could respond to 
local disruptions in seed supply by bringing 
in seed of known varieties from other 
countries in the region. 
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The Role of International Agencies in the Seed Sector 
C H Rosell1 
Abstract 
International institutions (e.g., United Nations agencies, government aid agencies, 
international banks) have long supported seed sector development programs in 
developing countries. These agencies play important roles in several areas—policy 
guidance, management of plant genetic resources, research, seed project 
development and implementation, variety protection legislation, quality control, 
seed trade, technology and information exchange, financial support or credit for 
infrastructure development, and in establishing advisory, policy, and training 
networks. 
However, despite the efforts of governments and international agencies, seed 
supply is inadequate in most developing countries, partly because needs and 
priorities are changing. Correspondingly, new strategies are required, which must 
build on past gains and exploit new technology, clearly identify priority needs 
(farmers' needs, food security), examine the relationship between food security and 
biodiversity issues (the genetic base for plant breeding and crop improvement), and 
thus develop effective and cost-efficient strategies focusing particularly on the most 
vulnerable areas. These strategies must be developed within the framework of 
international conventions and therefore better coordination among international 
agencies—and among different national agencies within a country—is critical. FAO 
has initiated discussions that are expected to lead to the development of a world 
expert consultation involving international agencies and national experts. The 
objective is to draw up a new global seed policy and a set of programs relevant to 
the needs of developing countries. 
Introduction 
It is widely recognized that improved 
varieties have the potential to dramatically 
increase crop production and quality, farm 
productivity, and incomes, and thereby 
enhance food security. In the face of rapid 
population growth, other options for 
increasing crop production are becoming 
more difficult. Productive land is becoming 
less available. The use of huge doses of 
fertilizers and farm chemicals is becoming 
economically prohibitive and less effective 
than before, and resulting in land 
degradation. Even with the use of improved 
varieties, yields may have reached a plateau 
in many areas and in several crops, implying 
that the present strategies are no longer 
1. Seed and Plant Genetic Resources Service, FAO, Via delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 Rome, Italy 
Rosell, C.H. 1997. The role of international agencies in the seed sector. Pages 245-250 in Alternative strategies for 
smallholder seed supply: proceedings of an International Conference on Options for Strengthening National and Regional 
Seed Systems in Africa and West Asia, 10-14 Mar 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe (Rohrbach, D.D., Bishaw, Z., and van Gastel, 
A.J.G., eds.). Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. 
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adequate. A new approach in enhancing food 
security is needed, This requires a "systems" 
approach in which seed of improved varieties 
plays its role alongside other interventions in 
policy, investments, and technology. 
International agencies have, for decades, 
been in the forefront of seed sector 
development in developing countries, and 
their continued support wil l be crucial in the 
new approach. International agencies can 
play important roles in areas directly linked 
to the development and improvement of seed 
production and supply: 
• Management and use of plant genetic 
resources 
• Agricultural research, variety develop-
ment, and technology generation 
• Seed project development, financing, and 
implementation of investments in the seed 
sector 
• Facilitation of international seed trade 
• Variety protection legislation 
• Seed quality control 
• Advisory, policy, and training networks. 
FAO's seed-related activities 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) has played a 
pioneering role in the development of the 
seed sector in member countries. In 1953, it 
initiated seed awareness programs and began 
distributing small quantities of seed of 
improved varieties for experimental purposes. 
From then on, with the support of donors and 
recipient countries, FAO's Seed and Plant 
Genetic Resources Service (AGPS) has 
successfully implemeated a number of major 
initiatives. 
• Collected and disseminated information 
on seed and plant genetic resources for 
variety development 
• Defined appropriate seed policies and 
programs aimed at developing and impro-
ving national supply systems for seed and 
planting material 
• Strengthened national and regional pro-
grams for the production and supply of 
seed and planting material 
• Provided regulatory mechanisms, standards, 
and improved technology on all aspects of 
production, quality control, distribution, 
and utilization. 
FAO has produced a number of seed-
related publications that have been widely 
distributed—World List of Seed Sources, 
Seed Reviews, World List of Seed Equip-
ment, Information System on Seed and Plant 
Genetic Resources, and a World Information 
and Early Warning System for Plant Genetic 
Resources comprising several databases 
(developed in cooperation with IPGRI). Over 
50 technical publications have been produced 
and distributed. 
Early FAO efforts were conducted under 
the World Seed Campaign, which covered 79 
countries and territories and encouraged the 
breeding, introduction, and seed production 
of improved varieties. In the 1970s, FAO 
created the Seed Improvement and Develop-
ment Programme (SIDP) to expand seed 
programs worldwide. Under SIDP, FAO 
helped implement many projects in member 
countries, and formulate programs to improve 
national seed systems through donor 
assistance. Since its inception, SIDP has, 
directly or indirectly helped implement more 
than 700 seed-related projects with an 
accrued budget of over US$ 600 million. 
More than 40 seed projects currently operate 
in 30 countries, supported by over 50 
national and international experts. 
FAO has had several other notable achieve-
ments in recent years. 
• Establishment of the Asia Pacific Seed 
Association, leading to rapid improve-
ments in the seed sector in the region 
• Establishment of the Caribbean Seed and 
Germplasm Resources Information Net-
work (CSEGRIN), a computerized 
database system for CARICOM countries 
• Development of the Quality Declared 
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Seed concept, appropriate for seed sector 
development in developing countries 
• Emergency seed assistance in countries 
affected by natural disasters or civil strife 
(Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti) 
• Assistance in national seed policy 
development and public-private sector 
partnerships in the seed industry in 
several countries in the Caribbean, Africa, 
Asia, Latin America, and the Near East. 
Other international agencies 
Apart from FAO, several other international 
agencies have been active in seed 
development. The Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA) and the 
governments of Austria, Belgium, France, 
Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland, and the Arab Gulf Fund have 
also provided notable assistance to the FAO 
Seed Field Programme. The UNDP has been 
a major funding agency for several FAO seed 
projects in Africa and Asia. 
GTZ and USAID have funded and 
implemented a number of seed projects in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Recent 
efforts by GTZ (acting in collaboration with 
ICARDA over the past 10 years and from 
1996 in collaboration with I ITA) to establish 
networks in the West Asia and North Africa 
region and in West Africa are new strategies 
that hold much potential. 
Variety protection legislation. The Inter-
national Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV), the leader in 
variety protection legislation, plays an important 
role in the seed industry. UPOV was esta-
blished in 1961 when the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants was signed in Paris, and aims at 
protecting the rights of plant breeders. 
Plant breeders' rights are becoming a 
crucial issue as countries gear up to 
incorporate private research in their efforts to 
develop the national seed sector. Recent 
discussions in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America at national and regional levels 
indicate that UPOV input, especially by way 
of advice and guidance, wi l l be very 
important as countries seek to strike a 
balance between plant breeders' rights and 
the need to ensure that legislation does not 
unduly constrain seed delivery or hinder food 
security. 
Seed quality control. The International Seed 
Testing Association (ISTA) was established 
in 1924 to promote accurate and reliable 
testing methods for seed being traded both 
internationally and nationally. ISTA facilitates 
the efficient production, processing, distri-
bution, and utilization of seed not only within 
member countries but also in international 
trade. With its membership comprising 
government-accredited seed testing stations 
and seed technologists, ISTA promotes 
uniformity in seed testing procedures through 
the International Rules for Seed Testing. 
Facilitation of international seed trade. The 
International Seed Trade Federation (FIS), 
which was formed in 1924, is an association 
of national seed industry associations. It 
works on standardizing terms and conditions 
to facilitate seed trade transactions. FIS is 
largely made up of seed associations in the 
developed countries, though some developing 
countries with relatively strong private 
sectors and active seed associations 
(Argentina, India, Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Venezuela) have been members for many 
years. The aims of FIS are to liaise between 
international and national seed agencies, 
bring together seed industry participants 
through meetings, and create congenial 
conditions for international trade. 
Investments in the seed sector 
In several developing countries, local 
resource allocation for seed sector develop-
ment has been minimal, because national 
budgets are insufficient and the private sector 
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is not will ing to invest because of 
unattractive policies or lack of incentives. 
Since governments, by and large, recognize 
that seed sector development is their 
responsibility, they have sought assistance 
from donor countries and agencies. UNDP 
and Trust Funds resources (made available to 
FAO by governments of developed countries) 
have been important sources of funds to 
implement projects, alongside FAO's own 
internal funds that are used to support short, 
crucial, and often forerunner projects under 
the FAO Technical Cooperation Programme. 
In recent years, international banks such 
as the World Bank, the Inter-American Deve-
lopment Bank, the African Development 
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank have 
provided large amounts of credit to help 
governments establish the necessary infra-
structure for a seed industry. Such credits are 
useful tools to encourage private sector partici-
pation and reduce government responsibility 
as the sole investor in the seed sector. A 
healthy collaboration has emerged between 
banks and developmental agencies, ensuring 
that investments are properly channeled. 
Seed networks 
There are few networks devoted entirely to 
the seed industry. The most active has been 
the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) 
Seed Network which operates under the 
auspices of ICARDA, where the network 
secretariat is based. The network has initiated 
several activities to improve seed supply, 
with the emphasis on regional cooperation 
among member countries. These include the 
development of a uniform seed policy and 
regulatory framework to standardize seed 
production and quality control procedures, 
and thus integrate national seed systems and 
stimulate regional seed trade. The network 
stimulates information exchange through its 
publications and a newsletter, SEED INFO. 
The recently formed Asia Pacific Seed 
Association fa also a network but with both 
public and private sector participation. 
Although established only recently, it has 
made a strong impact on seed trade in the 
region. Its bi-monthly magazine, Asian Seed 
and Planting Material, already enjoys a wide 
international readership. Its seed trade publica-
tions, conferences, seminars, and study tours 
have also contributed in enhancing seed trade 
in the region, and developing regional position 
papers on important issues. CSEGRIN— 
Caribbean Seed and Genetic Resources Infor-
mation Network—is another seed network 
developed under the FAO aegis for 14 
CARICOM countries. Among other initiatives, 
efforts are under way, with FAO assistance, 
to help SADC countries establish a SADC 
On-farm Seed Multiplication Network. 
New challenges 
In spite of the efforts of governments and 
international agencies, seed production and 
supply in most developing countries do not 
adequately meet national needs. While 
seeking solutions, it is important to recognize 
that although strategies must build on past 
gains, they must take into account the new 
realities of a changing world and the priority 
needs of developing countries striving to 
redirect their investments in agriculture in a 
more cost-effective manner to ensure food 
security. 
Governments and international seed 
agencies face a big challenge—to recognize 
the present and future needs of the seed 
industry, develop effective strategies quickly, 
mobilize resources, and finally install the 
right policies and programs. Some of the new 
issues that need to be tackled include: 
• National and global strategies to protect 
biodiversity and how they affect the 
genetic base for crop improvement; and 
the possibility of incorporating these 
strategies into seed security schemes in 
vulnerable areas 
• Active use of recent research advances, 
(eg., use of apomixis, true potato seed, 
248 
artificial seed, and hybrid rice) 
• Socioeconomic factors influencing farmers' 
crop/variety choices and their implica-
tions for food security 
• Cooperation between the public and 
private sectors and its implications for 
sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and 
adequate seed supply for a broad range of 
crops 
• Current trends in plant protection 
legislation and their implications for seed 
production 
• Recognition of and support for on-farm 
seed production to extend the benefits of 
research programs to small-scale farmers 
• The fate of seed projects under various 
successor arrangements, and the roles of 
both public and private sectors in ensuring 
sustainability. 
Cooperation among international 
agencies 
Seed production and supply requires a 
coordinated approach by the various actors 
involved. In particular, international agencies 
must cooperate closely, coordinating their 
activities to ensure efficiency in seed 
assistance. Seed strategies must recognize the 
importance of such linkages, and the need to 
develop and strengthen them. Furthermore, 
future seed policies and programs wil l need 
to be developed in the light of international 
conventions: the UPOV convention for plant 
variety protection, OECD schemes for variety 
certification, GATT and TRIPS agreements 
for protection of trade-related intellectual 
property rights, sui generis systems, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and 
UNCED, Agenda 21, and ISTA guidelines on 
seed testing. 
The FAO's Sustainable Seed Develop-
ment Programme (SSDP) has initiated 
discussions that wi l l lead to a world expert 
consultation involving international agencies 
and national experts. The objective of these 
consultations wi l l be to develop a new global 
seed policy and a set of programs relevant to 
the needs of the seed sector in developing 
countries. International seed agencies are 
expected to participate actively, and where 
necessary, reshape their own operations to 
better address newly emerging needs. For 
example: 
• IARCs need to redefine crop impro-
vement strategies for minor crops, assist 
in the development of on-farm crop 
improvement strategies, support emerging 
private sector research programs, and 
accelerate the transfer of relevant, 
appropriate technologies to farmers 
• Seed projects supported by donor 
agencies must be compatible with local 
systems to ensure sustainability, and 
should exploit complementarities with the 
national agricultural system to improve 
cost-effectiveness 
• Regulatory and service agencies must 
recognize the needs of the seed sector in 
developing countries, and provide appro-
priate assistance, especially in seed legis-
lation, quality control, and international 
trade, with a view to gradually achieving 
international norms 
• International banks need to channel more 
resources to the seed industry. They must 
also make better use of the experience of 
other international organizations—in 
identifying areas of investment and 
subsequently in formulating, imple-
menting, supervising, and evaluating seed 
projects 
• Seed networks must be expanded to cover 
other areas and must consider four 
important issues—the needs of the 
informal sector, which supplies the major 
portion of seed in developing countries; 
strengthening seed security through national 
and subregional efforts; germplasm 
conservation; and training for small-scale 
seed growers. 
The cumulative might of the many inter-
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national agencies can go a long way towards 
addressing all the issues facing the seed 
sector. But whether this collective might can 
be used effectively wi l l depend largely on the 
ability of these agencies to recognize the real 
needs of the sector, and their willingness to 
collaborate with each other and with 
governments, seed producers, and farmers. 
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Strategies for 
Seed Sector Development 

Working Group Discussions 
Nearly half the workshop was devoted to in-
tensive, small-group discussions on specific 
topics. Six Working Groups were constituted, 
one for each of six key aspects of seed sector 
development. 
Each group identified four or five major 
constraints in a particular area, and suggested 
solutions or approaches to strengthen national 
and regional seed systems. Working group 
recommendations were presented, discussed, 
and ratified at a session attended by all the 
delegates. 
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Background 
Working Group 1: Seed Regulation and Policy 
Lack of govt seed policy in many countries. 
Effective laws and a clear policy are basic 
prerequisites for seed sector development. 
These laws and policies ought to specify govern-
ment objectives for seed production and 
distribution, define the roles of the private and 
public sectors, and identify specific measures 
to stimulate private sector involvement. 
Policies should be framed with inputs from all 
stakeholders. Policies would vary depending 
on the level of development of the seed sector 
in a particular country. The Working Group 
highlighted the following specific recommen-
dations. 
• Governments should establish national 
seed advisory councils with represen-
tation from farmers, Ministries of Agri-
culture, seed services agencies, the private 
sector, research institutes, and NGOs. 
• International associations with ex-
perience on seed policy and regulation 
should be used to provide advice where 
needed (e.g., on issues relating to bio-
engineered material). 
• In general, regulation is not recommen-
ded for crops for which seed is 
produced largely in the informal sector. 
Poor or non-existent seed laws and regula-
tions. Seed laws should facilitate the develop-
ment of the seed sector and encourage 
innovation. 
• Laws should be flexible, easily 
amended, and respond to the changing 
needs of farmers and industry as well 
as to new technological developments. 
• There should be no subjective criteria, 
and only a minimum set of objective 
criteria guiding the regulation of seed 
production and distribution. 
Lack of plant breeders' rights. The lack of 
plant breeders' rights (PBR) hinders the entry 
of foreign investment into the national seed 
market and the development of local seed 
entrepreneurs. PBR should also apply to the 
public sector; this would provide an incentive 
to public sector breeding programs. The 
group recommended that governments should: 
• Recognize that PBR are appropriate 
only when the seed industry has reached 
a minimum level of sophistication. Legis-
lation should be developed/enforced 
with this in mind. 
• Move towards membership in UPOV. 
• Enact PBR legislation in line with 
UPOV procedures. 
• Improve enforcement by strengthening 
enforcement organizations or establis-
hing new ones where needed. 
Variety approval/registration procedures. 
Release and registration procedures for new 
varieties are often cumbersome, and sometimes 
biased or subjective. In many countries, it is 
difficult to introduce varieties from foreign 
sources. Several steps need to be taken to 
improve the flow of modern varieties to 
farmers. 
• Simplify registration procedures and 
standardize registration requirements to 
reduce subjective criteria. 
• Reduce the amount of information that 
breeders/firms are asked to supply for 
variety registration—variety name, 
description, and areas of adaptation 
should be sufficient. 
• Ensure rapid registration; 2 years of 
data on field performance should be 
considered sufficient to apply for 
registration. 
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• Ensure private sector representation on 
release committees. 
• Release committees meetings should be 
held regularly, with transparent proce-
dures; the record of discussions and results 
at these meetings should be published. 
• Introduce a regional listing, so that 
varieties registered in one country are 
automatically registered in other 
countries of the region. 
Lack of incentives for the private sector. 
Governments must make strong efforts to 
attract private investment. Incentives to 
private firms must be increased, particularly 
since seed businesses have long gestation 
periods before profitability is achieved. Various 
specific incentives were recommended. 
• Governments should provide state land 
on long lease to private seed producers. 
• Commercial banks (especially state-
owned banks) should provide credit at 
low interest and establish cash credit 
facilities for seed businesses. 
• Governments should allow duty free 
import of farming and seed processing 
equipment. 
• Private firms should be given a tax 
holiday for 5-10 years, depending on 
the structure and stage of development 
of a country's seed sector. 
• The state should gradually disinvest 
from the seed sector, and transfer public 
seed entities to the private sector on 
long-term, installment payment plans. 
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Working Group 2: Roles of the Private and Public Sectors 
Unfair competition between public and private 
sectors. Government subsidies provide public 
sector firms an unfair advantage over private 
firms. In order to encourage fair competition 
without disrupting the existing system: 
• Subsidies should be gradually phased 
out, and public sector seed prices 
should be adjusted to reflect market 
realities and actual costs. 
• Throughout this period of transition 
(and beyond), governments must ensure 
the continued production and availa-
bility of high-volume, low-cost seed 
(e.g., rice, wheat) that private firms 
may find unattractive. 
Seed industry associations. The absence of 
professional seed industry associations was 
felt to be a significant constraint. The 
formation of such associations (which are 
found in most developed seed economies) 
wil l ensure that private sector concerns are 
adequately addressed while formulating seed 
policy. It wil l also improve coordination 
within the private sector, and between private 
firms and regulating agencies. The FAO and 
donor agencies provided support for the 
secretariat of the Asia Pacific Seed 
Association. This could be used as a model 
for Africa and West Asia. 
• Donor support could be sought for the 
establishment of national or regional 
seed associations. 
Better use of existing facilities. Existing 
facilities (e.g., processing plants, testing 
laboratories) should be used more 
efficiently. 
• Where possible, private firms should 
be permitted to lease or buy public 
sector facilities. 
Promotion of new varieties. Greater efforts 
are needed to stimulate demand for seed of 
modern varieties. Various promotional 
methods should be used. 
• Demonstration plots, established with 
public sector facilities and staff where 
necessary. 
• Exhibitions and fairs to generate 
awareness. 
• Concessional advertising rates in 
government-owned media (press, radio, 
TV) to both private and public seed 
companies. 
Poor linkages between private and public 
sectors. Closer linkages would eliminate 
duplication of effort and help public and 
private firms focus on their respective areas 
of comparative advantage. 
• Hold regular meetings between private 
and public agencies to ensure the conti-
nuous exchange of information and 
ideas. 
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Working Group 3: The Roles of National and 
International Institutes 
Research priorities. Research impacts are 
limited by the poor adoption of many available 
modern varieties and lack of adaptation in 
some varieties. These problems persist because 
of poor documentation of varietal adoption 
and impact. While research priorities are best 
set by national programs, the following 
general recommendations were made. 
• Research should be consumer-focused 
and demand-driven. It should focus on 
both open-pollinated varieties and 
hybrids, with a different "mix" for 
different target areas. 
• Empirical studies of farming systems 
and farmers' preferences should be 
conducted before developing a variety 
for a specific agroecology. 
• Researchers should display a stronger 
sense of stewardship of varieties. Their 
involvement should continue after 
variety release, through seed production 
and dissemination, monitoring adoption, 
and obtaining farmer feedback on 
performance. 
• While breeding for broad adaptation is 
necessary, it is essential to factor in 
local preferences (e.g., for plant height, 
crop mix, fodder/fencing usage), 
especially since these preferences can 
vary substantially in different regions. 
Participatory breeding is therefore 
strongly recommended. 
Breeder seed production. This was felt to be 
a critical bottleneck in many countries. 
Production of breeder seed is the responsibility 
of national programs. However, international 
agricultural research institutes (IARCs) 
may need to play a catalytic role and 
provide initial material to some national 
programs. 
• National programs should increase 
funding and priority to ensure that 
adequate breeder seed is produced for 
all released varieties. 
• Breeder seed should be supplied to 
many organizations for multiplication, 
not restricted to one organization or 
public agency. 
Intellectual Property Rights. IARCs have a 
clear policy of unrestricted access to any mate-
rials they develop. However, in some cases 
this policy has been violated due to poor 
enforcement or lack of information. Private 
firms have sometimes acquired sole rights to such 
materials, denying farmers' groups and NGOs 
the right to multiply and distribute seed. 
• IARCs should monitor the use of the 
varieties they provide to national 
programs, and ensure these remain in 
the public domain. 
Declining funding. Both IARCs and national 
research institutes are affected by declining 
budgets, and should seek new funding 
sources, particularly to support breeder seed 
production. 
• Research institutes need to be more 
imaginative in their search for funding, 
and should look for alternative mecha-
nisms to ensure sustainable funding for 
breeder seed production. 
Linkages. IARCs should form wider 
associations, among themselves and with 
national research institutes, to ensure regular 
exchange of information and ideas. 
• IARCs and national programs should 
pursue more consistent strategies for 
communication on seed issues. 
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Working Group 4: Roles for NGOs and Farmers' Groups 
In a non-emergency or developmental situa-
tion, NGOs should focus, as a general rule, 
on capacity building and training rather than 
on direct intervention. NGOs should aim to 
strengthen local institutions, facilities, and 
administrative structures rather than developing 
new structures and channels. They should 
help develop farmers' groups and similar 
community organizations, strengthen local 
capacity in key areas, and gradually devolve 
responsibility to the local community. They 
should help farmers' groups—even if they 
operate in an "informal" way—to link into a 
more formal system (e.g., registered 
societies, credit financing). 
In an emergency (relief) situation, NGO 
intervention has necessarily to be more 
direct, but the above guidelines should apply 
to the extent possible. Such principles apply 
to interventions relating to seed supply as 
well as to other NGO targets. 
Six major constraints were identified to 
seed production by NGOs and farmers' groups. 
Lack of farmer training. In many areas, 
farmers lack the necessary skills to maintain 
varietal purity and produce high-quality seed. 
NGOs must help disseminate information on 
new varieties and management practices, 
seed production methods (isolation distances, 
seed selection), and storage and processing 
methods 
• NGOs should provide farmers involved 
with seed production with training in 
seed crop management, processing, and 
storage. 
Lack of entrepreneurial skills. Even farmers 
who may be skilled at seed production 
generally lack skills in marketing, small-
business management, and book-keeping and 
accounting. NGOs must provide appropriate 
training in these areas, where necessary in 
collaboration with specialized training institu-
tions and other agencies. 
• NGOs should facilitate local seed trade 
by providing training on business 
management and accounting. 
Inadequate expertise among NGOs. Most 
NGOs lack skills in areas related to entre-
preneurship and small-business management, 
and cannot strengthen communities in these 
areas. NGOs themselves would require 
training and backstopping, which could be 
provided by donor or government agencies. 
• NGOs should diagnose their own 
weaknesses in supporting community-
level seed production and maricet develop-
ment, and seek training to strengthen 
these skills. 
Poor community organization. NGOs and 
farmers' groups should strengthen community 
organizations. This wi l l help local commu-
nities articulate their needs, and facilitate 
empowerment by making them aware of their 
rights and obligations. Training on group 
dynamics should be considered, wherever 
needed. 
• NGO interventions should build on 
existing community organizations and 
thus strengthen local seed supply 
systems. 
Lack of coordination between NGOs and 
public agencies. NGOs should develop 
close links with extension services and other 
public agencies operating within the area. 
This w i l l help ensure that different 
agencies complement each other, compa-
rative advantages are ful ly exploited, and 
duplication of effort and waste of resources 
are minimized. 
258 
• NGOs should work with national 
research and extension institutions invol-
ved with seed production and distri-
bution. Links with the private sector 
may also be fruitful. 
Lack of sustainability. Many farmers' groups 
and NGOs collapse when donors withdraw 
support. Long-term sustainability of small-
scale, community-based seed projects could 
be ensured through better design of 
programs, emphasizing economically viable, 
socially acceptable interventions, and deve-
loping structures that wi l l become self-
sustaining and financially stable. 
• NGO-supported community-level seed 
schemes should be designed to ensure 
sustainability after donor assistance is 
withdrawn. 
259 
Working Group 5: Emergency Seed Schemes 
Timeliness and funding. Emergency schemes 
require complex logistics and large financial 
resources. Speedy mobilization of funds is 
essential. Even more important, emergency 
seed supply schemes need to improve their 
capacity to obtain and distribute seed. This 
can ideally be done through the establishment 
of seed security stocks in each country. 
National stocks could be linked to provide a 
regional buffer stock available for emergencies. 
Currently, funding constraints limit the 
feasibility of building up such stocks. 
However, a start could be made by planning 
in advance for the next emergency. This 
planning could encompass: 
• Development of a strategy for rapid 
seed multiplication once emergency 
needs are recognized. 
• Establishment of an information network 
(seed availability, variety catalog, list of 
producers, import/export regulations, 
quarantine regulations, etc) to be able to 
mobilize regional seed stocks from 
whatever sources might be available. 
Coordination. Poor coordination between 
different agencies is due to several factors— 
poorly designed relief schemes, lack of 
information on seed channels, poor targeting 
(oversupply/shortages) due to difficulties in 
estimating the number of affected households, 
poor monitoring of seed movement and 
adoption, diversion of seed for food use, and 
poor coordination between implementing 
agencies and/or between donors, NGOs, and 
the government. Two recommendations were 
made to improve coordination. 
• Establish a national emergency seed 
committee, with representatives from 
donors, government, and implementing 
partners. 
• Establish a national committee of NGOs 
and implementing agencies in countries 
where multiple agencies are involved 
in relief work. 
Seed quality. It is difficult to impose strict 
regulations since seed is generally imported 
under emergency situations, when availability 
is more critical than quality. This creates the 
danger of introducing exotic pests and diseases. 
This risk cannot be eliminated, but can be 
reduced if seed suppliers provide relief agencies 
with information—disease/pest susceptibility, 
grain quality, adaptation, phenology, seed 
rates, expected performance—for each 
variety they hold in stock. Relief agencies 
can then advise farmers accordingly. 
• Establish and disseminate national lists 
of varietal characteristic for seed that 
might be distributed under emergency 
schemes. 
Adaptation. Due to lack of time or unavai-
lability of appropriate seed, relief agencies 
are often forced to distribute seed of non-
adapted or completely inappropriate material, 
e.g., distributing hybrids because open-
pollinated varieties are not available. It was 
recommended that: 
• A l l seed relief operations should be 
planned with a clear "exit strategy" in 
mind. 
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• Regional information systems should 
be developed, e.g., a database on 
availability and characteristics of 
cultivars with specific adaptation. 
• Efforts should be made to improve future 
seed security by building up stocks of 
cultivars with specific adaptation. 
Sustainability. A number of facilities and mecha-
nisms (e.g., storage facilities, monitoring 
methods, distribution channels) are developed 
during relief schemes. Often, however, no 
policy exists on steps to be taken after relief 
agencies withdraw. As a result, local commu-
nities are generally unable to use these 
facilities to strengthen their capacity to 
respond to future emergencies, or to ensure 
that these mechanisms continue to function in 
normal years. It was recommended that relief 
schemes: 
• Use existing seed channels wherever 
possible, which wil l continue to function 
after the scheme ends. 
• Help to ensure that established seed 
traders and "leading" farmers, who act 
as seed banks in normal years, survive 
the emergency. 
• Establish a strategy for regular local 
seed production and marketing. 
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Working Group 6: Seed Information Systems 
There is a widespread lack of information on 
seed needs, availability, regulations, and markets. 
The group discussed four areas where this 
lack of information was felt to be particularly 
serious. 
Poor understanding of farmers' needs and 
practices. The flow of information between 
breeder and farmer is often poor, resulting in 
the development of non-adapted cultivars and 
consequently poor adoption. Various factors 
are involved. The farmers who participate in 
trials may not be representative of their 
communities (e.g., in terms of gender, 
landholding size, attitudes to risk). Lack of 
communication between men and women 
farmers, or between progressive farmers and 
the rest of the community, tends to limit 
adoption. Finally, lack of data on adoption 
limits breeders' ability to diagnose constraints 
and respond to farmers' preferences. Several 
recommendations were made. 
• Involve farmers more closely and at 
earlier stages of technology development. 
• Select fanners who represent various 
categories of end users, in order to 
obtain a selection more representative 
of the community. 
• Study existing seed supply systems and 
work with these systems. 
• Conduct surveys to determine seed 
needs and current practices. 
• Use extension staff and ongoing 
adaptive research programs to collect 
location- and context-specific informa-
tion on seed production and use. 
• Identify seed "experts" at community 
level, who wi l l interact with breeders to 
factor farmers' preferences into germ-
plasm screening. 
• Clearly identify farmers' needs and 
train extension officers (through field 
days and seed seminars) on how to help 
farmers address these needs. 
• Provide extension materials that farmers 
and extension staff can easily use. 
• Establish a system to monitor varietal 
performance and adoption; link this 
information into the technology deve-
lopment process. 
Lack of information on available varieties. 
Information does not flow efficiently 
between breeders and extension staff, and 
between companies (especially those in the 
public sector) and farmers. Farmers often 
lack information about the availability, 
price, and characteristics of modern varieties 
that have been developed but not widely 
disseminated. Information flow wi l l improve 
as private sector involvement grows, since 
private firms depend on effective marketing 
and quick response to farmers' needs in 
order to survive. However, since large-scale 
public sector involvement is likely to 
continue in the near future in many 
countries, the following recommendations 
were made. 
• Create a database on seed availability 
(varieties, quantities, prices, locations), 
and disseminate this information to 
farmers through extension staff 
• Use local radio stations and posters to 
inform farmers about market oppor-
tunities for both seed and grain. 
• Increase awareness and stimulate demand 
for modern varieties in various ways— 
field days, demonstrations, posters, and 
advertisements in national media 
(especially in local languages). 
• Produce inexpensive pamphlets for 
farmers on variety characteristics and 
management recommendations, to be 
distributed at sale points. 
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• Publish a comprehensive annual source 
book of the identity and characteristics 
of varieties available for sale. Summarize 
information from the source books into 
regular newsletters for extension staff. 
These can be produced by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and perhaps sponsored 
by seed companies. 
• IARCs should support national efforts 
on information dissemination by helping 
to compile information, supporting infor-
mation dissemination networks, and 
providing updates on new varieties. 
Lack of information on seed regulations. 
Farmers are generally unaware or unclear 
about seed regulations and their implications 
for community-level seed trade. This infor-
mation is restricted to regulatory bodies, the 
public seed sector, and large-scale private 
seed growers. Communication between policy 
makers and the seed sector (public and private) 
is poor. Several recommendations were made. 
• The government should focus on deve-
loping and implementing regulations on 
truthful labeling, rather than on strict 
seed quality requirements, which are 
often irrelevant at smallholder level. 
• Simplify quality control regulations 
into a small set of objective, unambi-
guously defined standards. 
• Make information on seed regulations 
and quality standards easily available 
to seed growers and farmers. Train 
farmers about their consumer rights. 
• Expand training programs for seed 
growers, farmers, and extension staff 
on standards, quality control, and seed 
crop management. 
Lack of information for seed entrepreneurs. In 
order for small-scale seed entrepreneurs 
(growers and processors) to develop, infor-
mation must be made available on market 
opportunities, market conditions, prices, etc. 
The following recommendations were made. 
• Governments should not control the 
market (either as the major purchaser 
or through excessive regulation), but 
focus on facilitating its functioning. 
• The Ministries of Agriculture should 
coordinate information flow between 
government agencies. 
• Use existing farm survey programs to 
collect information on seed markets; 
use variety demonstrations to assess 
market demand; and thus create a 
database on seed requirements and 
prices for each area within a country. 
• Produce a newsletter outlining varieties, 
prices, locations where seed is available, 
regulations, market conditions and 
opportunities. 
• Periodically during the planting season, 
governments should publish data 
(variety, quantity, price) of seed stocks 
at various locations. 
• Publish an annual listing of NGOs 
involved in seed distribution. 
Other areas where information is lacking. 
Information flows are poor in many other 
areas; for example, between countries (on perfor-
mance and availability of widely adapted 
varieties); between producers of different 
classes of seed (on demand and stocks of 
breeder, foundation, and certified seed). Lack 
of information on seed requirements and stocks 
can cause wide-spread—and unnecessary— 
problems, particularly during emergency situa-
tions. Restricted flow of information on training 
needs and opportunities leads to a shortage of 
skills (for example, most NGOs and farmers 
lack business skills) or to inappropriately 
chosen or poorly maintained equipment. 
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Regional Action Plans for Improving 
Seed Multiplication and Distribution 
Background 
On the final day of the meeting, partici-
pants formed three regional discussion 
groups to review the recommendations of 
the six Working Groups and identify priori-
ties for regional action. Each regional 
group was asked to prioritize the problem 
areas outlined during the previous sessions, 
and develop practical plans to resolve the 
three or four most important seed supply 
problems in the region. These plans were to 
identify specific activities and suggest a 
schedule for completion of each activity; 
identify institutions that could take primary 
responsibility for each activity; and esti-
mate funding requirements. The resulting 
plans were reviewed at the plenary session 
of the conference. 
The regional action plans outlined below 
are incomplete. Further discussions are required 
in order to work out the modalities of imple-
mentation and seek formal agreements with 
regional institutions and funding agencies. 
Responsibility for the further development 
and implementation of these action plans was 
assigned as follows; 
• Southern and Eastern Africa—the SADC 
Food Security Unit and SADC/ICRISAT 
• Western and Central Africa—IITA/GTZ 
Promotion of Seed Production and Mar-
keting Project 
• WANA—ICARDA and the WANA Seed 
Network. 
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Action Plan for Southern and Eastern Africa 
A number of NGOs, donor agencies, and 
others are active in seed sector development 
in the region. However, they have been 
unable to significantly improve seed availa-
bility. Private sector investment is limited to 
a few high-value crops. Government or 
parastatal monopolies and complex variety 
release and certification procedures contribute 
to the non-availability of seed of modern 
varieties of most food crops. Frequent droughts 
in large parts of the region, and disruption of 
agriculture due to civil strife in some areas, 
have put seed systems under great strain. 
This Working Group identified four 
priority areas that must be addressed. 
• Inappropriate seed laws and policies 
• Lack of sustainability of informal seed 
systems 
• Poor understanding of farmers' needs and 
priorities 
• Poor coordination of emergency seed 
supplies. 
The regional action plan is developed as a 
series of 10 objectives, focusing on these 
priority areas. 
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Action Plan for Western and Central Africa 
Despite the availability of a number of 
modern varieties and substantial investments 
by donors in seed production over the past 20 
years, formal seed supply systems in Western 
and Central Africa have largely failed. Seed 
is produced and distributed by government 
departments and NGOs. However, govern-
ment departments lack staff and expertise, 
while NGO programs are generally unsus-
tainable, being dependent on continuous donor 
subsidies. Many governments lack a clear 
seed policy, and information on varieties is 
lacking. 
The recently initiated IITA/GTZ Promotion 
of Seed Production and Marketing Project is 
expected to play a leading role in seed sector 
development in the region. However, strong 
support from national programs is essential, 
particularly because a basic reorientation of 
priorities may be necessary in some areas. 
The Working Group identified four key 
areas where interventions are needed. 
• Inappropriate seed policies and regulations 
• Lack of information on available modern 
varieties (characteristics and seed cost/ 
availability) 
• Inappropriate research priorities, and lack 
of emphasis on breeder seed production 
• Lack of seed production skills at farm 
level. 
The regional action plan thus contains 
four objectives. 
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Action Plan for West Asia and North Africa 
The WANA region differs from the other two 
regional groupings in several key features. 
Agroecology and climate are different from 
those in many other parts of Africa; strong 
national research programs exist in most 
countries; few NGOs operate (except in 
Ethiopia and Sudan); emergency situations 
are rare (except Ethiopia, Afghanistan); and a 
regional seed network is already in operation. 
There is wide variation among countries in 
skills and expertise. For example, Turkey has 
a strong, growing private sector, while Af-
ghanistan and Ethiopia have no private sector. 
This Working Group identified four pri-
orities for action. 
• Seed policy 
• Support for the informal seed sector 
• Support for national seed associations 
• Incentives for the private sector. 
Specific activities were defined relating to 
each of these priorities. Implementation of 
these activities wi l l generally require addi-
tional funding support. The existing regional 
seed network is expected to expand its role as 
a technical advisory body, and increase its in-
volvement in developing and influencing re-
gional seed policies. The network is also ex-
pected to expand its activities relating to the 
dissemination of seed information among 
member countries and institutions. 
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Estrategias alternatives para o fornecimento de sementes ao pequeno agricultor: actas duma 
conferencia international sobre opcoes para o reforco dos sistemas nacionais e regionais de sementes 
em Africa e Asia Ocidental. A falta de sementes e o maior constrangimento para o pequeno agricultor em 
muitas partes do mundo em desenvolvimento. Esta publicacao reporta uma conferencia de 5 dias, que 
procurou definir os problemas de oferta de sementes em Africa e Asia Ocidental; discutir os papeis 
correntes e potencias dos sectores publico e privado, ONGs, institutos internacionais de investigacao, 
cooperativas, e grupos de agricultores; e analisar o funcionamento de varios canais de fornecimento de 
semente, incluindo as trocas de agricultor para agricultor. 
A conferencia foi organizada pelo ICRISAT, ICARDA, I ITA e GTZ, e atendido por mais de 70 
participantes de 18 paises (Algeria, Costa do Marfim, Egipto, Etiopia, Gana, Quenia, Malawi, Marrocos, 
Namibia, Paquistao, Serra Leoa, Sudao, Siria, Tanzania, Turquia, Yemen, Zambia, e Zimbabwe), 4 
centros CGIAR, e um numero de doadores, ONGs, agendas nacionais e internacionais, e institutos de 
investiga9ao avancada. 
O objectivo principal da conferencia foi desenvolver estrategias para reforcar tanto os canais de 
distribui9ao de sementes formais como os informais, particularmente para as culturas de seguranca 
alimentar onde o interesse do sector privado e limitado. Cerca de metade da conferencia foi devotada 
para a identificar e priorizar politicas e constrangimentos institucionais, e com base nestas discussoes, 
desenvolver pianos de accao para melhorar a disponibilidade de semente em cada uma das tres regioes— 
Africa Austral e Oriental, Africa Ocidental e Central, e Asia Ocidental e Africa do Norte. Estas actas 
contem os artigos apresentados na conferencia, e as recomendacoes e pianos de accao desenvolvidos 
atraves das discussoes. 
Sumario 
About ICRISAT 
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